Abstract
This paper aims to argue that Jean-Luc Marion’s philosophical theology is an axio-meonto-Theo-logy which proposes a new way of approaching God. The traditional way of approaching God in theo-logy attained God by the predication and the predicate in the categories of being. However, Marion’s theology attempts to bring out the freedom of God from all categories of being. It provides a critique of the traditional way of approaching God and two arguments for Marion’s alternative approach. On the grounds of the axiological argument and the meontological argument, I defend Marion’s theology from some recent criticisms.
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Notes
It seems that Gschwandtner’s analysis focuses on ‘Is the Argument Ontological? The Anselmian Proof and the Two Demonstrations of the Existence of God in the Meditations’ which is published in Cartesian Questions, rather than ‘Is the Ontological Argument Ontological? The Argument According to Anselm and its Metaphysical Interpretation According to Kant’ which is published in Journal of the History of Philosophy. Although the central thesis in two articles is the same, the arguments are different.
It is true that God without Being is Marion’s relatively early work. I have deliberatively paid attention to this work because God without Being is the landmark volume in which he begins his project. As Fotiade and Jasper point out, ‘for it is in this landmark volume that he begins to disengage the existence of God from the metaphysical concept of Being (and the discourse on the “death of God”), and at the same time relate it to the notion of “givenness”, which not only exceeds intentional constitution and restores ontological difference to the field of phenomenological analysis, but also has the potential to resist the deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence, undertaken by Derrida’ (Marion 2016, p. xvii). The recent development of Marion’s philosophy and theology has its ground in the work. It seems to be unavoidable to discuss this best-known philosophical and theological work in the English-speaking world if one wants to offer a systematic account of Marion’s thought.
In ‘Phenomenology and Theology’, Heidegger begins by considering theology in the sense of Christian theology. Christian theology is based on the history of Christianity, Christianity as something that has come about historically, witnessed by the history of through its institutions, cults and communities as a widespread phenomenon in world history. However, he then asserts that theology does not belong to Christianity because theology is a science which initially makes Christianity as an event in world history possible. Christian theology is only one of the examples in theology. What makes Christianity as an event in world history possible is faith. Faith understands itself only in believing. We ‘know’ about the event as a fact only in believing. The existence of Christ is reoriented in and through the mercy of God grasped in faith. Nevertheless, theology is not speculative knowledge of God. All concepts in theology are essentially related to the theo-occurrence as such which refers to some historical events. For instance, the crucifixion is an historical event, and this event gives testimony to itself as a revelation of the crucified God in Christian faith. Theology ‘can never be deduced from a purely rationally constructed system of sciences’, as it consists of both faith and events in world history (Heidegger 1998, p. 44).
Marion strongly criticizes the late medieval/early modern move to univocal language about God in Théologie blanche. It is another interesting study to investigate the similarities and differences of Marion’s interpretation of the late medieval/ early modern move and Heidegger’s. Yet it would be beyond the scope of this paper.
The principle of Sufficient Reason can trace back to the modern sense of reason since Leibniz (Marion 2017, p. 78). It is said to regulate. This can be understood as the ‘giving’ of a reason for a statement: there is always a reason to be given, and everything is in principle knowable (Allers 1959, p. 372). The principle of Sufficient Reason in turn must have its root in the existence of somebody who understands and speaks about the knowable, a potential knowing subject of what I am potentially there to be known as an object. This being is a rational human being. However, Heidegger critically examines the modern sense of reason and looks for the origin of it (Heidegger 1998, pp. 63–81; see also Ruin 1998, p. 51 and Dahlstorm 2011, p. 135). Humanized reason is the ground for knowledge or distinction, but the whole question of an ultimate reason or ground in fact points to itself a question. The question of an origin leads back to that which needs such a ground, as well as to that which is capable of providing such a ground. The origin of reason points to the questions of being: how can a rational being be certain about its rationality? A rational being cannot be certain about its rationality because human being is uncertain to give or provide a reason for it.
Marion offers more than two arguments for a new way of approaching God. But I pay special attention to the meontological argument and the axiological argument to support my interpretation of Marion’s theology as an axio-meonto-theology.
Unlike Descartes and Kant’s interpretation, the sentence ‘God does not exist’ is not so much a logical contradiction as it is either a claim to infinite understanding or a misidentification of what is being talked about.
The classical interpretation of Anselm’s argument as an ontological argument can be found in Kant, and it remains influential (Plantinga 1966). For further information of ontological argument, please see (Plantinga 1968 and Malcolm 1960). I make reference to Plantinga’s work not because I agree with his interpretation, but simply because Marion also cites Plantinga’s work, although Marion does not discuss it. It would be interesting to discuss the difference between the analytic interpretation and the continental interpretation, but it is outside of the objective of the present paper.
In ‘Is the ontological argument ontological? The argument according to Anselm and its metaphysical interpretation according to Kant’, Marion further points out the our finitude is twofold; that our inability of predication is caused by our finite faculty of understanding, and our lack of predicate is caused by our finite faculty of reason. This interpretation is corresponding to Kant’s philosophy.
I agree with one of the reviewers that the comparison between Levinas and Marion may be helpful to illustrate Marion’s philosophy. However, this study is worthy to spend a paper or even a book to explore on Marion’s reception on Levinas and Levinas’ influence on Marion’s theology. To avoid off-track, here I can only add some general remarks on the issue. Both Levinas and Marion agree that the tradition ontology fails to address God in a proper way because God cannot and should not be restricted by any categories of being. Despite of the fact that they do not employ the term meontology, their approaches are similar. Both approach God or theos beyond any ontological categories. God or theos indexes the insufficiency of our linguistic expression within any ontological categories. The approach beyond any ontological categories is a meontological approach. Caputo and Scanlon clearly and correctly state the affinity between the two, ‘in both Levinas and Marion, the classical idea of transcendence proves to be not enough—it remains caught up in an ontological idolatry—and must give way to a certain ultratranscendence or more radical or hyperbolic transcendence beyond being’ (Caputo and Scanlon 2007, p. 3). They respectively provide their own accounts of meontological argument.
The very difference between the two does lie in the axiological argument. For goodness is not an attribution that seeks to measure the essence of God through a categorical predication, but rather, it is the name that signals the transcendence that draws all naming into the unthinkable. Min (2006) argues that how we relate to fellow human beings necessarily influences how we approach God. Levinas proposes the concept of hunger, whereas Marion suggests concept of charity. Min’s interpretation is insightful, yet I believe that the most important difference lies in their different understanding of love. Levinas argues that love is different from responsibility because his understanding of love mainly refers to Eros rather than Agape (Levinas 1998, p. 108; see also Ferreira 2001, p. 48). Love indicates an interlacing of egoistic pleasure and selfless engagement with the other in the sexual relation. Instead of giving the space for both onto and me onto, love raises an ethical question of responding others. Through the mediation of human others, I experience the irreducible gap and infinite distance between I and God. In contrast to Levinas’ understanding of love, Marion argues that love is charity because love reveals itself as distance in order to give itself, only love will be able to welcome it. Love gives the space for both onto and me onto. In love, a new relation between God and human being is established. God is a requisite while human being becomes a requestant who is not simply a passive receiver. I am an active subject who praises God. Such a new relationship can appropriate the infinite distance. In Believing in Order to See, Marion addresses his similarity and difference with Levinas. Levinas has not stopped relativizing the constituting primacy of the I. Levinas and Marion make the constituting I dependent on a relationship to someone other than itself. In the case of resurrection, the love of God radically inverts the constituting primacy that the position of the I is revealed as a me who is responding to a givenness rather than objectifying it. The resurrection of Jesus Christ admits that the resurrection as a phenomenon cannot be constituted by an I, yet in order to receive it, the I must allow itself to be constituted and revealed. By doing so, the I converts itself from the I to the me (Marion 2017, pp. 100–101). This miraculous faith renders the gaze apt to see the manifestation of God.
Marion has a detailed analysis of the intertwining of the visible and the invisible in Western paintings. In elsewhere, I argue for two possible relationships between the visible and the invisible in Marion’s analysis. First, the invisible organizes the visible if the gaze in perspective aims at the intentional object. Second, the invisible and the visible are placed together in the sense that the invisible merges in the visible. It requires surpassing objectivity without any particular human perspective. While the first relationship produces phenomenality in the sense of giving the intentional object represented, the second produces phenomenality in the sense of giving itself by itself (Tang 2021, pp. 204–214). The second relationship underlies Marion’s argument for a new way of approaching God.
Concerning the scientific character of theology, Heidegger has a discussion in relation to the objectivating and nonobjectivating mode of thinking and speaking. The widespread, uncritically accepted opinion that all thinking, as representing, and all speaking, as vocalization, are already ‘objectivating’. However, only the thinking and speaking of the natural sciences is objectivating. Thinking and speaking are not exhausted by theoretical and natural-scientific representation and statement. The mode of thinking and speaking in theology and works of art need not to be objectivating because objectivating thinking and speaking would prevent the theos or the artwork from appearing. Interestingly enough, Heidegger concludes ‘theology is not a natural science’, but he leaves ‘the question whether theology can still be a science’ because he assumes that theology ‘should not be a science at all’ (Heidegger 1998, p. 61). Marion agrees with Heidegger that: (1) the mode of thinking and speaking in theology and works of art need not to be objectivating; (2) objectivating thinking and speaking would prevent the theos or the artwork from appearing; and (3) theology is not a natural science. However, Marion would disagree that theology ‘should’ not be a science at all. Rather than limiting theology by our preestablished idea of science that consists of objectivating mode of thinking and speaking only, Marion radicalizes the idea of science by including both objectivating and nonobjectivating modes of thinking and speaking into any future sciences. Therefore, theology is and should be a science.
One should bear in mind that in seeking to understand the philosophical grounds of atheism, Marion is not encouraging atheism. ‘This hesitancy obviously should not be understood as a sign of atheism, which would be anachronistic to the point of being a misreading’ (Marion and Kosky 1999, p. 786).
A similar ground can also be found in Richard Kearney’s Anatheism: Returning to God after God. Anatheism discredits and questions religion and theology in the West and returns to the experiences of approaching God. I believe that atheism, Kearney and Marion are similarly in search of an original preceding genesis outside any humanized God. However, unlike atheism, Kearney and Marion further describe a deep religious sensibility and do not encourage atheism. Interestingly enough, Kearney’s Anatheism still has several differences with Marion’s theology. For all their similarities and differences, it is noteworthy to refer to their dialogue in ‘Hermeneutics of Revelation’ as at the time even Kearney has not yet clearly used the term Anatheism (Manoussakis 2006, pp. 318–339).
I agree with Fritz’s interpretation. The realm of faith should not be sharply separated from reason although they are theoretically different. If reason refers to logos (the modern sense of reason or Sufficient Reason), then reason consists of exercising within all categories of being. Faith should be separated from reason (logos) because faith concerns the realm other than being. But Marion argues alternatively in his recent article ‘Faith and Reason’ that the opposition is artificial, for faith has its reasons and scientific reason has its belief (Marion 2017, p. 3). If reason refers to Logos, which consists of exercising within all categories of being as well as beyond all categories of being, then faith is inseparable from Reason (Logos).
It is true that God without Being is an extremely early source, situated in a very particular French debate. But one cannot deny that it grounds Marion’s broader philosophical and theological claims. As Fotiade and Jasper point out, it is a landmark volume in beginning to disengage the existence of God from the metaphysical concept of Being (Marion 2016, p. xvii).
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Acknowledgements
I would like to say a big thank you to the anonymous reviewers whose careful reading and constructive comments greatly improved my paper. Some ideas in this paper were presented in talks organized by RTHK and HKPPS. I am grateful to the participants for their questions and discussion and to the respective organizers for providing these opportunities.
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Tang, Mt. A Theo-logy Without logos: On Jean-Luc Marion’s Axio-meonto-theology. SOPHIA 62, 359–380 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-022-00927-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-022-00927-y