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Confucian Multiculturalism: A Kantian Reinterpretation of the *Classic of Rites*

Abstract:
Chinese Communist monocultural policies, notably the re-education camps for the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, have recently been condemned for violating human rights. In response to critics, the Chinese Communist Party frequently replied that one should not impose Western concepts of democracy, liberty, and human rights on the Chinese people. Nevertheless, instead of introducing Western philosophies criticizing the current Chinese Communist monoculturalism; with the help of a modern reinterpretation of the *Classic of Rites*, this paper aims to construct a Confucian Multiculturalism and argues that: (1) the *Classic of Rites* explicitly warned against cultural assimilations of "barbarians" into the "civilized" Empire, (2) the *Classic of Rites* acknowledges cultural diversities, and (3) although the *Classic of Rites* does not explain clearly why the imperial court should tolerate cultural diversities, a Kantian reinterpretation of the Chinese concept of *Jing* 敬 implies the respects for minority rights. In doing so, this paper formulates Confucian Multiculturalism as a new model of the Chinese philosophy of culture which asserts cultural diversity.

Keywords:
multiculturalism, Chinese philosophy, Confucianism, Classic of Rites, philosophy of culture, political philosophy

Introduction

Recently, the monocultural policies of the Chinese Communist Party have been severely criticized, most notably for the controversial re-education camps for the Uyghurs[1] and the crackdown of the 2019 Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protest.[2] The emphasis on cultural, ethnic, and national unity highlighted by Beijing is widely regarded by scholars as monoculturalism and a violation of human rights. Lin and Jackson criticized the current Chinese history curriculum in secondary education in Hong Kong, where "only majority perspectives are provided," "cultural superiority of the dominant group (the Han) is asserted," and "plural monoculturalism, where minority views are treated as threatened and/or as threatening in relation to the society as a whole."[3] Other scholars even accuse the Chinese Communist Party of "Uyghur genocide." Abbas claimed that "The entire Uyghur population of East Turkistan (some nine million people) is living under an Orwellian surveillance state where the CCP has limited free movement and accelerated observation to criminalize even the most mundane task."[4] Similarly, Çaksu criticized that the "Pairing Up and Becoming Family" implemented by the Chinese authority in Xinjiang province is literally a "state-sponsored rape and contribute[s] to ethnic cleansing and genocide."[5]

Yet whether the current Chinese monoculturalism is rooted in ancient Chinese culture is debatable among scholars. Zheng argued that Chinese monoculturalism is the product of modern Chinese nationalism. Zheng indicated that the concept of the "Chinese nation" did not exist until the late Qing dynasty when reformists Liang Qichao and Yang Du introduced Western nationalism to China. Zhang claimed that "they not only realized the national characteristics of 'unity in diversity,' but also preliminarily possessed the idea that 'Chinese nation' is the common appellation of all ethnic groups in China."[6] By contrast, Mankoff argued that Sinocentrism embedded in ancient Chinese culture is the root of modern Chinese monoculturalism. He blamed that under the Confucian notion of *Tianxia* 天下, foreign relations are treated "as an extension of internal administration."[7] Mankoff claimed that the Chinese current ethnic and diplomatic policies employ the same "*Tianxia* framework." For example, he criticized Zhao Tingyang's *The Tianxia System* in 2005 and argued that

> In Zhao's idealized "Tianxia System," political legitimacy derives from the ethical conduct of relations, which are equivalent across the different types of relationships comprising the family, the state, and *tianxia*, and which owes something to the belief in the acculturating potential inherent in Confucianism, with its ability to "civilize" the "barbarians."[8]

Nevertheless, based upon a Kantian reinterpretation of the Chapter "Royal Regulations" of the *Classic of Rites* (also known as *Liji* 禮記), this paper argues that Confucianism does not necessarily imply monoculturalism; instead, one may reformulate Confucian multiculturalism with the help of modern Western philosophy, namely Kantian ethics which are extensively employed by Chinese New Confucians. There are three main arguments claimed by this paper:

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1) See Davis, "Reeducation Camps in Xinjiang," 116–28; and Salimjan, "Recruiting Loyal Stabilisers," 95–104.

2) See Lee, Yuen, Tang and Cheng, "Hong Kong's Summer of Uprising," 1–32; and, Jain, Kesselbrenner and Mattis, "Hong Kong's Future," 1–15.

3) Lin and Jackson, "Constructing Chinese Identity," 209–21.

4) Abbas, "Global Islamophobia," 3.

5) Çaksu, "Islamophobia, Chinese Style," 185.

6) Zheng, "Modern Chinese Nationalism," 5.

7) Mankoff, "Sinocentrism and Tianxia," 254.

8) Ibid., 255.

(1) the *Classic of Rites* explicitly warned against cultural assimilations of "barbarians" into the "civilized" Empire,

(2) although the *Classic of Rites* assumed the universality of Confucian moral teachings, it acknowledges cultural diversities arising from geographical conditions, and

(3) although the *Classic of Rites* did not explain why the imperial court should tolerate cultural diversities, a Kantian reinterpretation of the Chinese concept of *Jing* 敬 implies respect for minority rights.

This paper will first summarize the contemporary discussion on cultural policies in Western political philosophy and political science and clarify the definition of culture and multiculturalism. Secondly, there will be an in-depth textual analysis of the chapter on *Wang Zhi* in the *Classics of Rites* where Confucians explicitly expressed their opposition against cultural assimilations, although they do not explain their reasons clearly. Thirdly, this paper will suggest a possible explanation: because Confucians assert the concept of *jing* 敬 (respect), they respect cultural diversities and therefore reject cultural assimilations. However, recent research in Chinese philosophy reveals that Confucians' understanding of *jing* fails to acknowledge the concept of equality and mutual respect. Finally, following the Chinese New Confucians' approach, this paper will revise the concept of *jing* expressed in the *Classic of Rites* with the help of the Kantian concept of *Observantia* which assumes the equality of all human beings.

What is Multiculturalism?

There are generally four approaches to cultural policies in the contemporary world: monoculturalism, melting pot, *Leitkultur,* and multiculturalism, as well as different approaches to acculturation. This section clarifies these concepts in cultural geography, anthropology, and applied psychology before applying the concept of multiculturalism to the reinterpretation of the *Classic of Rites*.

Monoculturalism is defined as the "policy or process of supporting, advocating, or allowing the expression of the culture of a single social or ethnic group,"[9] according to the Oxford Dictionary. Similarly, the melting pot refers to the state when heterogeneous cultures are merged into a common and homogenous culture. As Hirschman criticizes, "while the melting pot image suggests a blending of cultures, the process was essentially one of 'anglo-conformity'."[10] Both monoculturalism and melting pot incline to the cultural assimilation of different cultures into one culture.

Alternatively, while *Leitkultur* tolerates different cultures within a state, it assumes a guiding culture dominating other cultures: "the values needed for a core culture are those of modernity: democracy, secularism, the Enlightenment, human rights and civil society."[11] While *Leitkultur* does not explicitly pursue assimilation in Tibi's definition, "Merz redefined *Leitkultur* as 'the putative essence of national culture to which immigrants must assimilate … In his propagation of a 'liberal German *Leitkultur*,' Merz nationalized and culturalized the concept, suggesting that these core norms and values are (to be) rooted in (a superior) German culture."[12] Here Tecmen criticized that *Leitkultur* assumed the superiority of the dominant culture and is inclined to assimilation. He used chancellor Angela Merkel's speech in the 2010 CDU party congress resolution as an example:

9) "Monoculturalism," *Oxford Dictionary*, assessed August 8, 2022.

10) Hirschman, "America's Melting Pot Reconsidered," 398.

11) Tibi, *Europa ohne Identität,* 154.

12) Tecmen, "German Leitkultur."

> Our cultural values – influenced by our origin in the ancient world, the Jewish-Christian tradition, enlightenment, and historical experiences – are the foundations for societal cohesion and, additionally, shape the leading culture in Germany, to which the CDU especially feels obligated. We expect that those who join us will both respect and acknowledge this.[13]

Based upon Merkel's speech, Tecmen concluded that "German *Leitkultur* is an attempt to create a model that anticipated socio-economic and socio-cultural adaptation to society to be recognized and accepted. This assimilationist approach inevitably isolates and marginalizes migrant and migrant-origin communities."[14] Tecmen further argued that Turkish minorities who are mostly Muslim are marginalized by German *Leitkultur* because they are outside of the "Jewish-Christian tradition."[15] While Tecmen's challenge to the priority of the dominant culture is understandable, his accusation of German *Leitkultur* for assimilation seems to be arbitrary because asking immigrants to "respect and acknowledge" the "Jewish-Christian tradition" is different from asking Muslims to convert to Christianity, although Merkel's definition of German culture is debatable. Highlighting the priority of the dominant traditional culture may be regarded as cultural conservatism but it does not necessarily imply assimilation unless there are obviously political, social, and economic pressures (e.g. re-education camps), forcing the minorities to adopt the dominant cultural identity.

By contrast, multiculturalism does not assume any leading culture and merely refers to "a society that contains several cultural or ethnic groups in which cultural groups do not necessarily engage with each other."[16] Yet Western multiculturalism only acknowledges the co-existence of different cultures without highlighting intercultural interactions. For example, Kymlicka defined multiculturalism as such:

> A state is multicultural if its members either belong to different nations (a multination state), or have emigrated from different nations (a polyethnic state), and if this fact is an important aspect of personal identity and political life.[17]

Nevertheless, here Kymlicka only highlighted the different "origins" of different cultural groups without asserting intercultural interactions. Such multiculturalism is labeled as "differentialist" by Gomarasca.[18] To replace multiculturalism, *interculturalism*: the "exchange of views between individuals, groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds,"[19] is proposed, although Gomarasca also criticized interculturalism as a form of "essentialism," namely the "understanding of cultures and identities as self-consistent entities (or mosaic of entities)."[20] However, as we shall see, the *Classic of Rites* is in favor of a differentialist multiculturalism by highlighting the essential and indestructible cultural differences between the people of the "Middle Kingdom" and "the people of five areas." By contrast, since intercultural exchanges are not regarded

13) Ibid.

14) Ibid.

15) Ibid.

16) Ibid.

17) Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 18.

18) Gomarasca, "Multiculturalism or Hybridisation?," 70.

19) Ibid.

20) Ibid. To replace multiculturalism and interculturalism, Gomarasca proposed the concept of cultural hybridity, as he claims: "Hybridisation suggests one aspect which can be considered relevant: Cultures are originally and intrinsically intertwined." Yet this paper does not discuss whether the *Classic of Rites* may imply a non-essentialist cultural hybridity as Gomarasca proposed because textual evidence suggests that the *Classic of Rites* assumes essentialism, as we shall see in this paper.

as something necessary for the construction of cultural identity by the *Classic of Rites*, the *Classic of Rites* can hardly imply any form of interculturalism.

Regarding approaches to acculturation, Berry proposed the fourfold model. He argued that there are two questions in acculturation: "is it considered to be of value to maintain relationships with larger society?" and "is it considered to be of value to maintain one's identity and characteristics?"[21] Based upon these two questions, Berry listed four approaches: *assimilation*: the non-dominants lose their identities and adopt the dominant culture; *separation*: the non-dominants maintain their identities and reject the dominant culture; *integration*: the non-dominants preserve their identities and accept the dominant culture at the same time; and, *marginalization*: the non-dominants do not maintain their identities, nor do they accept the dominant culture either.[22]

Remarkably, monoculturalism usually implies *cultural assimilation*, the process when minority groups are fully or partially homogenized with the majority. A classic example in East Asian history would be Japanization (*Kōminkaundō* 皇民化運動) during the imperial period (1868–1945), when Ryukyuan, Minnan, and Korean were banned at school and in the press in the occupied Okinawa, Taiwan, and Korea. As we shall see, however, the *Classic of Rites* explicitly rejects assimilation and marginalization and seems to prefer integration to separation.

Confucian Attitudes towards Cultural Diversity According to the Classic of Rites

Confucianism is a philosophical school that originated from Confucius' (551–479 BC) and Mencius' (372–289 BC) moral teachings. Yet the New Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan argued that it would be misleading to say that "Confucianism is limited to morality, with Confucius discussing *ren* [humanity, humaneness] and Mencius teaching that '[human] nature is good' [*xing shan*], and that it does not involve the question of being,"[23] because Confucian texts like the *Doctrine of the Mean*, the *Great Learning* and *Yijing* extensively discuss metaphysics. "In Confucianism there is a heaven to be responsible for being. Confucius' *ren* and Mencius' *xing* [human nature] were certainly in communion with heaven, certainly in communion and therefrom united with heaven."[24] As Mengzi claims, "By fully developing one's mind, one knows one's nature. Knowing one's nature, one knows Heaven. It is through preserving one's mind and nourishing one's nature that one may serve Heaven"[25] (*Mencius* 7A:1). According to Mou's interpretation of the quotation above, Confucianism is defined by the doctrine of the *commensurability between individual moral subjectivity and Dao* (the Way of Heaven). Mou quoted the *Doctrine of the Mean* and continued:

> "Heaven's command is called one's nature [*xing*]. Following one's nature is called *Dao*. Cultivating *Dao* is called teaching… . Therefore the noble man [*junzi*] is guarded and vigilant where he is not seen, is fearful where he is not heard. Nothing is as apparent as the hidden, nothing as prominent as the minute. Therefore the noble man is vigilant in his solitude." … This vigilance in solitude is achieved through one's inner moral capacity [*xingti*, nature-substance] of "Heaven's command is called one's [moral] nature."[26]

21) Berry, "Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation," 9.

22) Ibid.

23) Mou, "The Character of the Confucian System."

24) Ibid., 71.

25) Bloom, *Mencius*, 144.

26) Mou, "The Character of the Confucian System", 76.

Mou's definition of Confucianism reasserted the traditional belief that *Four Books* and *Five Classics* are consistent with each other.[27] As we shall see, some interpreters below may refer to other canons when they interpret the chapter "Royal Regulations" of the *Classic of Rites*.

The *Classic of Rites* is a collection of Confucian commentaries on the rites of the Zhou dynasty dating from the third to the first century BC. The chapter *Wang Zhi* or "Royal Regulations" discussed in this paper is said to be written between the Qin dynasty (221 to 206 BC) and Western Han dynasty (202 BC to 9 AD) according to Kong Yingda (孔穎達 574–648), although the author is unknown.[28] Nevertheless, since the *Classic of Rites* was regarded as one of the *Five Classics* by Confucians, the chapter *Wang Zhi* or "Royal Regulations" was frequently quoted by Confucians as a reference for political discussions, remarkably on the relationships with foreign countries and ethnic minorities. Confucian historians from different dynasties interpreted and applied these two paragraphs from the Royal Regulations in diplomacy and internal affairs:

> The capacities of people living in all places must follow heavenly and earthly influences, as cold or warm, dry or humid. Where there are wide valleys and large rivers, there are different institutions; people who are living there have different customs. Their natures, hard or soft, light or heavy, slow or fast, are differently apprehended. Their preferences for the five flavors are differently harmonized. Their instruments are differently instituted. Their clothes are differently fashioned. Their teachings are revised but their customs are not altered. Their governances are apprehended but their fashions are not altered.[29]
>
> Each of the people of the five areas, the Middle Kingdom, *Rong, Yi*, etc. – has its own nature which cannot be transformed… . To achieve their goals and apprehend their desires, there are interpreters: in the East, they are called *Zi*. In the South, they are called *Xiang*. In the West, they are called *Diti*. In the North, they are called *Yi*.[30]

Zheng Xuan's (鄭玄 127–200) footnotes to the paragraph above were added to the text in Kong Yingda's *Real Meanings of the Classics of Rites*:

> Because of heaven, earth, coldness, warmth, dryness, and humidity, people's capacities are instituted differently according to the earthly air. Different institutions refer to images while different customs refer to preference; different apprehensions refer to natures of slowness and fastness while different harmonization refers to fragrance, odor, saltiness, and bitterness. Different institutions refer to the implements of affairs while different fashions refer to clothes that are made of fabrics,

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27) *Five Canons* refer to the *Classic of Poetry,* the *Book of Documents,* the *Classic of Rites*, *Yi Ching,* and *Spring and Autumn Annals*, while *Four Books* refers to *Analects*, *Mencius*, the *Great Learning,* and the *Doctrine of the Mean*. However occasionally Mou seems to be uncertain about such consistency between *Four Books* and *Five Canons*. For instance, when distinguishing Zhuxi from Wang Yangming, Mou argued that Zhu belongs to the "*Great Learning* Tradition" while Wang belongs to the "*Mencius* Tradition." See ibid., 79.

28) Kong, *True Meanings of Classic of Rites*.

29) Original text: 凡居民材，必因天地寒暖燥濕，廣谷大川異制。民生其間者異俗：剛柔輕重遲速異齊，五味異和，器械異制，衣服異宜。修其教，不易其俗；齊其政，不易其宜。

See "Royal Regulations."

All English translation, if not specified, are translated by the author with the original text attached as reference; to avoid misunderstanding, when possible, original texts from *Ctext* are kept in footnotes. *Chinese Text Project* (Ctext) is a database which contains both the original texts and scanned original manuscripts.

30) Original text: 中國戎夷，五方之民，皆有其性也，不可推移。……五方之民，言語不通，嗜欲不同。達其志，通其欲：東方曰寄，南方曰象，西方曰狄鞮，北方曰譯。Ibid.

> fur, and kudzu. Teaching refers to prosperity and rightness while governance refers to punishments and bans.[31]

While whether these paragraphs above suggest any form of environmental determinism is debatable and out of the theme of this paper, a differentialist understanding of culture is asserted. The author states that the people of the five areas essentially have different fashions and customs due to different geographical conditions instead of intercultural interactions emphasized by interculturalism.

Furthermore, the Royal Regulations quoted above explicitly rejected assimilation and marginalization by claiming that the locals' "teachings are revised but their customs are not altered. Their governances are apprehended but their fashions are not altered." However, if the locals are still required to follow the Confucian teaching and governance imposed by the imperial court, it seems to suggest that the author prefers integration to separation: instead of avoiding interaction between the Middle Kingdom and the "barbarians," the texts called for integrations in terms of teaching and governance. Hence, the Royal Regulations can hardly be read as a text for monoculturalism, although a few interpreters try to argue for an assimilation policy, as we shall see in the following.

Confucian historians disagreed with each other on whether the Royal Regulations endorsed the transformation of the barbarians' cultures. In the *Book of Han*, Ban Gu (班固 32–92) argued that the emperor should transform people's customs according to Confucian moral principles:

> All people have the nature of five constant virtues [namely, humaneness, rightness, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness], but their hardness or softness, lightness or heaviness, and different utterances vary with the atmosphere of water and soil, which is called *Feng* 風. All of their favor, preferences, activeness or passiveness, appearance, and disappearance follow the superior's desires, so they are called *Su* 俗. Confucius said, "Music is the best way for the transformation of customs." It means that when the sage-king reigns, he apprehends ethics, moves the people's causes, and changes their effects, so that the world is united in harmony and the sage-king teachings are completed.[32]

Here Ban followed Mengzi's teaching on transforming barbarian cultures in *Mencius* 3A:4; "I have heard of using Xia [the civilized] customs to transform the Yi [the barbarian], but I have never heard of being transformed by the Yi."[33] Yet Ban also highlighted the *universality* of Confucian morality in the same passage: the transformation of the barbarian's customs is possible only because barbarians also share the same moral nature with the civilized Han Chinese. Without the same moral nature, one could not be cultivated morally.

When Sima Guang (司馬光 1019–1086) quoted Ban's interpretation of the Royal Regulations in his *Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance*, he interestingly argued that Ban's argument justified the opposition against a uniform imperial edict disregarding local customs. Sima mentioned the story of a minister

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31) 因天地寒煖燥濕者，使其材藝堪地氣也。異制，謂其形象。異俗，謂其所好惡。異齊，謂其性情緩急。異和，謂香臭與鹹苦。異制，謂作務之用。異宜，謂旃裘與絺綌。教謂禮義，政謂刑禁。Ibid.
Kong, *Real Meanings of the Classic of Rites*.

32) 凡民函五常之性，而其剛柔緩急，音聲不同，繫水土之風氣，故謂之風；好惡取舍，動靜亡常，隨君上之情欲，故謂之俗。孔子曰：「移風易俗，莫善於樂。」言聖王在上，統理人倫，必移其本，而易其末，此混同天下一之虖中和，然後王教成也。
Ban, "On Geography II."

33) Bloom, *Mencius*, 58.

named Shi Bi (?–178): in 166 and 169, the Emperor Huan of Han (漢桓帝 132–168), who empowered eunuchs, sent an edict to all counties that each county must report the "partisans" (people who opposed the eunuchs) to the court. Yet Shi refused and said "borders are divided, water and soil are not uniform, while customs are different. Other counties may have 'partisans' but mine does not have any, how can you compare my county with others?"[34] Here Sima argued that Shi justified the local differences by referring to Ban's *Book of Han* and did not realize that Ban actually argued for eliminating these differences instead.

By contrast, when Wei Zheng (魏徵 580–643) narrated the failure of the Sui Dynasty invasion of Goguryeo (Goguryeo–Sui War, 598–614) in discussed diplomacy in the *Book of Sui*, he argued against changing the "Eastern barbarians" (namely, ancient Korean, Japanese and Manchurians) customs and argued for guiding them with the principle of morality:

> Wide valley, big valley, and different institutions mean that people born there have different customs and inclinations, while their languages are incommensurable. The sage-kings design teaching according to situations to achieve their goals and apprehend their desires. Although nine barbarians are living in places separated from the Middle empire, their heavenly nature is obedient and lacks violence. Although they live beyond mountains and oceans, one can change them with the guidance of *Dao*.[35]

Here Wei acknowledged geographical differences but assumed moral universality: since all nations share the same moral nature, the emperor may "guide" the "barbarians" with *Dao*. In other words, there are *two layers* of cultures in Wei's interpretations: geographical particularity and moral universality. For this reason, Wei argued that the Tang dynasty should not invade the Korean peninsula but should promote Confucian moral teachings instead.

Although Ban, Sima, and Wei were historians and did not specialize in the philological studies of the *Classics of Rites*, their interpretations above show how Confucians apply the teaching of the Royal Regulations to politics. Sima's interpretation disregards the context of the Royal Regulations; while the original text addresses relationships with foreigners (diplomacy) and ethnic minorities (internal cultural policies), Sima applied the text to justify Shi's disobedience against the imperial edict. Conversely, Ban called for transforming and even assimilating the "barbarian's" customs while Wei only called for integration: the barbarians only need to adopt the Confucian universal moral teaching but should preserve their customs. Ban's interpretation is inconsistent with the text as it is written that "each of the people of the five areas – the Middle Kingdom, Rong, Yi, and so forth – has their own nature which cannot be transformed."[36] It seems that only Wei's interpretation is consistent with the text, although he failed to explain why the Middle empire should "guide" the "barbarians" with *Dao*. In the following section, we shall see how philologists and philosophers analyze the texts and discuss the possible reasons behind them.

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34) 畫界分境，水土異齊，風俗不同。他郡自有，平原自無，胡可相比！
Sima, "Chapter 56."

35) 廣谷大川異制，人生其間異俗，嗜欲不同，言語不通，聖人因時設教，所以達其志而通其俗也。九夷所居，與中夏懸隔，然天性柔順，無獷暴之風，雖綿邈山海，而易以道御。
Wei, "Chapter 81."

36) "Royal Regulations," *Classic of Rites*.

Textual Analysis of Royal Regulations

In Tam's recent article, he outlines three possible reasons why the Royal Regulations suggest that the empire should only revise the "barbarians" teachings and apprehend their governance but should not alter their customs and fashions:

1. Strategy: "It is only a temporal appeasement: initially the empire only implemented policies and moral teachings to the indigenous but gradually replaced their cultures with Confucian ritual laws."
2. Practicality: "Due to geographical limitations, the empire could not transform the indigenous culture and therefore only implemented policies and moral teachings. For example, asking the locals living in the tropical climate of South East Asia to wear Hanfu simply ignores the climatic conditions."
3. Morality: "Respecting the indigenous, the empire did not force them to transform their cultures."[37]

The interpretation of strategy is inconsistent with the text as the complete transformation of local cultures is explicitly denied. Therefore, as we shall see, commentators are inclined to argue for the interpretations of practicality or morality, which may be mutually inclusive in some cases.

Kong Yingda, the well-known philologist in Tang Dynasty, supports the interpretation of practicality. He said:

> The differences between the Middle Kingdom and the Four Barbarians in terms of living places, languages, clothes, and cuisine are called *qi* 氣, nature, capacities, and talents. People living in five different places have different capacities following their *qi*, natures, capacities, and talents according to the *qi* of the land so that those who can endure coldness can live in the frigid zone, while those who can endure heat can live in tropical zone … instruments refer to military weapons while customs refer to people's manners. Fashions refer to the suitableness of land and equipment. It means that *cultivations of propriety and rightness should follow people's customs while the apprehensions of their governances and orders should follow the fashions of objects*.[38]

Like Wei, here Kong acknowledged the *universality* of Confucian moral teachings and the *particularity* of local customs, which are conditioned geographically. Remarkably, Kong argued for Confucian moral cultivation for the "barbarians." Like his contemporary Wei, Kong experienced rapid military expansions of the Tang empire.[39] Both Zheng and Kong warned against the transformation of local customs, yet they agreed that the barbarians living in the vassal states of the Tang Empire should be educated according to Confucian principles.

The distinction between moral universality and cultural particularity was found in *Mencius* 4B:1, where Mengzi argued that cultural particularity does not prevent moral cultivation: the sage-king Shun was "a man of the Eastern Yi" while Wen was "a man of the Western Yi." Yet their "barbarian" heritages did not

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37) Tam, 論香港政治處境下儒學價值實現的可能性:從終極關懷與初始關懷考察, *[On the Possibility of Manifesting Confucian Values]*.

38) 中國及四夷居處言語衣服飲食不同之事材謂氣性材藝言五方之人其能各殊五者居處各須順其性氣材藝使堪其地氣能寒者使居寒能暑者使居暑……註公羊傳云攻守之器曰械俗謂民之風俗宜謂土地器物所宜言修此禮義教化當隨其風俗齊其政令施為當隨物之所宜也。

"Royal Regulations," *Classic of Rites*.

39) Using the failure of the Emperor Wen of Sui's (541–604) invasion of Goguryeo, Wei warned against military expansion and argued that the emperor should respect the autonomy of Korean tribes as long as their embassies offered tributes regularly. See Wei, "Chapter 81."

prevent them from becoming sage-kings: "when they realized their intentions and implemented them in the Middle Kingdom, it was like uniting the two halves of a tally."[40] In the *Classic of Rites*, Eastern, and Southern "barbarian" music was included in the summer sacrifice for the Duke of Zhou to show "the inclusiveness of the state of Lu to the world."[41]

Chen Gao's (陳澔1260–1341) *Collections of Interpretations of the Classic of Rites* collected many less well-known commentators' interpretations, including Chen Xiang-dao (陳祥道 1042–1093), Fang Que (方慤 ?–?) and Ma Xi-meng (馬晞孟 ?–?),[42] who provided more detailed investigations on climatic conditions.

Fang Que carefully investigated the climatic differences in North, East, South, and West and argued that changing customs and fashions are impossible. "Following customs, there are fashions. Hence, there are differences of shallowness and depth between indicating customs in terms of teaching and fashion in terms of governance."[43]

Similarly, Chen Xiang-dao argued that changing people's customs and fashions is simply impractical. He said:

> What humans desire are customs. Fashions are which customs are suitable for. Sage-kings observed people and instituted teachings, so they revise people's teaching without changing their customs, and govern people accordingly, so they do not change their fashions… . Cultivations of teaching and apprehensions of governance agree with (the way of) humans while not changing customs and fashions agree with (the way of) Heaven.[44]

Chen's claim is supported by Ma Xo-Feng, who argued that customs and fashions are determined by climates and therefore the sage-king employs moral "teachings to orientate customs according to their desires."[45] They highlight the practicality of the cultural policy in Royal Regulations without mentioning its moral aspect.

Yet Que, Chen, and Ma failed to elaborate why the sage-kings preserve local customs and fashions; one may argue that the sage-kings do not need to take care of local climatic conditions but request the locals to overcome environmental limitations and follow the customs of the Middle Kingdom for moral reasons.

Among the Song dynasty interpreters, Lu Dian (陸佃 1042–1102) was the only one who appreciated the sage-king's preservation of local customs as a *virtuous* (*de* 德) act. He claimed: "the way to govern the barbarians … is to subjugate them with virtues. Therefore, it is said: 'barbarians were directly subjugated to Xia [the civilized] is not merely about subjugation; it must only be caused by moral teachings'."[46]

Similarly, Sun Xi-dan 孫希旦 (1736–1784) highlighted that the sage-kings' preservation of local customs and fashions was welcomed by the barbarians, and therefore they were obedient to the sage-kings. "Living with people's capacities and governing them according to their customs is the governance and

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40) Bloom, *Mencius*, 86.

41) 言廣魯於天下。 "Royal Regulations," *Classic of Rites*.

42) Chen,《禮記集說大全》修纂取材來源探究 [Sources of *Liji jishuo daquan*: an Exploration], 10–11.

43) 因俗然後有宜故于教言俗于政言宜此淺深之別也上兼言異齊異制異和此則止言俗與宜者別而言之雖有三者之異合而言之無非俗與宜故也。

Chen, *Collections of Interpretations*.

44) 人之所欲為俗俗之所安為宜先王觀民設教故脩其教不易其俗因而為政故齊其政不易其宜……故齊之脩其教齊其政人也不易其俗不易其宜天也。Ibid.

45) 異宜者因天地有寒煖燥濕而制之也教所以導民俗則因民之所欲也。 Ibid.

46) 故治夷狄之道……必有德以服之故曰蠻夷率服夏則非唯服之也必有教以及之故。 Ibid.

teaching of the sage-king. So, the *Da Situ* (大司徒, minister of land) does not command people by force but people happily follow his order."[47] Nevertheless, the interpretations of Lu and Xun seem to be consequentialist; they only highlighted the beneficial consequence of the preservation of local customs to the Empire. In this sense, the sage-kings' preservations of the local customs would be merely conditional because they wanted to avoid resistance.

By contrast, while Wei was a historian and not a philologist specializing in the *Classics of Rites*, his interpretation of the Royal Regulations implicitly argued that the civilized Middle Kingdom *should respect* the barbarians. As we have seen in the previous section, Wei used the Royal Regulations to justify his criticism of military expeditions. Having asserted the moral universality shared by the Middle Kingdom and the barbarians, Wei argued that Korean and Japanese were actually moral and civilized and should not be discriminated against by the Chinese regime. For instance, he quoted the legend of Jizi (?–?), who fled from China after the fall of the Shang dynasty (1600–1045 BC) to Korea and educated local tribes. Wei also indicated that at that time Korean and Japanese clothes and cuisine were influenced by Chinese culture and the scholars there loved Chinese literature and history so much that they even risked their lives to travel a long way to Chang An to study Confucianism. Wei concluded:

> As it is said in the *Book of Military*: "whoever is eager to expand his virtues will be prosperous; whoever is eager to expand his territory will be extinct." The area of *Liao Dong* 遼東 has been outside of the imperial territory for a long time. These nations give tribute to the Empire regularly without suspension. [Yet] Two previous dynasties were angry and arrogant, misunderstood these nations were inferior and lacked the virtue of harmony. Hence there were wars. Previous dynasties were overconfident in their strength and coveted after expansion. Their arrogance triggered hatred while their anger implied warfare. I have never heard of any Empire which would not be overthrown because of these wrongdoings![48]

In other words, Wei rejected forceful transformations of barbarians not merely because of the concerns over practicality but also over morality: forceful transformation and invasions were simply immoral according to Wei.

Here Wei challenged the traditional assumption that Eastern barbarians were less civilized than the Chinese Empire, for during the Tang Dynasty (618–907) Korean and Japanese scholars had extensively adopted Chinese culture, including Classical Chinese as the official written language, Confucianism, and Chinese Buddhism. Since Wei claimed that Confucian morality is universal, Korean and Japanese could also be as moral as the Chinese. In this sense, Wei implicitly acknowledges these East Asian people as *moral subjects.*

Unfortunately, Wei did not explicitly formulate an account of the moral subjectivity of the people, as his discussions focus merely on the moral subjectivity of the rulers, namely, how rulers could manifest virtues when governing cultural minorities or dealing with foreigners. Wei only argued that the rulers should respect ethnic minorities and foreign nations but did not acknowledge them as equal moral agents. Therefore, in the following section, this paper introduces Kant's discussion on the three senses of respect and reinterprets the Royal Regulations so as to construct Confucian multiculturalism.

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47) 因其材治之遺其俗此聖人之政教所以不強氏而民樂從大司徒。Sun, *Explanations Classics of Rites*, 21.

48) 兵志有之曰:「務廣德者昌，務廣地者亡。」然遼東之地，不列於郡縣久矣。諸國朝正奉貢，無闕於歲時，二代震而矜之，以為人莫若己，不能懷以文德，遽動干戈。內恃富強，外思廣地，以驕取怨，以怒興師。若此而不亡，自古未之聞也。Wei, "Chapter 81."

Three Senses of Respect*: Respekt, Observantia,* and *Reverentia*

In Feinberg's article, he argued that Kant categorized *Achtung* (the German word for respect) into three senses: *Respekt*, a respect arising from an "uneasy and watchful attitude that has 'the element of fear' in it,"[49] *Observantia*, a respect arising from a moral sense of duty for others,[50] and, *Reverentia*, a respect arising from the amazement of something sublime.[51] In Kant's case, this would be the moral laws, as he stated in the *Metaphysics of Morals* 468 §44:

> I am not bound to *revere* others (regarded merely as *men*) that is, to show them positive high esteem. The only reverence to which I am bound by nature is reverence for law as such (*revere legem*); and to revere the law, but not to revere other men in general (*reverentia adversus hominem*) or to perform some act of reverence for them, is man's universal and unconditional duty toward others, which each of them can require as the respect originally owed others (*observantia debita*).[52]

In Kant's context, *Observantia* implies equality as it refers to respect for all people regardless of their social status or gender. As Kant stated in 462 §38:

> Every man has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow men and is in turn bound to respect every other.
> Humanity itself is a dignity; for a man cannot be used merely as a means by any man (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used at the same time as an end… . Hence there rests on him a duty regarding the respect that must be shown to every other man.[53]

Kant further remarked in §44 that respect for others should not vary with social class:

> The different forms of respect to be shown to others in accordance with differences in their qualities or contingent relations – differences of age, sex, birth, strength or weakness, or even rank and dignity, which depend in part on arbitrary arrangements – cannot be set forth in detail and classified in the metaphysical first principles of a doctrine of virtue, since this has to do only with its pure rational principles.[54]

As we shall see in the following, the emphasis on equality in the Kantian concept of *Observantia* is different from the Confucian concept of respect.

It seems that the senses of *Respekt*, *Observantia,* and *Reverentia* are all found in Confucian contexts. *Wei* 畏, which literally means "to awe," may refer to *Respekt*. For instance, in *Analects* 9:23, Confucius said: "We should look upon the younger generation with awe [*hou sheng ke wei* 後生可畏] because how are we to know that those who come after us will not prove our equals?"[55]

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49) Feinberg, "Concept of Respect," 1.

50) Ibid.

51) Ibid., 2.

52) Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 259.

53) Ibid., 255.

54) Ibid., 259

55) Slingerland, *Confucius Analects*, 94.

Yet Confucians' understanding of *Reverentia* differs from Kant's. While Kant argues that one should give reverence only to moral laws, Confucians give reverence not only to Heaven or the Heavenly Way (i.e., moral laws), but also to the teaching of sage-kings. For example, in *Analects* 16.8 Confucius said: "The gentleman stands in awe [*wei* 畏] of three things: the Mandate of Heaven, great men, and the teachings of the sages."[56]

However, modern philosophers argue that Confucians do not share the Kantian concept of *Observantia*. As Lao Sze-Kwang criticized, the Confucian concept of *ren* or humaneness, which is the ultimate virtue in Confucianism, only affirms a "single [moral] subject" manifesting *ren* but not the "co-existence of many [moral] subjects."[57] Likewise, the New Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan criticized that Confucians only entrusted sovereignty to an Individual or a royal family and family but not citizens.[58] For these reasons, Mou introduced Kantian ethics to modern Chinese philosophy: to acknowledge the co-existence of other moral subjects, although he did not pay attention to the Kantian concept of *Observantia,* but focused on reformulating Mengzi's idea of mind with the help of the Kantian concept of moral autonomy.[59]

Unlike *Observantia*, *jing* (敬, the Chinese word for respect), is defined in terms of the ritual system or propriety (*li* 禮) according to one's social roles rather than equal moral duties for others. "To act without propriety is to be disrespectful."[60] Here *li* does not only refer to the objective instructions instituted by the Duke of Zhou, but also the subjective moral feelings, as Mou clarified: "the ritual and music institutionalized by the Duke of Zhou… . Yet although full of minutiae, they were still based on human feelings, and although based on human nature and human feelings they were still a tedious subject to learn."[61]

Yet whether the Kantian concept of *Observantia* is inconsistent with the concept of *jing*, in the context of *Four Books* and *Five Classics*, is debatable. On the one hand, it seems that in Confucian contexts, *jing* does not refer to equal respect for all because its manifestations vary with interpersonal relationships and social status. Mou identified two kinds of moral feelings manifested in Zhou rituals, namely, "*qinqin* [treating kin as kin, loving one's kin]" and "*zunzun* [giving respect to those deserving respect]. In other words, they were concerned with the gradations in the treatment of kin as kin and with the degrees of giving respect to those deserving respect."[62] Remarkably, *zunzun* assumes hierarchy. As Mou explained, "Why should we respect him? Because he has an objective position. *Zunzun* belongs to the realm of government and it too has gradations."[63] Here the Confucian understanding of *jing* in terms of *zunzun* contradicts the Kantian concept of *Observantia* because the former is defined in terms of hierarchy while the latter refers to equal respect for all people.

In other texts, however, the Confucian concept of *jing* seems to imply that everyone regardless of his/her social rank should be respected. It is written in *Mencius* 4B:28: "One who is humane [*ren*] loves other people; one who possesses courtesy respects other people. One who loves others always is loved by them; one who respects others is always respected [*jing*] by them"[64] Similarly in *Analects* 12.5, Confucius's student Zixia said, "A gentleman is respectful and free of errors. He is reverent and ritually proper in his dealings with others. In

56) Ibid., 195.

57) Lao, *Liberty, Democracy and Cultural Creation*, 221.

58) Mou, *Way of Politics and Way of Governance*.

59) See for example, Mou, *On Perfect Teaching.*

60) 作事不以禮，弗之敬矣。"Rites in the Formation of Character," *Classics of Rites*.

61) Mou, "Lecture 3," 49.

62) Mou, Ibid., 52.

63) Ibid., 53.

64) 仁者愛人，有禮者敬人。愛人者人恆愛之，敬人者人恆敬之。Bloom, *Mencius*, 92.

this way, everyone within the Four Seas is his brother."[65] In other words, the ritual system or propriety manifests *jing* and a person with propriety treats *everyone* with *jing*.

Here is a theoretical problem in Mengzi's and Zixia's ethics: on the one hand, according to Mengzi's understanding of *jing*, everyone should be respected equally as "brothers." On the other hand however, only two kinds of *jing*, namely *qinqin* and *zunzun*, are acknowledged by the ritual system. Neither *qinqin* nor *zunzun* can be understood as equal respect for all. Therefore, Mengzi's and Zixia's concepts of equal respect cannot be expressed within the ritual system which is assumed to be the sole instrument to manifest *jing*.

To solve this problem, Wawrytko introduced the Kantian concept of *Observantia* to Confucianism and reformulated the Confucian concept of *jing*, so that the Confucian unmanifested concept of equal respect can be manifested, as we shall see in the following section.

Wawrytko's Kantian-Confucian Ethic of Respect

Wawrytko argued that Confucius' concept of humaneness in *Analects* creates a practical theory of respect in three aspects where Kantian ethics and Confucian ethics of respect can be integrated: "(a) family and social roles or personae, (b) with regard to [the] moral law or *tao* [*dao* 道, the Way], and (c) in the model of the moral being."[66] All these aspects will be analyzed critically below.

(a) refers to the ritual and music system where *qinqin* and *zunzun* manifest as discussed above. While Kant's concept of *Observantia* transcends social roles asserted by Confucians, Wawrytko argued that Kantianism and Confucianism can complement each other. "Confucius and Kant share the concept of universality of respect for human beings in accordance with their guiding model-rational nature in Kant and social nature in Confucius, a community of individuals as opposed to individuals in a community."[67] To support her claim that both Kant and Confucius assert respect for everyone, Wawrytko quoted *Analects* 15:8 that "the wise person does not let people go to waste, but he also does not waste his words."[68] Yet this quotation can hardly support Wawrytko's claim because "to waste" [*shi* 失, to lose] is not necessarily associated with respect but with utility. A more appropriate textual evidence supporting Wawrytko's claim would be *Analects* 3.26: "Someone who lacks magnanimity when occupying high office, who is not respectful when performing ritual[s], and who remains unmoved by sorrow when overseeing mourning rites – how could I bear to look upon such a person?"[69] Here Confucius argued that everyone should perform all rituals respectfully, including the rituals to greet people with lower social ranks, which agrees with the Kantian concept of universality of respect for human beings, and therefore Wawrytko's argument is justified.

Similarly, (b) refers to the equivalence among Heaven, nature, and mind expressed in Mou's interpretation of *Mencius* and the *Doctrine of the Means* as we have seen in the previous section, although Wawrytko wrongly attributed (b) to Confucius who had never clarified the relation between Heaven (or the Heavenly Way) and human nature. Yet Wawrytko's mistake did not prevent her from integrating Confucian ethics with Kantian ethics in terms of respect for moral laws.

Wawrytko compared the Kantian concepts of the Categorical Imperative and moral laws and the Confucian concept of rightness and *Dao* and argued that the former lacks the flexibility and practicality of the

65) 君子敬而無失，與人恭而有禮。四海之內，皆兄弟也。Slingerland, *Confucius Analects*, 127.

66) Wawrytko, "The Ethics of Respect," 239.

67) Ibid., 249–50.

68) Slingerland, *Confucius Analects*, 177.

69) Ibid., 28.

latter. Wawrytko argued that both the Categorical Imperative and rightness refer to "the 'oughtness' of a situation… . Yet the greatest divergences between the theories of Kant and Confucius also occur in these areas, particularly with regard to the Confucian Mean and its flexibility of standards."[70] In *Analects*, *Dao* is not understood as a set of maxims but just a general and abstract guiding principle. The manifestation of *Dao* varies with practical situations. As it is written in *Analects* 15.29, "Human beings can broaden the Way – it is not the Way that broadens human beings."[71] In Slingerland's commentary, he quoted Liu Baonan's (1791–1855) remark that "the point of this remark is that it is human ability that allows the Way to manifest itself in the world."[72] Slingerland continued: "The Way thus is transcendent, in the sense that it continues to exist even when it is not being actively manifested in the world, but it requires human beings to be fully realized."[73]

An example of the flexibility of *Dao* would be Confucius' discussions on the details of practicing rituals in *Analects* 9.3:

> A ceremonial cap made of linen is prescribed by the rites, but these days people use silk. This is frugal, and I follow the majority. To bow before ascending the stairs is what is prescribed by the rites, but these days people bow after ascending. This is arrogant, and – though it goes against the majority – I continue to bow before ascending.[74]

Here Confucius allows alternations of rituals with practical reasons (e.g. frugality) and without implying inappropriateness (e.g., arrogance). Yet such flexibility is not found in Kantian ethics. As Kant claims in 4:421, "*act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.*"[75] To overcome Kant's rigidity, Wawrytko called for introducing the flexibility of Confucian ethics.

While (b) explains how Confucian ethics may contribute to Kantian ethics, in (c), Wawrytko argued that the Kantian principle of humanity formulated "the model of the moral being" which is an essential ground for the integration of both accounts. According to the Kantian principle of humanity stated in the *Groundwork* 4:429, "*act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.*"[76] Wawrytko indicated that here for Kant, "Respect for others is conjoined with self-respect. A similar principle is put forth by Confucius: 'A gentleman is not an implement,' either to himself or to others (AII,12)."[77] Since the principle of humanity is embedded in *Analects* but not articulated, Wawrytko argued that a Kantian-Confucian ethics can benefit both accounts, as she said:

> By a synthesis of Kantian and Confucian concepts, therefore, ethical theory becomes practical and relevant to the dynamic movement of society. Combining the recognition of social roles offered by *li* with the universality of reason in Kant, the roots of an organic theory-practice continuum receive a firm grounding. Respect is directed to both persons and personae. Respect for the Moral Law, as *tao* or the Categorical Imperative, conveys the essential nourishment of these roots. Moreover,

70) Wawrytko, "The Ethics of Respect," 250.
71) Slingerland, *Confucius Analects*, 185.
72) Ibid., 186.
73) Ibid.
74) Ibid., 87.
75) Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 31.
76) Ibid., 38.
77) Wawrytko, "The Ethics of Respect," 254.

> it takes account of the need for individual judgment or in determining the applicability of moral directives. This process is given a more sophisticated analysis by Confucius, with the flexible balancing of the Mean, thereby overcoming the deficiencies of Kant's rigid architectonic.[78]

Application of Kantian-Confucian Ethics of Respect to the Kantian Re-Interpretation of the *Classic of Rites*

This section applies Wawrytko's Kantian-Confucian Ethics of Respect to the Kantian re-interpretation of the *Classic of Rites* and argued that one reinterprets that the sage-kings preserve the locals' customs and fashion because the sage-kings *respect* the locals in the sense of *Observantia*.

According to Wawrytko, the Kantian concept of individuals' moral autonomy is embedded in Confucianism but has yet to be articulated. In other words, a person manifests different kinds of respect in different interpersonal relationships according to the Zhou ritual and music systems. Although Wawrytko did not discuss *Mencius*, one may find evidence from *Mencius* supporting Wawrytko's claim. When Mengzi explains the emperor Yao's governance of humaneness in *Mencius* 3A:4, he said: "between parents and children there is affection; between ruler and minister, rightness; between husband and wife, separate functions; between older and younger, proper order; and between friends, faithfulness."[79] These relationships are known as the five relationships in Mengzi's teachings.

Here the concept of five relationships does not necessarily imply inequality because all these five virtues are different aspects of humaneness, which is the ultimate virtue in Confucianism, while Confucius' and Mengzi's concept of humaneness or *ren* implies universality. As Mou argued:

> When Confucius talked about *ren*, *ren* is a universal principle, but you cannot say that *ren* is an abstract concept. *Ren* does not belong together with the so-called concepts of science, mathematics, and logic. According to Confucius, *ren* can be concretely manifested in the real human life that is before our eyes. That is why Mencius said that *ren* is simply "compassion [*ceyin zhi xin*]"; it is concrete. But although concrete, it is not an event. It has universality. Under these circumstances, such universality is what Hegel called a concrete universal.[80]

In *Mencius* 2A:6, Mengzi uses the analogy of a child falling into a well to illustrate the universality of *ren* or humaneness: "if anyone were suddenly to see a child about to fall into a well, his mind would be filled with alarm, distress, pity, and compassion… . The mind's feeling of pity and compassion is the sprout of humaneness [*ren* 仁]."[81] The moral feeling of pity and compassion is universal, yet the manifestation of humaneness is limited by interpersonal relations.

Since different aspects of humaneness are manifested in different interpersonal relationships, different ritual practices are required. Yet all these different practices manifest the same humaneness. Likewise, as we have discussed in the previous section, according to *Mencius* 4B:28, a person with propriety manifests *jing* to everyone in the ritual and music system in different ways. *Zunzun* is only a particular way of expressing *jing* to people in higher ranks. While Confucius and Mengzi failed to articulate the ways of expressing *jing* to people

78) Ibid., 254.

79) Bloom, *Mencius*, 57.

80) Mou, "Lecture 2," 30–31.

81) Bloom, *Mencius*, 35.

in lower ranks, their accounts of *ren* and *jing* implicitly imply that one should respect everyone equally. In this sense, the original sense of *jing* agrees with the Kantian concept of *Observantia*, although Confucius and Mengzi did not have the means to manifest *jing* as equal respects but could only manifest *jing* in terms of the unequal *zunzun*.

As we have mentioned before, there are three possible reasons why the Royal Regulations claimed that the "barbarian's" customs and fashions should not be altered: strategy, practicality, and morality. If the *Classic of Rites* is consistent with the teachings of Confucius and Mencius on respect, the third reason is more reasonable: the Middle Kingdom preserves the barbarian's customs and fashions because the former *respects* (*jing*) the latter. Yet the traditional practices of *jing* focus on *zunzun*. If the barbarians are treated as inferior groups compared with the sage-kings of the Middle Kingdom, there is no point for the sage-kings to express *zunzun* toward the barbarians. But as Mengzi said, a person with propriety always respects others regardless of their social status. Hence the sage-kings' *jing* for the barbarians cannot be *zunzun* but something else.

The Kantian concept of *Observantia* supplements the Confucian concept of *jing* by acknowledging barbarians as equal moral subjectivities to be respected. The sage-kings' *jing* for the barbarians cannot be defined within the original Confucian framework because Confucians only understand *jing* in terms of *zunzun,* while *zunzun* only refers to the lower's respect for the upper. When Sun explicitly and Wei implicitly appreciated the sage-king's *jing* for the barbarians, they did not realize that such a *jing* could not be explained within the ritual system because *jing* was only reserved for *zunzun* (i.e., the lower's respect for the upper). Yet as mentioned above, *Mencius* 4B:28 implies that the sage manifests *jing* to everyone; in other words, Sun, Wei, and Mengzi were in a dilemma: on the one hand, they acknowledged that *jing* may also refer to the upper's respect for the lower; on the other hand, in the ritual system, *jing* is only defined as the lower's respect for the upper. The introduction of the Kantian concept of *Observantia* solves the dilemma by defining the upper's respect for the lower in terms of a non-hierarchical concept: even though the sage-kings were superior to the barbarian, the former was obliged to respect the latter.

The *jing* as *Oservantia* stated above is manifested by the sage-kings by means of a two-layer cultural policy: preserve the local people's customs and fashions (geographical particularity) but transform their teachings and governances to conform to Confucian ethics (moral universality). For example, Ban Gu argued that Jizi taught the indigenous Koreans not to commit robbery and adultery.[82] While Ban used Jizi as an example of the Confucian transformation of barbarian culture, Ban failed to distinguish geographical particularity and moral universality. According to the reinterpretation of the Royal Regulations discussed above, the sage-kings only transformed people's immoral practices to conform to Confucian moral teachings but preserved other customs because the sage-kings respected the people.

Nevertheless, one may argue that the two-layer cultural policy embedded in the Royal Regulations should be understood as a Confucian *Leitkultur* rather than Confucian multiculturalism because the policy assumed a guiding culture: barbarian and cultural minorities must follow Confucian concepts of humaneness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom, just like non-European immigrants are requested to follow the European idea of democracy and freedom in the European *Leitkultur*.

However, this paper does not regard the Royal Regulations as a manifesto of a Confucian *Leitkultur* because it is inconsistent with the Kantian reinterpretation of the text adopted by this paper. As explained above, *Leitkultur* assumes the priority or superiority of the dominant culture over non-dominant cultures, which agrees with Sinocentrism (remarkably Zhao Tingyang's concept of the *Tianxia* system): that the people of the non-dominant cultures should respect the dominant culture. Such kind of respect is hierarchical and unidirectional

82) Ban, "On Geography II."

and the dominant culture is not obliged to respect the non-dominant culture in return. Yet Mengzi and Wei indicated that there is also non-hierarchical and bidirectional respect: although the sage-kings were superior to barbarians, both should respect each other, because the sage-kings knew that everyone has a moral duty to respect everyone. Such kind of respect is not hierarchical or conditional, so it is neither *Respekt, Reverentia* nor *zunzun;* it is *Observantia*.

Furthermore, unlike *Leitkultur*, the reinterpretation of the Royal Regulations in this paper does not assume a "dominant culture": the culture of the Middle Kingdom does not necessarily dominate the barbarians, even if it is regarded as superior. As Wei concluded in his summary of the history of the Western barbarians:

> In the system instituted by the ancient philosopher-kings, the total area of the territory was only 5000 squared *Li*. They were obliged to bring peace to the tribes of Xia but did not serve the faraway. Was it because they could not exert their majesties or virtues? No, it was because they did not enslave the four barbarians to serve the Middle Kingdom and did not harm the useful with the useless.[83]

While Wei assumed the superiority of the Chinese civilization over barbarians and even labeled the latter as "the useless," he argued that there is no reason that the Empire should dominate and govern these barbarians. If they admired the civilization of the Empire, the Empire should welcome them. If they would like to be vassal states of the Empire, the Empire should treat them with respect. If they threaten the security of the Empire or its vassal states, the Empire should fight back. Yet the Empire should not force barbarians to submit to the imperial governance if the barbarians chose to isolate themselves. In other words, the Empire did not voluntarily invade and dominate barbarians and asked them to adopt Confucian ethics; instead, when barbarians voluntarily accepted the governance or protection of the empire, they were obliged to follow Confucian ethics.

Besides, the cultural and diplomatic policy in the Royal Regulations expresses two features of differentialist multiculturalism: acknowledgment of the co-existence of different cultures without the highlighting of the intercultural interactions, and highlight the different "origins" of different cultural groups without asserting intercultural interactions. In the Royal Regulations, the world is divided into five areas: North, East, South, West, and Middle. Each of the people of these regions "has their own nature which cannot be transformed." For this reason, Confucians unilaterally emphasized the moral cultivation of the barbarians but reluctance to be transformed into barbarian cultures, as Mengzi claimed in *Mencius* 3A:4.

Conclusion

Overall, by redefining the sage-kings' respect for barbarians in terms of the Kantian concept of *Observantia*, Confucian multiculturalism that respects cultural diversities is formulated. Even though Confucian multiculturalism assumes the superiority of the Middle Kingdom, unlike *Leitkultur*, it does not necessarily assume a relationship between dominant and non-dominant cultures. Although its two layers of cultural policies give room to cultural integration by means of the preservation of customs and fashions and the transformation of teachings and governance, it does not actively pursue transforming every nation according to Confucian ethics. The sage-kings did not bother even if barbarians refused integration and chose separation because governing and teaching barbarians were never the prioritized tasks, and the sage-kings are obliged to respect the choice of barbarians if they did not want to be "transformed" by Confucian teaching.

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83) 古者哲王之制，方五千里，務安諸夏，不事要荒。豈威不能加，德不能被？蓋不以四夷勞中國，不以無用害有用也。Wei, "Chapter 81."

While both moral universality and geographical particularity are acknowledged in the Royal Regulations, Confucians propose neither cultural imperialism (forcing cultural minorities and foreign countries to accept Confucian teaching) nor environmental determinism (claiming that cultures are merely determined by geographical conditions and therefore moral transformations are impossible). Instead, moral universality enables barbarians to be "civilized," while geographical particularity implies that the sage-kings should respect cultural differences. By no means would the Royal Regulations endorse any form of monoculturalism or cultural assimilation.

Therefore, this article contributes not only to the philosophy of culture in the sense that it reformulates Confucian multiculturalism by reinterpreting the Royal Regulations with the help of the Kantian concept of *Observantia* but also to political philosophy as it provides a new model criticizing contemporary cultural policies, remarkably Chinese Communist monoculturalism. It also solves the inner theoretical problem in Confucianism that the concept of equal respect acknowledged by Confucius and Mengzi was unable to be manifested in the ritual system. Future research may investigate how to overcome the theoretical limitation of Confucian multiculturalism, remarkably the essentialist assumption of cultural differences which is questionable in the contemporary philosophy of culture.

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