

Kumāriḷa’s Buddhist

John Taber

Published online: 27 August 2010
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract The *pūrvapakṣa* of the Śūnyavāda chapter of Kumāriḷa’s Ślokavārttika (vv. 10–63) is the longest continuous statement of a Buddhist position in that work. Philosophically, this section is of considerable interest in that the arguments developed for the thesis that the form (*ākāra*) in cognition belongs to the cognition, not to an external object, are cleverly constructed. Historically, it is of interest in that it represents a stage of thinking about the two-fold nature of cognition and the provenance of the *ākāra* that is clearly more advanced than Dignāga but not quite as sophisticated as Dharmakīrti. In particular, although one may see an anticipation of Dharmakīrti’s famous *sahopalambhaniyama* argument in this text, it is not yet fully spelled out.

Keywords Kumāriḷa · Dharmakīrti · Self-awareness · *Sahopalambhaniyama*

The wind was flapping a temple flag. Two monks were arguing about it. One said the flag was moving; the other said the wind was moving. Arguing back and forth, they could come to no agreement. Hui-Neng, the Sixth Patriarch, said, “Gentlemen! It’s not the flag that moves or the wind that moves. It’s your mind that moves.” (Zen story)

Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa, always concerned to show the relevance of philosophical questions to the study of Dharma—for we should not waste our time indulging in speculation about abstract matters for their own sake—clearly articulates at the beginning of the *Nirālambanavāda* chapter of his *Ślokavārttika* what’s at stake in the debate about the existence of external objects. If cognitions were devoid of objects (*arthaśūnyāsu buddhiṣu*, *Nirālamhana* 3d), he says there, then virtually all of the categories that comprise the foundation of ritual science would be invalid: that which is a means of knowledge and that which isn’t, merit and demerit and their

J. Taber (✉)
Department of Philosophy, MSC 03 2140, 1 University of New Mexico,
Albuquerque, NM 87131-0001, USA
e-mail: jataber@unm.edu

fruits, injunction, *arthavāda*, *mantra*, and *nāmadheya*, the distinction of *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta*, the connection of the sacrificer with a desired end as the result of karma, and so forth (*Nirā lambana* 1–3). “Therefore, those who are concerned with Dharma should first exert themselves in regard to the existence or non-existence of the object by means of the commonly accepted *pramāṇas* with respect to [i.e., for the sake of carrying out] action” (*Nirā lambana* 4).¹

Now, there are two principal ways, Kumārila goes on to explain, in which those who have denied that cognitions have external objects² have attempted to deny it: one “due to an examination of the object” (*arthasya parīkṣaṇāt*) and another “based on an examination of the *pramāṇa*” (*pramāṇam āśritaḥ*), that is to say, of the cognition which allegedly establishes the existence of the object (*Nirā lambana* 17). By the first kind of denial Kumārila probably intended the sorts of arguments found in such texts as Vasubandhu’s *Viṃśikā*³ and Dignāga’s *Ālambanaparīkṣā* that might be taken to question the very possibility of objects by pointing out absurdities that follow from the various ways one conceives of them, whether as collections of atoms, as wholes, etc.⁴ The Mīmāṃsaka, Kumārila says, is not concerned with this kind of approach to proving that cognitions are devoid of objects, but rather with the approach having to do with the *pramāṇa*, that is to say, the analysis of cognition itself; for, he says, it is “[more] basic” (*mūlatvāt*) (18ab). As Kumārila’s commentator Pārthasārathimīśra explains, cognition itself seems to present us *prima facie* with objects. Any refutation of objects based on their alleged impossibility would immediately run up against the evidence of common experience!⁵

Yet there are also two ways in which one might refute the existence of external objects based on an analysis of cognition itself: one, which constructs an inference allegedly yielding as its conclusion that cognition is by nature devoid of any object, and another, which “examines the capacity of [perception]” (*tacchaktyavekṣaṇa*) (*Nirā lambana* 18cd–19ab). I shall explain this idea presently. The first way is the concern of the passage in the *Śābarabhāṣya* that begins, *nanu sarva eva nirā lambanaḥ svapnavat pratyayaḥ?*,⁶ to which the *Nirā lambanavāda* chapter of Kumārila’s *ŚV* corresponds. The second is the concern of the passage in the *Śābarabhāṣya* that begins, *sūnyas tu [pratyayaḥ]. katham? arthajñānayoḥ ākārabhedam*

¹ *tasmād dharmārthibhiḥ pūrvam pramāṇair lokasammataiḥ | arthasya sadasadbhāve yatnaḥ kāryaḥ kriyāṃ prati* || Citations from the *Slokavārttika* are based on a comparison of the editions B, T, and M (ŚV(B), ŚV(T), ŚV(M)). When no variants are noted, all three editions agree.

² Most of the time Kumārila uses the expression *artha*, ‘object’. But he also employs *bāhyārtha*, ‘external object’ (e.g., *Nirā lambana* 15a) and *bāhyavastu*, ‘external thing’ (e.g., *Nirā lambana* 13d).

³ As demonstrated by Kano (2008, p. 345), the title *Viṃśikā* is better attested for this work than *Viṃśatikā*.

⁴ Strictly speaking, in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* and perhaps the *Viṃśikā* as well, the absurdities have to do with conceiving physical objects as the *ālambana* of our cognitions.

⁵ NR 158,17–19. Umbeka and Sucarita explain *mūlatvāt* in *Nirā lambana* 18a differently in their commentaries *ad loc.* If the object cannot be established by *pramāṇas*, why be concerned with whether it is possible or not? Thus, the investigation of the *pramāṇa* is basic.

⁶ ŚBh 26,22.

nopalabhāmahe,⁷ to which the *Śūnyavāda* corresponds. According to Kumāriḷa's analysis in his *Nirāḷambanavāda* the inference (*anumāna*) elliptically expressed in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the first part of Śabara's discussion is as follows:

The cognition of a post, etc., is false because it is a cognition (*pratyayatvāt*); for whatever is a cognition is seen to be false, like the cognition of a dream. (*Nirāḷambana* 23)⁸

It is unknown which Buddhists developed and defended this argument, which is attacked by other Brahmanical philosophers. Versions of it are mentioned by Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka, but not presented extensively by them. It was also subscribed to in different forms by later logicians, e.g., Jñānaśrīmitra and Prajñākaragupta, but is not to be found in either Dignāga or Dharmakīrti.⁹ It bears some resemblance to the first verse of the *Vimśikā*, but it is by no means identical with it; and, as Hanneder has shown, it seems quite possible that the first verse of the *Vimśikā* was actually fashioned, perhaps by Vasubandhu but also possibly by later redactors, in producing an un-commented (i.e., verse-only) version of the treatise, from a sentence that was originally part of the prose introduction to the work.¹⁰ That is to say, the first verse may represent nothing more than an attempt to put together some semblance of an argument for the *vijñaptimātratā* thesis so that the text does not begin abruptly with an objection.

Be all that as it may, Kumāriḷa felt the need in his *Nirāḷambanavāda* to refute this inference at great length, following Śabara's rather loose treatment. Much of his critique stresses that it is actually *self*-refuting. If the conclusion of the inference were true, then the various factors of the inference—*pakṣa*, *hetu*, *sādhya*, and *drṣṭānta*—would not really exist,¹¹ so that there really wouldn't be an inference. In the course of his discussion, however, he also says that some hold that the inference fails because its thesis is directly refuted by perception: *pratiññādoṣam evāhuḷ kecī pratyakṣabādhanam* (*Nirāḷambana* 30ab). Perception, indeed for that matter all *pramāṇas*, seem to indicate to us, of themselves, the presence of external objects! Whatever inference one might concoct to invalidate the deliverances of the *pramāṇas* will *ipso facto* be directly contradicted by them. As Kumāriḷa puts it, anticipating the argument he will develop in the *Śūnyavāda*, which comes after the *Nirāḷambanavāda*,

[When it is to be shown in the *Śūnyavāda* that the object of cognition cannot be just a portion of the cognition itself,] an external object of perception and so forth remains [as the only alternative].¹² There would [thus] be a refutation by

⁷ ŚBh 28,14.

⁸ *stambhādīpratyayo mithyā pratyayatvāt tathā hi yaḥ | pratyayaḥ sa mṛṣā drṣṭaḥ svapnādīpratyayo yathā ||*

⁹ Hisayasu Kobayashi, "On the Development of the Argument to Prove *vijñaptimātratā*," paper delivered at the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna, August 23–27, 2005.

¹⁰ Hanneder (2007). The same possibility is also entertained in Harada (2003) (in Japanese).

¹¹ Cf. *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* 74–81.

¹² The idea here is that if an aspect of the cognition itself is excluded as its *grāhya*, then the only remaining possibility is that the *grāhya* is an external object.

means of those [normally recognized *pramāṇas* perception and so forth] of the view of the one who denies that [external object]. (*Nirāḷambana* 32)

For the denial of an object grasped by a defective cognition [that is, a cognition shown to be incorrect by a subsequent cognition] is valid. But if there is the negation of that which is grasped [by any cognition] in general, then even one's own thesis is not established. (*Nirāḷambana* 34)

*pratyakṣādeś ca viśayo bāhya evāvaśiṣyate*¹³ |

tanniṣedhakṛtas tasya tair bhavet pakṣabādhanam || (32)

*duṣṭajñānagrhītārthapraṭiśedho*¹⁴ *hi yujyate* |

grhītamātrabādhe tu svapakṣo 'pi na sidhyati || (34)

This, moreover, would be a decisive refutation; for the inference has already been weakened by the criticism that it is self-refuting.

But is it really legitimate to appeal to perception in this way, as a means of knowledge that directly reveals an *external* object to us? Here, it seems, we must investigate whether that which is presented in perception—the *grāhya*—is really something distinct from the cognition that is the perception itself, or, as Kumāriḷa puts it at the beginning of the *Śūnyavāda*, whether perception manages to go beyond itself and apprehend an exterior object or is “exhausted” (*kṣīṇa*) apprehending a *grāhya* that is merely part of itself (*Śūnyavāda* 3). Thus, this can be said to be a question about the “capacity” of perception. At first glance it does not seem that the *grāhya* is distinct from the cognition, or at least so maintains Śabara's (Buddhist) *pūrvapakṣin*: *pratyakṣā ca no buddhiḥ. atas tadbhinnam artharūpam nāma na kiṃcid astīti paśyāmaḥ*.¹⁵ The cognition alone is evident to us. There is no form of the object that we apprehend separately from that. So it would seem that the form that we apprehend belongs just to the cognition. How can we separate the object from the cognition?

In this article I shall examine—to some extent reconstruct—and try to understand the Buddhist point of view as developed further in Kumāriḷa's discussion, i.e., the *pūrvapakṣa* of his *Śūnyavāda*, which extends from vv. 10 to 63. (In fact, I shall concentrate just on the first part of this passage, vv. 10–34.) My main concern shall be with the philosophical content of the passage: what exactly are the arguments being developed? I am also, however, tangentially interested in ascertaining what stage of development in Buddhist thinking about this problem the *pūrvapakṣa* of the *Śūnyavāda* represents. Some time ago I rather baldly asserted that the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument is presented in this passage without taking the trouble to demonstrate it.¹⁶ I would like on this occasion to look at the passage again more carefully and try to determine if the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument is really there, or at least some approximation or anticipation of it. This is hard to do, however, because it requires that we really understand the philosophical ideas being

¹³ ŚV(M): *avaśiṣyate*. ŚV(B) and ŚV(T): *avatiṣṭhate*.

¹⁴ ŚV(B) and ŚV(T): *duṣṭajñānagrhītārthapraṭiśedho*. ŚV(M): *apramāṇagrhīte 'rthe praṭiśedho*.

¹⁵ ŚBh 28,15–16.

¹⁶ Taber (1986–1992).

presented. To say that two texts contain the same argument obviously involves more than examining the terminology used; it involves comparing the ideas being expressed. And the ideas in this case, the actual arguments, are rather slippery.

Let us take advantage of the helpful framework Kumārila uses to set up the problem. It is “established for all living beings,” he says, that something having the form or aspect (*ākāra*) of blue, yellow, and so forth is indeed apprehended; but cognition and object are not themselves ascertained as having different forms, nor is it evident whether the form that is apprehended is a property of the cognition or of the object (vv. 5–6). Therefore, the matter must be investigated. If it turns out that the form belongs to an object to be known distinct from the cognition, then perception and the other *pramāṇas* serve as direct evidence for the existence of external objects and contradict any proof of their nonexistence. If, on the other hand, it belongs to the cognition and not to any object distinct from it, then that by itself could be taken as a demonstration that there are no external objects (vv. 8–9).

The first part of the Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa*, on which I shall focus and which extends from vv. 10 through 34, presents what I identify as three more or less distinct arguments in favor of the second alternative: the form that is apprehended belongs only to the cognition.

The first argument, presented vv. 10–20, is, in essence, that it is more economical to assume that the form belongs to the cognition. Once again, it has been stated that (in conscious experience) something possessed of form (*ākāravat vastu*) is grasped (10cd). If it were an external object (*artho bāhya*), then, just because it is *grasped* (*grāhyatva*), one would have to admit the existence of some factor that grasps it (*grāhaka*) (11). Thus, the realist—as we shall call the defender of the existence of external objects—will actually have to posit two things: an (external) object that possesses the form and a separate *grāhaka* (12), which presumably would be a cognition; and that is certainly more than positing just one thing. Now, the realist might attempt to attribute both functions to the object. In that case, however, his position would differ only terminologically from that of the Buddhist that cognition and object are identical (13cd–14ab).

The advantage of the Buddhist position is that it is allegedly able to explain all aspects of our experience by positing just one thing: the cognition. Although by nature translucent (*svaccha*), the cognition is nevertheless able to appear diverse, taking on different forms and apparently dividing into two parts, subject and object, due to the influence of impressions contained in it (15–17ab).¹⁷ The cognition, in other words, has within itself all the resources needed to appear as a subject apprehending a succession of different objects! And the mutual causation of cognition and its *śaktis* (i.e., *vāsanās*) is beginningless (17cd), so there is no problem about how the *vāsanās* arose in the first place. In short, “the postulation of just one thing is better than the postulation of many” (18ab). Finally, if you postulated an object possessed of form you would still need to posit a cognition that takes on that same form in apprehending it. Unless the cognition has the form of the object,

¹⁷ In explaining *Śūnyavāda* 15–17ab all three classical commentators, Umbeka, Sucaritaśīra, and Pārthasārathimiśra, cite PV 3.354 (= PVin 1.44): *avibhāgo hi buddhyātmā viparyāsitarāsanaiḥ | grāhyagrāhakaśaṃvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate ||*.

unless it had some specific content itself, it couldn't know the object (19–20a).¹⁸ So better to just leave it with that—a cognition itself possessed of some form.

The second argument, which I take to begin with v. 21, is more difficult to decipher and reconstruct. The *pūrvapakṣin* begins by introducing the highly questionable assumption that for something to illumine or manifest something it has to be apprehended itself.

For this [reason], also, the cognition is possessed of the form [and not the object]: because according to you [the Mīmāṃsaka] it is a revealing factor (*prakāśaka*); it is considered a means for [the revealing of] an external object devoid of self-illumination. (*Śūnyavāda* 21)

And the object which is to be illumined is not ascertained when the appearance of the cognition is not apprehended, because its illumination is dependent on that, like a pot when there is the light of a lamp. (*Śūnyavāda* 22)¹⁹

itaś cākāravaj jñānaṃ yasmāt tad vaḥ²⁰ prakāśakam |
svayamprakāśahīnasya bāhyasyopāyasaṃmatam²¹ || (21)
na cāgrhīte jñānākhye prakāśyo²² 'rtho 'vadhāryate |
tadadhīnaprakāśatvād dīpābhāse yathā ghaṭaḥ || (22)

I say this is a questionable assumption because it just doesn't seem true that one has to see the source of illumination in order to see objects illumined by it. All the time we look at objects illumined by the sun and other luminous bodies without also apprehending those sources of illumination. In the case of the moon, most of the time it isn't even possible to apprehend the sun which is illumining it, for it is blocked by the earth. And of course, while the Mīmāṃsaka may agree that a cognition *reveals* its object, he would never agree that it reveals itself at the same time. That is the crucial point where the (Bhāṭṭa) Mīmāṃsaka and the Buddhist (and

¹⁸ *Śūnyavāda* 19–20a: *tasmād ubhayaśiddhatvāj jñānasyākārakalpanā | jyāyasī bhavatas tv arthaṃ kalpayitvā bhaved iyam || tadasiddhāv aśaktatvāt*. Umbeka cites PV 3.302, *tatrānubhavamātreṇa jñānasya sadṛśātmanah | bhāvyaṃ tenātmanā yena pratikarma vibhajyate ||*, in his commentary on 20a, *tadasiddhāv aśaktatvāt*. In explaining the continuation of the passage, *tenaivaṃ viprakṛṣṭatā | pratyāsaṅgaṃ ca sambaddhaṃ grāhyaṃ mama bhaviṣyati || (Śūnyavāda* 20bcd), he cites PVin 1.38 (which has a parallel in PV 3.327): *nānyo 'nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo 'paraḥ | grāhyagrāhakaivaidhūryāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate ||*, as well as PV 3.435: *ekadeśena sārūpye sarvaḥ syāt sarvavedakah | sarvātmanā tu sārūpye jñānam ajñānatām vrajet ||* (according to PVBh(k) and PV(Tib.)). (For a discussion of the PV witnesses for this verse see Kellner (2009–2010, p. 180 (n. 54 and 200.)) Pārthasārathi's commentary on *Śūnyavāda* 20 is almost word-for-word identical with Umbeka's. Sucarita, meanwhile, cites PV 3.352 (= PVin 1.43) along with PVin 1.38 and 3.435 in his commentary on *Śūnyavāda* 20. Obviously, all three commentators see this passage of the *Śūnyavāda* as presenting ideas that are also developed by Dharmakīrti, if not Dharmakīrti's ideas themselves.

¹⁹ Note that Umbeka and, following him *verbatim*, Pārthasārathi, cite PVin 1.54cd, *apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati*, by way of explaining this verse.

²⁰ ŚV(M): *tad vaḥ*. ŚV(B) and ŚV(T): *tadvat*.

²¹ ŚV(M) and ŚV(T): *bāhyasyopāyasaṃmatam*. ŚV(B): *bāhyasyopāsaṅgaṃ matam*.

²² ŚV(B) and ŚV(T): *jñānākhye prakāśyo*. ŚV(M): *jñānākhyaparakāśe*.

others, most notably the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka) part ways.²³ Nevertheless, the *pūrvapakṣin* proceeds to offer an a priori argument for the self-luminosity of cognitions. Namely, we fail to be aware of something only because either a source of illumination is lacking or there is something obstructing it. When a cognition arises, however, neither is the case: nothing obstructs it, and it itself is a source of illumination. Thus, there must be awareness of it; it must illumine itself (23–24). This argument may contain an answer to the above objection. The objection presupposed that there is some observer of objects *besides* the source of illumination who could be turned away from it or blocked from seeing it. But on the Buddhist account, the cognition itself is the agent of cognition, no other “knower” is posited. Just as the cognition both illumines and cognizes other objects nothing can prevent it from at the same time illumining and cognizing itself. And so, necessarily, it reveals itself in revealing other things.²⁴

How does it follow from the premise of the self-luminosity of cognition that the form (*ākāra*) apprehended in experience belongs to the cognition? The idea seems to be—at least this is how Sucaritamīśra explains it, in part drawing on a fuller statement of the argument in vv. 31–32—that if a cognition necessarily apprehends itself, then it *must* apprehend itself *as having some form*.²⁵ I take him here to be appealing tacitly to a general principle: nothing can be perceived without its being perceived as having some determinate nature; we don't perceive formless things. Moreover, there is no perception of different forms when one experiences something, one possessed by the cognition and another possessed by the object. Thus, the *one form* that is apprehended could only belong to the cognition.²⁶ The cognition and its form would even have to be apprehended before the object;²⁷ for it is a general Mīmāṃsā rule that something must exist before it can exercise its

²³ At the beginning of his *siddhānta* Kumāriḷa simply declares that “there is no example (*dr̥ṣṭānta*)” of a single thing that is both *grāhya* and *grāhaka* (*Śūnyavāda* 64). Even sources of illumination such as a fire do not illumine themselves, “for they do not require illumination” (*prakāśasyānapekṣaṇāt*; 65d). The bulk of his *siddhānta*, however, is devoted to showing why this *cannot* be the case: the distinctions of *grāhya* and *grāhaka* cannot pertain to something that is truly one; a cognition exhausts its function cognizing its object and so cannot also cognize itself, etc.

²⁴ The sense of the lamp analogy in v. 22, then, becomes: just as a lamp must illumine itself when it illumines an object—for there is nothing to block the lamp's illumination—so a cognition must illumine itself when it illumines an object. Thanks to Alex Watson for forcing me to reflect on this more deeply. For Kumāriḷa's refutation of the idea that a cognition must reveal itself because there is no obstruction, see *Śūnyavāda* 183–184. Dharmakīrti offers an explanation of why a cognition must illumine itself in the prose to PVin 1.54cd. His argument there is rather obscure and actually seems to be a *non sequitur*. Cf. Kellner (forthcoming).

²⁵ Kāś. 102,6-8: *tad yadi jñānam arthasya prakāśakam etad api nāgr̥hītaṃ tat prakāśayet. ato 'vaśyaṃ grahītavyam. na ca tad anākāraṃ grahītuṃ śakyam. . . .* Thanks to A. Watson again for pointing out to me that Sucarita, in his comment on v. 22, could well be anticipating the argument of vv. 31–32.

²⁶ Kāś. 102,8-9: *na cārthajñānayoṛ ākārabhedopalambhaḥ. ato 'vaśyābhyupagantavyaṃ grahaṇasya jñānasyaivāyāṃ ākāraḥ. . . .*

²⁷ *Śūnyavāda* 25: *prāk cārthagrahaṇād iṣṭā tasyotpattis tadaiva ca | samvedanaṃ bhaved asya na cet kālāntare 'pi na ||. ŚV(B) and ŚV(T) in 25b: tadaiva. ŚV(M): sadaiva. ŚV(B) and ŚV(T) in 25c: bhaved asya. ŚV(M): bhavet tasya.*

function.²⁸ A cognition, then—relying on principles acknowledged by the Mīmāṃsaka himself—must arise before it can reveal an object. In that case, it must reveal itself, form and all, even before the object is cognized, which also suggests that the form that is apprehended when the object is cognized belongs just to the cognition, not the object (25–26).

This argument is more fully developed in verses 31–32. First, cognitions arise which apprehend themselves. Then they function to reveal objects, but, as was established earlier, they can do so only insofar as they have some content, namely, the form the objects are supposed to have. This point is now reinforced by a new argument, vv. 28–30, which I discuss below, which claims that we know we must experience cognitions as possessed of form because that is how we report them, e.g., in talking about our memories. In any case, whenever we cognize objects (naturally, as having some form), we experience our cognitions themselves as having form. But then, it would seem apt to assign the form that is experienced just *to the cognition*, not to the object at all; for, crucially, there is no perception of one form belonging to the cognition and another belonging to the object. No distinction of forms is observed in experience (as was already stated by Śabara's *pūrvapakṣin*: *tadabhinānam artharūpaṃ nāma na kiṃcid astīti paśyāmaḥ*); as Kumārila noted in originally setting up the problem (vv. 5–6), we are aware of only *one* thing that has form. Nor can one hope to avoid this conclusion by maintaining that a cognition, when it arises, reveals itself as *devoid* of any form and then one experiences, by means of that cognition, an object possessed of form, so that the object would have to be the bearer of the form and not the cognition. That would simply not be borne out by experience, either. For we do not notice any difference between an object possessed of form and a cognition devoid of it when we experience an object, any more than two distinct forms—one belonging to the cognition, another belonging to the object.

Therefore, there is perception [of an object] when cognitions have been previously apprehended. Moreover, there is no perception [of an object] when cognitions are without form. (*Śūnyavāda* 31)

And because something possessed of form is seen and there is no cognition of a distinction [of a form of the cognition on the one hand and a form of the object on the other], it follows that there is an awareness of the cognition as having the form. (*Śūnyavāda* 32)

For the following postulate cannot [be stated]: that first a formless cognition is apprehended, after that an object possessed of form is cognized. (*Śūnyavāda* 33)

For a difference of possession of form [in the sense that the object has form while the cognition does not] would be able to be stated when[ever] one cognizes [an object]. It is established that prior to apprehending the cognition [as possessed of form] there is no awareness of the object. (*Śūnyavāda* 34)

tasmāt pūrvagr̥hītāsu buddhiṣv arthopalambhanam |
na copalabdhir astīha nirākārāsu buddhiṣu || (31)

²⁸ See *Ślokovārttika, Pratyakṣasūtra* 54ab and discussion in Taber (2005, p. 67).

vivekabuddhyabhāvāc ca sākārasya ca darśanāt |
ākāravattayā²⁹ bodho jñānasyaiva prasajyate || (32)

na hy evaṃ kalpanā śakyā nirākārādito matih |
gṛhyate 'rthas tataḥ paścāt sākāraḥ sampratīyate || (33)

ākāravattvabhedo hi³⁰ jñātvā śakyeta bhāṣitum |
prāg buddhigrahaṇād arthe saṃvittir neti sādhitam || (34)

Finally, the third argument, which I see in vv. 28–30, supports (and occurs within) the second, reinforcing the idea that cognitions indeed apprehend themselves, but it can also be seen as standing on its own. It appears to pick up on what Dignāga says at PS 1.11:

viśayañānatajjñānaviśeṣāt tu dvirūpatā |
smṛter uttarakālaṃ ca na hy asāv avibhāvite ||

Here, Dignāga is not strictly attempting to prove that the form, the *ākāra* one experiences, belongs to the cognition; rather, he is attempting to establish that a cognition has indeed the two forms (*rūpa*) that he has mentioned in the previous v. 10, the *grāhaka* and the *ākāra*, which in his tradition came to be called the *grāhākāra* or “subject form” and the *grāhyākāra* or “object form.” But this may amount to roughly the same thing if one interprets it to mean that a single cognition has two aspects and that in the act of perception one aspect could just be apprehending the other aspect, not any *external* object. Dignāga cites as evidence for this view, first, the fact that a cognition of an object and a cognition of that cognition are different in content (*viśayañānatajjñānaviśeṣāt*)—here the argument is too complicated to go into—and, second, the experience of memory (*smṛter uttarakālaṃ ca*). When we remember an object we have previously experienced, *we remember that we have experienced it*; the cognition that revealed the object is part of the memory. Dignāga then suggests that this means that a cognition is aware of itself, “for there is not that [memory] in regard to what has not been [previously] known” (11d: *na hy asāv avibhāvite*).³¹ (He will go on to argue, in v. 12, that it could not have been known by another cognition.) Thus, the experience of an object always includes an experience of the cognition.

Kumārila's *pūrvapakṣin* refers to memory also as evidence that the form one experiences belongs to the cognition, not the object, but he seems to see more in it than Dignāga does. Memory reveals not just that the cognition is cognized along with the object, but that the cognition is decisive in determining the character of the experience. Our reporting of memories suggests that the nature of the object we experience depends on the nature of the cognition.

²⁹ ŚV(B) and ŚV(M): *ākāravattayā*. ŚV(T): *sākāravattayā*.

³⁰ ŚV(B) and ŚV(M): *ākāravattvabhedo hi*. ŚV(T): *ākāravattvabhedo 'tra*.

³¹ PSVṛtti preceding PS 1.11d reads: *tasmād asti dvirūpatā jñānasya svasaṃvedyatā ca. kim kāraṇam?...*

Moreover, even the reflection [i.e., memory] later of the nature of the object as subsequent to the cognition (*jñānaprṣṭhena*) is observed, [and there is also observed a reflection of the nature of the object] even in the absence of the object [i.e., in regard to a past or future object].³² How could that be possible if the cognition did not arise depicting an object of that nature, and if at a previous time the object were not perceived as dependent on that [cognition] (*tatpūrvam*)? (*Śūnyavāda* 28–29)³³

jñānaprṣṭhena yo 'py ūrdhvam arthābhāve 'pi drśyate |
*parāmarśo 'rtharūpasya sa katham copapadyate*³⁴ || (28)
tadrūpam artham ālikhya yadi dhīr nopajāyate |
bhūtakāle ca yady arthas tatpūrvam nopalakṣitaḥ || (29)

Kumārila's commentator Sucarita gives as an example of a memory report, "Such and such a king is known by me to have passed" (*jñāto mayātikrānto 'muko rājā*).³⁵ The object of experience, the king, is remembered as having a certain property, having passed, by virtue of a cognition of it as having that property. The nature of the object is dependent on that of the cognition. This is even how we report current experiences:

Moreover, people are observed as saying with respect to current cognitions of objects, "This is a blue object because a cognition of that nature has arisen for me." (*Śūnyavāda* 30)

vaktāraś ca drśyante vartamānārtbabuddhiṣu |
nīlo 'rtho 'yaṃ yato me 'tra tadrūpā jāyate matiḥ || (30)

We cite our cognitions as evidence for how objects are. The experience of the object is dependent on, derivative of, the experience of the cognition. Thus, it seems most appropriate to attribute the form that is experienced to the cognition.

Before considering the provenance of the three arguments I've outlined some reflection on their quality as arguments seems in order, which I offer here very briefly, quite independently of the refutations Kumārila will develop in the *śiddhānta* of the *Śūnyavāda*; for these arguments, especially the first and the last ones, extracted from their historical context, seem quite capable of standing on their own as philosophical arguments against the existence of an external world. I don't think they quite duplicate any arguments that have come down to us from the Western

³² This follows the explanation of *arthābhāve 'pi drśyate* (28b) of Umbeka and Pārthasārathi.

³³ Umbeka sees v. 28 as indicating two phenomena that require explanation: (1) a later reflection that represents the object as "subsequent to the cognition" and (2) a reflection directed toward an object which is not present, i.e., either existing in the past or the future. v. 29ab suggests that phenomenon (2) wouldn't be possible unless cognitions arose containing the forms of objects within themselves, while v. 29cd suggests that (1) wouldn't be possible unless the object were previously perceived as dependent on the cognition. Pārthasārathi, as usual, follows Umbeka. Sucarita, however, does not offer this intricate parsing.

³⁴ ŚV(M): *copapadyate*. ŚV(B) and ŚV(T): *vopapadyate*.

³⁵ Kāś. 104,3-4.

discussion of the problem of the external world, so they are potentially of interest to contemporary philosophers. To be sure, few philosophers would deny the existence of the external world today, but that has nothing to do with the fact that idealism has been decisively refuted in Western philosophy—it hasn't. Rather, it has to do with the fact that philosophers have simply moved on to other positions (while related positions such as anti-realism and skepticism continue to surface). Primarily, though, philosophers are interested in arguments and how they work, so that even an argument for an utterly implausible view merits attention if it is “interesting.”

As for the first argument, to the effect that it is simpler to hold that the form that appears in experience belongs to the cognition, not the object, since if it belonged to the latter one would still have to postulate a second element, a cognition, but not if it belonged to the former—this is really only minimally interesting, because it turns on the notion of simplicity, about which there is no consensus. The idealist may posit only the cognition, not both cognition and object, but he still must attribute to cognition enough complexity to produce the vast experienced world. Is that really simpler? The *pūrvapakṣin* tries to head this off by insisting that “a difference of mere powers [i.e., internal *vāsanās* capable of generating a rich array of experienced objects] is different from [i.e., not as bad as] a difference in things [i.e., between a cognition on the one hand and an object on the other],”³⁶ but he doesn't explain *why*.³⁷ The second argument, that cognitions must cognize themselves prior to cognizing their objects as possessed of a certain form, hence the form that presents itself in experience should be assigned to the cognition, not to some other object—this runs up against objections, some of them already aired, against the self-luminosity of cognition. Why, to begin with, should a source of illumination *have* to reveal itself along with the other things it illumines?³⁸ The classic Brahmanical objection, of course, which was also subscribed to by the Vaibhāṣikas (and which is developed in a sophisticated way by Kumārila in his *siddhānta*) is that the same thing cannot function as both agent and object in the same act. Even if one considered reflexivity—self-consciousness—of some kind a necessary component of consciousness, as many philosophers, both Indian and Western, have (see, e.g., Fichte and Sartre), it needn't be attributed to the *cognition*. Other philosophers have thought it more plausible to attribute it to the subject of consciousness, the self. (This was one of Śāṅkara's principal objections to the Buddhist view of consciousness: even self-luminous cognitions would not count as *conscious* if they were not experienced by a self, any more than a bunch of lamps hidden in a cave.)³⁹

³⁶ *śaktimātrasya bhedaś ca vastubhedād viśiṣyate, Śūnyavāda* 18cd.

³⁷ Umbeka suggests that both the Buddhist and the *arthavādin* accept that cognition is endowed with capacities, i.e., impressions (*saṃskāras, vāsanās*), while the *arthavādin* posits in addition an external object. This, however, overlooks all the theoretical apparatus that attends the notion of *vāsanā* in Yogācāra, which Kumārila exposes at length in the *Ātmavāda* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika*.

³⁸ In fairness to the *pūrvapakṣin*, however, he may not be arguing that cognitions have to reveal themselves so much as that they in fact do—as a lamp does, and as we seem to acknowledge in reporting our (memory) experiences. If that is indeed the case, then it becomes a crucial question whether, as the *pūrvapakṣin* also maintains, we are in fact aware in an experience of only one thing that has form.

³⁹ BSBh 554,1–555,1. Note that Kumārila himself considers the *ātman* an exception to the rule that something cannot be both *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, *Śūnyavāda* 67–70.

Moreover, the notion that cognitions arise by themselves prior to cognizing their objects seems gratuitous and dogmatic as well and presents the spectacle of a kind of double event. First the cognition, aware of itself and its specific form, arises, then it ‘apprehends’ an object, which apprehension has exactly the same structure as the initial self-apprehension of the cognition—for the form that is evident when the object is apprehended supposedly belongs to the cognition!

More intriguing is the last argument. Do memory and our reports of our experiences really reveal that it is the cognition that defines the content of the experience? If they did, then it would seem that there would be nothing to debate; everyone would agree that experience itself teaches us that the form we experience belongs to the cognition. Moreover, we have learned many times over not to let our ways of talking mislead us about the nature of reality. But perhaps this is where a deeper phenomenological investigation is called for.⁴⁰

I now turn, finally, to the thorny question: whose arguments are these? Which Buddhist or Buddhists are being allowed to air their views in the *pūrvapakṣa* of Kumārila’s *Śūnyavāda*? I’ve already suggested that the ideas go beyond Dignāga’s very brief treatment of the dual (subject—object) nature of cognition at PS 1.11–12. For one thing, as we have seen, Kumārila’s Buddhist interprets the evidence provided by memory differently from Dignāga. Another, perhaps more significant, difference lies in the fact that Dignāga does not stress the principle of the self-luminosity of cognition as a condition of perception. Although he recognizes that every cognition in fact cognizes itself, he does not clarify that a cognition cannot reveal an object *unless* it also reveals itself. As we have seen, this idea is central to one of the arguments of this passage. It *is*, however, clearly enunciated by Dharmakīrti, for instance, at PVin 1.54cd:

apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadrṣṭiḥ prasidhyate ||

The experiencing of an object is not established for someone for whom the perceiving [of that experiencing] is not [also] evident.⁴¹

Compare *Śūnyavāda* 22 and 34cd, translated above. Could Kumārila’s *pūrvapakṣin*, then, be a stand-in for Dharmakīrti?

Obviously, I cannot give a definitive answer to this question in this short paper. I can only try to pique the reader’s interest. To do that, I ask the reader to consider a passage from the *Pratyakṣa* chapter of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika*, namely vv. 333–335. Does it develop some of the same ideas that are enunciated in the Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa* of Kumārila’s *Śūnyavāda*? I suggest we compare it, in particular, with the verses I discussed above as summarizing the second argument of the *pūrvapakṣa*, *Śūnyavāda* 31–34. Certainly, the language of these passages is not the same, but the thoughts they express do seem to have much in common.

The *Pramāṇavārttika* passage in question, on my interpretation, comes after Dharmakīrti has considered whether an external object must be the object of perceptual awareness and concluded that there is no reason to think so. Now, however,

⁴⁰ Any such investigation, I believe, should begin with a reconsideration of G. E. Moore’s classic paper, “The Refutation of Idealism,” in Moore 1922.

⁴¹ Alternatively, “The experiencing of an object is not established when the perceiving is not evident.”

he seems to be considering whether there are any reasons that compel us to believe that it *could* be, and this he appears to answer in the negative as well. The passage begins with a brief exchange with the (Sautrāntika) realist or externalist and an interlocutor, whom I shall refer to simply as an “internalist:”⁴²

[Realist:] If an external [object] were experienced, what would be the mistake?

[Internalist:] None at all! [But] for what reason would it be said that the external object is experienced? (*Pramāṇavārttika* 3.333)

If the cognition has the form of that [external object], [then] it [must be] characterized by a [certain] form. It should be investigated whether [the cognition, insofar as it possesses a specific form, comes] from an external [object] or from something else. (*Pramāṇavārttika* 3.334)

Because [something blue] is not apprehended without the additional qualification (*upādhi*) of consciousness, [and] because [blue] is apprehended when this [qualification of consciousness] is apprehended, consciousness [itself] has the appearance of blue. There is no external object by itself. (*Pramāṇavārttika* 3.335)

yadi bāhyo 'nubhūyeta ko doṣo naiva kaścana |

idam eva kim uktaṃ syāt sa bāhyo 'rtho 'nubhūyate || (333)

yadi buddhis tadākārā sāsty ākāraviśeṣiṇī⁴³ |

sā bāhyād anyato veti vicāram idam arhati || (334)

darśanopādhirahitasyāgrahāt tadgrahe grahāt |

darśanaṃ nīlanirbhāsaṃ nārtho bāhyo 'sti kevalaḥ⁴⁴ || (335)

The first thing, I think, that jumps out at us from this passage, when one considers it in light of the *Śūnyavāda*, is that essentially the same framework that Kumāriḷa employs to discuss the problem of the external object is introduced here. Namely, our experience presents us with something that is possessed of a certain form, an *ākāra*. Dharmakīrti already identifies it (3.334ab) as belonging to the cognition, but the question being posed seems very much the same: Does this form come from some external object or something else—meaning, I take it, some potency or potencies (i.e., *vāsanās*) contained within the cognition itself? This amounts to asking, Does the form that the cognition displays *originally* belong to the cognition or some external object? And this is precisely the question Kumāriḷa asks when setting up the debate between *pūrvapakṣin* and *siddhāntin* in the *Śūnyavāda*.

⁴² Following Birgit Kellner's practice. The translation of these verses was worked out collaboratively in a seminar I led at the University of Vienna in Wintersemester 2006. Birgit Kellner provided the lion's share of assistance (more realistically, we were assisting her), but important contributions were also made by Shinya Moriyama, Yasutaka Muroya, and Cristina Pecchia.

⁴³ PVV(k): *ākāraviśeṣiṇī*. PV(I), PVBh(k): *ākāraniveśiṇī*. PV(Tib.): *nam pa rjes žugs can de yod*.

⁴⁴ PV(I), PVBh(k): *kevalaḥ*. PVV(k): *kevalam*. PV(Tib.): *phyi rol yan gar don*.

Second, Dharmakīrti articulates very clearly here the same idea found in our *Śūnyavāda* passage, that the cognition must somehow take on the form of the object in order for perception to occur. As the *pūrvapakṣin* says, *na copalabdhir astīha nirākārāsu buddhiṣu* (*Śūnyavāda* 31cd). As Dharmakīrti says, *yadi buddhis tadākārā sāsty ākāraviśeṣiṇī* (3.334ab). The idea is that even if the cognition is of an external object, it must still somehow assume the form of that object in order to cognize it. Thus, the cognition itself will be characterized by a specific form that it displays. But, then, the answer to the question whether the form belongs properly to the cognition or really derives from an external object seems obvious, *given the additional premise that the cognition, too, must be apprehended whenever the object-form is*. Dharmakīrti presents the decisive point in v. 335: Whenever an object is apprehended as having some form, awareness will be apprehended as well; but conversely, whenever awareness of a particular form is apprehended, an object having that form is apprehended. From this we can confidently conclude that the form of the object and awareness are actually in some sense the same, hence that the form belongs to the awareness or cognition. And from that Dharmakīrti apparently believes it follows that there is no external object.

This, of course, is what came to be known as the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, which was considered by Brahmanical opponents as one of the key Yogācāra arguments against the existence of external objects. Manorathanandin, in his gloss on v. 335, implicitly identifies it as such.⁴⁵ Dharmakīrti returns to this argument later in the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*—e.g., at 390: “No object [is observed] without awareness, nor is an awareness observed being experienced without an object; thus they are not different”⁴⁶—and also presents it in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.⁴⁷ It is at *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.54ab where the most widely cited formulation is given: *sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ*. The argument seems to relate to the principle of logic known in Western philosophy as the Identity of Indiscernibles: two things having exactly the same properties are identical.⁴⁸ Here, however, instead of the sharing of all properties, the sharing of just *one crucial* property is

⁴⁵ PVV(k) 200,12-13: *yat tāvan nīlādikaṃ bāhyam ity ucyate taj jñānena sahopalambhaniyamāt tabhinnasvabhāvaṃ dvicandrādivat*.

⁴⁶ *nārtho 'saṃvedanaḥ kaścid anarthaṃ vāpi vedanam | dṛṣṭaṃ saṃvedyamānaṃ tat taylor nāsti vivekitā* ||. See the entire passage that extends from *Pramāṇavārttika* 3.388-391.

⁴⁷ PVin 1.54 (p. 39,11-42,6).

⁴⁸ Saul Kripke argues that if two things are identical then it is impossible for one to exist without the other. Thus, if mind and body really are identical, it would be impossible to conceive of one existing without the other (which, he maintains, we clearly are able to do; therefore, mind and body are not identical); see Kripke (1972). This argument seems to appeal to a (modalized) form of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, which is the converse of the Identity of Indiscernibles: identical things necessarily have all properties in common, including existence. It is tempting to see the *sahopalambhaniyama* as the converse of Kripke's rule, substituting the concept “being perceived” for “existing,” i.e., two things that are always (i.e., necessarily) perceived together are identical.

considered sufficient to establish identity or, more precisely, “non-difference” (*abheda*),⁴⁹ namely, the property of being perceived at a particular time! Yet, certainly, the fact that two things are always perceived at the same time *is* strong *prima facie* evidence that they are in some sense the same.⁵⁰ The more controversial aspect of the argument is the interpretation of its conclusion as establishing the non-existence of an external object, that is to say, does the fact that cognition and object-form *are* non-different establish the non-existence of anything external to the cognition which is responsible for its form?⁵¹ For one might indeed reasonably argue that the shape of a statue is not different from the bronze the statue is made out of because, in the statue's case, they are always perceived together, yet that does not entail that the shape wasn't imposed upon the statue from the outside—by a sculptor!⁵² Be all that as it may, the *sahopalambhaniyama* is certainly a very *interesting* argument, a full philosophical assessment of which will have to be left to another study.

The *sahopalambhaniyama* is the third point where these two passages, *Śūnyavāda* 31–34 and *Pramāṇavārttika* 3.333–335, come close to coinciding in their trains of thought. We have seen that the crucial premise that the cognition must also be grasped in order for the object to be perceived is articulated in the *Śūnyavāda* passage also. Meanwhile, the idea that there can be no awareness of a cognition without awareness of an object-form is implied by the notion that in apprehending itself, it must apprehend itself *as possessing form*. It must have some content. Thus, the two parts of the equivalence which is the *sahopalambhaniyama* of cognition and object—no perception of an object without perception of awareness and no perception of awareness without perception of an object-form—are present, or can at least plausibly be understood to be present, in the *Śūnyavāda pūrvapakṣa*. The *pūrvapakṣin*, however, doesn't put them together and actually state the equivalence from which the non-difference of cognition and object would immediately follow.

⁴⁹ The expression *abheda*, “non-difference,” was interpreted in different ways by Dharmakīrti's commentators. Some, e.g., Devendrabuddhi, Śākyamaṭi, and Prajñākaragupta, understood it to mean complete identity. Dharmottara meanwhile, holding the *ākāra* to be unreal and the cognition to be real, took it to mean neither complete identity nor complete difference. Still others, e.g., Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, seemed willing to accept both interpretations. See Iwata (1991, I.110–216).

⁵⁰ Provided, that is, that they are not always perceived at that time *as different*, like different stars in a constellation. This proviso is required to obviate the objections of *anaikāntika*- and *viruddha-hetu* raised by opponents like Śubhagupta and Bhāsarvajña. (Unfortunately, the stock example for the proof is the two moons seen by someone with an eye disease!)

Thus, suppose that you and I are talking about various people we know and we discover that someone I know only as “Janet's husband” has always been present at social occasions where someone you know as “Bill” has also been present. Indeed, for every social event that both you and I have attended, when I've seen Janet's husband, you've seen Bill, and *vice versa*. We could reasonably infer that Janet's husband and Bill are the same person. If it is true in all possible worlds that wherever Janet's husband is observed, then Bill is observed, and vice versa, then they *must* be the same person.

⁵¹ However, not all Buddhists understood the *sahopalambhaniyama* as establishing the non-existence of external objects. Some merely saw it as proving the “duality of form” (*dvairūpya*) of cognition, in effect, the *sākārajñānavāda*, which is compatible with both the existence and non-existence of external objects. See Iwata (1991, I.25–29).

⁵² The continuation of the *Śūnyavāda pūrvapakṣa*, however, develops interesting arguments against the possibility that a form belonging to an external object could be somehow transferred, e.g., by reflection or contact, to the cognition.

Rather, he takes a more circuitous route, which I described above as argument 2: One is always aware of cognition having some form when one experiences an object, even *prior* to experiencing it, and never aware of any difference in form between object and cognition—one is only aware of *one* thing that has form. Therefore, the form must belong to the cognition. One of the notable differences between the two passages is that in the *Pramāṇavārttika* passage Dharmakīrti does not feel it is necessary to state that, whenever something is perceived, the cognition that perceives it is apprehended by itself *prior* to perceiving it. This idea, as I've noted above, makes the *pūrvapakṣa* argument a bit awkward. It is as though, in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Dharmakīrti has eliminated the dross of an earlier discussion and brilliantly reformulated it as the elegant and intriguing argument that is the *sahopalambhaniyama*.

In short, we can say that the elements for the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument are there in the *pūrvapakṣa* of Kumāriḷa's *Śūnyavāda*. Someone just had to come along and put them together in the right way.

In his invaluable historical treatment of the *sahopalambhaniyama* Takashi Iwata suggests how the *sahopalambhaniyama* might have been derived from the idea, articulated by Dignāga in his *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, that an object of cognition must be both cause of the cognition and its content, i.e., that which appears in the cognition.⁵³ The idea that the object causes the cognition led to the notion that whenever the object is present, the cognition is present and vice versa, and this is close to the notion that the two are always perceived together. Yet what is missing in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* is a clear articulation of the self-reflexivity principle, the idea that a cognition *must* be apprehended along with the object in order to reveal the object. It is this fact which Dharmakīrti seems to mention at PVin 1.54cd as explaining *why* cognition and object are always perceived together. As shown above, this idea is also clearly expressed in the Buddhist *pūrvapakṣa* of Kumāriḷa's *Śūnyavāda*.

Various hypotheses could be introduced at this point to explain the apparent relation of the *pūrvapakṣa* of the *Śūnyavāda* and *Pramāṇavārttika* 3.333–335. One would be that the source or sources Kumāriḷa used in composing his *pūrvapakṣa*, which as we have seen seems to extend beyond the thought of Dignāga, were also sources for Dharmakīrti. Another hypothesis—which I consider much less likely in light of evidence that Dharmakīrti sometimes seems to be referring to Kumāriḷa's views—would be that Kumāriḷa's *pūrvapakṣa* at certain points actually picks up some of the ideas of Dharmakīrti himself, which he learned second-hand from other Buddhist teachers or even knew from Dharmakīrti's own writings but chose to present in his own way (as Dharmakīrti often did when considering the views of other philosophers). Yet another hypothesis is that the *pūrvapakṣa* represents another line of thought developing out of Dignāga distinct from the one formulated by Dharmakīrti but bearing certain similarities to the latter due to the fact that both ultimately derived from the same source—Dignāga. I do not think we have enough evidence, just on the basis of this part of the *Śūnyavāda* itself, to decide in favor of, or for that matter exclude, any of these hypotheses.

⁵³ Iwata (1991, I.20–24).

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Birgit Kellner and Alex Watson for their thoughtful comments on this paper, which led to a number of improvements.

References

Primary Sources

- Kāś: *Kāśikā* of Sucaritamīśra. See ŚV(T).
 NR: *Nyāyaratnākara* of Pārthasārathimīśra. See ŚV(B).
 PV(I): Sāṅkṛtyāyana, R. (Ed.). (1938). *Pramāṇavārttikam* by Ācārya Dharmakīrti. *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, 24, Appendix.
 PV(Tib.): Miyasaka, Y. (Ed.). (1971–1972). *Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica*, 2, 1–206.
 PVBh(k): Sāṅkṛtyāyana, R. (Ed.). (1953). *Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta* (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikam*). Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.
 PVV(k): Sāṅkṛtyāyana, R. (Ed.). (1938–1940). *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a Commentary by Manorathanandin*. *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, 24–26, Appendix.
 PVin: Steinkellner, E. (Ed.). (2007). *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya, Chapters 1 and 2*. Beijing/ Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/ Austrian Academy of Sciences Press. For Corrigenda, cf. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 51 (2007–2008) 207–208, as well as http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/steinkellner07_corrigena.pdf (last accessed 28 June 2010).
 PS: Steinkellner, E. (Ed.). (2010). *Dīgnāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1. A hypothetical reconstruction with the help of the two Tibetan translations on the basis of the hitherto known Sanskrit fragments and the linguistic materials gained from Jinendrabuddhi's Ṭikā*. URL: http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf (last accessed 28 June 2010).
 BSBh: Sāstri, A., & Paṅsīkar, V.L.S. (Eds.). (1982). *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya, with the commentaries Bhāmati, Kalpataru and Parimala*. Varanasi: Krishnadas Academy.
 Vaidalyaprakaraṇa: Tola, F. & Dragonetti, C. (Eds., trans.). (1995). *Nāgārjuna's refutation of logic (Nyāya): Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
 ŚBh: Frauwallner, E. (Ed.). (1968). Śābarasvāmi's Bhāṣyam zu den Mīmāṃsāsūtren I.1,1-5. In Erich Frauwallner, *Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā* (pp. 7–61). Wien: Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
 ŚV(T): Sāstri, K. S. (Ed.). (1926, 1929). *Mīmāṃsā Ślokavārtika with the commentary Kasika of Sucaritamīśra*. Trivandrum (reprint Trivandrum: CBH Publications 1990).
 ŚV(B): Sāstri, D. (Ed.). (1978). *Ślokavārtika of Śrī Kumāri Bhaṭṭa, with the commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathimīśra*. Varanasi: Tara Publications.
 ŚV(M): Sastri, S. K. R. (Ed.). (1971). Revised by K. K. Raja and R. Thangaswamy. *Ślokavārtikavyākhyā Tātparyāṭikā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa*. Madras: University of Madras.
 ŚVVT: *Ślokavārtikavyākhyātātparyāṭikā* of Umbekabhāṭṭa. See ŚV(M).

Secondary Sources

- Hanneder, J. (2007). Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikā 1 2 anhand der Sanskrit- und tibetischen Fassungen. In K. Klaus & J.-U. Hartmann (Eds.), *Indica et Tibetica. Festschrift für Michael Hahn, zum 65. Geburtstag von Freunden und Schülern überreicht* (pp. 207–214). Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien.
 Harada, W. (2003). A philological and doctrinal reconsideration of the Viṃśatikā Vijnāptimātrāsiddhiḥ, Part 3. *Bulletin of Kyushu Ryukoku Junior College*, 49, 131–188 (in Japanese).
 Iwata, T. (1991). *Sahopalambhaniyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, daß Erkenntnis und Gegenstand ausschließlich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf deren Nichtverschiedenheit*. 2 Volumes. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
 Kano, K. (2008). Two short glosses on Yogācāra texts by Vairocanarakṣita: *Viṃśatikāvivṛti* and **Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavivṛti*. In F. Sferia (Ed.), *Sanskrit texts from Giuseppe Tucci's collection, Part I* (pp. 343–380). Roma: Istituto Italiano per L'Africa e L'Oriente.

- Kellner, B. (forthcoming). Infinite regress arguments (*anavasthā*) in connection with self-awareness (*svasamvedanā*): A closer look at Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Paper presented at 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyōto. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (to appear).
- Kellner, B. (2009–2010). Towards a critical edition of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtika*. In J. Hanneder & P. A. Maas. (Eds.), *Text genealogy, textual criticism and editorial technique = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*, 52–53, 161–211.
- Kripke, S. (1972). *Naming and necessity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Moore, G. E. (1922). *Philosophical studies*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Taber, J. (1986–1992). Further observations on Kumāriḷa's Bṛhaṭṭikā. *Journal of Oriental Research*, 56–62, 179–189.
- Taber, J. (2005). *A Hindu critique of Buddhist Epistemology. Kumāriḷa on perception. The "Determination of Perception" chapter of Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa's Ślokavārtika. Translation and Commentary*. London/New York: RoutledgeCurzon.