The issue of body ownership cannot be considered irrelevant to the sports community. For example, in places and times where sports were controlled mainly by the State, including in former East Germany, the body of the player was owned and managed by the State. The issues caused by body ownership by others have been overcome through the private right known as “property right to the body”.
However, I can say that certain issues related to “body self-ownership”, including body enhancement by free will as seen in the field of competitive sports in recent years, have ironically brought about the necessity to reexamine the property right to the body. This is because the broad interpretation of this notion and the objectification of the body have resulted in a surge in popularity of the view that one can freely do anything to one’s own body.
It is believed that the British philosopher John Locke first proposed the concept of the property right to the body and the person. Based on Locke’s concept, should “doping as an act of body self-ownership”, namely self-doping, be allowed, even though “doping as an act of body ownership by others” is prohibited?
Considering such questions, this paper aims mainly to examine doping as an issue of body self-ownership in light of Locke’s concept of the property right to the person. To this end, I first review and thoroughly examine Locke’s notion. On this basis I then consider whether and on what grounds doping as an act of body self-ownership is permissible.
After such consideration, I arrive at the following conclusion: first, the notion of “person”in the concept of “property right to the person” as proposed by Lock does not correspond to “body” in the physical sense, and second, the concept of God is supposed to be superior to that of “property right to the person.” Through the discussion in this thesis, I indicate that it would be difficult to refer to the “property right to the person” concept as a basis for accepting doping as an act of free will.