Abstract
This paper has a twofold purpose. First, it aims at highlighting one difference (albeit in degree and not in kind) in how counterfactuals work in general history, on the one hand, and in history of the natural sciences, on the other hand. As we show, both in general history and in history of science good counterfactual narratives need to be plausible, where plausibility is construed as appropriate continuity of both the antecedent and the consequent of the counterfactual with what we know about the world. However, in general history it is often possible to imagine a consequent dramatically different from the actual historical development, and yet plausible; in history of science, due to plausibility concerns, imagining a consequent far removed from the results of actual science seems more complicated. The second aim of the paper is to assess whether and to what degree counterfactual histories of science can advance the cause of the so-called “contingency thesis,” namely, the claim that history of science might have followed a path leading to alternative, non-equivalent theories, as successful as the ones that we currently embrace. We distinguish various versions of the contingency thesis and argue that counterfactual histories of science support weak versions of the thesis.
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Notes
See www.uchronia.net. Accessed 22 Oct 2017. Attempts to imagine different pasts date as far back as Livy’s speculations on what would have happened, had Alexander the Great expanded his empire westward instead of eastward. In any case, Louis Geoffroy’s Historie de la Monarchie universelle: Napoléon et la conquête du monde (1836) is sometimes credited as “the first recognizable full-length, speculative, alternative history” (Evans 2014, p. 11).
As our analysis in the following sections will amply illustrate, advocates of counterfactual history of course disagree with Evans on this score. Indeed, it is easy to imagine, for instance, a counterfactual scenario revolving around Tycho Brahe’s death in 1566, following the sword duel in which he lost part of his nose; and all that is required to start building such a scenario are biographical facts about Brahe—namely, clear-cut instances of concrete historical evidence.
Evans’ response to critics of his book is included in a recent monographic issue of the Journal of the Philosophy of History devoted to counterfactuals, which features papers by Ben-Menahem (2016), Nolan (2016), Sunstein (2016), Tucker (2016), and Woolf (2016). Evans sketched the essentials of his criticism of counterfactuals, well before the publication of Altered Pasts, within a symposium on counterfactual history published in Historically Speaking in 2004. The contributions therein collected (reprinted in Yerxa 2008) are an excellent sample of the debate among historians on the merits of counterfactuals.
Weber hastened to emphasize the general methodological validity of his remarks on counterfactuals, which apply not only in the case of the specialist discipline of history, “but also in the ‘historical’ ascertainment of causes of every individual event, including even the individual events of ‘inanimate nature’” (1949 [1905], p. 166, fn. 32). For discussions on Weber’s view of counterfactuals within historical explanation, see esp. Reiss (2009) and Maar (2016).
See however Nolan (2013, esp. Sect. 2) for a discussion of the problems involved in the best way to unpack the connection between causal claims and counterfactuals.
As Kinzel (2016, pp. 93–94) notes, it is unclear whether, on Bowler’s account, such alternatives fared better or worse, along the dimension of empirical success, than evolution by natural selection.
Within this framework, the term “advance” does not necessarily bring with it its usual positive connotation, since it “may also apply to steps in a ‘wrong’ direction” (Pessoa 2005, p. 264).
According to Chang, “pluralism is more beneficial to science than monism, given any reasonable position regarding the aims of science and the fundamental views operating in science” (2012, p. 269). Such claim echoes Feyerabend’s work (see, e.g., Feyerabend 1970), by which Chang is admittedly inspired.
For a systematic discussion of the difficulties involved in assessing how a certain discipline would have progressed, had history gone differently, see Fumagalli (2017, Sect. 5).
See Soler (2015a, p. 9) for an impressively long list of the “ingredients” of science that one can view as inevitable (contingent).
Cushing’s counterfactual history is an exception in this regard, exactly because it hinges on actual science.
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Acknowledgements
This paper is based on material presented at the workshop “Progress, Realism, and Cognitive Values” (Trieste, 30 September 2016), at the SILFS2017 conference (Bologna, 20–23 June 2017), and at the EPSA17 conference (Exeter, 6–9 September 2017). Audiences at such venues—especially Mario Alai, Francesco Bianchini, Alberto Cordero, Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Fumagalli, Anne Sophie Meincke, Jan Sprenger, and Ioannis Votsis—offered precious criticisms and suggestions. I was lucky enough to have the opportunity to discuss at great length the issues addressed in this article with Gustavo Cevolani and Roberto Festa. Their insightful comments on various drafts of the manuscript, as well as the detailed feedback of two anonymous reviewers, contributed to improve significantly the final product. Usual caveats apply.
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Tambolo, L. So close no matter how far: counterfactuals in history of science and the inevitability/contingency controversy. Synthese 197, 2111–2141 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1787-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1787-7