Intimacy, Admirability, and Virtue: An Examination of Michael Slote's View
Virtues, according to Michael Slote, are our inner traits or dispositions. Slote defends "balanced caring" as an admirable character trait. He believes that caring more for intimates than others is admirable. A virtuous person attains balanced caring between intimates and others. This account of virtue conceived "balanced caring" as "fundamentally admirable" and it is the basic virtue. All other virtues, such as honesty, kindness, generosity, truthfulness, and so forth, are "derivatively admirable". This paper examines Slote's view and argues that Slote should explore the opposite situation because his idea of "balanced caring" and "admirability" is so vague and misleading. In contrast to his ideas, a reverse formulation that is caring for others more than for intimates seems plausible.
References
Aristotle. FromThe Nicomachean Ethics. In S. Darwall (Ed.). Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 7-50, 2003.10.1093/oseo/instance.00262114Search in Google Scholar
Arnett, R. C., Arneson, P.Dialogic Civility in a Cynical Age: Community, Hope, and Interpersonal Relationships. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.Search in Google Scholar
Baron, M. W., Pettit, P., Slote, M.Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.Search in Google Scholar
Blum, L. A. Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory. In M. J. Larrabee (Ed.). An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 49-68, 1993.Search in Google Scholar
Copp, D., Sobel, D. Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics. Ethics 114, 514-554, 2004.10.1086/382058Search in Google Scholar
Gilligan, C. Moral Orientation and Moral Development. In M. Timmons (Ed.). Conduct and Character: Readings in Moral Theory. Ontario: Thomson Wadsworth, 228-237, 2003.Search in Google Scholar
Hursthouse, R.On Virtue Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.Search in Google Scholar
Kawall, J. Virtue Theory, Ideal Observers, and The Supererogatory. Philosophical Studies 146, 179-196, 2009.10.1007/s11098-008-9250-0Search in Google Scholar
Noddings, N. An Ethic of Caring. In M. Timmons (Ed.). Conduct and Character: Readings in Moral Theory. Ontario: Thomson Wadsworth, 244-255, 2003.Search in Google Scholar
Slote, M.From Morality to Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.Search in Google Scholar
Slote, M.Morals from Motives. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.10.1093/0195138376.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Slote, M. Agent-Based Virtue Ethics. In S. Darwall (Ed.).Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 203-226, 2003.Search in Google Scholar
Slote, M. Autonomy and Empathy.Social Philosophy and Policy 21, 293-309, 2004.10.1017/S0265052504211128Search in Google Scholar
Slote, M.The Ethics of Care and Empathy. New York: Routledge, 2007.10.4324/9780203945735Search in Google Scholar
Tong, R.Feminine and Feminist Ethics. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993.Search in Google Scholar
This content is open access.
