

Concepts in **Muslim Philosophy**



**Tariq Rafeeq Khan
Mudasir Ahmad Tantray**

Concepts in
MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY

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PREFACE

This book has been written as a basic introduction to the Muslim Philosophy. It comprises of some fundamental philosophical problems on which Muslim Philosophy is based upon. Muslim Philosophy is the philosophical study of interpretations and knowledge derived from the Quran, the Hadiths and other significant sources of teachings of Islam. Among these, Quran is the divine source of philosophy which explains the different aspects of world and guides to the true knowledge. Muslim Philosophy is the philosophy which discusses the fundamental problems of the world like existence, universals, mind, thought, language, God, world, soul, reality, knowledge and values. However, these problems or questions demand answers from the philosophers' attitudes and points of view which are highlighted in this book at a beginner's level. It is also a matter of fact that these problems or issues could not be answered through other ways. The need of the hour is that the philosophical ways, Islamic principles and methods distinguish these matters of facts from other disciplines. So, this book is helpful for undergraduate, postgraduate, and multidisciplinary scholars and thinkers interested in studying the basics of the Muslim Philosophy. It is also a valuable source for those who are just interested in acquiring knowledge in the field of Muslim Philosophy. This work shall guide them to understand the basic principles of Islamic Philosophy. The most notable Muslim Philosophers who are mentioned in this book are: Al-Kindi, Al-Gazali, Ibn Rushd, Al-Farabi, Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, Ibn-Arabi, Sheikh Nurrudin Wali (Nund-Reshi), Ibn Tayamiyya, Ibn-Sina, Shah Waliullah, Hamza Makhdhoomi, Allama Iqbal and Lal Ded. Furthermore, a few other important concepts of philosophy that have been mentioned in this book are Mutazalism, Asharism, Sufism and Articles of Faith.

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Mudasir Tantray

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1. Introduction

Muslim philosophy is the philosophy which tries to discuss and clarify the fundamental problems of the world. The fundamental problems of the world are Existence, universals, mind, thought, language, world, soul, reality, knowledge and values. However, these are not the problems but these are the questions which demands answers from the philosopher's stance and thinking. It is a matter of fact that these problems or issues could be answered and resolved through other methodological ways but the need of the hour is that philosophical ways and methods distinguishes them from others disciplines.

Problems, questions, thoughts, ideas are same in every philosophy like western philosophy, Indian philosophy, African philosophy, Chinese philosophy and Muslim philosophy. So, what distinguishes and separates Muslim philosophy from other philosophies is only the sources like Quran, Hadith (teachings of the Prophet) and logic which differentiates the methodology of Muslim philosophy from other philosophies. Here in Muslim philosophy, some conditions are necessary applied to answer the philosophical problems. First, to answer and clear these problems in our life, we need to reflect on Quran as a source and imply rulings according to it. Secondly, we need to judge problems as per prophetic teachings

and third we need to think on these problems through Analogical reasoning (Ijtihad) or logic (authentic logic)¹

Categorically, we can say that Quran is a not a book of philosophy but there are many philosophical signs and issues which has been reflected and described in Quran. Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) was a great philosopher because he has clarified and simplified every philosophical problem with examples and illustrations. However, there are some limitations regarding Islamic religion but those are related to God, Soul and other religious matters, where we are bound not to discuss much without having the knowledge of religious Scriptures and Authentic books.²

Muslim philosophy is also called Kalam. This philosophy gets its birth between the 8th and 9th century which refers to Islamic Golden age. Two main currents may be distinguished the first is kalam, that mainly dealt with the Islamic theological questions and the other is Falsafa that was founded on interpretation of Aristotlianism and Neoplatonism. One of the first debates was between followers of the Qadar (Arabic: qadara means to have power), who affirm free will and the Jabarites (Jabar: force, constraint) who believed in Fatalism. The main source of classical or early Islamic philosophy is the religion of Islam itself especially ideas derived and interpreted from

¹ Authentic logic is the logic which quran and hadith recommends.

² In Islam, we have some limitations regarding the discussion and argument about God, soul, attributes of God, heaven, hell, and predestination. In Islamic sciences scholars can discus only with the guidance of Quran and Hadith (Sayings of the prophet).

the Quran. Most of the philosophers and people have a misconception regarding the founder of the Islam. Basically Islam has no founder. It is the religion of one God. Prophet Muhammad (SAW) is not the founder of Islam. He is the last prophet and Adam (AS) is the first prophet. God sent prophets only to propagate His commands in the form of Islam. The word Islam literally means peace. It is basically called the *Deen-e-Islam* and the Arabic word *deen* means religion. Muslim philosophy was present since Greek period but could not flourish much at that time. However, it spread after the Muslim conquests of the ancient regions like Alaxandria, Syria, Jundishapur, which came under Muslim rule.

Islam is the oldest religion of the world. It has 150000 to 200000 years of history but at that time it was not called Islam. The Prophet Adam and Eve who were the first human beings of the world are the first followers of the Islam. Holy Quran mentions that Adam and Eve were created by God and God taught them the names of things. Those Jews and Christians who followed their Prophets and their sayings are Islamic and those who were betrayed were not. It is a very big misconception to regard Prophet Muhammad (SAW) as the founder of Islam. He is the last prophet of the Islam. It is the name Islam which is new but its history is not new. Just like Pythagoras coined the term philosophy but thinkers before Pythagoras were doing philosophy and they were unaware that this is philosophy. So, among the Jews and Christians and may be people from other oldest religions who followed the prophets of Islam are considered as

Muslims and they have the same place in Islam as followers of Prophet Muhammad have.³

1.1. Characteristics and Nature of Muslim Philosophy

Muslim Philosophy has a very significant role in dealing with day to day problems. Muslim could have proved a very genuine knowledge to tackle with the issues which are debatable in Islamic religion. The knowledge of these issues and problems arise from due to the human practices in Islamic religion. There are no problems in Quran and in religion but the problem exists in human dealings. Muslim philosophy is the philosophy which tries to explore rational conflicts, empirical conflicts and hermentalical problems. Muslim philosophy is known as Ilm-al-Kalam. Many scholars believe that the advance of Muslim philosophy arises in the interpretation of Quran and Hadith. It also advent due to Linguistic problems and other modern burning issues. Muslim philosophy is the amalgam of two approaches, one is that we look at our actions through scriptures and another is that we can explain Islamic religious propositions through philosophical methodology. Following are characteristics of Muslim philosophy

1. It makes us to understand the Muslim theological problems and resolve them through philosophical methodology.
2. It is a philosophical activity which could philosophise the scriptures and other sources of knowing Islamic religion.

³ <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4480857,00.html>

3. It helps thinkers to understand the proofs which favour existence of God and the proofs which are against God.
4. It opens the new vistas for knowing the history of Islam.
5. It helps us to understand the philosophy of Quran and Hadith.
6. It rationalizes the issues discussed in Muslim theology.
7. It provides us the information regarding Muslim philosophers like, Kindi, Farabi, Avicenna, Rumi, Ibn Rushd, and others.
8. It differentiates the philosophy of different schools.
9. It helps to understand the debate between Muslim rationalism and empiricism in philosophy.
10. It discusses the Islamic view of morality, metaphysics, logic, religion and behavior.
11. It helps to understand the fundamentals of Islam.
12. It differentiates between existence and essence.
13. It explains the attributes of God, views of Mutazalites and Asharites.
14. It helps us to live one's life with Islamic Jurisprudence.
15. It makes us to differentiate between good and bad, valid and invalid through Quran and Hadith.
16. It provides us the Islamic criteria for choosing a Khalifa (King) for a state.
17. It provides us the Islamic description of human behavior.

1.2. Nature of Muslim Philosophy

The nature of Muslim philosophy is philosophical. Muslims have imperishably impressed their stamp on the history of civilization and evolved a culture of which any nation can legitimately feel proud. They held the torch of learning at a time when other nations of the world were shrouded in the darkness of ignorance. They led the world for several centuries in learning and culture. They established universities all over the empire far in advance of any in the west. The great seats of learning at Cordova and Granada were visited by Christian students who assimilated Muslim culture and spread it in European countries.

The chief impetus behind all the literary, scientific and philosophical activities of Muslim scholars was the religion they professed. Islam, as the term indicates, is a religion of peace and love. It has friendship for all, enmity for none. It contains within itself the seeds of growth and development. It embraces all learning in its fold, holding that all knowledge, whether of being or of the universe, is essentially one. It keeps pace with the general rise in the standard of humanity. It assimilates the growth of knowledge and makes further contribution thereto. Muslims, therefore, have had always a burning aspiration for reason and truth.

Some critics observe that Islam discourages the search of truth and is opposed to rationalism. They also assert that Muslim scholars were only imitators of foreign culture with no originality of their

own. These assertions only betray their ignorance of Islam and its history. Those who have studied the religion of Islam thoroughly and impartially know well that the Quran attaches great importance to the study of 'Hikmat' or rationalism, in as much as it says, 'whosoever has been given Hikmat has been given great wealth'. One of the chief attributes of God in the eye of Islam is 'Hikmat', which is mentioned in the Quran innumerable times. The main object for which the prophet of Islam was deputed by God was, in the words of the Quran, 'that he would show them (mankind) His signs, purify them, and teach them the scriptures and Hikmat'.

Such verses are further substantiated by the traditions. The prophet would often say that 'the ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr'. He, who leaves his home in search of knowledge, walks in the path of God. He who travels in search of knowledge to him God shows the way to paradise etc. From what has been said above, it is abundantly clear that the believers were required to develop the art of Hikmat and understanding to the best of their capacity.

Muslim philosophy is divided into two branches: Hikmat and Kalam (science of reason). The latter was subdivided into (a) Mutazalism (rationalism) and (b) Asharism (Scholasticism. Hikmat (freethinking) aims at attaining truths regarding the fundamental problems of the universe, soul and God by rational arguments acceptable to the general humanity, irrespective of their conformity or inconformity to the religious dogmas. But Hukama (Muslim

Philosophers) maintain that the truths and findings of reason invariably confirm to the religious injunctions.

Kalam (science of reason) on the other hand, aims to attaining truths in a way compatible with the laws of religion. Hukama and mutakalimun both believe in conformity of reason to revelation, with this difference that the former do not take into account the question conformity at the time of attaining truths, while the latter do take. Kalam is a science of reason which sprang up in course of controversies between the the orthodox believers and new converts to Islam. The new Muslims infused with their ancestral ideas and ideals began to interpret the Quranic text in their way. To meet this new situation a science of reason was brought into being under the name of 'Kalam'.

2. Origin and Development of Kalam

The Arabic word *Kalam* signifies word, speech and argumentation. The word *mutakallim* designates one who preaches it. It is not possible here to trace the evolution where by the word *kalam* came to mean simply theology, and the word *mutakallimun* (those engaged in the science of the *kalam*, '*ilm-al-kalam*') came to mean the 'theologians'. This would involve a more detailed analysis of the genesis of the problem, touched on below, of the Qurana's *kalam-Allah*, the 'word of God'. Furthermore, the science of the *kalam*, as the scholastic theology of Islam, came to mean more particularly a theology professing atomism, an atomism which, while it is

reminiscent of the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus, is entirely different in context. As the scholasticism of Islam, the kalam manifests itself as pure rational dialectic which operates upon the concepts of theology. We are dealing neither with mystical gnosis nor with the 'science of the heart' of which the Shiite Imams were the first to speak. Moreover, as the philosophers al-Farabi and Averroes, as well as Mulla-Sadra, al-Shirazi, have emphasized. The mutakallimun are above all apologists, devoted not so much to a demonstrated or demonstrable truth as to upholding, with the aid of all the resources of their theological dialectic, the articles of their traditional religious philosophy. Such a task is doubtless inescapable where a religious community is concerned: there was also a Shite kalam. But the Imams were already warning their followers against any exclusive attachment to the problems and method of the kalam. This is because mystical theosophy functions in a manner which is hermeneutical rather than dialectic, and keeps itself as aloof as possible from all 'intellectualism'. Those known as Mu'tazilites are considered to be the earliest as mutakallimun. They form, without any doubt, a school of speculative religious thought which is of prime importance, their labels being based on the fundamental religious facts of Islam. We must confine ourselves here to a brief description of the Mu'tazilites and their doctrine, following this with an account of the life and work of the great figure of Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari. Assertion, expressed in logical or dialectic fashion, whether verbal or written, was called by the Arabs, generally, but more particularly in religious teaching a Kalam and those who

advanced such assertions were called Mutakallimun. The name was transferred from the individual assertion to the entire system, and it covered also the introductory, elementary observations on Method, and so on. Our best designation for the science of the Kalam is 'Theological Dialectics' or simply 'Dialectics', and in what follows we may translate Mutakallimun by 'logicians'. The name Mutakallimun, which was at first common to all the logicians, was in later times applied specially to the Anti-mutazilite and orthodox theologians. In the latter case it might be well, following the sense, to render the term by Dogmatists or Schoolmen. In fact while the first dialecticians had the Dogma still to form, those who came later had only to expound and establish it.

Kalaam literally means speech or word. It is the argumentation about problems such as predestination (Qadar), divine justice, and eternity of the world, free will, Angels, Gayb (unseen), and Essences of God etc. These problems were resolved with the aid of Greek philosophy. The study of Islamic philosophy has had a long history not only in the Muslim world itself but also in the west. The tradition of the study of this philosophy in the west is nearly one thousand years old and can be divided into three phases, that is, the medieval period of translation, analysis, and study of Arabic texts; the second wave of translation and study in the Renaissance following the medieval effort, and finally a new attempt to study Islamic philosophy, which began in the nineteenth century and which continues to this day. There is certain continuity

in this long history and connection between these three phases, but there are also discontinuities.⁴

The Islamic revelation possesses within itself several dimensions and has been revealed to humanity on the basic levels of *al-islam*, *al-iman*, *al-ihsan* (submission, faith, and virtue) and from another perspective as *al-Shariah*, *al-Tariqah* and *al-Haqiqah* (the law, the path and the truth). When we speak of the role of philosophy in Islam, we must first of all ask with which aspect and dimension of Islam we are dealing. In any case we must avoid the mistake made only too often by many orientalists during the past century of identifying Islam with only the *Shariah* or *Kalam* and then studying the relationship of philosophy or metaphysics with that particular dimension of Islam.⁵ Rather in order to understand the real role of philosophy in Islam, we must consider Islam in all its amplitude and depth, including especially the dimensions of *al-Haqiqah* where precisely one will find the point of intersection between traditional philosophy and metaphysics and the aspects of the Islamic perspective into which wisdom in all its forms has been integrated throughout Islamic history.

The Quran and the Hadiths of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) are the real basis of the Islamic philosophy. Since philosophy is love of wisdom or knowledge, the impulsion given to them by the Muslims

⁴ Nasr, S. H. (2006). *Islamic philosophy from its origin to the present*. State university New York Press, pp-12,31

⁵ *ibid*

came directly from the Quran and traditions. The Quran is the first source of Islamic philosophy. The Quran has its own wisdom; it is full of philosophical ideas and truth. The western scholars are not correct in their thinking that Islam and free thought do not go together. There is nothing in Islam which is free from rational criticism. If this were not there, how it was possible to have different schools of thought in Islam. The mere presence of different schools of thought is conclusive evidence that Islam had provision of free thought

In the very first Quranic verses, God revealed to the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) there is a command for him to read in the name of the Lord. In another verse of the Quran, God commands him to pray for advance in knowledge. So also the Quran attaches great significance to Hikmah (wisdom/rationalism). One of the main attribute of Almighty God is al-Hakim. Man is endowed with reason and freedom of thought. He is the highest creation of the Almighty God. Search for knowledge is his duty. His perfectness lies in the acquisition of knowledge for which man is superior to other creations of the world and also to angels. He is the vicegerent of God on the Earth (Q:2: 29-34). Every man should reflect on the natural phenomena, the creation of heaven and earth, and the changes of season succession of day and night, the moon, the stars, the sun, the seas, the clouds, the winds and the laws around him. He should try to know his own self and the world around him. He should try to ponder over the mysteries of death and birth, growth

and decay of all things and beings. He should try to know all of them by inferences, observation and by rational experience.

The secondary sources are Pre-Islamic Arab ideas, Greek, Christian, Persian and Indian philosophies. Although, it has been argued that there were some secondary sources which influenced Muslim philosophy but it should be remembered that Islam was not a new religion;⁶ so it had some common points with some other religions but Islam did not accept anything in its philosophy which was against the Quran and Hadith. The first important Islamic philosopher was the ninth-century Philosopher Al- Kindi. He tried to provide a philosophical basis for theology. This was done by synthesizing the concepts of Greek philosophy and the doctrines of Islam. He was primarily influenced by the works of Aristotle and by neo-Platonism, which he synthesized into a single philosophical system. He claimed that conclusions of philosophy and religion are essentially harmonious. He, nevertheless, placed revelation above philosophy and prophetic insights above reason.

In contrast, Al-Farabi upheld the primacy of philosophical truth over revelation. He claimed that philosophical truth is the same throughout the world. Al-Farabi posited a Supreme Being who had created the world through the exercise of rational intelligence. He believed this same rational faculty to be the sole part of the human

⁶ Khan, M. S and Saleem, M. A. (1994).Muslim Philosophy and Philosophers. Ashish Publishing House Punjabi Delhi, pp. 3-5.

being that is immortal.⁷ Therefore, he set as the paramount human goal the development of the rational faculty. Al-Farabi considered all existing religions are symbolic expressions of an ideal universal religion.

In the eleventh century, the Persian Islamic philosopher and physician Avicenna achieved the most systematic integration of Greek rationalism and Islamic thought. Avicenna is regarded by Muslims as one of the greatest Islamic philosophers. He based his philosophy on a combination of Aristotelianism and neo-platonism. Contrary to orthodox Islamic thought. Avicenna denied personal immortality, God's interest in individuals, and the creation of the world in time. He also contended that religion is merely philosophy in a metaphorical form that makes it acceptable to the masses. These views invited strong criticism from Al-Ghazali.

Al-Gazali refuted the neo-Platonic theories of other Muslim philosophers, particularly those of Avicenna. The neo-Platonic theories were opposed to such orthodox religious doctrines as that of creation, the immortality of the soul, and divine providence. In his work, *The Revival of the Religious Sciences*, Al-Ghazali presented a unified view of religion.⁸ In this view, he incorporated elements from all three sources formerly considered contradictory: tradition, intellectualism, and mysticism. The work has been considered the

⁷ Perumalil, A. (2001). *An Invitation to Philosophy*. Rev. Ashish Amos of the Indian Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (ISPCK), Delhi, pp. 98-99.

⁸ *Ibid.*,

greatest religious book written by a Muslim scholar, second only to the Quran. His, book, Destruction of the Philosophers, had much to do with the eventual decline of the rationalist philosophical speculation in the Islamic community.

Against Al-Ghazali, Averroes defended Aristotelian and neo-Platonic views. Averroes held that metaphysical truths can be expressed in two ways: through philosophy and through religion. Some Christian thinkers understood Averroes as propounding what they called the theory of 'double truth'. But he did not actually propose the existence of two kinds of truth, philosophical and religious. He maintained that the world has no beginning. God is the 'prime mover', the self-moved force that stimulates all motion. God transforms the potential into the actual. He taught that the individual human soul emanates from the one universal soul. Averroes became the most significant Islamic philosopher in the western intellectual history through his influence on the scholastics.

The mystical movement in Islam called Sufism originated in the eighth century. It was the reaction against the growing worldliness of the Islamic community. It emphasized the inner life of the spirit and moral purification which culminated in direct communion or even ecstatic union with God. The inspiration to mystical union with God went against the orthodox Islamic commitment to monotheism. Prominent Sufis subsequently attempted to achieve a synthesis between moderate Sufism and orthodoxy. After the medieval period there was a stagnation of

Islamic culture. This led to movements aimed at social and moral reform. The first such movement was the Wahabi movement. It aimed at reviving Islam by purifying it of un-Islamic influence, particularly those that had compromised its original monotheism. It stressed the responsibility of Muslims to think independently rather than blindly accepting tradition.

The most influential reformist of the nineteenth century was Egyptian Mohammed Abduh. He tried to synthesize Western thought and Islamic doctrine. He believed that reason and modern western thought would confirm the truth of Islam rather than undermine it. He held that Islamic doctrine could be reformulated in modern terms. Intellectuals in Egypt, Turkey, and India attempted to reconcile such ideas as constitutional democracy, science, and emancipation of women with the teachings of the Quran.⁹ The Quran teaches the principle of ‘rule by consultation,’ they opined. In modern times this can best be realized by a representative government rather than monarchy, they argued. They claimed that the Quran encourages the study and exploitation of nature, but Muslims, after a few centuries of brilliant scientific work, have abandoned the scientific outlook. They demonstrated that the Quran has given women equal rights.

The Islamic philosophy likely with the other philosophies of the world has taken up large onto-cosmological, axiological and

⁹ Ibid.,

epistemological issues. Within the theological structure of Islam, Muslim philosophers have deliberated upon the diverse problems such as the problem of Being, harmony and multiplicity, the relationship between God, world and man and so on. Apart from these there have been certain other problems pertaining to reconciliation between revelation and reason, knowledge and faith, freedom and determinism and religion and philosophy. They have also engaged themselves on issues pertaining to space, time, causality, matter, mind, life and death etc.

However, the Islamic philosophy has remained, for long spells of time, under a shadow of doubt, criticism and uncertainty. Some thinkers, mostly orientalist, denied its very existence. This state of uncertainty with regard to Islamic philosophy continued all through the nineteenth century. Those philosophers, who tended to deny the very existence of an Islamic philosophy in view of their social and religious prejudices, misunderstood the very vision and mission of Islam.¹⁰ They consequently maintained that the teachings of Islam are opposed to all free discussion and rational investigation. In view of the same, Islam has never risen to the aid of philosophy and science throughout the centuries of its existence. The only fruits that Islam, according to them, has borne for its followers have been intellectual despotism, irrationalism, and dogmatism.

¹⁰ Kazmi, L. H. (2010). *Studies in Islamic Philosophy: Modern Islamic Thought*. Department of Philosophy Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh (U.P.) India, Part-2, pp. 2-7.

Islamic civilization, in its real sense, concerned itself with the development of human knowledge and science. It was not opposing philosophy but rather strongly recommending, encouraging and appreciating the attitude of philosophizing. It not only welcomed and embraced philosophy but in the light of Islamic teachings, also made it mandatory for the Muslim to adopt and inculcate among them rational temperament to understand the meaning, significance as well as the truth and reality of Islamic beliefs and values. In this way, Islamic civilization further welcomed opinions and views of all shades that it found or deemed fit in the framework of Islamic value system. There are several Quranic verses and the prophetic traditions, which vehemently endorse the above viewpoint and encourage reflective thinking and promote philosophical spirit in understanding things and various matters related to human life and cosmos.

The earliest philosophical theologians (Mutakalimun) of ninth and tenth centuries A.D., such as Mutazilites and Asharites discussed such vital philosophical issues as Freedom of Will and Determinism, Good and Evil, Reward and Punishment, Divine Justice and Human Responsibility etc. Besides the Mutazilism and Asharism, another important school of Islamic philosophy was Sufism or Islamic Mysticism.¹¹ The Sufi philosophers too were keenly appreciative of the epistemological, methodological and

¹¹ Ibid.,

hermeneutical issues pertaining to philosophical discourse. The most outstanding Sufi philosophers and poets such as Ibn Arabi, Rumi, Sadi, Jami, Iqbal, Hafiz, Mulla Sadra, Mahmud Shabistari etc. have made their substantive and methodological contribution to philosophy through the medium of Arabic, Persian and Urdu poetry and Mathnavi. Through their allegorical, parabolical, metaphysical, analogical and symbolic poetic expressions, the Sufis launched an irresistible critique against our quest for rational, objective, universal, eternal and transcendental account of reality long before postmodernists advanced extremely powerful assaults on the allegedly rational, universal, eternal, objective and transcendental accounts of reality formulated by ancient, medieval and modern philosophers of East or west. Islamic philosophy is unique in character and concerns towards various dimensions of life.

Islam promotes the philosophical spirit in order to thought, perceive, enquire, investigate, interrogate, examines and rationalizes things and matters related to every aspect of human life. The Quran being the foundational source of Islamic onto-cosmological doctrines and axiological norms powerfully inspires human beings to philosophize. The traditions of prophet supplement the Quran i.e. holistic view and value system by providing concrete guidelines to human conduct in multiple social, political, religious, ethical, and economic spheres of operation.¹² The following verses of the Quran

¹² Ibid.,

clearly indicate the place, function and the role of reason in the basic framework of Islam:

“(Here is) a Book which we have sent down unto thee, full of blessings, that they may meditate on its signs, and that Men of understanding may receive admonition.”¹³

The *Summum bonum* according to al-Ghazzali is the realization of the vision of God in the next world. This consists of seven elements: life without death, pleasure without pain, wealth without property, perfection without defect, joy without sorrow, honor without disrespect, and knowledge without ignorance- all these will be eternal and will never diminish. This everlasting bliss, the complete end, or ideal, will be achieved through one’s love for God as demonstrated by one’s conduct in this world. But the intensity of love towards God is conditioned by one’s knowledge of God. Thus it follows that knowledge is the highest, the supreme end in this world, for it leads to perfect love. Knowledge may be sought either as an end in itself or as a means to some end. When it is sought as an end in itself, it is absolutely good, but when it is sought as a means, it may be good or bad. It is bad when it is harmful to society or to the individual. It is good if it is conducive to the welfare of the individual in this world as well as in the next. The more it is conducive to the ultimate end the better it is, and it becomes absolutely good only when it becomes absolutely

¹³ Al-Quran, 38:29.

conducive to it.¹⁴ Knowledge which is absolutely conducive to the end is the apprehension of the nature of things and herein lays the object of man's creation. Knowledge is of two kinds: 'Ilm al-Mu'amala and ilm al-Mukashafa, ilm al- 'Mu'amala consists of knowledge and cultivation of outer and inner virtues and the eradication of outer and inner vices. There is no limit to the development of virtues in us. *Ilm al- Mukashafa* (intuitive knowledge) is the outcome of *ilm al- Muamala*. It is the ultimate end in this world leading to perfect love of God here and to the realization of His vision in the next. One who possesses the strongest love will be the most successful in the next world; and the intensity of the love which depends on the knowledge of God but knowledge of God can only enter a pure heart, that is a heart which after being purged of the vices, has adorned it with good qualities, in other words, which has completely emancipated itself from the love of this world. It is then good conduct (*al Amal al Salih*) which leads to the knowledge of God and is subservient to it.¹⁵ Thus, knowledge is a means as well as an end in itself.

Almost all Muslim classical authors from al-Kindi, al-Ferabi and al-Biruni to ibn-Khaldun have produced major classifications of knowledge. In general, *ilm* (knowledge) is divided into two categories: revealed (scriptures), and non-revealed knowledge. Revealed knowledge provides the moral and ethical framework, and

¹⁴Umaruddin, M. (2003).The Ethical Philosophy of Al-Ghazzali. Adam Publishers & Distributors New Delhi (India), pp. 125-126.

¹⁵ Ibid.,

non-revealed knowledge, the pursuit of which is an obligation under the dictates of *ibadah*. Non-revealed knowledge is further subdivided into two categories: *fard-ayan*, which is essential for the individuals to survive, and *fard kifayah* which is necessary for the survival of the whole community. The pursuit of knowledge for the benefit of the individual or the community is ‘*ibadah*’ contemplation of God. It will please the lord to see that one of his humble servants seeking the truth in His Revelation or in His Signs in pageants of nature.¹⁶

The phenomenon of the Islamic civilization may be seen as a wheel that is running on the axis of a continuous divine message from the first human, Prophet Adam, to the last Messenger of Allah, prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.). This divine axis of the Islamic civilization has remained the same because it has the same meaning of the living spirit and because it is the same logic of the transcendental truth. The code of the axis is such that it moves the wheel of the Islamic civilization in different directions. But it remains in the vicinity of the axis. The dynamics of the movement of the wheel is faster at its edge than at its center. The axis of the Islamic civilization is the divine gift, which unfolds itself in the continuity of life and history. The wheel of Islamic civilization is the divine gift as well, but its movement is due to the human direction

¹⁶ Usman, K. K. (1998). This is Islam. Forum for faith and fraternity cochin, india, pp. 135-136.

and speed.¹⁷ Indeed civilization is the is the state of mind which Ibn khaldun called the '*asbiyyah*', i.e. the passion for a decent human life as it progresses from one stage to another with a purpose of self-actualization in history. Very important forces of the passion for human life are the freedom of human spirit and the strength of human mind.

Islam is a complete way of life. Islam is not a new religion on earth. It exists from the dawn of human consciousness. There is no place for blind faith. It is a religion which requires right thinking, right speaking and right action. The quality of Islam is such that it is not against the philosophy; somewhat it has its own philosophy. Quran wants man to think, reflect and contemplate. Holy Quran encourages man to use reason and permits freedom of thought. Quran has stated man as the highest creation of God and pursuit of knowledge has been prescribed for him. In Islam there is no place for blind faith.¹⁸ There are several verses of the Quran and sayings of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) which put Islam in the category of higher order of learning leading to Muslim philosophy. Philosophy has its basis in the reflective capacity of man but it cannot go against the teachings of holy Quran. There are differences in the interpretation of Quranic verses but there is no controversy about its contents.

¹⁷Said, A. A. and Nimer, M. A. et al (2006). Contemporary Islam. Routledge Taylor and Francis Group London and New York, p. 17.

¹⁸Khan, M. S. and Saleem, M. A. (1994). Muslim Philosophy And Philosophers . Ashish Publishing House Punjabi Bagh, Delhi, p. 2.

Muslim thinkers have firmly believed that Islamic philosophy encompassed all aspects of human life; personal affairs, social problem, economic issues, security affairs and political questions. They have endeavored to show that reason and revelation do not contradict each other, and that religion would be acceptable to the people when it is illuminated by the light of philosophical wisdom.

In fact, the Islamic philosophy touches various important areas of human concern. It is mainly interested in exploring truth, knowledge, faith, values etc. Although Islamic philosophy, like many other philosophies, is religiously oriented; it has not ignored any major philosophical issue. For example, it has extensively discussed the problem of being, and deliberated upon such issues as time, matter, space, life, death. It drew distinction between the self (*nafs*) and reason, inborn and acquired qualities, accuracy and error, certainty and valid knowledge etc. It has investigated the question of what is virtue and happiness (*sa'adah*) and divided virtue into number of categories.¹⁹For example, al-Ghazzali says that man can attain perfection only by acquiring qualities that are similar to those of angels who are devoid of passions or sentiments. Man ought to subjugate the life of 'passions' to the life of 'reason'. When he attains the life of reason (*Hikmah*), he consequently surrenders himself to God, lies in Him and breaths in Him.

¹⁹Kazmi, L. H. (2010) Studies in Islamic Philosophy (part two). Department of philosophy Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh (U.P.) India, pp. 17-18.

According to Ghazzali, the fundamental dimensions of man are reason or wisdom (*Aql* or *Hikmah*), self-assertion and appetite (*Shahwa*). To form a beautiful character, these elements must work harmoniously. Their proportionate development produces good qualities or virtues which are conducive to the spiritual progress of the self and conversely their excess or deficiency produces traits which destroy man's spiritual and moral growth. For Al-Ghazzali, a philosophical mind, if rightly developed, produces the virtues like wisdom (*Hikmah*), self-assertion or courage (*Shaja'a*), appetite (in right sense that produces charity (*Iffah*), modesty (*Haya*), forgiveness (*Musaha*), patience (*Sabr*), contentment (*Qana'at*), helping others (*Musa'da*), piety (*Wara*), ability to estimate correctly (*Hussunal- Tadbir*), gracefulness and wit (*Zafar*) and Justice. Again, the wisdom also brings the virtue like clearness of vision (*Naqayat al -Ra'e*), administrative ability (*Husn al-tadbir*), acute-mindedness (*Fawat adh-Dhilhan*), etc.²⁰ Finally, the Islamic philosophy highlights that the highest virtue is uninterrupted contemplation and serene realization of truth.

3. Al Kindi: Concept of Philosophy

Before we turn to an analysis of al-Kindi's theological thought, let us examine his conception of the nature and scope of philosophy and the manner in which it differs from other disciplines. In *First Philosophy*, a major treatise addressed to the caliph Al-Mu'tasim, he

²⁰ Ibid.,

defines philosophy as “the knowledge of the realities of things, according to human capacity”, and first philosophy or metaphysics, more specifically, as the “knowledge of the first Reality which is the Cause of every reality”. Metaphysical knowledge, he explains, in unmistakable Aristotelian fashion, which is the knowledge of the causes of things. To the extent we know the causes of an object, our knowledge is nobler and more complete. These causes are four: the material, the formal, the efficient (moving), and the final. Philosophy is concerned with four questions also, since as ‘we have shown in numerous places’, writes al-Kindi. The philosopher inquires into ‘the whether, the what, the which, and the why’ or the existence, the genus (or species), the differentia, and the final cause of things. Thus whoever knows the matter knows the genus, whoever knows the form knows the species, as well as the differentia which it entails; and once the matter, form, and final cause are known, which means that we can easily know the reality.

In a noteworthy tribute to the ancients, al-Kindi stresses the cumulative character of philosophy, the debt of the philosopher to his predecessors, and his duty to receive the truth gratefully from whatever source it comes, even if this source should happen to be foreign: We owe great thanks to those who have imparted to us even a small measure of truth, let alone those who have taught us more, since they have given us a share in the fruits of their reflection and simplified the complex questions bearing on the nature of reality. If they had not provided us with those premises that pave the way to

truth, we would have been unable, despite our careful lifelong investigations, to find those true primary principles from which the conclusions of our obscure inquiries have resulted, and which have taken generation upon generation to come to light before now.

Al-Kindi quotes Aristotle as saying, “We ought to be grateful to the progenitors of those who have imparted to us a measure of truth, just as we are to the latter, in so far as they have been the causes of their being, and consequently of our discovery of the truth. Our aim should be to welcome truth from whatever source it has come, for nothing should be dearer to the seeker after truth than truth itself”. And, dedicated to the quest of truth, we ought to begin by setting forth the views of our predecessors as readily and as clearly as possible, supplementing them where necessary, according to the norms of our own language and times’. We should avoid prolixity in discourse, which has allowed false seekers after truth to misinterpret and repudiate the study of philosophy in the name of religion, of which they are devoid, and which they merely exploit for their personal aims and ambitions. Whoever repudiates the quest for truth as blasphemous (kufr), must himself blaspheme, for the knowledge of truth involves the knowledge of the divine, of the unity of God, of whatever is virtuous or useful, as well as the means for clinging to it and shunning its opposite. This, Al-Kind wrote, is precisely what all the genuine apostles of God have taught. Moreover, no one can reasonably deny that such a quest is necessary, for, if he admits that it is necessary, and then it is necessary. If he refuses, he must give

his reasons for this refusal; and this is already to admit that it is necessary, since no one can reason without knowing the reason or (as Aristotle put it) no one can refuse to philosophize without actually engaging in philosophizing.

As to the various divisions of philosophy, Al-Kindi establishes them on the basis of the different channels of human knowledge. To begin with, there is the channel of sense experience, which is bound up with our apprehension of external objects in an effortless and immediate manner through our senses. Such apprehension, like its sensible object, is in a state of continuous flux and may increase and decrease incessantly. The act of sensation results in the formation of certain images in the representative faculty and these images are subsequently committed to the retentive faculty for safe-keeping, and acquire in this fashion certain permanence.

In proving the existence of God, al-Kindi sometimes used the teleological argument, which has always enjoyed a particular preeminence in circles where religious or esthetic feeling has been intense. It is, however, the argument from the beginning or novelty of the world which he more generally used. Indeed, the finitude of time and motion is advanced by Al-Kindi as a clue to the beginning of the world in time and this in turn as the clue to the existence of its author. Thus, having established that it is impossible for the world to be infinite and eternal, the author proceeds to make the inescapable inference that "it must therefore be generated of necessity. Now what is generated is generated by a generator since generator and

generated are correlative terms. The world as a whole must be generated out of nothing”.

3.1. Al-Kindi: Philosophy and Religion

Abu Yusuf ibn Ishaq Al-Kindi is the first in this group of philosophers whose works have survived, in part at least. He was born in Kufah around 185/801 into an Arabic family of the Kindah tribe, from the south of Arabia, which earned him the honorific title of “Philosopher of the Arabs”. His father was governor of Basrah, where Al-Kindi himself spent his childhood and received his primary education. He then went to Baghdad, where he enjoyed the patronage of the Abbasid Caliphs al-Ma'mun and al-Mu'tasim. The latter's son, Prince Ahmad, was the friend and mentor of Al-Kindi, who dedicated several of his treatises to him. But during the caliphate of al-Mutawakkil (232/847-247/861) Al-Kindi, like his Mu'tazilite friends, fell out of favor. He died, a lonely man, in Baghdad in about 260/873 (the year of al-Ash'ari's birth, and also the year in which in Shaism the 'lesser occultation' of the twelfth Imam begins).

In Baghdad, philosophers were involved in the scientific movement stimulated by the translation of Greek texts into Arabic. He himself cannot be considered a translator of ancient texts, but, being a well to do aristocrat, he had a large number of Christian collaborators and translators working for him, though he often ‘touched up’ the translations with respect to Arabic terms that the latter found

difficult. Thus the famous theology attributed to Aristotle was translated for him. Ptolemy's *Geography* and part of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* were also translated by him.

He was known in the West principally for some treatises which were translated into Latin in the middle Ages: matter, form, motion, space and time. A few years ago, about thirty treatises by him were discovered by chance in Istanbul, and a number of these have since been edited, most notably the treatise 'On the First Philosophy', the treatise 'On the Classification of Aristotle's Works'.

Al-Kindi took an interest in metaphysics as well as in astronomy and astrology, in music, arithmetic and geometry. We know that he wrote a treatise about the 'five Platonic bodies', with the title 'On the reason why the Ancients related the five figures to the Elements'. He took an interest in the different branches of the natural sciences, such as pharmacology. His treatise 'On the knowledge of the powers of compound medicine' shows an affinity with the ideas of Jabir about degrees of intensity in Nature. In short, he is a fair illustration of the type of philosopher whose scope is universal, as was that of al-Farabi, Avicenna, Nasir Tusi and many others.

Although he was closely in touch with the Mu'tazilites who, prior to the reign of al-Mutawakkil, were in favor at the 'Abbasid court', al-Kindi was not part of their group—he aimed at something quite different from the dialecticians of the Kalam. He was guided by the

sense of a fundamental harmony between philosophical research and prophetic revelation. His aim accords with that of the prophetic philosophy outlined above a philosophy which we described as being the authentic expression of a prophetic religion such as Islam. Al-Kindi was convinced that doctrines such as the creation of the world ex nihilo, corporeal resurrection, and prophecy, have neither origin nor warranty in rational dialectic. These influences merge with the general Islamic perspective, whose truths are regarded by al-Kindi as so many lamps slighting the way of the philosopher. He is rightly considered to be a pioneer, the first of the 'peripatetic's' in the special sense that this word, as we saw, possesses in Islamic philosophy. If he was known to the Latin West as a philosopher through the few treatises mentioned above, he was also known as a mathematician and a master of astrology. Prophethood in Islamic is not a natural faculty as rationalists thought but prophets are chosen by God to eradicate evil and to reform mankind. God sent down different prophets towards their nations. In Islam there are approximately one lakh twenty thousand prophets, the first among them is Prophet Adam and the last is Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W).

The Relationship between Philosophy and Religion Al-Kindi was the first Muslim to seek harmony between philosophy and religion or between reason and revelation. According to him, the two are not contradictory because each of them is the science of truth, while the truth is one. Philosophy includes Divinity, Allah's Oneness, and Allah's Superiority and other sciences that teach how to obtain what

is useful and to stay away from what is harmful. Al-Kindi made a phenomenal contribution when he was able to bring philosophy and religion together. According to al-Kindi, the real function of philosophy is not to challenge the truth of revelation or to demand presumptuous superiority or demand equality with revelation. Philosophy must in no way put forward a claim as the highest way to truth and want to humble itself as a support for revelation. Al-Kindi introduced religion with philosophy on the grounds that philosophy is the science of truth, and religion is also the science of truth as well; therefore there is no difference between the two. The influence of the Sect of Mu'tazilah (a group who dissociated from Hasan al-Basri) was evident in the way he thought when he determined the ability of the human mind to know the secrets brought by the prophet Muhammad SAW. According to Al-Kindi we should not be ashamed to admit the truth and take it from wherever it comes, even from other nations far from us. He defined philosophy as the knowledge of everything to the extent of human knowledge. Therefore, al-Kindi firmly said that philosophy has limitations and that it cannot overcome problems such as miracles, heaven, hell, and the afterlife. Philosophy, Religion, true knowledge and truth results from rational arguments and through revelation. Theology is a part of Philosophy. Theology is the core of religion. The purpose of Philosophy is searching for the Truth. Al-Kindi is a pioneer in making efforts to integrate philosophy and religion or between reason and revelation. So it can be said that Al-Kindi has played a large and important role in Islamic philosophy.

4. Ibn Tayimiya: Refutation of Logic

Ibn Taymiyah, who was born at Harran in Mesopotamia in 661/1263, and who died in prison in Damascus in 728/1328, was a Hanbalite theologian, and consequently a representative of the line most antagonistic to that of the philosophers. He was a polemicist and a critic, and he challenged everything and everyone with spirit and courage. In reading him, the metaphysician is at least able to grasp what it is in his own work which will always be incomprehensible to the non-philosopher. And when a character like Ibn Taymiyah proves to be the inspiration, through his writings, of the so-called modern Hanbalite renaissance a few centuries later—that is, the Wahhabite movement in the eighteenth century and the salafi reform in the nineteenth century—then the philosopher must agree that such a character merits his particular attention. One of his most famous teachers was Shaykh Shams al-Din al-Maqdisi, the great qadi of the Hanbalites in Damascus after 663/1265. Ibn Tayamiyya refuted philosophers and logicians. He wrote his famous Refutation of the Logicians (*Radd al-mantiqiyin*), which is an attempt to destroy the logic of the Greeks and the main theses of the great philosophers, notably of al-Farabi, Avicenna and Ibn Sab'in. But his most important and characteristic work is the *Minhaj al-Sunnah* (The Way of Sunnism), which he wrote between 716/1316 and 720/1320. This is a massive and methodical polemic against the *Minhajal-karamah* (The Way of Charisma) by al-'Allamah al-Hilli (726/1326), the famous theologian and pupil of Nasir al-Din Tusi.

Needless to say, Shiism survived the attack perfectly well; in as lively a fashion as philosophy survived the attacks of al-Ghazali. But Ibn Taymiyah's work is of great interest when it comes to understanding the fundamental contrast between the Sunni and the Shiite conceptions of Islam. Comparison is very hard, however, because everything here takes place on the level of the kalam, not on the level of the theosophical metaphysics of Haydar Amuli or Sadra Shirazi. He criticizes those who conceive the relationship between the Necessary Being and non-necessary, creatural being as the relationship between matter and form; a propos of Ibn al-'Arabi, he attacks those who distinguish between existence in actuality and the simple, positive reality of essences. We must at least make mention of the most faithful of his disciples, the Hanbalite Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah (d. 751 /1350), who taught and commentated his works and who accompanied him twice to prison. We should also mention his *Kitab al-Ruh*, a great Book of the Spirit, whose subject is the Spirits (Arwah) of the dead and the living. Like his other works, of which there are seven or eight, this is worthy of more than a mere analysis. Ibn Taymiyyah was an eminent Muslim scholar reputed with his criticism of Aristotelian logic, especially in his works *al-Radd ala-al-Mantiqiyyan* and *Naqd al-Mantiq*. Inherent in his criticism of logic was his refutation of metaphysics, the actual target of his criticism of logic. 1. Ibn Taymiyyah thought that Muslim philosophers (had) approached some metaphysical problems pertaining to Islam from an almost exclusively Aristotelian perspective, 2. Even despite their attempts to harmonise Greek

metaphysics with the Islamic teachings. Their approaches were, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, rather incompatible with the metaphysical doctrines taught by the Quran and the Prophetic tradition as understood by the earlier generation of Muslims (al-salaf al-Salih). It is interesting to elaborate on the incompatibility of Aristotle's metaphysics with its Islamic counterpart upheld by Ibn Taymiyyah. There are at least three aspects of metaphysics that Ibn Taymiyyah believed to be contradictory, which he consequently rebutted seriously. The three aspects are the subject matter of metaphysics were (1) the concept of universal, (2) the issue of the contingent being and God's existence, and (3) the origination of the universe.

Ibn Taymiyyah's critique of Aristotelian metaphysics seems to be driven by a desire to follow the way of the earlier generations of pious Muslims (salaf al-saliha), who had posited that the only source of Muslim thought was revelation. He held that the subject matter of metaphysics could not be the reality of created being (al-mawjud), but God Himself (alwujud). He argued that placing the created being as the subject matter of metaphysics could lead to the application of a principle that God has in common with all of His own creatures, thus reducing His universality. However, he did not clarify that in some places the revelation also commands that Muslims should understand God by way of His creature. The dispute would then evolve around the concept of 'universal'. Moreover, Ibn Taymiyyah's concern to avoid positing any resemblance between

God and creation was also manifest in his repudiation of Ibn Sina's theory of 'possible being' in relation to the 'Necessary Being,' especially in relation to the theory of emanation. Yet, the philosopher's theory of emanation was against the principle of creation. Envisaged from this angle, the philosophers' metaphysics was incompatible with Quranic thought as understood and vindicated by Ibn Taymiyyah and by other Muslim thinkers, too.

Ibn Taymiyyah criticizes the Aristotelian logic in his book *al-Radd 'ala 'l-Mantiqiyyin*. He believes that the proposition (al-qadiyyah) that is based on experience can ensure true knowledge and it can be subjected to examination and empirical proof. Although the universal proposition (alqadiyyah al-kulliyyah) is derived from the particular one, it does not exist in the experiential world but only in the intellect. This means that we can think it, but we cannot prove it by empirical means. Therefore for Ibn Taymiyyah the particular and experiential proposition assumes a fundamental importance. In his book *De Interpretatione*, Aristotle distinguished between different types of propositions: a proposition (in the sense of 'assertion') is whatever can be said to be true or false. A prayer, on the other hand, is a proposition that is neither true nor false. This is because one cannot ask if a prayer proposition is true or false, while a universal proposition asserts something and subjects its claim to the bar of truth or falsity. Aristotle speaks about an assertive proposition that reveals the truth of things.

5. Ibn-Sina (Avicenna): Theory of knowledge

Ibn - Sina (Avicenna) was a polymath and a Persian philosopher. Avicenna thought that brain as the place where reason interacts with sensation. In this theory of knowledge ibn Sina identifies the mental faculties of the soul in term of their epistemological function. knowledge beings with abstraction, sense perception, being already mental is the form of the object perceived we must both retain the images given by sensation and also manipulates them by disconnecting parts and aligning them according to their formal and other properties, retention and manipulation are distinct epistemological functions and can't depend on the same psychological faculty. Avicenna reconciles Aristotelism and Neo-Platonism along with kalam. He also propound that child's mind at born is a Tabula rasa (white sheet/blank state). Ibn Sina's famous works are (Al-Kanoon- Fil-Tib) canon of medicine and Al-shifa (the book of healings). Ibn Sina stresses the importance of gaining knowledge and develops a theory of knowledge based on four faculties, i.e. Sense perception, retention, imagination and estimation. While, imagination has the principle role in intellection, as it compare and construct images which give it access to universals. The ultimate object of knowledge is God, the pure intellect. Ibn Sina defines knowledge as abstraction of the form of a thing known to us. Different cognitive faculties have various degrees of this abstracting power. Our sense-perception, in order to negotiate a cognitive act needs the very presence of matter. On the other hand, our imagination does not

require the presence of actual matter. However, it also needs material accidents which give to the images its particularity. It is only intellect which cognizes the pure form in its universality. The human faculty of perception is comprised of both internal and external powers of understanding. Our five senses such as sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste are sources of perception of the phenomena. Our internal perception consists of such faculties as *sensus communis* (*hissi-I Mushtaraka*), representative imagination (*khayal*), the cogitative (*Mufakkirah*), memory (*Hafizah*) and active Imagination (*Takhayyul*). Some faculties are engaged in the perception of the form of the sensed objects and others perceive their meaning or intended purpose of the object. Various faculties have various functions. For example, form and matter of objects are grasped by our cogitative faculty. Our representative imagination is the treasury of forms and figures which as our memory is the storehouse of meanings. Our active imagination achieves universal concepts. These faculties can understand meanings and significances and they can also derive erroneous conclusions.

5.1. Perception by Sense

Perception is the abstraction by the percipient subject of the form of the perceived object in a certain mode. It is a perception of same material object in which it abstracts its form from its matter. But there are different kinds of abstraction and its various grades. The reason for this differentiation is that owing to matter, the material form is subject to certain states and conditions which do not belong to it qua form. Sometimes the abstraction of the form is effected by

all its material attachments. At other times, the abstraction of the form may be effected only by some of the material attachments. It is also that the abstraction is complete in which it not only abstracts the form from matter but also the accidents the matter possesses. For example, the form (quidity) of man is a nature in which all the individuals of the species share equally while in terms of definition it is a single unit. It is merely by accident it exists in this or that individual and is multiplied. This multiplicity and essentiality do not belong to man. Then man would not be predicted of what is numerically one. Again, if the quiddity of man were present in 'Zaid' merely because it is his own quiddity, it could not be attributed to 'Amr'. Consequently, one of the accidents which occur to the human quiddity through matter is multiplicity and divisibility. Besides, it also possesses accidents when it is in matter like quantity, quality, space, and position. Sense abstracts the form from matter along with these accidents and its relationship with matter. Sensation cannot totally separate form from matter. It cannot be totally divorced from material accidents, nor can it retain that form after the absence of matter. Sense neither abstracts it completely from matter, nor from the accidents of matter.

5.2. Perception by Imagination

In the faculty of representation or imagination the abstracted form is purified to a form of higher degree. Representation takes form from matter in which it does not need the presence of matter for the presence of form. The representative faculty retains the form even after the absence or corruption of matter. The representation

abstracts the form completely from matter. The forms in representation are same as the sensed forms and possess a certain quantity and position. The form in representation does not admit all the individuals of the species to share in it but in representation only a particular man is represented among men. But men might exist as well as represented different from particular man in representation.

5.3. Perception by Estimation

The faculty of estimation goes higher in abstraction because it receives the intentions which are non-material although they accidentally happen to be in matter. Shape, colour, position, etc. are necessarily attributes of bodily matters but good and evil, agreeable and disagreeable being non-material entities present in matter are accidental. Good and evil, agreeable and disagreeable are conceivable apart from matter and indicative of their being non-material. It is such entities which the faculty of estimation perceives and thus it perceives non-material objects which it abstracts from matter. This abstraction is relatively more perfect and nearer the absolute than the perception and representation.

5.4. Reason

In the faculty of reason fixed forms are either the forms of existents which are not at all material and do not occur in matter by accident, or the forms of existents which in themselves are not material but happen to be so by accident, or the forms of material existents, though purified in all respects from material attachments. This

faculty perceives the forms completely abstracted from matter in all respects. Which existents in themselves free from matter. This faculty completely abstracts those existents present in matter either existentially or accidentally. They are abstracted from matter and material attachments in every respect and perceived in pure abstraction. Thus in the case of 'man' which is predicted of many, this faculty takes the unitary nature of the many, diversity of all material quantity, quality, place, and position, and abstracts it from all these in such a way that it can be attributed to all men. Thus sensation, representation, estimation, and intellect are the various judging faculties yielding knowledge. Ibn Sina while bringing out the intellective or facultative account of human knowledge also talks of hierarchy of faculties. The Acquired Intellect is the presiding intellect. The habitual intellect serves the actual intellect which is itself served by material intellect with all its capacities. The practical intellect serves them all for attachment to the body exists for the sake of perfection and purification of the Theoretical Intellect. The Practical Intellect is served by the faculty of estimation, the faculty of representation is served by the appetitive faculty and the representative faculty and the faculty of imagination serves it by accepting the combination and separation of its images. The faculty of imagination is served by fantasia which is itself served by five senses. The appetitive faculty is served by desire and anger. These are served by the motivative faculty distributed through the muscles. The animal faculties are served by the vegetative faculties in their entirety. The particular is perceived by the material faculty and the

universal by the non-material faculty. The particular is perceived only through a bodily organ. The perceiving faculty of individual forms that is the external senses do not perceive them completely abstracted from matter and at all divorced from material attachments. These individual forms are perceptible only when their matter is present. A body can be present and perceived only by another body and cannot be present to what is incorporeal. Being a spatial entity (thing) it cannot have a relation of presence and absence to a non-spatial or immaterial faculty. Presence occurs only at a certain position of nearness and distance of the present object in relation to them one to which it is present which is also either a body or in a body. The faculty which perceives the individual forms as completely abstracted from matter but not at all abstracted from material attachments, like representation, also needs a physical organ. For the faculty of representation cannot perceive without the represented forms being imprinted on a body in such a way that both it and the body share the same imprint. The animal faculties assist the rational soul in various ways. Sensations bring to it particulars from which result four intellectual processes. Firstly, from these particulars the soul abstracts single universals by abstracting their concepts from their matters, material attachments and accidents considering the human factors and differences, and by distinguishing the essential from the accidental. From this the soul gets the fundamental concepts by using the faculties of imagination and estimation. Secondly, the soul finds relations of negation and affirmation between these separate universals. In case of self-evident

combination by negation and affirmation, it simply accepts it; but in case of its absence it leaves it till the discovery of the middle term. Thirdly, the soul acquires empirical premises found through sense-experience the necessary attribution of a positive or negative predicate to a subject, or in finding a contradictory opposition e.g., man is rational, man is not rational, or a consequence of a positive or negative conjunction e.g. if it is day it is light; if it is not a day it is not light; or a positive or a negative disjunction without contradictory opposition e.g., either it is day or it is night. This relation is valid always. This belief is obtained both from sense-experience and from reasoning, it does not involve chance. Fourthly are the reports to which the soul gives assent on account of unbroken and overwhelming tradition. The soul requires the help of the body in order to acquire these principles of conception and judgment after acquiring them it returns to itself. When the soul becomes perfect and strong i.e. after obtaining all the principles it needs for conception and judgment, it isolates itself absolutely in its actions, and the faculties of sensation and imagination and all the other bodily faculties divert it from its activities. For example, a man may need a riding animal and other means to reach to a certain place and after having completed a work certain eventuality falls which make him to stay, but the very means he has employed to get these would indirectly prove an impediment. Thus the -substratum of the intelligible i.e. the rational soul is not a body, nor a faculty in a body. Reason stands at the apex of the intellectual powers of the soul. The unity of Reason is exhibited in self-consciousness, or the

pure recognition of its essential nature. Reason lifts up the lower powers of the soul, refines sense perception, and generalizes presentation. Reason at first a mere capacity forth ought to become elaborated by the finished material conveyed to it by the external and internal senses. Reason through the exercise of its capability becomes reality through the instrumentality of experience, but it is under guidance and enlightenment from the ‘Giver of the Forms’ - the Active Spirit that imparts ideas to the Reason. The soul of man does not possess any memory for the pure ideas of Reason, for memory presupposes a corporeal substratum, whatever the rational soul comes to know flows to it on each occasion from above. Thinking souls do not differ in the range and contents of their knowledge, but in the readiness with which they put themselves communication with the Spirit over us to receive their knowledge. The real essence of man lies in its rational soul and comes to know the higher by means of the enlightenment given by the World-Spirit.

6. Ibn- Sina (Avicenna): Theory of Being

Ibn-Sina (Avicenna) was born in 989 A.D in Afshana in the Bukhara district and he died in 1037 A.D in Hamadan. He was influenced by Al-Farabi’s writings. Aristotle was always his ideal. He agreed with Aristotle that God was the unmoved First mover, existing by his own nature and who eternally generated the first created being-pure intelligence-by a creative activity of thought. The first intelligence created the second intelligence and the first celestial sphere and its soul. The second intelligence produced the

third intelligence and so the process continued to the tenth intelligence, the given of forms. He classified souls as vegetables, animals and human but the human soul could reproduce, motivate, grow, perceive and reason. Reason had two faculties: the theoretical and practical. The theoretical could develop to the stage of actual intellect, activated by the tenth intelligence, and then knowledge consisted of discovering necessary relation between Universals. He based his theory of intelligence on Aristotle's theory of the movers of the sphere. His theory was accepted in Christian medieval philosophy with the intelligence as angels. He classified metaphysics as the primary science because its subject was primary with the necessary properties of being and its major divisions such as substance and accident. God is divine science and the goal of metaphysics was to know Him.

Ibn Sina or Avicenna was an encyclopedic philosopher, physiologist, physician, mathematician, astronomer and poet. He is the most famous scientist and philosopher of Islam and one of the greatest of all races, places and times. His thought represents the climax of Arabian philosophy and he is also called al-Shaykh al-Rais i.e. 'Archpriest of Learning'. Like Farabi, he too is deeply impacted by Greek rationalism. He was influenced by the teachings of Plato, the neo-Platonists, Galen and Aristotle. However the system of philosophy which he expounded was his own. There is substantial originality in his teaching of the subtle difference between "essence" and "existence" and between the "necessary-

Being” and the “possible being”. Ibn Sina divides philosophy into Logic, Physics, and Metaphysics. For him Philosophy is essentially a study of all Being or Existence. It also studies the fundamental principles of different sciences. Human soul which is dedicated to philosophical explorations attains higher levels of perfection by its continuous engagement with the fundamentals of all sciences or disciplines. The Being or Existence is also of three types:

- (a) The Spiritual
- (b) The Corporeal,
- (c) The Intellectual.

The spiritual aspects of the Being are the subject matter of metaphysics. The corporeal aspects are studied by physics and the intellectual aspects are explored through logical methods. The ultimate stuff of physical existence is matter whereas the metaphysical realm is clipped of matter. On the other hand, the principles of logic are abstracted from the material phenomena. The logic resembles mathematics. However logic unlike mathematics cannot always be represented by symbols. The logical has its existence only in the intellectual categories such as Identity and Difference, Unity and Plurality, Universality and Particularity, Essentiality and contingency.

In his metaphysical thinking Ibn Sina is inspired by Aristotle and Plotinus. He is also deeply impacted by Islamic world-view. In working out his metaphysical system, Ibn sina tries to bring out, the synthesis or reconciliation between the assumptions and principles

of Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic systems of Philosophy and Islamic or Semitic monotheistic perspective upon the universe. According to Ibn Sina, God is eternally and supremely transcendental. He is high above the created world. God's relationship with the world is negotiated by intermediary links. These links relate to the absolute eternity and necessity of God with the world of pure contingency. In view of the same, Ibn Sina appropriates a Neo-Platonic theory of Emanation. God is the only Necessary Existent. The first Intelligence alone flows from Him. As He is absolutely a unity, only one thing can emanate from Him. However, the nature of the first intelligence is no longer absolutely simple. Its possibility has been actualized by God. In view of this dual nature, the first intelligence gives rise to two entities: (i) the second intelligence by virtue of the higher aspect of its being, its actuality, and (ii) the first and highest sphere by virtue of the lower aspect of its being, its natural possibility. This dual emanatory process continues down to tenth Intelligence which resides the sublunary world. Most of the Muslim philosophers consider the Tenth Intelligence as Angel Gabriel. However, Ibn Sina does not offer any full-fledged metaphysical or theological proof for the existence of God. Rather, for Ibn Sina God is the ground of the world, i.e. given God we can understand the existence of the world. Here cause and effect behave like premises and conclusion, i.e. instead of working back from a supposed effect to its cause; we work forward from an indubitable premise to a conclusion. For Ibn Sina, God creates through a rational necessity. Ibn Sina also explains the divine pre-knowledge of all events on the

basis of this rational necessity. Ibn Sina also forwards a radical dualism with regard to mind-body relationship. For Ibn Sina, human soul is a substance capable of existing independently of the body, Ibn Sina tries to establish the incorporeality of soul by suggesting in a Cartesian manner that we can doubt the existence of the body but we cannot doubt the existence of the mind. It may be called the argument from abstraction in that it abstracts physical function from the total functions of the organism. Ibn Sina maintains that there is a complete disruption between the mental and physical qualities. Both types of qualities cannot belong to one and the same substance or the mental and the physical attributes negotiate a difference of kind not a difference of grade. The soul is an independent substance and is our transcendental self. At the transcendental level, the soul is a pure spiritual entity and body does not enter into its definition even as a relational concept. However, at the phenomenal level, there exists a mystique between each soul and body which renders them exclusively appropriate for each other. The impact of the mind on the body is visible in voluntary movements. The mind impacts body through imagination, desire, impulsion and movement of the muscles. The mind also influences body through emotional and voluntary acts. Indeed when an idea becomes firmly established in the imagination, it necessitates a change in the temperament and in our overall behaviour. For Ibn Sina, it is possible that the soul can transcend its own body to affect others. At this level, the soul becomes akin to the Universal Soul. It is of the nature of mind to influence matter and it is of the nature of matter to obediently follow

the instructions of mind. Ibn Sina follows Farabi's logic in its essentials. The central task of the logician is to derive from known premises that which is unknown. Human thinking, in its raw form, is ultimately linked to errors of appearance and desire or epistemic and moral limitations. It needs great intellectual struggle to elevate the representations of the sense experience to the pure truth of the Reason. It is through reason that we can gain necessary knowledge with regard to respective propositions in their different permutations and combinations. Ibn Sina's treatment of the universals is also similar to that of Farabi. The existence originates in the mind of God and when existents appear, in material forms, we are confronted by plurality or multiplicity. It is only at the human intellectual level that universal ideas are established. Ibn Sina develops his logical views on the model of Farabi's commentary on the Logical Organon of Aristotle. His philosophical works *al-Najat* and *al-Isharat* contain his logic. In his classification of sciences' Ibn Sina sub-divides the science of logic into nine parts. The first part is a kind of general philosophy of language which deals with terms of speech and their abstract elements. The second treats of simple and abstract ideas, applicable to all beings known as the categories. The third deals with the combination of simple ideas in order to form propositions named by Muslim philosophers as *Al ibarah* or a *Tafsir*. The fourth combines the propositions in the different forms of syllogisms and is the subject-matter of Aristotle's *First Analytics*, i.e. *al-qiyas*. The fifth discusses the conditions to be fulfilled by the premises from which the subsequent chains of reasoning proceed and is called the

Second Analytics i.e., al-Burhan. The sixth considers the nature and limitations of probable reasoning which corresponds to Aristotle's Dialectics i.e. al-Jadl. The seventh brings out the fallacies of logical reasoning, intentional or otherwise, and is equivalent to sophistical or al-Maghalita. The eighth describes the art of persuading through oratorical devices and is the rhetorical or al-Khatabah. The ninth and the last part explains the fine art of stirring the soul and the imagination of the audience through the magic of words, Ibn Sina presents Logic in a very broad sense in which syllogistic Logic is considered by him only a part of it. He considers Logic of an important place among the sciences, but at the same time recognizes its limitations. Its greater function is negative. The aim of Logic, he says in his book al-Isharat, 'is to provide us with some rules the observance of which would be a safeguard against falling into errors in our reasoning. Ibn Sina defines Logic as the science of Scales (canon). It is a pure (higher) and formal science and through it we can discover the unknown from the known. It is concerned with the different kinds of valid, invalid, and near valid references. While highlighting the importance of Logic, Ibn Sina says in Danish Nama "No Science which cannot be examined by the balance of Logic is certain and exact and without the acquisition of Logic, nothing can be truly called Science". Yet in an important work 'shifa' Ibn Sina calls logic an instrument. Ibn Sina in his science of Logic has discussed about the simple expressions and compound expressions, essential and accidental universals, genus, species, differentiation and common and special accidents, nature of definition and

description, names, terms and propositions, kinds of propositions, disjunctive conditional and the conjunctive conditional, contradictory Propositions, conversion, syllogism and its kinds, moods of the syllogism, induction and analogy, form and matter of the syllogism, premises etc. The Islamic logicians mostly were compilers and interpreters of the Organon of Aristotle which was available to them through Syraic and Arabic translation. Ibn Sina made departure from them and made ample use of Aristotelian and Stoic Logic but at the same time he did not consider Logic as a mere commentary on Aristotle. Rather he wrote many text books on logic and made also departures from Aristotelian logic. Thus Ibn Sina is regarded as “the greatest, and perhaps the most creative Logician of Islam”.

7. Ibn-Sina (Avicenna): Theory of Emanation

The animal and human life arises by virtue of the action of the heavenly bodies. But the Soul, as the principle of life, is an emanation from the lowest of the ‘separate intelligences’ or active intellect, the true agent of generation and corruption in the sublunary world and ‘giver of forms’ in it. The origination of the universe is described as an eternal procession, or emanation from the One. It is impossible that any change, whether it is an act of willing, intention, or capacity, should supervene upon it without prejudice to its immutability and perfection; and even a new relationship to an entity previously nonexistent, such as the creation of the world at a given moment, would involve change in its essence. This process of

emanation is bound up with the act of self-apprehension previously outlined. In so far as it apprehends itself both as the pure act of thought and the origin of all contingent entities in the world, the Supreme Being without any intermediary whatsoever generates the whole Creation and the order that permeates it. Neither will intention, nor any other form of passion or affection is involved in this process of generation, but only the act of apprehending itself as the cause and origin of all things. This necessary correlation between thinking and doing is a unique prerogative of this Being, and therein lies its ability to dispense with all the other conditions, including the condition of time, without which neither voluntary nor natural agents can generate any of their effects. He is most gracious and good, and, once a glimpse of his beauty is caught, the beholder can never be parted from him.

In this allegory it will be noticed that the light imagery, a favorite of Neo-Platonism and mysticism, is used to illustrate the doctrine of emanation. The category of goodness as a predicate of the Supreme Being, so radically emphasized in Ibn Sina's writings on metaphysics, is relegated to some extent to the category of beauty, which plays such a central role in the mystical-speculative attempts to describe figuratively the ineffable reality towards which the Soul tends. The passion, which moves it to seek union with this reality, is assimilated to human love (ishq).

From God, the highest being who is exalted above all distinctions and oppositions both of the Material and the Spiritual, the whole

world is derived by the path of Emanation. If now and again a Creation is spoken of, that is only to be understood as a form of adaptation to theological language. The gradation then of the Emanations is exhibited as follows: 1. The Creative Spirit. 2. The Passive Spirit, or the All-Soul or World-Soul; 3. The First Material; 4. The Operative Nature, a power of the World-Soul; 5. The Absolute Body, called also, the Second Material; 6. The World of the Spheres; 7. The Elements of the Sublunary World; 8. The Minerals, Plants and Animals composed of these elements. These then are the eight Essences which, together with God, the Absolute One, who is in everything and with everything completes the series of Original Essences corresponding to the nine Cardinal Numbers.

Does the universe have a beginning? Is it created and originated or not? Although Ibn Sina's answer to these crucial questions turns out to be in the negative, the full account and detailed arguments by which he corroborates his theses are by no means simple and therefore deserve careful examination. Briefly stated, Ibn Sina's position on this issue is a kind of synthesis between two rival schemes. The standard doctrine held by the majority of Muslim theologians affirms (1) that the universe, by which is meant the physical world of matter, does have a 'beginning in time' a definite moment in the past at which it was originated or created; (2) that its creator is one transcendent, eternal God; (3) that God's act of creation is voluntary in the sense that it is neither necessitated nor due to His eternal Essence; and (4) that God created it not from

anything pre-existent whatsoever, but ‘out of nothing’ (*la min syay*’), which also means that its origination is preceded ‘in time’ by non-existence (‘adam’). The other theory, though affirming God’s existence, contends that the universe, or rather the constituent matter underlying it is uncreated and that it has been there, eternally co-existing with God. This is the view subscribed by most philosophers (*falasifah*), who also deny God’s active role in the affairs of the world and construe Him as nothing more than the First Cause, an automatically operating force that keeps the spheres in motion and thereby sustains the world. Ibn Sina’s strategy was to adopt and appropriate the supposedly Aristotelian but actually Plotinian emanation scheme and fuse it with the Aristotelian metaphysics of self-sufficiency, causal necessity, and continuity of nature as well as with the Islamic monotheistic conception of the urgent contingency and immediate dependence of the world on God. It is in a bid to reconcile those polarized opinions as well as in a move to preserve the Quranic conception of God as the One that Ibn Sina adopted and appropriated the theory of emanation in his cosmology, viewing the universe as the necessary outflow or emission from an eternal, necessitating cause, i.e. the ‘necessarily existent’ God, while at the same time maintaining the metaphysical distinction between essence and existence with respect to necessary and contingent beings. This theory warrants Ibn Sina to allow the emergence of multiple things in the universe from the One without infringing in any way the simple oneness of that One, who is the source of the being of all things that exist. Thus, unlike the theologians who employ the terms

khalq and *ihdâts* for creation and origination respectively, Ibn Sina distinguishes the terms *sun* (making), *takwîn* (forming or producing), and *ibda* (inventing), from *ijad* (bringing into existence). And he reserves the term *fil* (acting) to describe Divine Agency, that is, the manner in which God ‘effects’ the universe in the sense of causing it to exist, or to be precise, necessitating its existence and sustaining it. It is in this sense that Ibn Sina uses and understands the term “act” as distinguished from the ordinary usage.

As far as Ibn Sina’s doctrine of emanative creation is concerned, one could easily discern that the theory is grounded on a presupposed premise derived from Revelation and philosophy which states that God is a unique and absolutely simple Being. Thus he maintains that the effect of God’s creative activity has to be consistent with His ‘unique’ nature (that is, His absolute oneness), so that the effect too would have to be numerically one and substantially simple, and hence his famous formula: “from one thing only one thing could proceed (*al-wâhid min haytsu huwa wâhid innamâ yûjad ‘anhu wâhid*).” However, since the universe is plainly composed and consists of innumerable things, it could hardly be supposed to have proceeded from God directly. Therefore, Ibn Sina contends, the only plausible explanation for the universe deriving its multiplicity from a single cause is to envisage a continuous series of individuals of various kinds proceeding from other causally prior entities, which serve as intermediaries between the First (*al-Awwal*) and the universe. In Ibn Sina’s view, the increasing scope and complexity of

these intermediary causes and effects, ranging from the immaterial ‘first intelligence’ to the lowest of material things, would eventually account not only for the tremendous diversity of the world-system, but also for its causal origin and dependence upon God. Thus God is seen as the agent or efficient cause (al-‘illah al-fâ‘iliyyah) of the universe and the latter as the expression of His act. Ibn Sina uses several terms to describe emanation, namely: *sudur* (procession), (*fayd*) (overflow), and *luzum* (necessary consequence). His choice of these terms reflects at least two assumptions, namely, his view that (1) the actuality of every contingent being represents the existential plenitude and activity of that from which it emanates, and that (2) such actualization is necessarily outgoing and self-revealing in the sense that the act not only belongs to it but also extends outward from it. Consequently, the procession of causes and effects will be continuous with its ultimate source in both a temporal and an ontological sense; temporally, it will be co-existent with God’s creative activity, and ontologically, the causal series will remain inseparable from God simply because it is a necessary overflow of Himself. This is part of the reason why Ibn Sina holds that the eternity of God’s existence necessitates a co-eternal universe which is the collective embodiment of the emanation, and this is why for him the universe (*al-kull*)—that is, the totality of things constituting the physical world, though not identical with God, is somehow a projection out of Divine Plenitude. According to Ibn Sina, it is from the Necessary Being, namely God, which is described as Pure Intelligence (‘*aql mahd*) and the First Principle (*al-mabda’ al-*

awwal) that all other beings derive their existence, not directly but through intermediary (*bi wasitah*). He insists, however, that we must not suppose that the universe comes into existence because God intended so (*‘alâ sabîl qasd minhu*), for then He would act for something lower than Himself and introduce multiplicity (*takatstsur*) within His divine essence. Nor can it be the case that the universe comes into existence naturally by itself (*‘alâ sabîl al-tab‘*) in the sense that He is not aware of its genesis and does not mean it (*lâ bi ma‘rifah wa lâ ridâ minhu*). Indeed, God was and always is completely cognizant of both the universe (which is His effect) and the goodness emanating from Him—a fact which not only reflects His perfection but also manifests part of the necessary consequences of His majestic nature to which every being yearns to return. It is by virtue of His act of self-reflection that the universe comes into existence (*ta‘aqquluhu ‘illah li’l-wujûd*) as a necessary consequence of His own Existence. Even so, Ibn Sina remarks, each of the issuing effects, including the universe is by no means identical (*mubâyinan*) with Him. Now, the First Principle is designated as Necessary Being (*wâjib al-wujûd*) in a double sense: not only does He exist necessarily, but He must act necessarily as well, and His act is an act of self-reflection. It is through His contemplation of His own essence (*ya‘qil dhâtahu*) that the first effect (*al-ma‘lûl al-awwal*), which is also said to be a pure, immaterial intelligence, necessarily proceeds. Since multiplicity (*kathrah*) is inconceivable in Him, the effect must be single (*wâhid bi’l-‘adad*), for as a rule, from one simple thing, only one can proceed. However, this formula breaks

down in subsequent emanations. For as Ibn Sina tells us, within the first intelligence (al-‘aql al-awwal) lies the germ of multiplicity, since its thought involves three acts of reflection, namely: (1) recognition of God’s necessary existence, (2) consciousness of its own causally necessitated existence, and (3) awareness of its own existence as in itself only possible. Consequently, the first act gives rise to another form of intelligence, the second act produces a celestial soul of the outmost sphere (nafs al-falak al-aqsâ), whereas the third act generates the body (jirm) of this same sphere. Then the second intelligence, in a similar fashion, gives rise to a third intelligence, to the soul of the second sphere of the fixed stars, and to the body of that sphere. From the third intelligence there likewise emanates another triad, namely, a fourth intelligence, the soul of the third sphere, and the body of the third sphere. This emanation of intelligences, we are told, goes on successively, each giving rise to successive triads and is halted only with the production of the sphere of the moon and the tenth or last intelligence, otherwise called the Agent Intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘âl) from which our material world of generation and corruption originated. This Active Intelligence, instead of begetting the soul and body of a sphere, begets human souls and the four elements, i.e. water, air, fire, and earth. As noted earlier, Ibn Sina conceives the universe as consisting of nine concentric spheres (aflâk) with their corresponding souls (nufûs samâwiyyah) and bodies (ajrâm ‘ulwiyyah), in addition to the ten intelligences (‘uqûl). In ascending order of the spheres he places, like Ptolemy did, the moon, Mercury, Venus, sun, Mars, Jupiter, and

Saturn—called the ‘wandering stars’ or planets (*al-kawâkib almutahayyirah*), whereas the Fixed Stars (*al-tsawâbit*) and another yet unnamed celestial body are said to be attached to the second and the first, outermost sphere respectively. Thus each planetary celestial body is believed to have only a single sphere (*falak*) or orbit (*kurah*) to which it is attached and by which it is carried around at various distances from the earth. In Ibn Sînian cosmic system, intelligence, being the teleological cause in every emanative triad, becomes the target of desire for the celestial soul within the triad, causing the eternal circular motion of the third component of the triad, the celestial body. And given the eternal motion of the celestial spheres, Ibn Sina thus postulates that the emanative process too must be eternal in the sense that God, the eternal efficient cause, ever in act, necessitates the existence of an eternal effect, the universe. One might curiously ask, however, why the process stops at the tenth, so-called Active Intelligence and does not go on ad infinitum. To this Ibn Sina replies: it is true that the necessary procession of multiplicity of being from one form of intelligence implies plurality of aspects (*ma‘ânî*) in it, the reverse is not true. That is to say, it would be wrong to assume that plurality of aspects always implies the necessary procession of multiplicity of beings. Nor is it true that every kind of intelligence having the same kind of aspects will produce the same kind of effects. What Ibn Sina seemingly wishes to say is that the outcome depends on the nature and power of each emanative intelligence; and as intelligences succeed one another, their power decreases, and since the Active

Intelligence stands low in the hierarchy its power is no longer sufficient to produce eternal beings like those emanated by the intelligences above it. Nevertheless, Ibn Sina ascribes to the Active Intelligence a set of functions that lend its scheme a balance missing in that of al-Fârâbî, who assigns the Active Intelligence functions related solely to the actualization of the human mind. By contrast, in Ibn Sina's scheme, the Active Intelligence, being the emanative cause of matter of our sublunar world ('aql al-âlam alardî), is not only responsible for bestowing the earthly beings their natural 'forms' (i.e. their souls) but also in charge of (yudabbiru) the souls of humans, animals and plants. Furthermore, the Active Intelligence is also described by Ibn Sina as the cause of the actualization of human minds (al-jawhar almukmil li anfus al-nâs) as well as the source of their intuitive knowledge. No wonder then the Active Intelligence is often called the Giver of Forms (wâhib al-suwar) and sometimes also identified as the Archangel Gabriel (rûh al-quds) or the Angel of Revelation (alrûh al-amîn).

8. Ijtihad: Shah Waliullah

Ijtihad literally means physical or mental effort, expended in a particular activity is an Islamic legal term referring to independent reasoning or the thorough exertion of a jurist's mental faculty in finding a solution to a legal question. It is contrasted with *taqlid* (imitation, conformity to legal precedent). According to classical Sunni theory, *ijtihad* requires expertise in the Arabic language, theology, revealed texts and principles of jurisprudence (*usul al-*

fiqh) and is not employed where authentic and authoritative texts (Qur'an and Hadith) are considered unambiguous with regard to the question, or where there is an existing scholarly consensus (*ijma*). Ijtihad is considered to be a religious duty for those qualified to perform it. An Islamic scholar who is qualified to perform *ijtihad* is called a *mujtahid*. Throughout the first five Islamic centuries, the practice of *ijtihad* continued both theoretically and practically amongst Sunni Muslims. The controversy surrounding *ijtihad* and the existence of *mujtahids* started, in its primitive form, around the beginning of the sixth/twelfth century. By the 14th century, development of Sunni jurisprudence prompted leading Sunni jurists to state that the main legal questions had been addressed and the scope of *ijtihad* was gradually restricted. In the modern era, this gave rise to a perception among Western scholars and laid Muslim public that the so-called 'gate of *ijtihad*' was closed at the start of the classical era. While recent scholarship established that the practice of Ijtihad had never ceased in Islamic history, the extent and mechanisms of legal change in the post-formative period remain a subject of debate. Differences amongst the jurists prevented Muslims from reaching any consensus (*Ijma*) on the issues of continuity of *Ijtihad* and existence of *Mujtahids*. Thus, Ijtihad remained a key aspect of Islamic jurisprudence throughout the centuries. *Ijtihad* was practiced throughout the early modern period and claims for *ijtihad* and its superiority over *taqlid* were voiced unremittingly. Starting from the 18th century, Islamic reformers began calling for abandonment of *taqlid* and emphasis on *ijtihad*,

which they saw as a return to Islamic origins. Public debates in the Muslim world surrounding *ijtihad* continue to the present day. The advocacy of *ijtihad* has been particularly associated with Islamic modernist and Salafiya movements. Among contemporary Muslims in the West there have emerged new visions of *ijtihad* which emphasize substantive moral values over traditional juridical methodology. Shia jurists did not use the term *ijtihad* until the 12th century. With the exception of Zaydi jurisprudence, the early Imami Shia was unanimous in censuring *Ijtihad* in the field of law (Ahkam). After the Shiite embracal of various doctrines of Mu'tazila and classical Sunnite Fiqh (jurisprudence), this led to a change. After the victory of the Usulis who based law on principles (usul) over the Akhbaris (traditionalists) who emphasized on reports or traditions (*khabar*) by the 19th century, *Ijtihad* would become a mainstream Shia practice.

Ijtihad the use of one's "personal effort" in order to make a decision on a point of law not explicitly covered by the Quran or the Sunna; the person with the authority to do this is called a mujtahid. Ijtihad means the modern interpretation/re-reading of Shariah in the light of Quran and Sunnah to suit the requirements of time and space. Ijtihad is an accepted concept in Islam and one cannot deny its legitimacy. In a fast changing world, recourse to ijtihad is a must. However, there is no need for Ijtihad as far as basic beliefs and Ibadat's (Prayers) are concerned, but in other matters of changed life styles Ijtihad is a great necessity. It is particularly important in relation to the status of women, relations between different Muslim Sects,

relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, the role of Muslims in non-Muslim societies, and Islamic economic theories.

Shah Waliullahan outstanding scholar-reformer and a thinker par excellence, of eighteenth century, emphasized the need for Ijtihad in order to provide economic and social justice to Muslims at large He highly decried closing its gates and criticized the contemporary Ulema for approving it. Shah Waliullah combined in himself a mastery of kalam and tasawwuf, the two streams of thought that have been the primary modulators of Islamic history over the last thousand years. In his encyclopedic knowledge and the breadth of his vision he was without peers. Aware that sectarian differences in Fiqh and madhab were tearing the community apart, he attempted a synthesis of Hanafi and Shafi'i schools of jurisprudence based on the central themes of adl (justice) and ihsan (good deeds towards fellow humans). In this respect alone, he stands tall among a handful of great scholars who mastered different schools of Fiqh and sought to synthesize them. It was Shah Waliullah's successors who laid the foundation of the Fiqh that is practiced in India and Pakistan today. The Shah was aware that independent thought was muzzled among learned men, who the spirit of ijtiḥad was asleep, and Muslims had long accepted taqlid (to follow, to emulate, to copy) as the governing principle of religious life. In his incisive analysis of Islamic history, he traced the origin and development of taqlid. He held that ijtiḥad was essential if Muslims were to confront the acute problems of the age. (ijtiḥad is a rigorous and independent

application of the Shariah by a competent scholar who analyzes and offers solutions to the paramount issues of the age). With this conviction, he set out to transform the entire spectrum of Muslim life, including its religious, social, political, and military aspects.

Shah Waliullah owns the credit of being the first Islamic scholar in India who stressed the need for Ijtihad (rethinking) to find ways to solve the most intricate problems of his time from a theological perspective .It was due to Shah Waliullah's emphasis on Ijtihad and independent reasoning that eminent Ulema and theologians of almost all Indian Muslim sects claimed to be his intellectual heirs and true followers.

Shah Wali Allah thought that the fundamental cause of the moral decline of the Muslims of the subcontinent was their ignorance of Islam itself. The basic teachings of Islam are contained in the Quran and the Sunnah, the authority of which have been recognized by all the Muslims. An emphasis upon the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah would, therefore, tend to reduce sectarian differences and create feelings of solidarity, because the differences are mostly a matter of interpretation. Hence, it was necessary to popularize the Quran itself. It is, therefore, he seems to pay his attention to solve such immediate problems. Though, most Muslims of India, in his time belonged to the Hanafi school, the followers of three other schools cannot be neglected. In fact, the conflicts arose among these four schools. In addition, conflicts among the sufi-sects and Sunnis-Shias also existed. He also endeavored to reconcile them as well. By

suggesting reconciliation among the followers of the confronting Sunni schools, Shah Wali Allah did not aim at initiating a new school of law at all, but confined his scheme to the four recognized Sunni schools. He really intended to foster a tolerant attitude among of the followers of different schools and to prepare them not only to accommodate their differences in fiqh, but also to make good use of them. Henceforth, he laid down the principles and conditions to which one should be bound in practicing *takhayyur* and *talfiq* as well as scheme of legal eclecticism avoiding rigid and unbending conformity to one school only. In his own words a combination of these principles is termed as *tatbiq*.

However, Shah Wali Allah does not appear to have taken further than his predecessors and developed *tatabiq* or an inter-juristic eclecticism recommending that on any point of doctrine or ritual a Muslim could follow the ruling of anyone of the four principal juristic schools. Another effort that he made to cure his people from blindness of their main sources of religion, i.e. Qur'an was his deliberate translation of the Qur'an into the popular literary language of his people i.e. Persian. Though this effort is now considered as the most important contribution of Shah Wali Allah, but he had to suffer many sharp and 'unfair' criticism directed at him by contemporary Muslim scholars of his time. About Wali Allah's practical *ijtihad*, an Indian Muslim scholar, Malik points out: He exhorted the Muslims to free themselves from the blind acceptance of the four school of law and advised them to go back to the Qur'an

and the Apostolic traditions and on this basis formulate legal system which would be more in harmony with the spirit and the needs of their times and cultural background. During 1737-1738, in pursuance of this object he translated the Qur'an into Persian the literary language of this day. This was considered detrimental to the economic interest of the orthodox 'Ulama'. They heaped all kinds of abuse on him and even threatened him with death. In the history of Islam, with the exception of Ibn Tumart's (1080-1130) translation, there had never been a translation of the Qur'an into any foreign language. Generally Muslims believed that the sanctity and authenticity of the Qur'an containing God's message can be preserved only if it is studied in the original Arabic. The sensitivity of the problem can be judged from the fact that as late as 1928 when the well-known Muslim convert Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthal undertook the English translation of the Qur'an he sought the advice of the 'ulama' of Al-Azhar, the oldest Muslim university in Egypt. Instead of encouraging such an undertaking, the 'ulama' declared that the translator, the readers and all those who approved of this "were condemned to ever-lasting damnation". The most important purpose behind Wali Allah's translation of the Holy Qur'an was to make the most basic source of Islamic teaching directly accessible to the literate and thus bypass the 'ulama's whom he regarded as hidebound, blind imitators of the scholastic text of earlier jurists. Collaterally, he argued for the revival of the legal principle of ijtihad.

9. Dr. Sir Mohammad Iqbal: Concept of Self

If we have to understand man in the Iqbalian purview, we have to take the route of the philosophy of Khudi to understand how Iqbal emancipates and empowers the Juzz (part) to realize the Kull (total). Khudi is what? It is simply a combination of three elements, i.e. *irfan-e-zaat* (to know one self) that is also known as the philosophy of self, selfhood or Falsafa-i-Khudi. Second is *Kayinat ki Haqeeqat ka Idraak* (Knowing the reality of the universe) and third is *Khuda ko Pehchanna* (Knowing God). (Philosophy of Self) to be concise is an emblem of Allama's message and a one word substitute of his entire philosophical discourse. In Iqbalian pristine 'Khudi' in simple words symbolizes realization of self, i.e. recognizing one's ego, one's self-sufficiency, and the divine strands that connect creation with the creator. Khudi as Allama held "means to realize that man has a particle of divine light within him whose discovery can escort man to the highest point of creation and whose negligence can confine him to the class of unethical bipeds".

Man is central to his philosophy as Allama deems man as the crown of the creation. Now who is this Iqbalian man? He is definitely the Mard-i-Moomin (The Ideal Man). If we have to understand Iqbal's real grandeur of man, we have to go through the path of Mard-i-Moomin (Ideal Man) and its characteristics and then only Iqbal's conception of man can be understood in true sense. Mard-i-Moomin, the real picture of, manhood as perceived by Iqbal is essentially spiritual in nature and stands above the physical, biological and

psychological confines. “Mard-i-Moomin” despite earning world is least influenced by its glory. He doesn’t turn away from universe as Platonic concept demands but rather conquers it as demanded by Quranic dictions. On qualifying all these hard trials “Mard -i-Moomin” is blessed with a throne where his will becomes the will of God and his thoughts and acts reflect the divine plans. He is bestowed upon an authority, the authority of which Allama Iqbal says:

“Koi andaza kar sakhta hain us kay zour-i-bazuka
Nigah-e-mard-i- moomin se badal jaati hain taqdeerain”

(Can anyone even guess at the strength of his arm? By the glance of the man who is a true believer, even destiny is changed).

Rumi once said, “I put forth fourteen reasons to prove the existence of God to a group of people. Shams Tabriz responded me on behalf of God and adding that i should prove my own existence as God needs no proof. Ali Shariati in this preview thus infers that “Shams’ advice is a general and lasting rule for understanding our “self” and who we are? And what we seek? Before speaking about God, religion, civilization, culture, etc”

Allama gives a spiritual call to the man to develop “The Self” at least through his beautiful Couplet in Bangi Dara:

Apnay Mann Main Doob Kar Paja Suragay-e-Zindagi
Tu Agar Mera Nahi Banta Na Ban Apna Tou Bann

Iqbal composed his first philosophical poem '*The Secrets of Self*' in 1914. He said that the universe is an ordered system of egos or subjectivity and the continuation of individuality depends upon the strengthening of the ego of self. The world consists of finite egos which are, to use an analogy from Leibnitz, centers of will and life. There is no such thing as completely lifeless and will-less form of being. There are different grades of individualities and the universe is a really evolving universe in which the lower types of ego struggle to become higher. The universe represents a perpetual process in which the lower becomes higher by becoming a higher individual. He wrote that the inexplicable finite centre of experience, regarded as mere illusion by Bradley, is the fundamental fact of the universe. He stated that all life is individual; there is no such thing as universal life. He agreed with Leibnitzean notion that ego is the highest form of life. He stated regarding self as:

The form of existence is an effect of the self
Whatsoever thou seest is a secret of the self
A hundred worlds are hidden in its essences:
Self affirmation brings not-self to light
By the self the seed of hostility is sown in the world
It imagines itself to be other than itself
It makes from itself the forms of others
In order to multiply the pleasures of strife
Its flames burned a hundred Abrahams
That the flame of one Mohammad might be lighted

Subject, object, means and causes

They all exist for the purpose of action (Nicholson's Translation)

The perfect man, the vicegerent of God, according to Iqbal is the rider of Time in whom that which is hidden in the realm of possibilities comes to light. The perfect man, who represents the highest ego-hood, is the conqueror of time. He did not seek a flight from time like his counterparts in Indian tradition. Iqbal agreed with Kant's notion of 'inward self'. The inward self aspires for affinity and thus gives rise to the idea of infinity or totality. The vicegerent of God is the soul of the universe and he knows the mysteries of part and whole, who executes the command of God on earth.

10. Sheikh Nurrudin Wali (Nund Reshi): Mystical

Philosophy

Nund Rishi or Nund Reshi also known as Sheikh Nurrudin Wali, Sheikh Nurrudin Noorani and popularly as Sheikh ul-Alam among the Muslim and influenced many great mystics like Hamza Makhdoom, Resh Mir Sàeb, Shamas Faqir till present day. Sheikh Noor-u-Din of charar-I-Sharif, popularly called Nund Rishi, was a Sufi saint, social reformer and philosopher. He was born in 1378 A.D. The guiding light of Nund Rishi's endeavours was Laleshwari and in his verses he acknowledges her supremacy. His susceptibility to emotion was very strong; human suffering and pain stirred up his feelings of religious sublimity and imagination. His aim was to grasp the Divine realities and he believed in the doctrine of annihilation (fana) that is, the passing away of individual consciousness in the will of God. From the very young age he was

of a retiring disposition and showed no inclination to any trade. Ultimately, he renounced the world and practiced penance for twelve years in a mountain cave and attained the spiritual bliss. Though he was utterly illiterate, yet he gave utterances to hundreds of wise sayings which are considered gems in the treasury of mysticism. These have been collected in two volumes, entitled Rishi Nama and Nur Nama. His verses called '*Shrukh*' are in a delicate didactic vein of a gentle moralist. He emphasized two things: first, Zikkar (praise of God) consisting of the recitation of the name of God and second Tawakal (trust in God), that is leaving one's self entirely in God's hands. He firmly believed in quietism, the abandoning of all desires, with the passive acceptance of whatever comes. In this regard he says:

“Desire is the knotted wood of the forest. It cannot be made into planks, beams or into cradles. He who cut and felled it will burn it into ashes”. Nund Rishi takes place beside Lalleshwari among the great regenerators of the conscience in a spiritual sense and his work had and still has an influence on the deeper moral resolves and actions of Kashmiri people, Hindus and Muslims alike”.

He insisted to control one's senses and the ego. Sheikh practiced Islam in real sense. He said that it is the religion where there is no expenditure of money. He described his philosophy through his poetry known as *Shrukh*'s. In most of his stanzas, he illuminated existence, salvation, karmas, Islamic principles, tawheed, and obligation to God. Some of his stanzas are:

Muslims who tread the path of non-Muslims
And lead a life of superstitions
By faith they are infidels and out worldly Muslims
They are malicious and dirty
They abandon aroma and inhale the stench
They will blackened on the judgment day (Sh. 69)

Oh Devotee! Adhere strictly to prayer and fast
You will have that long with thee
Tread the path of Hadith and the Quran
At last you will gain the stations lofty (Sh. 32)

Nurrudin became a recluse at the age of twenty five. He was the student of Syed Simnani. Here is a very small poem of Shiekh Nurrudin which tells about his autobiography

Oh my birth the cradles were decorated
In the third year my hands were tied
In the twelfth year my vision became clearer
In the fifteenth year, I got engaged
And in sixteenth year, the streams of my consciousness were over flooded
In the twentieth year of my life, the fire within me was replaced by the fire of love
In the twenty fifth year, my youth decayed
In the fifth decade, my life was made to wander around the world
During the sixties, I shall be taken away to my grave (Sh. 01)

Sheikh was against caste system, creed, religious hierarchy and inequality. He and Lal Ded are contemporaries and there is very large matter of dispute regarding the scrutinizing of their poetry.

Scholars could not distinct between *Shrukhs* and *Vakhs*. So, denouncing the cult of casteism and religious hierarchy, He wrote

One who does believe creed and color
Is in fact, a fool of first water
His motto, easy come and easy go
On the day of judgment, he will find no defender
Your placement will be decided on godly deeds
None can excel him who breeds on that fragrance.

During the mission of his preaching Islam, Shiekh once heard some people praising the miracles of a Brahmin ascetic Bhum Sadh. He desired to meet Bhum. They entered upon a conversation on the oneness of God, idol worship and exploitation of the low castes by Brahmins. Bhum Surrendered before Sheikh and reverted to Islam and was named as Bammudin. The Sheikh Pronounced the Oneness of God in these lines:

Can you perceive the unity of God?
The magnitude of His invisible presence
He is beyond your reason and thought
No one can attain Him in this universe.

Nurrudin was passionately against Mullaism and Pseudo Sufis of his time. He condemns mullaism in these stanzas

Outwardly they are winsome, but black hearted within
Mulla's deliver sermons from the pulpits after committing adultery
Rumi was a Mulla in the real sense
Otherwise seek God's refuge from the others

He didn't divorce Shariyat from Tariqat. Shariyat to him meant the word of God and Tariqat, the way of the prophet. He believed that the ways of the prophet are the ways of God and other than that is the way of Satan.

Truth is the blade of a sword
Lie is flesh to your bone
To leave Muhammad is to embrace Satan
God is everywhere, Thou you are alone.

God is source of guidance and blessing for us. His commandments are manifested through Quran and Hadith and the prophet himself. The earlier approach to get communion with Him is possible alone through the Quran and by performing the good deeds. He said that

Light the lamp of thy stormy self
Faith is oil, keeps the lamp burning on
Reject evil and embrace good
A source of knowledge is the Quran

11. Hamza Makhdoomi: Self Realization

Hamza Makhdoomi Kashmiri, popularly known as Makhdoom Sahib (c. 1494 – c. 1576), was a Sufi mystic, scholar and spiritual teacher living in Kashmir. He is sometimes referred as Mehboob-ul-Alam (literally, 'lover of knowledge') and Sultan-ul-Arifeen (literally, 'king of those who know God'). Sheikh Hamza Makhdumi, entitled Mehboob-Ul-Alam, and Sultan-Ul-Arifeen, was born to Baba Usman, of the Chandra-Vanshi Rajput family, a hereditary landlord, a scholar and a mystic saint of high order. Sheikh Hamza Makhdum, in this manner, inherited the mysticism.

He inherited the mysticism, and from the very childhood was inclined to the company of holy men, and to the truth. Having read the holy Quran in the village, he went to the seminary of Sheikh Ismial Kabroi for higher studies. Once he was playing instead of going to elementary school (maktab) His father happened to come there, grew angry, and beat him so severely that he fell ill. From the day he pledged that he would never play with his Grand Father Zaiti-Rena. He went to see Fatah Ullah (son of Hazrat Baba Ismial) the spiritual teacher of the Rena tribe, and learnt the Quran for a year in the monastery at Shamsi-Chak here he was enrolled into the seminary of Baba Ismial Kabroi, as a student, for higher studies. He studied the Jurisprudence, Tradition, Logic, Philosophy, Ethics, and Mysticism.

The title Sultan-UI-Arifeen indicates to serious efforts and painstaking prayers did. During his studies he meditated. Baba Dawood opines that Hazrat Makhdoom did not rest during night for years but remained engaged in prayers. Sultan-UI-Arifeen says, ‘I was directed to say the *daruds*’, mention of the names, and prayers because of His kindness and whenever I sluggish in the conduct I was reprimanded. ‘Hard work and painstaking prayers in the early youth made him old before time. The great sage followed the Sunni (Tradition) strictly not only in prayers but also in manners, dress, behaviour, and etc. He scrupulously followed the Prophet and his love for him knew no bounds. These things helped him to reach the

highest rank. Later, he had to forsake his love for isolation in order to serve the people. He remarks:

In the early days I had completely abandoned the company of the people. God granted me the gift of peace at heart and composure of mind. He ordered me to serve the people so I came and started delivering the Message.

Generally, the sages are indifferent to the Shairah. In the case of the persons of the Rishiyat Order, the indifference is evident. The suppression of self, renunciation of physical demands, asceticism, and other local effects are clearly visible on sages and the Islam here. His greatest contribution was that he delivered it in its purest form to the people. He followed the Shairah strictly but asked others to do it; opposed to their reluctance of legitimate things; joined the Shairah with Rishiyat and asked the people to follow into the footsteps of the Prophet; and relieved them of their superstitions. He made Rishi eat meat under his orders, wore rich dress, declared superstitions as untrue, opposed and exposed the hypocrites, advised to work hard continuously, observed personal hygiene and cleanliness and instructed to take lawful food and to lead pious and pure life. These are the teachings that show that he tried to build a society on the pattern of the Shairah.

His greatest contribution was that he instructed the people to forsake superstitions and Un-Islamic activities through his speech and

actions. Numerous instances can be cited from his life. Sultan-UI-Arifin's whole life was full of strange revelations and miracles.

It was the time when the present Nallahmar road was a famous waterway connecting Srinagar with wullar via Ganderbal. Hazrat Sultanul Aarifeen (RA) was performing ablution at the bank of this river at *Kalashpora Ghat*. There came a procession of few boats decorated with gold and silver, the music of the ores was heard from a distance. It was the procession of the Qazul qazzah the chief justice of Kashmir, Aalama Baba Dawood Khaki (RA) coming from Koolipora, Nowpora to attend his court. A man performing ablution at the bank directed the boat men to ask their chief justice to come to me. Baba Dawood Khaki (RA) refused at the very first instance to obey the order of a person ordinarily dressed. The entire procession of boats came to standstill, despite the efforts made by boatmen to carry boats forward. No boat moved from its place. Baba Dawood Khaki (RA) was again remained by his men that he denied the order of a pious person which may be the cause for this episode. This was the turning point for Aalama Khakhi (RA), He came, as usual, well dressed, wearing costly costumes with Golden belts and Jewellery to see the man performing ablution. The pious person asked a few questions to the Qazi, the questions were how much gold did Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) wear? Which fatwa you are going to give for a case that you don't follow yourself? Aalamas Khakhi (RA) could not reply. Instead, he took out his outfit and began to follow Hazrat Sultanul Aarifeen (RA) whom he considered his 'Pir or

Murshad' now on, till he was alive. Baba Dawood Khaki (RA) narrates the all dealings, teachings, mission and vision of Hazrat Sultanul Aarifeen (RA) in 'Virdul Muredeen' in Persian language.

*Shukur lillah hale maanhar lehzanay kotaar shudaast,
Sheikhu Sheikha Sheikh Hamzah ta mara rehber shudaast.*

*“Chou khuda elmayludan kard taleemash zemahr
Bahre asrare Illahi Aalim amhar shudast”
“Ao sheryat raast nasir dartareekat mujtahed
Bahre asrare hakekat sadr o masdar shudaast”*

*“Roushanash anwaare quraan gash hum asrare aan
pus khawasish dedo hum alfaaze aanash aabr shudaast”*

During the period of Makhdoom Sheikh Hamzah (RA) a number of great personalities existed amongst which Hazrat Sheikh Yaqoob Sarfi (RA) and Hazrat Mir Syed Ahmad Kirmani deserve a special mention .They too bear witness to the fact that Makhdoom Sheikh Hamzah had enormous spiritual power as is quoted by Aalama Khaki in Virdul Mureeden.

*“Mir Syed Ahmed Kirman zaahil kashf bood
ashq o dard o souz awra deedah wahair shudaast”*

Hazarat Hamza Makhdoomi (RA) bin Usman was born at Tujar, a peripheral village in Bomai (Zaingeer) area of Kashmir. He originated from Shahi Chak Dynasty. The elders of his dynasty were rich, honest, and pious and his house was then a super centre for learning and teaching of Islam quotes Aalma Khakhi. I met a few

elders of his village who were pious, well adapted with the Shariah, as I inquired cause of their being so religious they quoted Baba Usman's (RA) company with them as reason adds Aalma Khaki (RA). Hazarat Makhdoom's (AR) family used to send zakat of their wealth and livestock to the Khankhah of Hazarat Moulana Sheikh Ismail (RA) who was scholar and religious leader of that time besides being a good friend of Baba Usman (RA), the father of Hazrat Sultanul Aarifeen (RA) in Srinagar.

Hazrat Sultan (RA) had a wonderful memory power, as this is known from the fact that he was admitted in the Malik Shams Chak Khankha. Being a minor, a very elderly righteous person was kept as a room mate with him. The room mate used to get up during middle of the night and recite 'Surat ul Kahaf' of Quran. The minor used to leave the bed and listen to the same. With in few days he posed challenge to his room mate that he can remember the Surat ul Khaf without any mistake. He was given a test and proved successful. The elderly room mate was amazed to see his alarming memory. In beginning I developed affection of Quran and repeatedly reciting this Holy Book during a night, I remembered it by heart, says Hazrat Sultan (RA) quoted in Dastooru-Salikeen by Alama Khaki.

12. Fundamental Articles of Faith

The fundamental articles of Faith are: One must believe in

1. One God.
2. The Angels of God.
3. The books of God especially the Qur'an.
4. The prophets of God, especially Muhammad (S.A.W).
5. The Supremacy of God's will (predistination/Qadar).
6. The day of Judgment (The afterlife).

The explanation of above Articles is given as:-

1. Faith in one God: one must believe in one God, the one and only one, eternal, the absolute, he gives no birth nor was he born and there is none like him. He does not sleep. Islam believes in monotheism, He is the creator, the sustained, the destroyer and the resurrector of the universe. He is the merciful, the most compassionate. *Surah Ikhlas* is the full description of faith in one God.

2. Faith in Angels of God: This is the second article of Islamic faith and is very important because it frees the concept of tawhid from all probable impurities and makes it pure, simple and free from the danger of every conceivable shadow of polytheism. The angels are servant of God who worship Him day and night and carry out His commands without murmur and complaint. They are sinless because they cannot disobey God's orders. The Quran defines; the angels function is to obey Allah (God).

3. Faith in Holy Scriptures: In Islam we are bound to have faith in atleast four holy books. These books have revealed God to mankind through his prophets from time to time. All the books have many things in common and they serve the same purpose I.e. to reform mankind. The four prominent divine books are:-

i. Torah (Old Testament) revealed to prophet Musa (Moses).

ii. Zabur (Psalms) revealed to prophet Dawud (David).

iii. Injil (New Testament) revealed to prophet Isa (Jesus).

iv. The Holy Quran revealed to the Holy prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), the last of the prophets.

4. Faith in Prophets: Belief in prophets is the natural sequence of faith in divine revelation since revelation must be communicated through human beings. A Muslim must believe in all the prophets either from the prophets raised among the Israelites like Hud or the prophet that were raised among the Arabians like Saliha. A prophet is a servant and a messenger of Allah who receives divine revelations. A Muslim must believe in all the prophets of God like Musa, Isa, Adam, Abraham and the last prophet Muhammad (S.a.w). To believe in some prophets and reject others is regarded as disbelief.

5. Faith in Qadar (predestination): In this Article of Faith, a Muslim is bound to believe in what is already predestined by God for a mankind. According to this article our actions are determined by the God's will and He has already determined the whole universe i.e. nothing happens without the will of God.

6. Faith in life after death: prophet Muhammad (SAW) has directed us to believe in resurrection after death. According to this belief, the life of this world and of all that is in it, will come to an end on one appointed day when everything will be annihilated that day is called Qiyamah, i.e. the day of judgment. On that day the reward and punishment will be administered judiciously.

13. Islamic Sufism (Tasawuf)

The word ‘Sufi’ was derived from ‘Suf’ which means coarse woolen clothes which had become the conventional dress of the pious among the Semitic people. Al Qushairi writes in his book *al-Resalat al Qushairiyah* that the word “Tasawuf” had been used by the people before the 2nd century A.H those among the Sunnites who took extreme care in keeping their contact with God alive were known as *Ahl-al-Tasawuf*. It was used before 200 A.H. Hujwiri in his book “*kashaf-al-Mahjub*” writes that the prophet also used the word “Tasawuf”.

Sufism is primarily concerned with the internal state of the soul. Many writers have characterized Sufism as the code of the heart (*fiqh al batin*) or the purification of the soul (*tazkiyat al-nafs*), or the feeling of God’s presence (*al- ihsan*). Sufism is also seen as a quest for reality, an enlightenment or gnosis. The philosophical minded scholars supported this view like Al-Ghazali and Ibn Arabi. Maruf-i-Kharkhi defines Sufism as ‘The apprehension of Divine realities’. The approach to Sufism which is vital to the concept and

understanding of wahdat-ul- wujud is to define it in terms of fana and baqa. Junayd referred to it when he said: ‘Tasawwuf is that God makes you die to yourself and live by Him’. Al-Shibli described it as; ‘Tasawwuf is to rise above the perception of the world’. Jami explains it as; ‘Walayat means the effacement (fana) of man in God and his survival (baqa) in Him’. Fana literally means to die and disappear, and baqa means to live and survive. In Sufi context, fana means to abstain from something, to forget and to be unconscious of it; baqa means to be occupied with something, live in it or by it. One kind of fana and baqa is to refrain from vice and practice virtue; another kind is to shrink from violating the commands of God and obey His will. Yet another kind, which is crucial to Sufism, is an affective experience. This experience can be attained through a particular process which Wali Allah has described in his al-Qawl-Jamil as having three major Sufi orders, the Qadririyah, the Chistiyah and the Naqshbandiyah. The orders are agreed upon the basic principle even though differ in details. A Sufi aspirant begins with a preparatory phase in which he needs to set his beliefs right, discard evil habits, avoid big sins and abstain from small ones to the best of his abilities. He has to perform his obligatory prayers and other duties which the Shariah has placed on him and follow the Sunnah. At the next stage, the aspirant begins dhikr with loud voice by saying the name of God with one stroke. That is, he should say ‘Allah’ loudly, stretch the word as he pronounces, and do it with all force of his heart and throat. He should then pause, regain breath and repeat ‘Allah’. This practice has to be continued for some time

before moving onto the next stage where he has to say ‘Allah’ with two strokes. He is recommended to sit as he does in Salat and say Allah pointing first to the right knee and then to the heart. While striking at his heart, he should do it with full force, so that his heart feels the effect and his mind attains concentration. Afterwards the dhikr is repeated with three or four strokes. This is followed by the dhikr of negation and affirmation, that is he should say ‘la illaha illa Allah’ (‘There is no god’ which is negation), (except Allah which is affirmation). While repeating these words the aspirant should focus that nothing in this world is worth desiring and loving, nor anything at all exist. God alone is to be sought and loved, and He alone exists. The purpose of these dhikr is to concentrate attention on God, ignite His love and make him the sole object of one’s longing. It is believed that if a Sufi says them four thousand times every day and night, he is sure to feel their effect within two months. After achieving it, he is advised to take up silent dhikr in which the eyes and mouth is closed and he has to say it in his heart; ‘Allah is hearing’, ‘Allah is seeing’, ‘Allah is knowing’, raising the words from his navel to his heart, to his brain and then to the throne of God. The second time, the order will be reversed beginning from the throne of God, going to the brain, to the heart and then to the navel. Gradually the Sufi will devote himself exclusively to God. Then follows the stage of meditation (muraqabah) The Sufi meditates on ‘Allah is before me’, ‘Allah sees me’, ‘Allah is with me’. Some meditate on the Quranic verse ‘He is with you wherever you are’ and ‘whichever way you turn is the face of Allah’. He is nearer to us

than jugular vein'. These meditations produce absorption in God. However when the Sufi meditates on everything on the earth will perish, only the face of your Lord, the Glorious and Majestic will survive, and then he completely loses interest in this world and becomes absorbed in God in a state of intoxication (sukr) and effacement (mahw). The Sufis go as far as to imagine they are dead, reduced to ashes that re blown about by the wind, that the heavens have split, and everything has disintegrated and vanished, and that only God is there. Anyone who persists in this mediation for some time will forget himself and obtain complete effacement. This is the beginning of fana. According to M. Abdul Haq Ansari, fana and baqa are two sides of the same experience. From one side it is the negation of the mystic: negation of his will, his attributes, his self-consciousness and his being and from another angle it is the union with God and assimilation in Him. The mystics claim that there are two levels of union. One at which the mystic experiences oneness with God but at the same time is conscious of his difference from Him. This is called the stage of union (maqam-i-jam). But on the next level, the mystic loses consciousness of difference and is only aware of One Being beyond difference and distinction. This stage is called stage of absolute union by Sufis (jam ljam, literally 'union of union'). Al- Ghazali describes this absolute union in the following words: "When the gnostic reach the height of experience they testify without exception that they do not see anything in existence except the One Real Being (al-Haqq). For some, this is an intellectual realization. For others, however it becomes a matter of affective

experience (hal- an wa dhawq-an); plurality vanishes for them altogether. They are absorbed into Pure Unity (al-fadaniyat l-mahdah), losing their intellects completely, stunned and bewildered. They are no more conscious of anything other than God, nor even themselves. Nothing exists for them except God; as a result they exclaim in a state of intoxication (sukr) which removes the control of reason. One of them said: 'I am God'; another said 'Glory be to me, how great I am'; a third said: 'There is none in these clothes except God'. When this experience overwhelms the mystic it is called extinction (fana), rather extinction of extinction (fana l-fana) for he becomes unconscious of himself and unconscious of his unconsciousness (fana), because he is not aware of himself in this state, nor of his forgetfulness of himself. For, if he was aware of his self-forgetfulness, he would have been aware of himself. This state is called unification (itiihad) in the language of metaphor (majaz) and in the language of reality (al- haqiqah) affirmation of unity (tawhid)".

13.1. Principle teaching of Sufism

- i. Absolute being (God) is also absolute beauty.
- ii. Since absolute tends towards manifestation, absolute Being developed the phenomenal world.
- iii. Man should practice virtues like poverty, austerity, humility, fortitude and discipline he should devote himself to the ways of inwardness like withdrawal, silence, solitariness, and self-examination.

iv. Absolute firmness in the love of God, sense of union with the deity, sense of nothingness.

Sufism or tasawuf had its development from the eighteenth century when kufa, Basra, and khurasan became the main centres of Sufism- Abu Hashim of kufa was the person to be called a Sufi and sometimes Hasan-al-Basri (729 C.E) was called as the founder of Sufism. Shafiq of Balkh developed the theory of tawakul (trust in God). Dhun-nun- Misri developed the theory of Gnosis i.e. knowledge of Allah. Abu yazid Bastanvi founded the theory of Ecstasy. Al-Harith bin Asad al Muhasibi founded the Baghdad school of speculative Sufism. Abu Abdullah-al-Tirmidhi laid down the foundation of the psychology of Sufism. The sufis who had made development of Sufism are Malik-bin-Dinar, Sufyan-al-thauri. Rabia Basri, junaid Baghdadi, Al-Hallaj, Abu Talib al Makki, Abdul-al-Qadir jelani, Shihab al din Suhrawardhi and Ibn Arabi.

13.2. Different stages of attaining spiritual perfection in Sufi tradition

Islam has prescribed certain practices for Muslims for attaining perfection in life. These practices are kalimah, Salat, Sawm, Haj and Zakat. In addition to these, there are certain duties for a disciplined life but there is another method which is called Marifat. It is called the path of sufis. Marifat is concerned mainly with immediate experience. It has seven stages which are called “Muqamat” the path is known as path of Tariqat. There are

differences in sufis in regard to “Stages” but the main stages are as follows:-

- i. Repentance (Tawbah).
- ii. Abstinence (Wisr).
- iii. Renunciation (Zuhd).
- iv. Poverty (Faqr).
- v. Patience (Sabr).
- vi. Trust (Tawakul).
- vii. Satisfaction (Ridza).

These stages constitute the ascetic and ethical discipline of Sufi. Let us discuss one by one.

Repentance: it means regret in sins what one had done in past and complete abstinence from sins in future.

Abstinence: it means one should refrain himself from indulgence from acts which are doubtful, wrong use of desire, thoughts and speech.

Renunciation: one should give up worldly desires, fame etc.

Poverty: it means to be stripped of every wish that can turn one's thought from God.

Patience: patience in God, patience in and for God, patience in, for and with God.

Trust: trust in God means complete dependence on God in all religions.

Satisfaction: in this stage the Sufi does everything to please God.

The end of Sufi path is fana followed by Baqa. Baqa means passing from the phenomenal self to the real self.

13.3. Sufi Orders: (Silsilas)

Qadriya order: it was founded by hazrat Abdul Qadir jilani who was born in jilan in 1078 A.D and expired in 1166 A.D.

Chistiya order: it was founded by khawaja Mohiuddin chisti of Ajmer. Some call him Abu ishaq, or Banda Nawaz or khawaja Ahmad Abdal of chist as its founder.

Naqshabandiya order: it was founded by Khawaja Muhammad Bahauddin Muhammad Naqashband-al-Bukhari. They recite zikr silently.

Suhrawardiya order: it was founded by Abdul Qadir Suhrawardi and Umar Suhrawardi.

13.4. Shariyat

Shariat means the law that it is necessary for the collectivity to observe, to harmonize with one's surroundings and with one's self within. Although the religious authorities of Islam have limited it to restrictions, yet a thousand places in the Qur'an and Hadith one can trace where the law of Shariat is meant to be subject to change to suit the time and place. The law of Shariat, unlike any other religious law, deals with all aspects of life, and it is therefore that the

Prophet of Islam had to experience personally all aspects of life. The Prophet as an orphan, as a warrior, as a politician, as a merchant, as a shepherd, as a king, as a husband, as a father, as brother, as son and grandson, had to play different parts in the world's various aspects of life before he was prepared to give this divine law. Thus shariat is the law for living written by Allah subhanahuwatala and guided by Rasoolullah (SAW) which is based on quran and hadith.

In Islam there is no caste, as the Message was meant to be for uniting humanity in one brotherhood, and yet it was found necessary to train the individuals according to their evolution in life. Training was given in four classes, namely, Shariat, Tarikat, Haqiqat, and Marifat. Since the world of Islam became busy in national and social affairs, the Shariat was held fast by the religious authorities and Tarikat only with a few pious ones, who sought the door of a Sufi, wanting an initiation in the inner light which was contained in the two remaining classes, Haqiqat and Marifat. The two immediate disciples of the Prophet, Ali and Sadeeq, were initiated by the Prophet, and were the great Masters of the inner teachings of the knowledge of God. Besides, the Sufis who existing during the time of the Prophet were benefited by the presence of the Prophet and the inspiration they gained in Sufism, to which one soon reaches through the path of Shariat, Tariqat, Haqiqat, and Marifat.

13.5. Tareeqat

Tareeqat is the path, this also guided by Muhammas (SAW) if you walk on the path of tareeqat you will find the true meaning of shariyat, Tareeqat will lead you to haqeeqat of everything only if you hold tight the sharyat. A Tarīqah is a school of Sufism. A Tarīqah has a Murshid, or Guide, who plays the role of leader or spiritual director of the organization. A Sufi Tarīqah is a group of Murīd (pl.: Murīdīn), Arabic for desirous, desiring the knowledge of knowing God and loving God (a Murīd is also called a ‘Faqīr’ or ‘Fakir’, another Arabic word that means poor or needy, usually used as fiqeer. Tariqat is the understanding of law besides following it, that we must understand the cause of all things that we must do and must not do, instead of obeying the law without understanding. Those who are not evolved are supposed to have faith and to submit to the law. It is for those whose intelligence does not accept things that cannot answer their reason.

14. Mutazalism

The founder of Mutazalites school of thought was Wasil-ibn-Ata (699-748 C.E). Mutazilas are generally regarded as the “Rationalists” in Islam. They held that Allah cannot be perceived by senses. He is not contained in a place a limited by dimensions. He is creator of all things and produces them out of nothing. They forbade the describing of Allah by any quality belonging to material object. Mutazalism comes from the word “Itizal” which means to withdraw

or separate oneself. This school was started at Basra. Wasil-ibn-Ata was student of imam al Hasan al Basri. They seek to interpret Islam in the light of reason.

14.1. Principles of Mutazalism

1. Quran is the created word of God.
2. They rejected fatalism and affirm free-will.
3. They deny the indications of the Day of Judgment, yajuj-Majuj, appearance of Al-Dajjal and also various issues of the Ghayb (unseen) like the Jins, Magic and the existence of *kiraman katibin* as recording angels.
4. They held that Allah is not the author of evil.
5. They think that Mujtahid can never be wrong in his views.
6. They believe in the idea that a Muslim who commits a major sin, is in a state between Eeman and Kufr with respect to this world, and in the Hereafter, he will be in Hell-fire eternally if he dies without Repentance.
7. They gave importance to Aql (intellect) and giving it priority over Naql (texts of Quran and Sunnah) which resulted in deviation like Taweel and rejection of Ahadeeth.

15. Asharism

Asharism is the name of school of Muslim philosophy which developed during 4th and 5th centuries A.H. Its founder was Abul Hasan-al-Ashari. He was born at Basra in 260 A.H and died at Baghdad in 324 A.H. He was a staunch supporter of Mutazalism and

wrote for that up to his 40 years. One day in 300 A.H he announced that he was no more supporters of the views of Mutazalism. He specially mentioned that he disagreed with the views that Quran was created, God will not have been seen with eyes and we were the creators of our actions. Thus, Asharites are called Empiricists.

15.1. Principles of Asharism

1. They believe that Quran is eternal and not created.
2. Asharities believed that God is seated on his throne high up in the heaven and presented various Quranic verses for its defense.
3. They held that reason and faith both should be pressed into service in explaining and understanding the dogmas of Islam.
4. They rejected the Aristotelean notion of causality. The members of Ashariya School insisted that reason must be subordinate to revelation.
5. They held that knowledge of Allah could not be attained through reason alone.
6. They believe that attributes of God are his Essences i.e. God has qualities and attributes which are not applicable to human beings. The attributes used for human beings are different from the attributes used for God not only in degree but in kind also. When we say that man is wise and God is All-Wise, the attributes of wisdom of man is different from God not only in degree but in kind and nature. Thus Al-Ashari was the student of Abu-Ali-al-Jubbai, the head of Basran school. The famous later Asharites were Al-Gazali and Fakr-al-din-al-Razi.

16. Ibn-Arabi: Wahadat-al-Wajud

Ibn-Arabi (1165-1240) can be considered the founder of Wahadat-al-Wajud 'The oneness of being or the oneness of God'. It also meant (unity of existence). He highlights tawhid as his guiding principle and gives wajud a special prominence in his vocabulary. It was utterly obvious to him that there is no real Being but God and that everything other than God is an unreal Being. Ibn Arabi and even more so his followers like Qunawi focused on the real wajud as the one, unique reality from which all other reality derives. According to Ibn Arabi everything has its existence from the existence of God. Wajud is the unknowable and inaccessible ground of everything that exists. Ibn Tayamiya (1328) who called Wahadat al wajud is worse than unbelief. According to him, Wahadat al wajud means no distinction can be drawn between God and the world. Ibn Arabi concept of Wahadat al wajud resembles with the pantheism of Spinoza which means everything is God and God is everything. God alone is true wajud while all things dwell in non-existence so also wajud alone is non-delimited (*mutlaq*) while everything else is constrained, confined. Wajud is absolute, infinite, non-delimited reality of God, while all other remains relative, finite and delimited.

The word wahdat is from *wahdah* (means oneness; unit, used as a technical term in philosophy and theology with these meanings, though not occurring in the Quran. *Wujud*, in philosophy refers to being *mutliq*. In mysticism, it is a verbal noun derived from *wadjada*

to find or to experience. Wahdat ul wujud is commonly understood to be 'Unity of Being'. Marijan Mole exposes the issue of the term Wujud being translated correctly because Arabic being a semitic language has no verb to express 'to be'. So the term wujud commonly translated as 'being' or 'existence'. At the end of the path, only God is present, is found. So wahdat ul wujud is not just 'Unity of being' but also the unity of existence. Wujud and existence is gained by 'being found'. The Philosophical Concept of Wahdat-al-Wujud According to Wali Allah; "The meaning of wahdat ul wujud in the mystical context is that the mystic is so absorbed in the contemplation of the All Embracing Existence of which the world is a determination that distinctions and differences vanish which form the basis of our knowledge of good and evil, and which the Shar (evil) and reason categorically affirm and fully elaborate". This is the stage where the mystic stays unless God takes them beyond. Wahdat ul shuhud on the other hand, means in this context the consciousness both of the oneness and difference that is the consciousness that things are one in one sense and multiple in another. This stage is higher and more perfect than the former. Early Sufis had a great interest in dualism of soul and matter. They believed that the soul, which is present in each being emanates from God. So for them purpose of life was to integrate their soul with the Divine soul (God) so that 'I' becomes 'Thou'. The Sufis believed that by invoking God by any one of his many names while performing zikr (remembrance), they could cleanse their respective

souls (tazkiyat-i-ruh) and thereby work out their effacement (fana) in to God and achieve lasting survival (baqa) in Him.

17. Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi: Wahadat-al-Shahud

Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624) of India is the founder of Wahadat al Shahud. Wahadat al Shahud is the concept which means oneness in witness or unity of witness. It is also called theory of Apparentism so it means unity of apparentism. This theory holds that God and his creation are entirely separate. Its original founder was Ala-al-Dawla Simnani. Sirhindi hold that God and his creation are not identical rather than the latter is the shadow or a reflection of the divine names and attributes when they are reflected in the mirrors of their opposite non-Being. Wahadat al Shahud literally means Unity of witness, unity of perception or unity of appearance. It holds that any experience of unity between God and the created world is only in the mind of the believer and that God and his creation are entirely separate. Mohiuddin Ibn Arabi and Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi were the two prominent thinkers of Islam's mystical practice. Their teachings and philosophies focused on the divine nature but they differed vastly in their understanding and principles. Sirhindi wanted to cleanse the Sufism from what he regarded as the doctrine that was unfamiliar to the Quranic discourse. The major ideas in Sufism revolve around the concept of wahdat or unity with God. Wahdat-al-wujud, (Unity of Being) essentially states that in God lives everything and God lives in every-thing and wahdat-al-Shuhud also known as unity of witness holds that God is separate

from His creation. He is transcendent. A few Islamic scholars have claimed that the two doctrines differ only in semantics and that the discussion is only an assortment of spoken arguments which have come about because of the confusing language. Still the relationship between divine and non divine is constantly under debate in the Sufi and non Sufi circles as well.

Some issues should be pointed out before embarking upon exploring Sirhindi's criticism against the theory of wahdat al-wujûd. The theory of wahdat al-wujud, which is identified with Ibn Arabi and which to a great extent determined the direction of the Sufism, can be formulated as following: 'God is the absolute being (al-wujûd alhaq)' and 'there is no being other than God'. The essential statement here is that 'the absolute being is God'. The multiplicity and diversity that are found in the universe do not have an independent reality, but they are rather the disclosure (tajalli) and manifestation (zuhûr) of God's being. There cannot be any multiplication (ta'addud), disintegration (tajazzî), transformation (tabaddul) and division (taksim) in the necessary and eternal being of God, although He discloses Himself through the forms of the realm of multiplicity infinitely. His being is absolute and cannot be comprehended. Thus one can argue that the theory of wahdat al-wujûd is a monistic system (based on one single reality), which negates any real being other than God's being regarding the relationship between God and the universe. We should acknowledge at the outset that Ahmad Sirhindi, who is among the important

figures of the Nakshbandi Sufi path (tariqa), is considered to be the founder of the doctrine of wahdat al-shuhud. The departing point and the characteristic factor of the doctrine he puts forward concern Ibn Arabi and the doctrine of wahdat al-wujûd. Consequently, the statements that Sirhindi defends consist of the opposites of the basic statements constitutive of the theory of wahdat al-wujud. Thus, the theory of wahdat al-shuhud can be described as a reaction to the theory of wahdat al-wujud. Although Sirhindi developed the criticisms against the theory of wahdat al-wujûd in Sufism systematically, some other people before Sirhindi raised similar criticisms against Ibn Arabi. According to the author of the Nafahât al-Uns, Simnânî criticized Ibn Arabî in his al-Urwah li Ahl al-Khalwah as well as in his conversations with various Sufis. One can see his attitude in this regard in his correspondence with Abd al-Razzâq al-Kâshî. In this correspondence, one finds the basic elements of his criticism against Ibn Arabî. Al-Kâshî, who was an interpreter and supporter of Ibn Arabî, wrote a letter to Simnânî, when he became aware of Simnânî's criticism against Ibn Arabî. In this letter, al-Kâshî argues that Ibn Arabî is correct and the theory of wahdat al-wujûds is true on the basis of his own experience as well as on the authority of other Sufis. Responding to al-Kâshî, Simnânî maintains that Ibn Arabî made mistakes in various issues. According to Simanni, for example, Ibn Arabi's statement at the beginning of the Futuhat, 'I glorify the One who made things manifest although it is identical with them', cannot be approved and is even dangerous. Even atheists and naturalists have refrained from saying such things.

For Simnânî, anybody who does not assert that God is free from created attributes is truly unjust. Simnânî also criticizes Kâshî's claim that the latter got to know the reality of wahdat al-wujûd at the station (maqâm) of declaring God's unity (tawhîd), which is the highest station. For Simnânî, wahdat al-wujûd is not the last station. He also states that he reached this station at first for a while, and he loved it. But later on when he reached higher stations it became clear to him that wahdat al-wujûd is clearly a mistake. For Simanni, although through his Sufi practice (seyr-u sulûk) a Sufi may receive some instances of witnessing similar to wahdat al-wujûd, at the highest station, the station of servitude (ubûdiyyet), he comes to know that things are different. Another criticism of Simnânî is that Sufis who defend the theory of wahdat al-wujûd understand the station of the declaring God's unity as the highest station, and interpret it such that it may imply incarnation (hulûl), unbelief (kufr) and unity of creator and creature (ittihâd). As a result, Simnânî's criticism against the theory of wahdat al-wujûd focuses on two issues. The first is that the experience of wahdat al-wujûd is not the end-point, but beginning stage, of the Sufi experience. The second is that the theory of wahdat al-wujûd negates the difference between God and the universe. Before beginning to explore Sirhindî's position, It should be expressed that regarding his criticism against Ibn Arabî, Sirhindî was influenced by Simnânî to a great extent. Sirhindî clearly says that there is similarity between his position and his predecessor, Simnânî, with regard to methodology. Ahmad Sirhindi was born in Sirhind of the east of Panjab. After learning

religious sciences from many different teachers, he had completed his Sufi education mostly under the guidance of Shaykh Bâqî Billâh. His most important book is *Maktûbât* composed of the letters written to his deputies (khalîfa) and disciples (murid). Sirhindî also had a relationship with political leaders and an active role to reconstruct religious life of this area in Sirhind. He said that ‘I do not want to examine the books of reality and gnosis (marifa), especially the issues concerning wahdat al-wujûd and its levels of descent. I find many similarities between myself and Shaykh Alâ-al-Dawlah, and I agree with him on this issue in terms of taste and state (hal). However, unlike Alâ al-Dawlah, the knowledge of the past (prior knowledge, my knowledge of the books of reality written in the past), does not allow me to reject them and to raise offense against their followers’. The theory of wahdat al-shuhûd can be described as a reaction to basic statements of the theory of wahdat alwujûd. This is why Sirhindî’s doctrine of wahdat al-shuhûd is closely related to the criticism of the theory of wahdat al-wujûd. What is the doctrine of wahdat al-shuhûd, which is systematized by Sirhindî? Sirhindî answers this question. In his opinion, among Sufis there are two kind of declaring God’s unity:

First declaring God’s unity in terms of witnessing (shuhûdî tawhîd) and second is declaring God’s unity in terms of being (wujûdî tawhid). Declaring God’s unity in terms of witnessing is ‘witnessing the One’ (wâhid). That is, at this station, the follower of the Sufi path (sâlik) does not witness anything other than the One. Declaring

God's unity in terms of being is the case where the follower of the Sufi path believes that being is one, and all other things are non-existent. According to believers of the unity of God in this sense all things consist of the self-disclosure and manifestation of one thing. Declaring God's unity in terms of being indicates the level of certainty by knowledge (*ilm al-yakîn*), whereas declaring God's unity in terms of witnessing indicates the level of certainty by sense-perception (*ayn al-yakîn*). Sirhindî explains the difference between these two kinds of declaring God's unity by an analogy. Suppose a man is closer to the sun. This person sees only the sun; he cannot see stars because of his proximity to the sun. However, although he can see only the sun, he knows that there are stars. They are not non-existent, but they disappeared because of the strength of the sunlight. This person may deny the existence of stars on the basis of his experience of witnessing even though he knows that such a claim does not correspond to reality. In this analogy, the person who does not see stars when he witnesses the sun yet believes that stars exist as entities separate from the sun stands for the proponent of declaring God's unity in terms of witnessing. The proponent of declaring God's unity in terms of being is like the person who denies the existence of stars since he cannot see them when he is closer to the sun. Imam Sirhindi also argues that declaring God's unity in terms of being is contrary to the reason as well as the religious law. Thus one can conclude that the theory of *wahdat al-wujûd* amounts to denying the existence of other things on the basis of one's witnessing while the theory of *wahdat al-shuhûd* is the

acceptance of the reality of beings other than God despite the experience of unity during one's act of witnessing. Consequently, the former is monist and the latter is to some extent dualist. That is, while the former accepts that there is only one being in the absolute sense, the latter acknowledges two spheres of being. In sum, according to the theory of *wahdat al-wujûd*, the unity is in knowledge, and according to the other position, it is not in knowledge but in witnessing. This is how Sirhindî distinguishes between the theory of *wahdat al-wujûd* and the theory of *wahdat al-shuhûd*. He criticizes the theory of *wahdat al-wujûd* in four interrelated issues; and he founds his conception of *wahdat alshuhûd* on four principles.

1. Being (*wujûd*) is an attribute additional to essence (*dhât*). Imam Sirhindî, in one of his letters, indicates the identity of essence and being in a manner similar to commentators of Ibn Arabî, and maintains that 'the reality of the Real (*Haqq*) is pure being'. However, in another letter, he maintains that being cannot be ascribed to the reality of the Real (*Haqq*). Is not it a contradiction? How does Sirhindî overcome this difficulty? His explanation is as follows. He adopted the view that the reality of the Real is 'the pure being' at the beginning of his Sufi career up until the middle period. However, when he reached the peak of the Sufi experience, he saw that the reality of the Real could not even be called being. This is because being requires 'non-being' (*adem*), its logical opposite. Indeed, the reality of the essence is free from concepts that require

their opposites. As Sirhindî states, ‘how being, which is subsistent with its opposite, is eligible to the level of the essence! If we call this level as being, this is because of conceptual insufficiency. In this expression, the intention is the being to which non-being cannot occur’. It results from this that the Essence, which is beyond our knowledge and comprehension, is free from the state to which attributes and being can be ascribed.

2. Attributes are not identical but additional to the essence. The universe is the shadow of attributes which are shadow of the essence. This demonstrates that the universe is not identical with God. For Sirhindî, regarding the relationship between God and the universe, only the following can be said: the whole universe is the locus of manifestation of the divine names and attributes. However, other than being created by God and being indicative of divine names, the universe has no relation to the Creator. Sirhindî criticizes Ibn Arabî and his commentators at this point. On the one hand, they say that the essence is unknown and absolute, consequently we cannot make any judgment about it, and on the other hand they talk about the essential comprehension (ihâta), proximity (kurb) and togetherness (ma’iyyet). These include judgments about the essence. Thus, if the essence is beyond all kinds of judgments, then the universe cannot be identical with God. ‘I saw at the highest level that although the universe is a mirror and locus of disclosure of the perfections of divine attributes, contrary to what the supporters of declaring God’s unity in terms of being, the locus of manifestation is

not identical to that which is manifest, nor is shadow identical to the original (asl). Sirhindî gives an example to explain that the relationship between God and the universe is not a relationship of identity. Let's suppose that a person wants to make his perfections manifest. He invents sounds and letters to explain hidden beauties in him to people. Through sounds and letters he makes his perfections manifest. The form consisting of letters and sounds is the mirror and disclosure of these perfections. This form cannot be identical to the perfections, since perfections on the one hand and sounds and letters on the other are related to each other as the signified and the sign. Just as we cannot approve of the identity between human perfections on the one hand and sounds and letters on the other on the basis of the relations of signified and the sign and that which is manifest and the locus of manifestation, we cannot argue for the identity between God and the universe. As a result, the universe is not identical to God. Thus, if the divine attributes and names are not identical to the divine essence, then the universe is not identical to the divine essence.

3. The distinction between the real being and the shadow one is not imaginary, but a real distinction. Sirhindî, who describes the universe as the shadow of attributes and names argues that the universe has an independent being even if it is relative. At this point he takes issues with the theory of wahdat al-wujûd, which is based on the idea that the universe is 'estimation' (vehm) and 'imagination'. For him the theory of wahdat al-wujûd is based on a

conception of being which consists of the essence of the Real. Accordingly, the universe is nothing other than the realization of the existence in knowledge (al-subût al-ilmî). Although the universe is God's shadow and the shadow-being is found only in sense-perception, it is pure non-being in re. At this point, Sirhindî criticizes the idea included in the theory of wahdat al-wujûd that 'the universe does not have a being independent of the being of the Real', and argues that it is completely wrong. Sirhindî establishes his view through an analysis of 'the original' (asal) and 'the shadow'. Although the universe is a shadow of God, the universe exists in re not as an original but insofar as it is a shadow (zilliyyat). For example, let's think about the relationship between a person and his shadow. Although the features of this person are mirrored in his shadow, the shadow does not feel pain when a piece of fire happens on the shadow. Thus, just as the shadow is distinct from the person, the existence of the universe is distinct from the existence of God. He clearly expounded his opinion that 'the Real is not identical to the universe, is not conjoined to the universe, nor is He separate from the universe. Sirhindi discusses this issue in another letter as well. The basic premise in this discussion is the fact that the universe is created out of 'nothing'. However, Ibn Arabî, who considers possible beings as forms of the divine knowledge, denies the existence of anything in Him other than the essence, when he declares that 'forms of knowledge are reflected in the mirror of the essence'. For Sirhindî, although the state of 'being an existent' is reflected on possible beings, they are nothing (adem). Consequently,

there are two spheres of being in front of us: ‘the sphere of the necessary being’ and ‘the sphere of the possible being’. It must be said that this conclusion compels Sirhindî to accept dualism to some extent.

4. The ultimate end of the Sufi experience is not *wahdat al-wujûd*, but *wahdat al-shuhûd*. No Sufi can argue for *wahdat al-wujûd* on the basis of his acts of witnessing. It seems that in all occasions when Sirhindî criticizes Ibn Arabi, this is the main point. Sirhindî states that at the beginning of his Sufi practice (*sülûk*), he attained the witnessing of *wahdat al-wujûd*. However, later on it was unveiled (*keşf*) to him that it was wrong. Thus he abandoned the theory of *wahdat al-wujûd*. Departing from this point, Sirhindî concludes that the ultimate end of the Sufi experience is not ‘unity’ but servitude (*abdiyyat*). This approach means that the idea of *wahdat alwujûd* is an incomplete and insufficient belief. Concerning the course of the experience in question, Sirhindi states: ‘The Dervish, author of these lines, used to believe in *wahdat al-wujûd*. While he was a child, knowledge of declaring such a unity occurred to him and he reached the level of certainty in this regard...upon entering this path, at first the way of declaring the unity was opened to him as a state, and for a while he strolled through the levels of this station. To him rushed knowledge conforming to this station. The problems occurring to the mind of the people defending the theory of *wahdat alwujûd* were unveiled to him and their solutions were presented to him. After a while, another ascription prevailed, and he hesitated about the theory

of wahdat al-wujûd, i.e., he was not sure whether the theory of wahdat al-wujûd conformed to the reality. However, this hesitation was not an outright denial but rather a good opinion. It lasted for a while, and then came the denial of the theory of wahdat al-wujûd. He received the inspiration that this station was the station of lowness (süfliyyat) and he should go up to the station of ‘shadow-ness’ (zilliyyat). However, this dervish did not have a choice regarding the denial, and he also did not want to leave that station since there were great Sufis. When he reached the station of shadow-ness (zilliyyat), he saw himself and other things in the universe as shadows. Thus he did not leave that station, since he thought that perfection was wahdat al-wujûd and at the new station, i.e., station of shadow-ness... Then through providence and gentleness they lifted him up from this station to a higher one, to the station of ‘servitude’ (abdiyyat). Then he became aware of the perfection and nobility of this station. Upon that, this dervish began repenting for the lower stations. In conclusion, Sirhindî criticizes the theory of wahdat al-wujûd as formulated by Ibn Arabi in four points, as explained above, and he develops the theory of wahdat al-shuhûd. According to this the doctrine of wahdat alshuhûd is based on these principles: Being is an attribute additional to the essence. Just as attributes are not identical to the essence, the universe is not identical to attributes. God’s being and the being of the universe is different from each other depending on the opposition between being and non-being (adem). The highest point of the Sufi experience is not the theory of wahdat al-wujûd, based on declaring

unity, but the theory of wahdat al shuhûd, based on the station of the servitude.

18. Al- Gazali : Philosophical Method (Method of Doubt)

Abdul Hamid bin Muhammad Al- Gazali (1059 A.D - 1111 A.D) was a skeptical student from his youth. He was unaffected by his religious studies. He doubted everything. He doubted the evidence of his senses and even the primary ideas of the mind. He remembered the traditional saying of the prophet “every child is born with a sound disposition (fitrah)”. Our senses deceive us. No eyes can perceive the moment of a shadow, still the shadow moves. A small coin could cover any star which is a world vastly larger than the earth. The most important thing about Al Gazali system of thought is its method which may be described as that of the courage to know and courage to doubt. For himself he said that he had embarked on the open sea of knowledge right from his adolescence. Al Gazali famously proclaimed that “when fire and cotton are placed in contact, the cotton is burned directly by God rather than by the fire”. A claim which he defended using logic methodology by reasoning that fire was inanimate, burning the cotton only up on coming into contact with it, but not cause the cotton to burn due to a reason or will. Al Gazali states that God’s creation follows a prior decision (taqdir). Al Gazali addresses theories of cause and effect in defense of the possibility of miracles. When two things happen in conjunction with one other, we immediately assume that first is the cause and second is the effect.

Main teachings of Imam Gazali are:

1. The reason is only source of knowledge.
2. Revelation and intuition are also the only sources of knowledge.
3. Primary essentials of religion can be had only through revelation which is given by Quran.
4. Reason cannot give the primary truth of religion.
5. God is the cause of all and us.
6. God is on a higher plane which cannot be reached by reason alone. This plane can be reached through intuition.
7. Philosophy is nothing more than common sense and regulated thinking so it cannot give us truth equal to revelation.

Gazali's famous works are: *Tahafat- al- Falasifah* (The incoherence of the philosophers) and 'ahyaa-al-uloom ad-Deen' and also 'iljaam-al-Awwaam-an-Ilm-al-kalaam'.

It attempts me to discuss the meaning and significance of doubt in the life and thought of al-Ghazzālī, not as an anticipation of the method of doubt or the sceptical attitude of modern western philosophy, but as an integral element of the epistemology of Islamic intellectual tradition to which al-Ghazzālī properly belongs. We will seek to analyze the nature, function and spirit of the Ghazzālian doubt. In discussing the above question, we are mindful of two important factors.' One is the specific intellectual, religious and spiritual climate prevailing in the Islamic world during the time of al-Ghazzali, which no doubt constitutes the

main external contributory factor to the generation of doubt in the early phase of al-Ghazzālī's intellectual life. The other concerns the whole set of opportunities which Islam ever places at the disposal of man in his quest for certainty, and what we know of al-Ghazzālī's life shows us that he was very much exposed to these opportunities. Further, the spirit of the Ghazzālian doubt can best be understood when viewed in the context of the true purpose for which the *al-Munqidh* has been written and when also viewed in the light of his later works.

In the *al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl*, al-Ghazzālī informs us of how in the prime of his life he was afflicted with a mysterious malady of the soul, which lasted for nearly two months during which time he “was a sceptic in fact, but not in utterance and doctrine. He was a student in his early twenties at the Nizāmīyah Academy of Naishapur when he suffered from this disease of scepticism. Now what is the nature of this Ghazzālian doubt? al-Ghazzālī tells us that his doubt has been generated in the course of his quest for certainty, that is for the reality of things ‘as they really are’ (*haqīq al-umūr*) This knowledge of the reality of things ‘as they really are’ is what al-Ghazzālī calls *al-`ilm al-yaqīn*, a sure and certain knowledge which he defines as ‘that in which the thing known is made so manifest that no doubt clings to it, nor is it accompanied by the possibility of error and deception, nor can the mind even suppose such a possibility’. Here, we need to say something of this inner quest of al-Ghazzālī itself because it is very much relevant to the whole of our present

discussion. In fact, the meaning of this quest should never be lost sight of if we are to understand truly the nature and significance of the Ghazzālian doubt.

In Islam, the quest for *haqāiq al-umūr* originates with the famous prayer of the Prophet in which he asked God to show him things as they really are. This prayer of the Prophet is essentially the prayer of the gnostic in as much as it refers to a supra-rational or inner reality of things. And for this reason, it has been the Sufis who have most faithfully echoed that prayer of the Prophet. The famous Sufi, Jāmi has this prayer beautifully expanded, capturing in an eloquent manner the spirit of the very quest of gnostic:

‘O God, delivers us from preoccupation with worldly vanities, and shows us the nature of things ‘as they really are’. Remove from our eyes the veil of ignorance, and show us things as they really are. Show us not non-existence as existent, nor cast the veil of non-existence over the beauty of existence. Make this phenomenal world the mirror to reflect the manifestation of Thy beauty, not a veil to separate and repel us from Thee. Cause these unreal phenomena of the Universe to be for us the sources of knowledge and insight, not the causes of ignorance and blindness. Our alienation and severance from Thy beauty all proceed from ourselves. Deliver us from ourselves, and accord to us intimate knowledge of Thee.

Al-Ghazzālī’s quest for certainty as he has defined it is none other than this quest of the gnostic. Initially, however, it was a purely intellectual quest. There were both internal and external

forces at work in fueling that quest to the point of generating a period of intense doubt in the youthful life of al-Ghazzali. Internally, by his own admission, his natural intellectual disposition has always been to grasp the real meaning of things. As for the external forces, we have already referred to the most important of these, namely the various intellectual, religious and spiritual currents of al-Ghazzali's times, all of which could not but have engaged his highly reflective and contemplative mind. That these various currents were of central concern to him is very clear from the *Munqidh*. He, in fact, traces the genesis of his famous doubt to those currents. He was struck by the diversity of religions and creeds and by the fact that the followers of each religion cling stubbornly to their inherited beliefs. One consequence of his critical reflection upon this question is the loss of the hold of *taqlidāt* (uncritical inherited beliefs) on him. But living as he was in an age when the idea of Transcendence is very much a living reality in the souls of men, the problem of diversity of religions was not to lead al-Ghazzali to the kind of relativism that is rampant in modern times as a response to the same problems. On the contrary, it was to lead him to the search for the inner reality of human nature, man's primordial nature (*fiṭrah*), which on the earthly plane becomes the receptacle for the multiplicity of religious forms and expressions.

It is wrong, however, to infer from the above that al-Ghazzālī is against *taqlid* as such. He never advocated at any time its abandonment altogether. In fact, he considered it to be necessary for the simple believers whose simple minds are free from the kind of

intellectual curiosity that has been manifested by God in others, and are therefore content to accept things based on the authority of others. Al-Ghazzālī's criticism of taqlīd must be seen in the context of his quest for the highest level of certainty, a quest which in practical terms is the concern, not of the majority; but of the few like him. From the point of view of this quest, taqlīd is certainly a great impediment to its realization and consequently he lets himself loose from the bonds of taqlīd (rābitat al-taqlīd). Here, one needs to make a clear distinction between taqlīd, which is a particular manner of acquiring ideas, and taqlīdāt, which are the ideas themselves. This distinction is somehow seldom noted by many students of Ghazzālian thought. Al-Ghazzālī's rejection of the former for himself is his methodological criticism of its inherent limitations, while his acceptance of it for the simple-minded is simply an affirmation of an aspect of the reality of the human order. The unreliability of taqlid stems from the fact that it is susceptible to lending itself to both true and false taqlīdāt. The solution to the problem of false taqlīdāt is, however, not sought through the complete eradication of taqlīd, which is practically impossible, but through addressing oneself to the question of the truth or falsity of the taqlīdāt, themselves. Thus, in the Munqidh, al-Ghazzālī tells us how, after reflection upon the problem of taqlīd, he seeks to sift out these taqlīdāt, to discern those that are true from those that are false. A lot of his intellectual efforts were indeed devoted to this task.

For al-Ghazzālī, the positive function of taqlīd, namely the acceptance of truths based on authority, is to be protected by those

who have been entrusted with true knowledge, who constitute the legitimate authority to interpret and clarify knowledge about religious and spiritual matters. As it pertains to knowledge, the reality of the human order affirmed by al-Ghazzālī is that there are degrees or levels of knowledge and consequently, of knowers. This view has its basis in the Qur’anic verse which al-Ghazzālī quoted:” God raises in degrees those of you who believe and those to whom knowledge is given”. In Islam, there is a hierarchy of authorities culminating in the Holy Prophet, and ultimately God Himself. Faith (īmān), which is a level of knowledge, says al-Ghazzālī, is the favourable acceptance (husn al-zann)—of knowledge based on hearsay and experience of others, of which the highest is that of the Prophet.

There has been objection from certain modernist circles that the idea of admissibility of taqlīd for one group of people and its unacceptability for another is a dangerous one for it will lead to the crystallization of a caste system which is against the very spirit of Islam. What has been said above is actually already sufficient to render this objection invalid. Nevertheless, we like to quote here the rebuttal of a scholar who has bemoaned the banishment of the Islamic idea of hierarchy of knowledge and of authorities at the hands of the modernists: ‘In respect of the human order in society, we do not in the least mean by ‘hierarchy’ that semblance of it wherein oppression and exploitation and domination are legitimized as if they were an established principle ordained by God. The fact that hierarchical disorders have prevailed in human society does not

mean that hierarchy in the human order is not valid, for there is, in point of fact, legitimate hierarchy in the order of creation, and this is the Divine Order pervading all Creation and manifesting the occurrence of justice'. It is this idea of the hierarchy of knowledge and of being which is central to al-Ghazzali's epistemology and system of thought, and he himself would be the last person to say that such an idea implies the legitimization of a social caste system in Islam.

The discussion of al-Ghazzālī's methodological criticism of taqlīd, we may say that he was dissatisfied with it because it could not quench his intense intellectual thirst. It is obvious to him at that young age that taqlīd is an avenue to both truth and error, but as to what is true and what is false there is an open sea of debate around him, which disturbs him profoundly. It leads him to contemplate upon the most central question in philosophy, namely the question of what true knowledge is, and this marks the beginning of an intensification of his intellectual doubt. Besides the problem of the diversity of religions and creeds of which the central issue is taqlīd, there is another and more important religious and spiritual current which contributed to the genesis of his doubt and which deeply affected his mind. This he mentions as the existence of the multiplicity of schools of thought (*madhāhib*) and groups (*fīraq*) within the Community of Islam itself, each with its own methods of understanding and affirming the truth and each claiming that it alone is saved. Al-Ghazzālī mentions in the *Munqidh* that in this state of affairs of the Community, which he likens to "a deep sea in which

most men founder and from which few only are saved”, one finds the fulfillment of the famous promise of the Prophet (SAW): “My Community will split into seventy-odd sects, of whom one will be saved”. The above religious climate was not peculiar to the times of al-Ghazzālī alone. A few centuries earlier, al-Hārith Bin Asad al-Muhāsibī another famous Sufi, whose writings exercised a great influence on al-Ghazzālī, lamented the similar pitiful state of affairs into which the Islamic community has fallen. In fact, the autobiographical character of the *Munqidh* may have been modeled on the introduction to al-Muhāsibī’s work, *Kitāb al-wasāyā* (or *al-Nasā’ih*) which is also autobiographical in character.

The following extract from the *wasāyā* reveals striking similarities with certain passages in the *Munqidh* and speaks much of the kind of religious climate prevailing during the time of al-Muhāsibī: It has come to pass in our days, that this community is divided into seventy and more sects: of these, one only is in the way of salvation, and for the rest, God knows best concerning them. Now I have not ceased, not so much as one moment of my life, to consider well the differences into which the community has fallen, and to search after the clear way and the true path, whereunto I have searched both theory and practice, and looked, for guidance on the road to the world to come, to the directing of the theologians. Moreover, I have studied much of the doctrine of Almighty God, with the interpretation of the lawyers, and reflected upon the various conditions of the community, and considered its diverse doctrines and sayings. Of all this I understood as much as was appointed for

me to understand and saw that their divergence was as it were a deep sea, wherein many had been drowned, and but a small band escaped there from; and I saw every party of them asserting that salvation was to be found in following them, and that he would perish who opposed them.

It is interesting that, although al-Ghazzālī's autobiographical work is more dramatic and eloquent than that of al-Muhāsibī's both men were led to an almost similar kind of personal crisis by similar external circumstances. Both sought the light of certainty and that knowledge which guarantees salvation, and they found that light in Sufism. In their very quest, they accomplished a philosophical as well as a sociological analysis of knowledge, the details of which remain to be studied. But having said this much, there is no doubt that al-Ghazzālī's philosophical discussion of doubt (shakk) and certainty (Yaqīn) is his original contribution.

We have already discussed the main factors which contributed to the generation of the Ghazzālian doubt, and the formulation of the fundamental question: what is the true meaning of knowledge? We have also mentioned that this doubt becomes more intensified after he begins to reflect with great earnestness upon the above question. We now discuss the philosophical meaning of this Ghazzālian doubt. We have seen earlier how al-Ghazzālī defines the kind of certain and infallible knowledge (al-ilm al-yaqīn) which he seeks. It is that knowledge which is completely free from any error or doubt and with which the heart finds complete satisfaction. Is such kind of certainty or certitude possible? It is significant that al-Ghazzālī

never posed that question but, armed with the above criteria of certainty, proceeded immediately to scrutinize the whole state of his knowledge. He found himself ‘devoid of any knowledge answering the previous description except in the case of sense-data (hissiyyāt) and the self-evident truths (darūiyyāt) He then sets out to induce doubt (tashkīk) against his sense-data to determine whether they could withstand his test of infallibility and indubitability. The outcome of this effort, in which reason (aql) appears as judge over the claims of the senses to certitude, is that his reliance on sense-data no longer becomes tenable. The charge of falsity leveled by reason against sense-perceptions cannot be rebutted by the senses.

With his reliance on sense-data shattered, al-Ghazzālī seeks refuge in the certainty of rational data which “belong to the category of primary truths, such as our asserting that ‘Ten is more than three’, and ‘One and the same thing cannot be simultaneously affirmed and denied’, and ‘One and the same thing cannot be incipient and eternal, existent and non-existent, necessary and impossible’. However, this refuge in the rational data (aqliyyāt) too is not safe from elements of doubt. This time, doubt creeps in through an objection made on behalf of sense-data against the claims of reason to certitude. These claims of reason are not refuted in the way that reason itself has previously refuted the claims of the senses. They are merely subjected to doubt by means of analogical argumentations, but it is nevertheless a doubt which reason could not dispel in an incontrovertible manner. Reason is reminded of the possibility of another judge superior to itself, which if it were to

reveal itself would “give the lie to the judgments of reason, just as the reason-judge revealed itself and gave the lie to the judgments of sense”. The mere fact of the non-appearance of this other judge does not prove the impossibility of its existence.

This inner debate within the soul of al-Ghazzālī turns for the worse when suggestion of the possibility of another kind of perception beyond reason is reinforced by various kinds of evidences and argumentations. First of all, an appeal is made to reason to exercise the principle of analogy to the phenomena of dreaming: that the relation of this suggested supra-rational state to the waking state, when the senses and reason are fully functional, is like the relation of the latter to our dreaming state. If our waking state judges our imaginings and beliefs in the dreaming state to be groundless, the supra-rational state judges likewise our rational beliefs. This argumentation is as if al-Ghazzālī, himself one of the most respected jurists, is addressing himself to the jurists and others who are proponents of reason and who are well-versed with the principle of analogy. We are not suggesting here that this idea enters into the mind of al-Ghazzālī at the time of his actual experience of this inner debate. It could well have surfaced at the time of his decision to write the *Munqidh* in as much as the *Munqidh* was written, we believe, with a view of impressing upon the rationalists that Islamic epistemology affirms the existence of supra-rational perceptions as the real key to knowledge. Thus, al-Ghazzālī reproaches the rationalists in the *Munqidh*: “Therefore, whoever

thinks that the unveiling of truth depends on precisely formulated proofs has indeed straitened the broad mercy of God”.

In addition, the confront reason in support of the possibility of a supra-rational state is the presence of a group of people, the Sufis, who claim that they have actually experienced that state. They allege that in the states they experience they see phenomena which are not in accord with the normal data of reason. Finally, the last piece of evidence brought to the attention of reason is the prophetic saying, ‘Men are asleep: then after they die they awake’, and the Qur’anic verse ‘Thou wast heedless of this; now have we removed thy veil, and sharp is thy sight this day’. Both the hadīth and the Qur’ānic verse refer to man’s state after death, and reason is told that, may be, this is the state in question.

All these objections to the claim of reason to have the final say to truth could not be refuted satisfactorily by reason. The mysterious malady of the soul of al-Ghazzālī, which lasted for nearly two months, is none other than this inner tussle or tension between his rational faculty and another faculty which mounts an appeal to the former, through the senses, to accept its existence and the possibility of those experiences that have been associated with its various powers, such as those claimed by the Sufis. This other faculty, which is supra-rational and supra-logical, is the intuitive faculty which, at this particular stage of al-Ghazzālī’s intellectual development, has actualized itself only to the extent of acknowledging the possibility of those experiences. Later, during the period of his intense spiritual life, he claims to have been

invested with higher powers of the faculty which disclose to him innumerable mysteries of the spiritual world. The powers al-Ghazzālī terms *kashf* (direct vision) and *dhawq* (translated as fruitionl experience by McCarthy, and immediate experience by Watt).

The gradational movement from sense-data to rational data presents no serious difficulty, but the first direct encounter between rational experience and the intuitive one proves to be a painful one for al-Ghazzālī. His two-month period of being ‘a skeptic’ in fact, but not in utterance and doctrine’ is the period of having to endure intense, doubts about the reliability of his rational faculty in the fact of certain assertive manifestations of the intuitive faculty. His problem is one of finding the rightful place for each of the human faculties of knowing within the total scheme of knowledge, and in particular of establishing the right relationship between reason and intuition, as this latter term is understood traditionally. Thus, when he was cured of this sickness, not through rational arguments or logical proofs but as the effect of a light, (*nūr*) which God cast into his breast, his intellectual equilibrium was restored and he once again accepted the reliability of rational data of the category of *darūriyyāt*. However, in this new intellectual equilibrium, reason no longer occupies the dominant position it used to have, for al-Ghazzālī says it is that light which God cast into his breast, which is the key to most knowledge.

We do not agree with the view of certain scholars that the method of doubt is something central to al-Ghazzālī’s epistemology

and system of thought. The whole spirit of the *Munqidh* does not support the view that al-Ghazzālī is advocating in it systematic doubt as an instrument for the investigation of truth. And there is nothing to be found in the *Munqidh* which is comparable to Descartes assertion that ‘it is necessary once in one’s life to doubt of all things, so far as this is possible’ this brings us to the question of the true nature of the first personal crisis of al-Ghazzālī. The celebrated Italian Orientalist, Guiseppe Furlani, also agrees that the doubt of al-Ghazzālī is not that of the skeptic but that of the critic of knowledge. We agree with the view of these scholars that at the time of his crisis al-Ghazzālī was neither a philosophical nor a religious skeptic, and that the crisis is an epistemological or methodical one. The *Munqidh* alone provides ample evidence to support this view. Al-Ghazzālī was not a philosophical sceptic because he never contested the value of metaphysical certitude. He was always certain of the de jure certitude of truth. Thus, as we have mentioned earlier, he never questions whether the knowledge of haqa’iq al-umur is possible or not. His natural intellectual disposition to always seek that knowledge is, in a way, an affirmation of his certainty of the de jure certitude of truth.

According to Schuon, it is the agnostics and other relativists who sought to demonstrate the illusory character of the de jure certitude of truth by opposing to it the de facto certitude of error, as if the psychological phenomenon of false certitudes could pre-vent true certitudes from being what they are and from having all their effectiveness and as if the very existence of false certitudes did not

prove in its own way the existence of true once. As for al-Ghazzālī, he never falls into the above philosophical temptation of the agnostics and relativists. His doubt is not of truth itself, but of the mode of knowing and of accepting this truth. But since by truth here, he means the inner reality of things, his quest for that reality also implies a quest for its corresponding mode of knowledge. His criticisms of all the modes of knowing that were then within his practical realization were motivated by a real theoretical awareness of the possibility of another mode of knowing, which the Sufis claim is theirs. In the case of al-Ghazzālī, this possibility must have agitated his mind right from the time it was first impressed upon him through his direct personal encounter with the way of the Sufis. We may recall here the early educational background of al-Ghazzālī. It was an education which was permeated by a strong influence of Sufism. His father, says al-Subki, was a pious dervish who spent as much time as he could in the company of the Sufis.

The first teacher to whom his early education was entrusted was a pious Sufi friend of his. Studying together with him then was the younger brother, Ahmad al-Ghazzālī who though less famous later made his mark as a great Sufi whose disciples include ‘Abd al-Qāhir Abū Najīb as-Suhrawardī, the founder of the Suhrawardiyyah Order, and most probably, as believed by a number of scholars, al-Ghazzālī himself. During his stay of study at Naishapur, besides studying Sufism as one of the subjects, he also became a disciple to the Sufi Abū ‘Ali-al-Fad ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Fārmadhi al-Tūsī who was a pupil of al-Qushairi. Al-Ghazzālī learnt from al-Fārmadhi

about the theory and practice of Sufism and, under the latter's guidance, even indulged in certain ascetic and spiritual practices.

He was increasingly attracted to the idea of a direct personal experience of God as insisted by the Sufis. He, however, felt a bit disheartened that he could not attain to that stage where the mystics begin to receive pure inspiration from 'high above'. With all these in mind we strongly believe that Sufism plays a central role in leading al-Ghazzālī to his epistemological crisis. Al-Ghazzālī's doubt of the trust-worthiness of reason was not generated from 'below' or by the reflection of reason upon its own self, but was suggested from 'above' as a result of his acquaintance with the Sufi's mode of knowledge which claims to be supra-rational and which offers its own critiques of reason. Likewise, the doubt was removed not by the activity of reason, but from 'above' as a result of the light of divine grace which restores to each faculty of knowledge its rightful position and its validity and trustworthiness as its own level. Al-Ghazzālī was also never at any time a religious skeptic. He tells us in the *Munqidh* that throughout his quest for certainty, he always has an unshakable belief in the three fundamentals of the Islamic faith: 'From the sciences which I had practiced and the methods which I had followed in my inquiry into the two kinds of knowledge, revealed and rational, I had already acquired a sure and certain faith in God, in the prophetic mediation of revelation, and in the last day. These three fundamentals of our Faith had become deeply rooted in my-soul, not because of any specific, precisely formulated proofs,

but because of reasons and circumstances and experiences too many to list in detail’.

The above quotation is yet evidence provided by the *Munqidh* that al-Ghazzālī’s so-called skepticism is not to be equated with the ones we encounter in modern western philosophy. The doubting mind of al-Ghazzālī was, therefore, never cut off from revelation and faith. On the contrary, it was based upon a ‘sure and certain’ faith in the fundamentals of religion. As for the doubting mind of the modern skeptic, it is cut off from both the intellect and revelation and in the pursuit of its directionless activity it has turned against faith itself. Now, what is the distinction between the ‘sure and certain’ faith which al-Ghazzālī always has and the certainty which he seeks? We will deal briefly with this question because in its very answer lies the significance of the Ghazzālian doubt and also because charges have been levelled against al-Ghazzālī by scholars like J. Obermann that his haunting doubts of objective reality led him to find sanctuary in religious subjectivism.

The answer to the above question is to be found in the idea of certainty (*yaqīn*) in Islamic gnosis. There are degrees of certainty: in the terminology of the Qur’ān, these are ‘*ilm al-yaqīn* (science of certainty), ‘*ayn al-yaqīn* (vision of certainty) and *haqq al-yaqīn* (truth of certainty). These have been respectively compared to hearing about the description of fire, seeing fire and being consumed by fire. As applied to al-Ghazzālī’s quest for certainty, the ‘sure and certain’ faith which he says he has acquired from his inquiry into the various sciences refers to ‘*ilm al-yaqīn*’ since the acceptance of the truth is

inferential in nature, based as it is upon the data furnished by revelation and the authority of the Prophet. In other words, at the level of faith, the truth which is the object of that faith is not known directly or with immediacy. Nevertheless, to the extent that in one's act of faith one participates in the truth through both his reason and heart, faith already implies a particular level of knowledge and of certainty. Thus, from the beginning of al-Ghazzalī's quest for the true knowledge of the Real, a certain element of certitude was always present.

In the *Kitab al-ilm* (Book of knowledge) of his *magnum opus*, *Ihya' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* (The Revivification of the Religious Sciences), Al-Ghazzali discusses the usage of the term *yaqīn* by the major intellectual schools of Islam up to his time. He identifies two distinct meanings to which the term is being applied. In one group are the philosophers (*nuzzīr*) and the theologians (*mutakallimūn*) who employ the term to signify lack or negation of doubt, in the sense that the knowledge or the truth in question is established from evidence which leaves no place for doubt or any possibility of doubt. The second application of the term *yaqīn* is that of the jurists and the Sufis as well as most of the learned men. *Yaqīn*, in this case, refers to the intensity of religious faith or fervor which involves both the acceptance, by the soul, of that which prevails over the heart and takes hold of it" and the submission of the soul to that thing in question. For al-Ghazzālī, both types of *yaqīn* need to be strengthened but it is the second *yaqīn* which is the nobler of the two since it is the life and value of the first, and it fosters religious and

spiritual obedience and praiseworthy habits. In other words, philosophical certainty is of no value if not accompanied by submission to the truth and the transformation of one's being in conformity with that truth. Although the jurists and the Sufis are both identified with the second *yaqīn*, they are centrally concerned with different levels of *yaqīn*. The Sufis are basically concerned with a direct or immediate experience of the Truth, and with submission not merely at the level of external meaning of the *Sharī'ah* (Divine Law) but with submission of all the powers of the soul to the Pure Spirit. For this reason, the degrees of certainty we have earlier spoken of belong to *marifah* (Islamic gnosis) and not to *fiqh* (jurisprudence). Or, in al-Ghazzālī's popular terminology in the *lhyā*, they belong to *ilm al-mukāshafah* (science of revelation) and not to '*ilm al-mu'āmalah*' (science of practical religion).

Reverting back to al-Ghazzālī's 'sure and certain faith', there are, with respect to his ultimate goal, deficiencies in both his modes of knowing and the submission of his whole being. Deficiency in the former lies at the heart of his first personal crisis which, as we have seen, is epistemological while deficiency in the latter is at the heart of his second personal crisis which is spiritual, although the two crisis are not unrelated. We have identified this earlier faith of al-Ghazzālī with the level of *ilm al-yaqīn* which is a particular manner of participation in the Truth. Objectively, if doubts could be generated about the trustworthiness of '*ilm al-yaqīn*' as being the highest level of certainty, it is because a higher level of certitude is possible for as Schuon profoundly says, if man is able to doubt, this

is because certitude exists. After the crisis, as a result of the light of intellectual intuition which he receives from Heaven, that certainty was elevated to the level of *'ayn al-yaqīn'*. This new-found certainty is not the end of al-Ghazzali's intellectual and spiritual quest. He is too aware of the Sufis' claim of mystical experience but which he himself has not been able to realize yet, and this must have been a lingering source of inner disturbance for him. We remember how he did attempt to indulge in certain spiritual practices of the Sufis but without success. He is to realize later where his central fault lies: he was too engrossed in worldly desires and ambitions such as fame and fortune, while the efficacy of spiritual practices presupposes certain conditions like the sincerity of one's intention.

Al-Ghazzālī mentions in the *Munqidh* that immediately after his first crisis is over, he proceeds to study with greater thoroughness the views and methods of the various seekers of the Truth, whom he limits to four. These are 'the mutakallimūn (theologians) who allege that they are men of independent judgment and reasoning; the ha-finites who claim to be the unique possessors of *al-ta'līm* (authoritative instruction) and the privileged recīpients of knowledge acquired from the Infallible Imam; the philosophers who maintain that they are the men of logic and apodeictic demonstration; and finally the Sufis who claim to be the familiars of the Divine Presence and the men of mystic vision and illumination". There is no doubt that al-Ghazal has undertaken this comparative study of all the categories of seekers of the Truth with the view of exhausting all the possibilities and opportunities which lie open to him in his path

of seeking the highest level of certainty seekable, although one may already detect in him then that his real inclination and sympathy lies in Sufism. At the end of this thorough study, he came to the conclusion that ‘the Sufis were masters of states (arbāb al-ahwāl) and not purveyors of words (ashāb alaḡwal)’’. He also came to realize how great a difference there is between theoretical knowledge and realized knowledge. For example, there is a great difference between our knowing the definitions and causes and conditions of health and satiety and our being healthy and sated, between our knowing the definition of drunkenness and our being drunk, and between our knowing the true nature .and conditions of asceticism and our actually practicing. Realized knowledge, however, demands the transformation of the knower’s being. The distinctive characteristic of the Sufi mode of knowledge, says al-Ghazzālī, is that it seeks the removal of deformations of the soul such as pride, passional attachment to the world and a host of other reprehensible habits and vicious qualities, all of which stand as obstacles to the realization of that knowledge, in order to attain a heart empty of all save. God and adorned with the constant remembrance of God. This led al-Ghazzālī to reflect upon his state of being. He realized the pitiful state of his soul and became certain that he was “on the brink of a crumbling bank and already on the verge of falling into the Fire” unless he set about mending his ways. Before him now lies the most important decision he has to make in his life. For about six months he incessantly vacillated between the contending pull of worldly desires and the appeals of the afterlife.

This is al-Ghazzālī's second personal crisis which is spiritual and far more serious than the first because it involves a decision of having to abandon one kind of life for another which is essentially opposed to the former. He tells us how, at last, when he has completely lost his capacity to make a choice God delivers him from, the crisis by making it easy for his heart to turn away from the attractions of the world. In the spiritual path of the Sufis, al-Ghazzālī found the light of certainty that he has tirelessly sought from the beginning of his intellectual awareness of what that certainty is.

19. Lal Ded: Mystical philosophy

Lal Dedh was the follower of Shaivism and later she accepted Islam under the influence of Shahi Hamdan. She explained unity of God in a transcendental way. She went away from ideal, cultural and traditionalism that is why she is best known as an iconoclast of her time. The philosophical wisdom of Lal Dedh should be explored through her poetry. Lal Dedh's poetry is known as *Vakhs* which means 'speech' or 'argumentation'. Nevertheless her poetry is vast in wit and knowledge. It took years to explain the real philosophical nature of her poetry. Lal Dedh is a champion of monotheism. I have taken some *Vakhs* and will try my best to explain Lal as a great metaphysician and logician like western philosophers and Indian philosophers. Lalleshwari is a great interpreter of the divine reality. Lal was a mystic and wonderer in the nature. She loved nature; her poetry signifies a solitude and ill-will towards worldly pleasure. One of her *vakh* she compared life with water Ocean with world and soft

piece of thread (*Aum pan* with karmas bad karmas leads to *pap* good karmas leads to *svarga* or *punya*. Lal prays to god and utters that I am in this world you created me, my karmas boat is sustained in ocean. Bestow me with right path to *svarga* or goodness and she prays to god please show me my destiny. Lal wants to go her real home that is life after death *vidhimukhti*. Though Lal was a literary figure, her *vakhs* contains diverse knowledge related to different fields. In some verses she describes her own empirical experience and observation.

Lal ded was born in the second decade of fourteenth century. Lal ded was most powerful symbol of Kashmir's civilization. Lal ded started her spiritual journey as a tormented soul, but attained a stage where self realization and self consciousness gave her tremendous inner strength and the confidence that derived from that strength. Lal ded is highly spiritual because she is gifted with an extraordinary poetic sensibility. Her *vakhs* bears testimony of Lala's genius as a saint and poet in one. The *vakhs* she uttered are direct outpourings from her heart rather than a consciously produced poetic composition, her *vaakhs* made a tremendous impact on the collective psyche of both Muslims as well as on Hindus. Her *vaakhs* convey a message of peace and harmony and one can see that she owes it as much to her educational background in a Shaivite Kashmiri Brahman family as to her spiritual enlightenment based on her *Sadhana*. In her *vaakhs*, there is a state of awareness and of an outlook for transcending cults. A voice which set off a resonance

heard with clear tone till today. She was genius both as a saint and as a poet. Reading her *vaakhs*, we get the notion that lalla aimed at achieving a fusion or synthesis of vedantic philosophy and Islamic Sufism. I shall quote her famous *vakh*:

Within a thin rope of untwisted thread
Tow I ever my boat o'er the sea
Will god hear the prayers that I have said?
Will he safely over carry me?
Water in a cup of unbaked clay,
Whirling and wasting, my dizzy soul
Slowly is filling to melt away
Oh, how fain would I reach my Goal!

(Grierson and Barnett translation)

Lal ded was a great philosopher, poet, mystic of Kashmir valley, who lived as an ascetic and pious life. In spite of this she was a Shavite who firmly believed in the doctrines and the authority of shaivism as indicated in the verses of her poetry. Many Muslim scholars mentioned in their historical works that she met Shahi Hamdan. She had accepted Islam and has been called by the Muslims Lal Ded. Lal ded is compared with other great female saints like Ded Mooj and Haba khatoon. In her poetry, there are two types of doctrines; one is that, in some of her *vakhs*, the philosophical vision of shaivism is reflected and in the other way, Islamic tawheed, self purification and Sufism are pictured. Lal ded is known by her many names like Laleshwari, Lala arifa, and so on. Lal ded sings the poetry known as *vaakhs*, derived from the word

vak. Abhinavagupta defines *Vak* as *Vimarsa* or “reflective awareness of the self”. A Sanskrit word which means speech (severely speech act) or argumentation. This speech is not an ordinary speech. In philosophy speech is technical term which is known for its dialectic or philosophical method. She wrote none like Socrates though her poetry which is full of philosophical thought.

What gave her poetry its distinctive flavor, its power and punch was the vogue and vitality of her idiom, the effect being reinforced by her use of imaginary taken from everyday life. The non dual Shavism of Kashmir, it must be noted, sought to internalize the forest rather than asking one to one renounce the world and enjoined upon spiritual aspirants to carry on their meditative practices in the midst of the daily flow of life. It was perhaps because of this that the images evoked her verses ‘Sung’ on ordinary people's consciousness and became an aesthetic delight for them even though the speculative and esoteric content must have eluded the grasp of many. What Lal vaks really did was to provide them a spiritual vision and moral strength with which they could arm their souls to meet the tremendous challenges that the times pored for them, Lal ded was not a mere wandering woman poet saint of the 14th century, but a symbol of the continuity of five thousand years of Kashmir’s civilization ethos. In her poetry, there are two types of verses which interpret two different realms one is that she addresses to monotheism of Islam and another for the monotheism of Shavites. Lal dedh was a great metaphysician, logician and linguist. I think, in

order to know the poetry of Lal dedh one should be competent in philosophy and shaivism if not competent, one should have knowledge of them. It seems to me that she sung a “philosophical poetry”. Her Vakhs denote the relation between man (Nara) God (Shiva) and world (Shakti). It seems that last two lines of above vakh elaborate terms like jivanmukhti and vide-mukhti. In a very popular Vakh Lalleshwari describes her journey through her life. She says she is towing the boat of her life through murky waters of the sea of the life pulling at the frail untwisted cotton thread praying constantly to her Lord to help across. Her life is like an unbaked earthen pot with water gradually seeping through ready to fall apart, but she is still aspiring to get liberated from the agony of life and reach her real home, the house of her Lord.

In first two lines Lal wants to cross the sea with her past karmas in the world *navv*/boat with her consciousness, I think *Oum Pan* is actually the reason which creates doubt in the minds of believers. Lal was a pious women and good believer of one God. She believes in monotheism. Following two vakhs indicated her belief on one God (monotheism) and *Shiv te Shakhti* from these vakhs. It is apparent that she had a good faith in oneness of God. And also she was in deep connection with the Islam and Shaivism. We are studying Lal dedh and her Vakh within the reigns of philosophical wisdom and reflection. Philosophical assumptions and logic teach us to study the objectivity, definiteness, truth, and holism of the poetry not the subjectivity and authority. Some of her Vakhs which express

existentialism, idealism, metaphysics, religion and morality in Kashmiri language are:

<i>Gooras precham saassilatay</i>	(I Asked the Guru a thousand times)
<i>Keh yes dapaan tass kya che naww</i>	(Who is known as nothing, what is his name)
<i>Prechaan prechaan thachis te loosiss</i>	(By asking again and again, I got tired and exhausted)
<i>Keh ne manz keh tayan draw</i>	(These foxhows shall bring you nothing)
<i>Wuchan te buchas saersey andher</i>	(I see it in everything)
<i>Wuchum prazlaan saersey menz</i>	(I can see it glittering in everything)
<i>Boozith ti roozith wooch haras</i>	(listening patiently, looking at Haras ²¹)
<i>Garah chui tasunduy bo kuese Lall²²</i>	(This is His house, Lall who am I)

²¹ Haras is a Sanskrit term which means one who destroys evil (Shiva).

²² Wuchan, I see; bachas saersey andar, I see my lord in everything around; wuchum prazlaan saersey menz, there is not a single thing with his dazzling presence; boozith ti roozith wooch haras, you can concentrate on His divine grace and experience His presence as the whole universe is the abode of the lord; Grah chui tasunduy bo kuse Lall, with Him only the ultimate truth and everything else trivial without any standing, who am I Lall.

Lal says that ‘Lo! I am lost in wonder, love and praise; now where is Lall? So Lall is realizing the highest state of bliss and ecstasy, where she has absorbed and has become one with the lord. She experiences ones with Him’. She experiences the generously glaring lord Shiva everywhere and not a single object without His gracious presence. Strangely enough Lalleshwari was nowhere seen as her existence had reduced to nothingness this is a situation that is experienced by the awakened souls.

Vadneh saeti gash ho mari (By weeping, your sight will be lost)

Vadneh madhon meeli na zaanh (You will never get your beloved by only crying)

Man kar saaf tai zeri aki meeli (Just purify your heart, you will get everthing at once)

Yemav shaleh tungav neeri ne kenh (These Foxhows will bring you nothing)

Shraan te dyan kya sana kari (Only hearing and meditating will do nothing)

Chetas rath trakrii vag (Keep the hold of the balance string)

Manas ti pawnas milvan kari (It will unite your soul and body)

Sehazas manz kar tirth snaan (Just like taking a bath of Salvation at Teerath)

Paraan paraan zeiv tall phojim
Chei yugei krai tajim na zanih
Sumran pheraan neth ta ongajh gajim
Manachi duiee maali chajim na zanh

Kehnas paeth kya choye nachun	(Why to dance on nothing)
Machii kehna nat nachun traww	(Got nothing but dancing! Oh psycho kind)
Pout feerith choye toutee Achun	(On return, you have to enter into the same)
Yohoi wachun chitass thaw	(Keep this saying in your mind).

Paraan paraan equal to reading and learning; *zeiv* equal to tongue; *tall* equal to plate; *phojim* equal to worn out; *sumran phiraan* equal to doing sadhna to get desired results, telling beads; *neth ta ongajh gajim* equal to worn thin my fingers and thumb; *manchi* equal to of mine; *duiee* equal to uncertainty, unsureness, doubt; *chajim na zanh* equal to have not been able to put off the instinct. Lal dedh in this vakh admits;

My tongue bruised with my continuous reading this sacred scripture. I read them aloud I could not perform the desired worship worthy of my loud. My thumb and fingers got worn out with continuous telling of rosary beads but I remained still attached with the worldly affairs and could not dismiss the duality from my mind.

Lal ded had shattered her patience and worn out her plate and tongue. She had an admission in her looks that she had neither been able to learn the desired feat, nor had acquired the desired end of her sadhna, so that she could become one with the lord and experience one with him. She had worn her thin fingers and thumb with the tiresome job of telling beads even then, she had not been able to put off the instinct of the duality and consent from her mind. Laleshwari gives a very beautiful description of her journey towards her liberation. Comparing her birth to the bloom of a cotton flower she says that she came to this world as a cotton flower, which is a symbol of purity and innocence. Soon the weaver took her control and gave her knocks and beating to make the thread out of it capable to be taken to the loom for weaving a coarse cloth.

The description is the assessment of people who spend a lot of time and money in doing formal worships in temples as well as in their homes. They read the Holy Scriptures, arrange formal worships, visit holy places and take dips in the holy waters at pilgrimage spots and engage themselves in holy Mantras but unfortunately experience no changes in their respective hearts. All this becomes merely a routine. For spiritual development purity of mind and detachment from the temptation of the world are required.

The Vaakhs of Lal ded are ultimate and as such endowed with wisdom on which her great popularity as a mystical poet largely rests. Lal-ded has explained some truths in her vaakhs as well the divine message. Truth is eternal and more appropriate to the modern

world. Lal ded's spiritual philosophy is bond to create a new cosmic vision for mankind. Lal ded provides on her vaakhs an inspiration to be a house holder; Lal-vak forms the foundation not only the contemporary Kashmiri literature but also of Kashmiri culture as a whole. Lal dedh is the most significant historical bridge that connects the shores of the gulf very effectively. She was the product of the spiritual creed that had been evolving in Kashmir for centuries and her immediate predecessors were saints and scholars. Lall gave a new lease of life to Kashmiri Saivistic spirituality. Lal ded's vision of reality as the manifestation of one indivisible consciousness pervades everything. Lal ded is also remembered today for her unique poetic idiom which derives its power and charm from the image of everyday life.

20. Environment Ethics in Islam

Muslim majority countries have imparted an essential part in the opening of human history from 1400 years. From their beginning, Muslim majority countries have been fundamental in the development of western civilization. At present there is almost 1.4 to 1.8 billion Muslims worldwide constituting one-fifth of humanity. More than one half of the world's Muslims live outside the Arab countries. Furthermore, Muslims come from hundreds of ethnic groups that have evolved plural understandings of Islam. Present-day Muslim majority countries are undergoing quick social change that threatens traditional cultural values. This social change has given rise to various socio-political tensions in various Muslim

majority countries. These countries associated with social change have been the enormous scale of ecological deprivation in most Muslim majority countries.²³ Environment is the part of human development and evolution. In all major religions of the world, there has been insistently asserted on the protection and prosperity of the environment.²⁴ Islam nominates that God owns the entire universe (Al-mulk-u- lillah) and nature is a sacred gift of God, granted to humans to do good conduct. The Quranic verse says, “It is God who created heaven and earth... that you may differentiate yourselves by your better deeds”. The duality of the Creator and created turns into the latter in Islam (e.g., nature, animals, humans and other creatures) a combined class of God’s creation. The Prophet (SAW) in regard to God’s creation said, “All creatures are God’s reliant and the most favorite to God among them is the one that does good to God’s dependents.” These dependents, though diverse, still have much uniqueness in common. First, all conception is a reflection of God’s holiness, splendor and control. The Quranic verse describes about such creation as: “Whithersoever you turn there is the face of God”.²⁵

Second point is that the creation of world by God has a purpose, and is architected orderly as well as exists with having a function. The Quranic sacred verse reminds us the specially created nature as,

²³ Arthur Saniotis. Muslims and ecology: fostering Islamic environmental ethics, Published online: 2 September 2011# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011.P.2.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Al Quran,11:115

“And the earth we have spread out; set therein mountains firm and immovable; and produced therein all kinds of things in due balance”.²⁶ And “Verily, all things have been created with measure”.²⁷ From the above verse, it is mentioned that God has created a balanced world with the count of every element which exists in this cosmos. Nature does not go against God because God is the originator of the Universe. Here I will quote an example of orderly and systematic universe. If we assume that creation of the universe occurred due to Big Bang theory not by God, then we could definitely assume that any bomb that could explode in any part of the world would not set things orderly but things scattered and destructed due to blast of the bomb turns into chaos.

Third, the created kind is all actualized to worship and comply with God. Hence, the Quranic verse affirms, “Sees thou not that to Allah bow down in worship all things that are in the heavens and earth, the sun, the moon, the stars; the hills, the trees, the animals; and a great number among humankind”.²⁸ Fourth, the created have all been created from the same element, water. The Quranic verse affirms, “We made from water every living thing” ²⁹(12:30), and continues in another verse by stating, “And God has created every animal from water of them there are some that walk on four..... It is

²⁶ 15:19

²⁷ 59:49

²⁸ 22:18

²⁹ 12:30

he who has created humans from water”.³⁰(24:45) Fifth, the union of God’s creation as a sort is also exemplified in Islam in terms of the social structure. The Quran states that God created and He created in communities by stating, “There is not animal (that lives) on earth. Nor a being that flies on its wings, but (forms a part) of a community like you”.³¹

Islam in taking into consideration all God’s manufacture as having common characteristic and divine reflections and echoes views of deep ecology. The whole universe is one single system shaped and amalgamated by Allah. Looking at the universe with such a perspective where all creatures are connected reveals universal principles in Islam and deep ecology. Humans and other creations here have a relationship with each other and the cosmos reflecting kinship, contemplation, adoration, admiration, reverence and reflection, but not blessedness.³² Almighty God formed environment fresh, untainted and useful as well as harnessed it to man and urged man to keep it. Allah has also called for thinking about the miracles He has put in the universe, which He put in the best shape. God Almighty says: “Do they not look at the sky above them?- How We have made it and ornamented it, and there are no flaws in it? And the earth- We have spread it out, and set there on mountains

³⁰ 24:45

³¹ 6:38

³² David Landis Barnhill, Roger S. Gottlieb. *Deep Ecology and World Religions* , State University of New York Press, Albany, 2001, P.197

standing firm, and produced therein every kind of beautiful growth (in pairs).”(Surah-Qaf: 6, 7)

Islam is the third of the Abraham religions which shares its religious legacy with Judaism and Christianity. The Quran and the prophetic traditions are the main sources of Islamic environmental codes that have been incorporated within Islamic jurisprudence. Both Muslim lay people and scholars often read these two sources when making considerations on the environment. The three founding ideas of Islam’s ecological principles are Tawhid (Divine unity), khilafah (trusteeship), and Akhirah (the hereafter). The keystone of tawhid is that Allah created the universe and that all existence reflects unity in plurality. According to Muslim researchers, the universe is ruled and synchronized by the principles of harmony, unity and balance that portray the interactive combined principle which is Tawhid. The Quran (14:19–20; 46:3; 15:85–86) constantly denotes that the universe is constituted by beauty, proportion and harmony which are the properties of Divine craftsmanship. Scholars have convinced that, in Islam, the universe is organized in balance, and is synchronized by the interdependency of ecological systems. Consequently, nature develops a source of stimulation and direction for understanding Divine action in creation. In human terminology, Tawhid is the foundation of human act and contemplation, incisive every element of subjective and social life. Stewardship is the second concept of Islamic environmental ethics. The Qur’an declares that humans are stewards of Allah’s creation “Behold, the Lord said to the angels: “I

will create a vicegerent on earth” (Qur’an 2:30). Furthermore, human beings need to refrain from mischief (actions leading to the corruption of the environment).

“Do no mischief on the earth after it hath been set in order, but call on him with fear and longing in your hearts: for the Mercy of God is always near to those who do good” (Quran 7:56).

The significance of environmentalism in Islam is affirmed by the reality that one-eighth of the Quran encourages Muslims to ponder on nature. The sociologist Ali Shariati asserts that the perception of stewardship should include its spiritual dimensions, notes that included in the concept of stewardship is the notion that humans are friends of the earth, not its masters. Akhirah (The hereafter) is the third concept of Islamic environmental ethics. This signifies that humankind is not only obligated as Allah’s steward on the earth, but will also be held answerable in the hereafter if there is any straying. No creation has a right to pollute the earth in a method that diminishes its assets and degrades its natural systems.

In addition to this, the level of environmental preservation is open to Divine judgment at the Day of Reckoning. Some Ahadiths (accounts of the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings) note that cruelty to animals and want on defacement of nature is forbidden and warrants Divine punishment. Alternately, kindness shown to animals bestows God’s reward. The following two prophetic accounts are mentioned to this effect: Ibn-Umar, a friend of the Prophet (narrated

by Al-Bukhari) stated that the Prophet said: “A woman who tied a cat will go to Hellfire; she neither fed it, nor allowed it to discover food on its own.” Another friend of the Prophet called Al-Sharid (narrated by Ahmad) stated that he had heard the Prophet say: “If you kill a sparrow want only it will hasten to God on the Day of Judgment saying: O Lord! so and so killed me for play and not for use”. Scholars uphold that humans have the privileges and rights of living from the earth in a sustainable manner, or usufruct. Of course, what humans describe as sustainable will vary from culture to culture, and indeed, between individuals. From this viewpoint, then, both the Holy book i.e. Quran and the prophetic traditions clearly recommend a principle for conscientious human trusteeship of the earth.³³

Tawhid defines God as a unique essence, the creator and having special attribute of independence. While we are seeing that the created is interdependent on everything and finally dependent upon God. In this connection of interdependence among the creations, Islam places the keeping of the earth and heavens in the hands of humans, as the Khalifah (viceregents) on earth. The Quranic verse affirms, “I am setting on the earth a vice-regent”(2:30). The Khalifah is a manager not a proprietor, a keeper for all generations. The Quranic verse (2:22) describing, “Who has made the earth your couch and the heavens your cover and sent rains from the heavens,

³³ Arthur Saniotis. Muslims and ecology: fostering Islamic environmental ethics, Published online: 2 September 2011# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011. P.5

and brought forth-with fruits for your sustenance, then set not up rivals unto Allah when you know,” clearly ends with a plural “you,” carrying the message that the universe is not for one creation but for every creation past, present, and future.

We are not allowed to misuse earth and its environment for our joy but we can use earth and its environment as much as we need it. In Islam we are bound with the ruling of God mentioned in Holy book Quran and Hadiths. We are allowed only to use earth and its environment as is recommended for us in Islamic Jurisprudence. Humans were given the responsibility for supervising the earth because they hold unique traits, and not because they have better traits.³⁴

The Quranic verses defines,

And He educated Adam all the names³⁵

By the soul, and the proportion and order given to it, and its
Enlightenment as to its wrong and its right.³⁶

In addition, human beings are the managers of earth because in his search, God found that only humans agreed to take on the responsibility. The Quranic verse notes, “God presented his trust to heaven and earth and mountain, but they shied away in fear and

³⁴ David Landis Barnhill, Roger S. Gottlieb. *Deep Ecology and World Religions* , State University of New York Press, Albany, 2001, P.198

³⁵ 2:31.

³⁶ 91:7-8.

rejected it, Humans only carried it”.³⁷ For these reasons the universe is given to humans as a “trust,” which is known as ‘Ammanah’, which they established when they bore witness to God in their covenant of Tawhid. The Tawhid firmly declares that ‘There is no God but Allah’. According to the Quran this convention was transformed throughout the years (7:65, 69, 87;10:73; 11:56, 61) until it reached Muslims in verses such as “Generations before you we destroyed when they did wrong”,³⁸ “Then we made you heirs in the land after them to see how ye would behave”.³⁹ In this world the role of humans act as a Khalifah, vice-regent, on earth is to better it and improve it and not to spread wickedness and annihilation. The holy Quran is complete of injunctions regarding such behaviors and utters clearly that this accountability of improving the earth will be checked by God to see how it has been accomplished, “All follow not the bidding of those who are extravagant”⁴⁰ “O my people! Serve Allah, and fear the last day: nor commit evil on the earth, with intent to do mischief”⁴¹ “But they strive to make mischief on earth and Allah loveth not those who do mischief”⁴² “And look for his Creation for any inconsistency! And look again! Do you find any gap in its system? Look again! Your sight, having found none, will return to you humbled”⁴³ “He it is who created the heavens and the

³⁷ 33:72.

³⁸ 10:13.

³⁹ 10:14.

⁴⁰ 26:152.

⁴¹ 29:36.

⁴² 5:64.

⁴³ 67:3-4.

earth... That He might try you, which of you is best in conduct”,⁴⁴
“That which is on earth we have made but as a glittering show for
the earth in order that we may test them as to which of them are best
in conduct”⁴⁵

On this basis of man and its environment, there is a relationship of love and affection which we could found between the Muslims and his surrounding environment, including lifeless things and living creatures. The Muslim is realizing that preserving the environment would benefit them in this life because they would have a nice life here and in their hereafter, as Allah would reward him decently for this. The Prophet’s standpoint for surroundings came to emphasis this comprehensive Quranic outlook of the universe, which is dependent on association between man and the fundamentals of nature and its catalyst is belief that if man misuses or drains any of the essentials of nature, the whole world would be damaged directly. Examples of how Islamic legislation is keen on environment. The Islamic legislation sets a general rule for all people on this earth, which is not to cause any damage to this universe. The Prophet (SAW) says: “la darar wala dirar” or “Let there be no harm or reciprocating harm.”⁴⁶ Then, it looks that Islamic legislation followed this with other things that pollute and damage the environment. The Prophet (SAW) says like this: ‘Avoid the three

⁴⁴ 11:7

⁴⁵ 18:7.

⁴⁶ Ahmad from Ibn Abbas (2719), Shu’aib al-Arnauti said: good. Al-Hakim (2345) and said: correct in terms of Isnad on Muslim’s conditions but they did not narrate it

actions that bring peoples curses: defecating in water sources, on roads, and in the shade’ and said: correct in terms of Isnad on Muslim’s conditions but they did not narrate it (Al-Azim Abadi: Aoun Al-Ma’bud:131). The Prophet (Saw) also urged for cleaning roads. Abu Sa’id Al-Khudri narrated that the Prophet (SAW) declared that: Beware! Avoid sitting on the roads. They (the people) said, O Allah’s Apostle! We can’t help sitting (on the roads) as these are (our places) where we have talks. The Prophet said, if you refuse but to sit, then pay the road its right. They said, what is the right of the road, O Allah’s Apostle? He said, lowering your gaze, refraining from harming others, returning greeting, and enjoining what is good, and forbidding what is evil.⁴⁷ The last advice mentioned in this Hadith is that an umbrella for all the things that include harming the people who use roads and streets. What is more than this is that the Prophet (PBUH) linked return to keeping the environment clean. He says: “The deeds of my people, good and bad were presented before me, and I found the removal of something objectionable from the road among their good deeds, and the sputum mucus left unburied in the mosque among their evil deeds.”⁴⁸ The Prophet (SAW) moreover asks Muslims to clean their houses. He says: “Allah is good and likes everything that is good”. He is clean

⁴⁷Al-Bukhari from Abu Sa’id Al-Khudri: Al-Mazalim book, chapter about backyards of houses and sitting in them and sitting on roads (2333), Muslim: Al-Libas and Al-Zina book, chapter about ordering not to sit in streets and give way to others (2121)

⁴⁸ 73 Muslim from Abu Zar: Book about mosques and places of worship, chapter about ordering not to spit in mosques and others (553), Ahmad (21589), Ibn Majah (3683)

and loves cleanliness, you must clean your houses and do not follow in the footsteps of Jews.⁴⁹ These wonderful teachings call for a decent life vacant of any pollutant to keep man's hygiene and psychological health intact. In a more expressive way to urge for keeping the environment and its beauty, the Prophet (SAW) said, when asked by one of his companions: "What if a man likes his clothes to look good and his shoes to look good, is this pride? He said, Allah is beautiful and loves beauty. Pride means denying the truth and looking down on people."⁵⁰ There is no doubt that beauty is to keep the environment as clean and beautiful as Allah has created.⁵¹ The Prophet (SAW) said in this regard: "he who is presented with a flower should not reject it, for it is light to carry and pleasant in odor!".⁵² Regarding Islam's glory in enacting laws that keep the environment clean, Prophet Muhammad (SAW) says: Whenever Muslims plant a tree, they will earn the reward of charity

⁴⁹ 74 Al-Termizi from Sa'ad Ibn Abi Waqqas: Al-Adab book, chapter about what is said about cleanliness (2799), Abu Yali (790), Al-Albani said: correct, see: Mishkat Al-Masabih (4455)

⁵⁰ 75 Muslim from Abdullah sud: Al-Iman book, chapter ordering not to feel pride (91), Ahmad (3789), Ibn Hibban (5466)

⁵¹ Al-Bukhari from Abu Sa'id Al-Khudri: Al-Mazalim book, chapter about backyards of houses and sitting in them and sitting on roads (2333), Muslim: Al-Libas and Al-Zina book, chapter about ordering not to sit in streets and give way to others (2121) 73 Muslim from Abu Zar: Book about mosques and places of worship, chapter about ordering not to spit in mosques and others (553), Ahmad (21589), Ibn Majah (3683) 74 Al-Termizi from Sa'ad Ibn Abi Waqqas: Al-Adab book, chapter about what is said about cleanliness (2799), Abu Yali (790), Al-Albani said: correct, see: Mishkat Al-Masabih (4455) 75 Muslim from Abdullah Ibn Ma'sud: Al-Iman book, chapter ordering not to feel pride (91), Ahmad (3789), Ibn Hibban (5466.)) Also in his recommendation of using perfumes and giving them as presents, we find evidence that he called for a clean environment.

⁵² 76 Muslim from Abu Hurira: Al-Alfaz men al-Adab book and others, chapter about using Musk ... (2253), Al-Termizi (2791)

because of the food that comes from it; and likewise what is stolen from it, what the wild beasts eat out of it, what the birds eat out of it, and what people take from it is charity for them.⁵³ In another narration: “It is charity for them till the Doomsday”. Islam’s fabulousness is manifested in the fact that the reward for planting, which is environment-friendly, will continue as long as this plant is benefitted even if it moved to the possession of others or the one who planted it died. The Islamic legislation has also mentioned the benefits of reclaiming a *Mawat* (uncultivated) land. The Prophet (SAW) says: “Whoever revives a dead land has right to it” meaning reward and “If beasts and birds feed from it, he who revived it will have it as a *Sadaqah*”.⁵⁴ And because water is one of the most important resources in environment, being economical in using water and keeping it pure are two important issues in Islam. The Prophet (Saw) advises Muslims to be reasonable when using water even if this water is abundant. Abdullah Ibn Umar narrated that the Prophet (SAW) passed near Saad Ibn Abi Waqqas,.⁵⁵ When he was performing his ablution and said: “What is this waste? And the latter replied: is performing ablutions an extravagance? He said: yes, even

⁵³77 Muslim from Jabir Ibn Abdullah: *Musaqah* book, chapter about virtue of planting and growing (1552), Ahmad (27401)

⁵⁴) 78 *Al-Nissa’I* from Jabir Ibn Abdullah: *Reviving the dead land* book, chapter about urging to revive *mawat* land (5756), Ibn Hiban (5205), Ahmad (14310), And *Shu’aib al-Arnaut* said: *Hadith Sahih*

⁵⁵79 *Sa’ad Ibn Abi Waqqas Ibn Wahib Al-Zuhari*: One of the ten proven to enter paradise and the last of whom who died, look: *Ibn Al-Athir: Usd al-Ghabah* 2433/, *Ibn Hajar al-Askalani: Al-Isabah* 33196(73/)

if you are (doing them) at a running river”.⁵⁶ This is the perspective of Islam and the Islamic civilization of the environment.⁵⁷ It is a view that believes that the different aspects of the environment react, integrate and cooperate with each other according to God’s rules in the universe, which was created by Allah in the best shape. So, every Muslim should keep this beauty.⁵⁸

The organizing into being of different creatures by God does not in any way abolish in the mind of the Ikhwana (the brotherhood) which is the fundamental distinction between God and the World. The Universe is “all the spiritual and material beings who populate the immensity of the skies, which compose the sovereignty of diversity which extends to the spheres, the stars, the elements, their products and to man”. This Universe, which they sometimes call a city or an animal, but always something distinct from the Divine Unity, is related to God by its existence (Wajud) and its perseverance in

80 Ibn Majah: Taharah and its sunnan book, chapter about shortening prayers and hatred to transgress it (425), Ahmad (7065), improved by Al-Albani said good. see: Al-Silsilah al-Sahihah (3292)⁵⁶

⁵⁷ Muslim from Abu Hurira: Al-Alfaz men al-Adab book and others, chapter about using Musk ... (2253), Al-Termizi (2791) 77 Muslim from Jabir Ibn Abdullah: Musaqah book, chapter about virtue of planting and growing (1552), Ahmad (27401) 78 Al-Nissa’i from Jabir Ibn Abdullah: Reviving the dead land book, chapter about urging to revive mawat land (5756), Ibn Hibban (5205), Ahmad (14310), And Shu’aib al-Arnaut said: Hadith Sahih 79 Sa’ad Ibn Abi Waqqas Ibn Wahib Al-Zuhari: One of the ten proven to enter paradise and the last of whom who died, look: Ibn Al-Athir: Usd al-Ghabah 2433/, Ibn Hajar al-Askalani: Al-Isabah 33196(73/) 80 Ibn Majah: Taharah and its sunnan book, chapter about shortening prayers and hatred to transgress it (425), Ahmad (7065), improved by Al-Albani said good. see: Al-Silsilah al-Sahihah (3292) He also called for not polluting water or urinating in stagnant water

⁵⁸ Muslim from Jabir Ibn Abdullah: Taharah book, chapter about ordering not to urinate in stagnant water (281), Abu Dawoud (69), Al-Termizi (68)

Being (Baaqi) its completeness (Tamim) and its precision (*Kamil*). The Universal intelligence, which is at the same time a great covering hiding God as well as the great gate to His Unity, inherits the four above-mentioned qualities from God and transmits them to the Universal Soul, which remains passive and feminine with respect to the Intellect. The Ikhwan also make use of the symbolism of love (Ishq) in terms of similarity to those used by the Sufis in order to show the attraction between God and the Universe. According to them, the whole world requires the Creator and loves Him. In fact, the Creator is really the only Beloved (Mashooq) and the only object of desire (Mureed). They make the power of yearning (*shawq*) the very cause of the coming into being. The Ikhwan write at times that God is an above Being, while in other instances they imply that Being is divided into God and Universe.⁵⁹ God, the most High, has created nothing in vain but everything has its purpose in this universe. “There are analogies and correspondences, ascents and descents of souls, integration and differentiation, all knit into a harmonious pattern which is very far from a “rationalistic castle”. It is rather the ‘cosmic cathedral’ in which the unity of Nature, the interrelatedness of all things with each other and the ontological dependence of the whole of creation upon the Creator, is brought into focus.⁶⁰ The basis and essence of Islam is the concept of Divine Unity. Divine unity is evident in the unity of humanity and of nature. God’s vicegerents on the earth, the holders of His trust,

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⁶⁰ Ibid.55

are therefore mainly dependable for preserving the unity of creatures, the central unity of the world, the flora and fauna, and wildlife and natural environment. Thus, ‘trust’, and ‘responsibility’ are the three basic notions of Islam. These values are at the same time the chief pillars of the Islamic environmental ethic. They form also the fundamental values taught by the Quran.

Environmental health is one of most important topics that come to mind when one says that it is the cleanliness of the general environment. These are places such as roads, places of worship, schools, parks, children’s playgrounds, stadiums, excursion spots and picnic places, public lavatories, public beaches, and other such places. What has to be done to sustain the purity of the social environment is to think not of ourselves but of others. We should not forget that God’s Messenger (Saw) forbade the dirtying of the roads and paths people used, and the places they sat and rested, like shady places and under trees and walls. He said that to remove a branch or a thorn that would cause hurt to people as they passed was a part of belief. He said too that God does not love those who cause hurt and pain to believers.

Muslims should scrupulously avoid doing anything to upset or disturb others in any circumstances or in any place. To pollute or dirty the city in which one lives, or the town or village and their surrounding countryside, waters, air, or views, and to scatter rubbish and refuse is both a sin and extremely discourteous. It is lack of thought both for oneself and for others. For thoughtful people know

that others will be disturbed by any place they have dirtied, and the beauties of nature spoilt. They are aware that it is an attribute of the believer and a sign of maturity not to leave scattered nutshells, cans, wrappers, bottles, and bits of paper and other refuse in the streets and picnic areas or to do anything that will disturb other people, or even the animals. The Prophet has also claimed the need to protect animals (including humans). The Prophet has said, “Whoever is kind to the creatures of God is kind to himself.” The Prophet has forbidden the beating of animals on the face, and prohibited the throwing of stones at animals. He has recommended that every care should be taken when slaughtering animals. It is forbidden to make animals the object of human sports or entertainment. The Prophet asks humans to feel within their souls the pain animals feel and avoid all practices that torture and frighten living beings. The Prophets says about using animals in game, “A sparrow that was used just for entertainment would on the day of judgment complain to God against the person who did so just for fun.”⁶¹ If we look towards the history of Muslim people, we could easily see that they lived in cooperation with nature and its creatures. The most dependable evidences to this were Western explorers who visited the Muslim lands. The famous French writer Montaigne touched on this subject when he said: “The Muslim Turks found hospitals and pious foundations for animal’s kingdom.” The French lawyer Guer, who travelled in the Ottoman Empire in the 17th century, mentioned a

⁶¹ David Landis Barnhill, Roger S. Gottlieb. *Deep Ecology and World Religions* , State University of New York Press, Albany, 2001, P.202.

hospital in Damascus where sick cats and dogs were treated, while Prof. M. Sibai gives the following details about the virtuous foundations for animals. In the previous institution of pious foundations, areas were selected for the grazing and management of sick animals. The ‘Green Mar‘a’ (the area now covered by Damascus sports stadium) was a place that at one time had been made over to the grazing of helpless animals, which were no longer fed by their owners since they had lost the power to work. Such animals grazed here till their deaths. Among the pious foundations of Damascus there were also spaces where cats could eat and sleep and wander about. There were hundreds of cats here which could have no difficulties in finding their daily food, were like the permanent equipments of the place. Birds have always a significant place in Muslims’ lives. They have felt particular affection not only for singing birds like nightingale, but for others such as chiefly the pigeon, and storks, doves, and swallows. This affection has been manifested in various ways: the defense of birds’ rights, establishing pious foundations for the feeding of birds, founding hospitals to tend to sick birds, the taming of some species and keeping them in cages, as well as the opposite of this, setting them free from captivity. Presently as many people have freed them from their cages out of love for them, so many others have kept them in cages.

21. Rumi

Jalal-Din-Rumi is possibly the greatest mystical poet across the globe. His intellectual achievements are as powerful as his spiritual accomplishments. He is appreciative of the unavoidable role of reason in human life. However, he is simultaneously blessed with abiding religious experiences and intuitive flashlights of most profound spiritual significance. The Muslims have conferred on him the title of Maulawi-i-Ma'nwi (Master of spiritual insights). Rumi was a philosophical genius who could penetrate beyond veil of appearance and divulge to us the splendor of spiritual reality. In his life and teachings he upholds the ethical values underlined by Semitic Prophets up to Muhammad and especially appropriates the overwhelming and all-pervading role of love stressed by Jesus. His Mathnawi harmonizes diversities and transcends Contradictions by recourse to creative synthesis. In Rumi every thesis and anti thesis' is transcended by a higher synthesis where in contradictions are resolved in the ever-advancing movement of life. Rumi is a thoroughgoing spiritualist. According to him, the ground of Being is akin to what we feel in ourselves as spirit or ego. The totality of existence is constituted by infinite number of egos emerging out of the cosmic Ego. Like Rumi, the German philosopher Leibnitz, also conceived of existence as an infinity of egos at different levels of consciousness. Like Leibnitz, Rumi too believed God to be a Universal or Cosmic Monad. Rumi's cosmology is teleological like that of classical Aristotle and he is also a creative evolutionist like that of modern Bergson. Born and brought up within the Semitic Conceptual Framework, Rumi seems to be subscribing to the

emanationistic cosmology of Plotinus rather than to the creationistic cosmology apparently advanced by Semitic Prophets. The Semitic belief in creation ex nihilo by a voluntary act of the creator at a particular moment of time is not apparently acceptable to Rumi, for, time according, to him is itself created and is a category of phenomenal consciousness which views events in serial time. Rumi, on the other hand, as a mystic dives into the spiritual ground of Being and apprehends Reality as non-spatial and non-temporal. Rumi postulates that there is initial unexplainable evolution of the Cosmic spirit which is Infinite, Self-Existent and Self Sufficient, to the lowest level of sentience and consciousness. All beings have emerged from a kind of over flow of the Divine Spirit, but every being or ego is impelled irresistibly by an urge to return to its origin. This urge which Rumi calls love becomes the evolutionary principle of all existence. All egos or monads are essentially spiritual and have emerged from the same Divine Principle. The fall of Adam was not a fall from paradise bliss into the phenomenal realm but the fall of ego from the unitary ground of divinity. The phenomenal mortals of physical, chemical and biological world are metaphorically speaking, fallen angels striving to return to their original divine ground. In contradiction to other evolutionary thinkers such as Darwin and Bergson, for Rumi God is the Alfa and Omega of the entire evolutionary process. He is the ground as well as the goal of all existence. Rumi accords with mechanistic evolutionists that life has evolved out of matter but for him matter was from the outset essentially and potentially spiritual. The

evolutionary process, for Rumi, started with the atomic particulars moving across the phenomenal universe for millions of years. Thereafter, the evolutionary process entered the inorganic realm of matter, crossing over to the vegetable kingdom, then stepping into animal kingdom. The evolution continued advancing from realm to realm. In the process, man's rational powers also evolved. However, the process of evolution is ongoing. In the future course of evolution, it is possible to be negotiating and transcending thousand other types of reason and consciousness.

Rumi is globally acknowledged as a man of highest poetic accomplishments as well as spiritual achievements. However he is not an exponent of a philosophical system. Historians of civilization have not included him in the list of technical philosophers. Nor is he an epistemologist in the sense in which Descartes, Locke and Kant are categorized as representatives of modern western epistemology. He is neither a rationalist nor an empiricist. His epistemological outlook is comprehensive enough to accommodate rationalist, empiricist and intuitionist theories of knowledge in his overall scheme of thought and interpretation. He may aptly be said to be a philosophical integrationist. His epistemology is also integrationist for he accepts all levels of experience, understanding and conceptualization. Rumi accords recognition to sense-experience, reason and intuition as these various sources of knowledge address themselves to an exploration and understanding of various levels of reality. In his poetic body-corpus, especially in *Mathnawi*, he frequently alludes to perceptual, rational and mystical levels of

understanding executed by sense-experience, reason, mystical experience and intuitive realization. For Rumi, sense-perception is definitely an important source of knowledge. It has vital role in the attainment of knowledge. However, sense-perception has a limited role. Its access is superficial and perusal. It is a fragile epistemic tool. Any individual interested in genuine knowledge must rise above the sensations furnished by sense- experience. We share our five senses with all the animals, birds, reptiles and insects. A person totally dependent upon sense-experience is like an ass lost in the appearances or phenomena of the world without participating in the eternal, universal and transcendental wisdom attainable by men of reason and intuition; Rumi deems metaphysical controversies such as transcendence of God versus His Immanence as a pointless intellectual exercise. Only when one liberates oneself from such metaphysical subtleties can one have some idea of Reality. The limitations of sense-perception cannot be appreciated if we cannot transcend perceptual knowledge. In order to bring out the limitations of perceptual knowledge, Rumi sets forth an example. He says that if anyone were to say to the embryo in the womb, "Outside is a world exceedingly well-ordered, a pleasant Earth, broad and long, wherein are a hundred delights...mountains and seas and plains... a skier lofty and full of light, Sun and Moon beams and a hundred stars'.., it (the embryo), in virtue of its present state, would be incredulous (not willing to believe)... It is a natural reaction of the embryo not to believe the reality of a bigger world outside the womb of the mother. The child's natural skepticism vanishes in course of

time after he is delivered from the womb of the mother. He is oriented to believe what seemed completely unbelievable to him earlier. Rumi cites the example of the proverbial elephant in the darkness. People who are curious to understand the shape, size and figure of the elephant will have to touch the elephant in the darkness. Thus a person touching his ear will understand an elephant to be like a fan, another person touching his back will feel the elephant to be like a throne, another person touching his leg will deem the elephant to be like a pillar, yet another person touching his trunk will come to understand the elephant like a water-pipe and so on and so forth. The hand in the darkness is touching only one portion of the elephant. The perceptual eye too is capable of appreciating only some dimensions of reality. Sense-experience can give us an understanding, of the phenomenal features of the space-time continuum. However, it is not within the purview of the sense-perception to furnish us an appropriate understanding of the trans-phenomenal reality. Rumi also deems reason to be a vital source of knowledge. Rumi is fully aware of the merits and demerits of the role of reason in the investigation and appropriation of reality. Historically speaking, reason has always brought out the limitations of sense-experience as a source of knowledge; it has also brought out its powerful credentials as a source of knowledge and as a faculty of understanding what is Ultimately Real. However, Rumi thinks that reason is blissfully ignorant of its own limitations. In view of the same, it always tries to seek ends which it is incapable of accomplishing. Reason according to Rumi is powerfully impacted

by infra-rational dimensions of our existence. Apart from that, in view of the apparent difference between appearance and reality, it rejects the claims of sense-experience to arrive at any certainty and forwards its own arguments with a view to achieving sure and certain knowledge about Reality. However, in the process, it generates riddles and puzzles and proliferate paradoxes and contradictions. Reason in its argumentative calculations ends up fixing a man in knots the so-called rational arguments can get pathologically addictive and one can get lost in one's own dialectical subtleties. The philosophers can spend a life-time in hair-splitting debates. However this dialectical approach is utterly futile and pointless. Such an approach can only lead to riddles, enigmas and dilemmas. Metaphysical dilemmas are like asking which of the two hands, right or left, made noise when we clapped or which came first hen or egg etc. These puzzles are unanswerable. But philosophers can spend decades while responding to such dilemmas or paradoxes. Reason is incapable of furnishing us any clue to an understanding of Reality through its dialectical acrobatics; the discursive and dialectical nature of reason is incapable of grasping the Ultimate Reality. It also cannot grasp the Unity-Essence of Existence. Besides, reason is inherently utilitarian in nature. It is driven by the considerations of profit and loss. As against reason, love is beyond profit and loss; it sacrifices and surrenders without asking any questions. Reason and love are diametrically opposite in their nature and in their approach to Reality.

“How should Reason wend the way of despair?”

It is love that runs on its head in that direction

“Love is reckless, not Reason; Reason seeks

That from which it may get some profit”,

Rumi acknowledges the role of reason in human life. However reason guides man up to a certain stage. Beyond that stage the role of reason is reversed. From teacher it assumes the role of a pupil, a tool in the hands of man.

Rumi's epistemology as well as metaphysics and axiology are rooted in his teleological world-view. For Rumi, the universe is thoroughly teleological. What is Ultimately Real is beyond sense-experience, reason and normal categories of understanding. God as Ultimate Reality can be finally something to be realized through intuition and not dissected through rational analysis. Knowledge of the world does not constitute a problem for Rumi, The standard epistemic skepticism discerned amongst some Greek and Modern western philosophers does not bother him. The ultimate problem of human understanding is not to attain a certainty with regard to the phenomenal features of the universe but an appreciation and realization of Ultimate Reality or God through intuition or love. The Ultimate *Logos* can only be responded to or appropriated by the supreme power of *Eros*. God is Ultimate Truth, Ultimate Goodness and Ultimate Beauty. He is ultimate Perfection personified. *Eros* or love is the universal principle of appropriation, absorption, evolution, assimilation, growth and reproduction. The manifestations of love are universally operative. Man's insatiable and indomitable will to understand, appreciate and appropriate is

also a manifestation of love. Rumi's conception of love is in turn; with the classical Platonic conception of love", although there are some crucial differences as well. Like Plato, Rumi's idea of love is also not utilitarian. Rather it is the intellect which according to Rumi cannot take a single step before weighing the pros and cons in terms of profit and loss. Love is opposed to all calculations and considerations. Love is sacrifice incarnate, it is a madness oriented to an appropriation of Ultimate Reality;

“Neither do they (lovers) put God to any test,

Nor do they work at the door of any profit or loss”

Like Plato, Rumi also underlines that love is the love of the Beautiful and the Beautiful alone is worthy of our love. Rumi operating in the monotheistic world-view of Islam emphasizes that Perfect and Eternal Beauty belongs to God and all that is beautiful in the phenomenal world is only a passing reflection of the Eternal Beauty of God and is related to God as sunlight is related to Sun. However, love is also the ultimate principle of unification and assimilation. It is, in fact, the ultimate cosmological principle, the principle of the genesis and evolution of the world.

22. Mulla Sadra

Mulla Sadra is one of the great Islamic philosophers. Firstly, Mulla Sadra was convinced of the wisdom of Greek philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander, Empedocles, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Secondly, he was inspired by the philosophical teachings of Plotinus. Thirdly, he was inspired by the principles of

the Islamic revelation and the esoteric teachings of the Prophet and the Shiah Imams. Fourthly, he was deeply impacted by the philosophy of Ibn Sina. Fifthly, the Gnostic doctrines of Ibn al-Arabi also inspired him.

Mulla Sadra synthesized revelation, demonstration and purification or illumination with a view to achieving the Truth in all its gradations and manifestations. He combined religion, philosophy and mysticism into a harmonious whole. In his system, philosophy, the Quran and the Traditions of the Prophet and the Imams and mystical illumination merge into a holistic *Weltanschauung*.

Mulla Sadra divides sciences into two types: (1) Theoretical Sciences consisting of Logic, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics; and (2) Practical Sciences consisting of Ethics, Economics and Politics. By recourse to another scheme, he gives another outline of the division of Sciences, Firstly, there are worldly sciences, such as the science of words (*ilm al-aqwal*), the science of acts (*ilm al-afal*) and the science of states of contemplation (*ilm-al-ahwal*). Secondly, the Sciences of the alphabet, word-construction, syntax, prosody, poetics, semantics, etc, are sciences of words. Such arts as weaving, agriculture, writing, mechanics, alchemy etc, are sciences of acts. Thirdly, the Sciences of the states of contemplation or thought include Logic, Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Medicine, Geology, Botany and Zoology etc. As against worldly sciences (*uloom-i-dunyawi*) there are other-worldly sciences (*uloom-i-ukhrawi*). These sciences include the knowledge of Angels, the knowledge of the Preserved Tablet (*Lauh al-Mahfuz*),

knowledge of the Exalted Pen (al-Quran al-ala), knowledge of the Divine Decrees and knowledge of the first determination of the Divine Essence also called Reality of Muhammad (al-Haqi quatal al Muhammadiyyah). Knowledge of death, knowledge of resurrection and knowledge of hereafter etc. are also included in the very same category of sciences. In Mulla Sadra's scheme of the division of Sciences, philosophy has the highest or most exalted status. Of all the branches of Philosophy, Metaphysics is the most important. For Mulla Sadra metaphysics means coming to know the state of the essence of things as they are, to the extent of human capacity. A metaphysician is one who is liberated from the physical world and has acquired complete comprehension of the universals. In his person he constitutes an intellectual world (Microcosm) isomorphically corresponding to the objective world (Macrocosm). Although metaphysics is an intellectual form of knowledge, yet in the process of metaphysical investigations and intimations we are substantially transformed. A metaphysician's soul becomes a mirror in which the cosmic order is reflected.

Knowledge, according to Mulla Sadra, can be divided into two broad forms: (i) formal knowledge and (ii) intuitional knowledge. The first form of knowledge can be acquired through formal training in schools and higher institutions of learning. This is known as (*al-ilm al-swari*). The second form of knowledge emanates from intellectual intuition. This form of knowledge is categorized as (*ilm al-Ladunniya*). The formal knowledge can be attained under the guidance and supervision of teachers. The second form of

knowledge becomes available only to the prophets and the saints. It is knowledge of greater certainty as it is spiritually authenticated and certified. The prophets and the saints attain this knowledge as their souls are purified and their intellects illuminated.

Mulla, Sadra's philosophy can be said to be mainly categorized by four Principles: (1) The Principle of the Being; (2) The Principle of Substantial Motion or Becoming; (3) The Principle of relation between the Knower and the Known; (4) The Principle of the Soul and its Faculties.

22.1.The Principle of Being

The fundamental principle informing Mulla Sadra's philosophy is his doctrine of the principality and the unit and gradation of the Being. As against the Illuminationists, Mulla Sadra agrees with Peripatetics (*Mashai*) and Sufis in accepting the objective reality of Being independent of mental abstractions and considered the quiddities to be nothing but accidents. While the Being is objectively real, the quiddities do not have a realist independent of the Being. They are accidents of the Being abstracted by the mind. The proper subject of metaphysical investigations is Absolute Being itself. Such a Being is above all limitations and above all accidents. The longitudinal manifestation of the Absolute Being creates various orders from arch angels to terrestrial, creatures. However, when Absolute Being manifests itself latitudinal, it creates the various members of each order of the Being. Being is unity in multiplicity and multiplicity in unity. It is amenable to logical divisions and distinctions. However, it is

essentially indivisible and above all polarizations. Mulla Sadra divides Being into collective being (*al-Wujud al-irtibati*) and self subsisting being (*al-Wujud al-nafsi*). Everything besides God is subsumed, under collective being. Only God is self-subsisting being. Following Ibn Sina, he also characterizes God as Necessity Being as God is independent of any external cause to Himself and everything else besides God is possible being and depends on God for its being.

The quiddities are either particular or universal. The universals exist independently of all particulars. They are the archetypes of the Platonic Ideas. Mulla Sadra insists upon the reality of the archetypes in the spiritual world. They are completely independent of the world of particulars. They are also independent of human mental images. The archetypes are in the spiritual world whereas the terrestrial world is inhabited by particulars. The real cause for the activities and ontological qualities of the terrestrial man is the spiritual man. Similarly the activities of other species on earth are governed by the irrespective archetypes.

22.2. The Principle of Becoming

Mulla Sadra brings out that every effect has a cause but every cause and effect is a manifestation of the Being. In point of fact, everything is an extension or effusion of the Divine Essence. However things belong to various degrees and stages of manifestation. God is thus the cause of causes and the Ultimate Source of all effects. God is Absolute Being whereas everything else is a relative being. The spectrum of the cosmos ranges from the

matter which is pure potentiality to the highest realm which is the world of Pure Intelligences. In view of the same, across all realms of the Being, matter is forever attracted by the form. Mulla Sadra considers the world to be like a stream of water. It is a continuous flowing or informed by continuous Motion. The Motion is nothing but the continuous regeneration and recreation of the world at every instance. In this ongoing world, both the accidents as well as the substance of the universe undergo continuous recreation and rebirth. The substance is the cause of the accidents and since the effect must be the same as its cause, the cause or substance of a changing accident must itself be changing. Furthermore, there is an eternal quest for perfection in everything and God creates new the opposites at every moment in order to remove imperfections and bring new perfections to things. The matter of each being is continuously in search of a new form. It is only the rapidity of this change that makes substantial Motion imperceptible, thus giving us a feel of continuity. The substantial Motion is essentially a rebirth because it always means the attainment of a new state of being.

Mulla Sadra applies his principle of substantial Motion to explain the creation of the world. He does not accept the doctrine of the *creatio ex nihilo*. For Mulla Sadra, through substantial Motion the being of the universe is renewed at every moment. The world is created at every instant. One can say that the being of the world depends upon its non-being at every previous moment. For Mulla Sadra, the first determination of the Divine Essence is the reality of Muhammad. The Pure Intelligence submerges thereafter. The Last

Intelligence gives forms to the universe. It governs the world and gives revelations to the prophets and inspiration to saints. In between the intelligible and the material domains and following the intelligible hierarchy, there is the world of cosmic imagination. The universe is created in time and its being is renewed at even nano second. This universe is the terminal state of an immutable hierarchy. However, the visible cosmos is related to its Divine source through subtle and angelic realms of the Being.

23. Philosophy of Syed Ali Hamadani (Shah-e-Hamadani)

Sayyid Ali Hamadani, popularly known as *Amir-i-Kabir* or *Shah-e-Hamadan* who in the 14th century, chose to work for the cultural transformation of the life of the people in the hilly zones of Central Asia, North and South of Pamir range to forge spiritual unity among them and to present such political ethics to them that could bring about peace not only among the kings and princes of the time but also between the rulers and the ruled. In *Khulasat al-Manaqib* there are references to the names of several places visited by the Sayyid such as Khatlan, Balkh, Badakshan, Shiraz Yazd, Syria, Baghdad, Turkey, Transoxiana, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Zaytoon (China) apart from Kashmir which he visited thrice and made this country the center of his Sufi and spiritual activity. Among 117 works (big and small in Persian and Arabic languages) which Sayyid Ali Hamadani wrote on different subjects like logic, philosophy, jurisprudence, political science, ethics, Sufism and commentaries that are extant in different libraries in Iran, Europe and other countries of Asia. Sayyid Ali is prominently credited with writing on the instance of

kings and disciples, the famous *Dhakhirat al-Muluk*, the book of Islamic ethics, Sufi thought and political theory. This book is more profound and substantial than *Ahkam al-Sultania* of Al-Mawardi, *Nasihah al-Muluk* of Ghazali and *Siyasat Nama* of Nizam al-Mulk Tusi. In *Dhakhirat al-Muluk*, Hamadani raises a just ruler to the position of the deputy or Vice-General of Allah. He holds that Allah made it imperative that there should be among the people a perfectly 'Adil' ruler (righteous and just), who would properly discipline the activities of the progeny of Adam to strive execute the decrees of the *Shari'ah* strictly. Like many other Muslim political thinkers, he believes that the implementation of the religious law, strengthening of Islam and faith, depends upon the Sultans (kings) and their officers. In his opinion strictness and implementation of authority are inevitable in the execution of religious law.

His thought, besides showing clarity of approach for good governance, also provides religious guidance to the rulers of his time, aiming at the revival of the Caliphate polity. Hamadani regards Adam as the first man who was bestowed by Allah, with Sultanate (kingdom) and *Nabuwiyyah* (prophethood). He regards Prophet Muhammad as the model of the statesmanship for entire mankind. He divides the rulers into two distinct groups:

- a. Those that could follow and strive to establish the ordained laws of Allah and Sunnah of the Prophet dispense justice and give their dues to the people. They are the vicegerents' of Allah on the earth.
- b. The other group consists of the rulers who negate the ordained laws of Allah, do not follow the Sunnah of the Prophet and act

according to their own wish. They, according to Hamadani are the enemies of Allah and His Prophet and the imposters (vicegerents of the Satan and Dajal) on the earth.

Hamadani identifies the qualifications of the ruler of the Islamic State. He clearly categorises the rights and duties of the subjects of a state and clarifies the obligations of a ruler towards his subjects. He holds that sagacity, prudence and wisdom are pre-requisites for a ruler. Hamadani holds that the two types of subjects in a Muslim state, the believers and the nonbelievers. Hence their rights and duties differ accordingly. However, some fundamental rights like, right to life and property, right to equality, right to legal defense, right to privacy, right against exploitation, etc. are shared by both the communities. Hamadani gives a separate mandate for dealing with the *Ahl-i-Kitab* (people of revealed books i.e., Jews and Christians). This mandate is composed of a set of twenty directives that are believed to have been formulated by the Caliph Umar (RA) on the *Ahl-i-Kitab*. He regards that it is imperative for every Muslim ruler and governor to make the covenant of Hadrat Umar (RA) as the basis of their treatment of *dhimis* (non-Muslim subjects). Hamdani's classification and explanation of fundamental rights are quite relevant to the modern world. He demands a high moral standard both from the ruler and his subjects. It is the important task of a ruler to lead his subjects to a better end and treat them with benevolence, love and justice. The ethicopolitical thought of Hamadani stands valid and relevant even today, as it contains elements, which are applicable universally in human society. He

presents a systematic set of fundamental right. In his treatment of *Dhimmis*, he follows a humanistic outlook. For the maintenance of peaceful political life he not only speaks of rights but lays emphasis on duties also. In his opinion every duty pre-supposes a right and every right implies a responsibility. In other words, there is neither an absolute right nor an absolute duty. They are closely related to each other. No socio-political system is likely to succeed if it does not bring coordination between the two. Sayyid Ali's thought contains certain valid and humanistic principles, which can make the human society peaceful, dynamic, prosperous and authentic, if applied in right earnest. He speaks of the duties and responsibilities of rulers for the betterment of man and the welfare of the society. He demands them to follow the principles of justice, equality, love, kindness and benevolence and holds them responsible for the eradication of all types of evils from the human society. He makes it incumbent on the people, to abide by the ideal principles, revealed in the book of Allah and practiced by Prophet Muhammad.

After Iran fell to Muslim Army in 7th century, the whole of Iran within short span of time came under Islamic rule and people all across Iran embarrassed Islam. The Iranians, being one of the greatest civilizations on earth excelled in all Islamic sciences and in turn produced a galaxy of great scholars, scientists, saints, Sufis, jurists, philosophers, historians, reformers and social scientists. Among them, Amir Kabir Syed Ali Hamdani is ranked alongside Rumi, Gazali, Razi, Firdousi, Al-Biruni, Avicena so on and so forth. He was born on Monday 12th Rajab 714 A.H. (1314). In a historical

place Hamdan. His father, Syed Shahab-ud-din is also said to have been a Hakim (important official) in Hamdan. However, some scholars are of opinion that Shahab-ud-din was very near to throne but was not among the rulers himself, after he was formally taught by the great Ullama of his time. He received his early education from his maternal uncle Syed Alaud-din a great aalim and saint of his time. Hamdani extensively travelled not only in the length and breadth of the country, but in neighbouring central Asia countries “propagate Islamic values and mystic traditions. The first name among the prominent preachers of Islam in Kashmir was Sharfuddin Abdul Rehman Bulbul Shah belonged to Suharver order of Sufis. He is said to have entered in Kashmir during the reign of Suhadeva (1301-1320). The farmer appears to have deeply impressed the people of Kashmir by personal examples, his method of preaching and pervasion at a time when the fortune of the ruling dynasty were in the melting pots and people were passing through a period of political instability, heavy taxation and crushing burden of feudalism. Above all he was responsible for initiating the new ruler *Richane* to Islam, after conversion to Islam. He got the Muslim name Sadrud-din (1320-23). After Bulbul Shah the mission was carried by the arrival of Mir Syed Ali Hamdani. The most important journey of Hamdani, however, was his visit to Kashmir. According to the legend Hamdani is said to have travelled three times all over the world. Some earlier sources are unanimous in opinion that he came to Kashmir only once. There is no agreement among the earlier and modern historians regarding the number of visits of

Hamdani to Kashmir. According to two latter authorities Mohd-ud-din Fooq and Syed Ashraf Zaffar, Hamdani visit Kashmir three times in 774, 781 and 785 A.H. None of them mentioned the activities of Hamdanis first two visits. Modern scholars like Mohi-ud-din and Mohib-ul-Hassan agree with them both are relying on Miskin. In Saying that “Ali Hamdani came to Kashmir only once although earlier historians agree but they disagree among themselves regarding the date of his arrival there. Hamdani’s visits are considered greatest events in the history of Kashmir, which totally metamorphosed the socio-religious, political and economic fabric of Kashmir. Shah-e-Hamdan extensively travelled not only in the length and breadth of the country but in neighbouring central Asian countries propagating Islamic values and mystic tradition. The Amir also visited Kashmir in 774 A.H. with not less than 700 great Sayyids, Ulemas and scholars of different sciences during the reign of Sultan Shahab-uddin (1369-1379). This is considered to be the greatest event in the history of Kashmir. He died in 786 A.H in Kunar and was buried in Khatlan (modern day Tajkistan). The purpose of his visit was to know the etiquettes, customs and manners of the people. He came to Kashmir with a mission for propagation of Islam that was the need of hour. He himself affirms that he was continuously inspired by the high above “to guide the people” the author of Risala Masturat, an authority on Syed Ali Hamdani Says that he was directly guided by prophet Mohammad (SAW) for his Kashmir visit. He was a spectacular traveler of his time and during his visits he spent most of the time in the expansion

of Islam in the different parts of the world. Many saints came to Kashmir for the expansion of Islam, but the only one who lit the torch of monotheism in reality was none other than Amir Kabir Mir Syed Ali Hamdani. Mir Syed Ali Hamdani (R.A) was a prolific and crudit  scholar. He penned down several works incorporate number of subjects including mysticism spirituality, governance, traditions, ethics and morality. A number of his scholarly works written both Persian and Arabic exceeds to one hundred and fifty though a good number of them got extinct. The history records his busy schedule but still he managed to shortest span of time to document his advices, decisions and judgment for the kings, nobles, courtiers, religious and other scholars and common people. Although caught up in the tight, busy and hectic schedule, he proved to be the greatest of writer as well. The writings of Hamadani are preserved in manuscripts form in various libraries of India, Britian and Iran. The British Museum and Indian office library in England, Raza Rampur Library in India, Kitab-Khana Milat of Tehran in Iran and Oriental Research Department, Srinagar Kashmir have preserved the valuable documents of Hamdani (R.A). Mir Syed Ali Hamdani (R.A) also established the first manuscript library of Islamic books at Srinagar in Kashmir. The library contained his personal collection also. A number of calligraphists worked under the supervision of the chief librarian Syed Mohammad Qazim. Mir Mohammad Toeyeb Kamli claims that he had seen many treatise of Hamdani (R.A) among them are Muqamati-Sufiya, Kifiyat, Kifiyat-i-Khawab and Munajat. Among all the works Zakhiratul Malook is considered to be the

magnum opus of Shah-i-Hamdan (R.A). It has been translated into Urdu under the titles like Minhaj-us-Saluk and Zakhira Sadat and was also translated into Latin by Earnest Fredrich Carel, Rosen Muller in 1825 and into French by D. Solven in 1829. Infact it is clear that Zakhiratul-Malook is especially written for the guidance of Muslim rulers and their subordinates. Hamadan's Zakhiratul-Malook was a favourite book with the scholars during pre-Mughal period in India. The period in which Mir Syed Ali Hamdani (R.A) penned down these works was a period of Turmoil and anarchy as the whole Persia was devised by the Mongal invasions. Therefore, the works has a tremendous literary significance for the style of Hamadan unique trying to make the man understand the fact that this world is temporary and therefore one must be pious and perform good deeds. His choice of works and constructions, similes and metaphors are taken from the spiritual and religious saureas like Quran and saying of Prophet Mohammad (SAW) and revered saints of mystics. Thus Amir Kabir Mir Syed Ali Hamdani (R.A) was a prolific writer, scholar and devoted Muslim, who spent his whole life for preaching and reforming the Muslim Ummah. He migrated from his home land only for the sacred cause of preaching Islam. He was undoubtedly the great benefactor of humanity in general and for Kashmir in particular. He was multidimensional personality and brought substantial reforms in the lives of ordinary Kashmir, getting rid of practices like Sati and black magic. He made Islamic teaching known to the people of Kashmir, improved their belief, made efforts for building of their character and laid down a full proof system for

propagation of Islam. His impact on all sections of Kashmir society was particularly due to integrity of his personal life. He himself made his living by cap making and encouraged others to do the same. Moreover, Mohd Yousuf Teng, Professor Mohibul Hassan, Hakeem Ghulam Mohammad Makhmoon and other important researcher unanimously regarded Shah-I-Hamdan (R.A) and his mission as a great advent of emergence of arts and crafts in Kashmir valley. However, though history bears testimony to the fact that ZainulAbdin (Budshah) and Mirza Haider were two important rulers of Kashmir who promoted various arts and crafts in the valley but in different context. The introduction of arts and crafts can be attributed to Amir Kabir Mir Syed Ali Hamdani (R.A) as he opened the gate of interaction between Kashmir and Iran and Kashmir in a manner which has no precedent. Thus the economy of the valley became better by these arts and crafts flourished by Amir Kabir (R.A). When he came to Kashmir, he brought along with him hundreds of disciples who were painters, calligraphers, shawl makers etc. Before the introduction of these arts, Kashmir's industrial sector was much poor so that even loom was not indigenously found in the valley. According to Mohibul Hassan it was introduced by the Persian craftsmen. Allama Iqbal (R.A) admits that because of Shah-e-Hamdan (R.A), the wonderful arts and crafts turned Kashmir into Mini-Iran and brought about a revolution in making the people prosperous. The skills and crafts brought to Kashmir gave rise to an industry which is world famous even now as the name of Kashmiri Shawl. Shah-e-Hamdan (R.A) was quite

aware about the benefits of the trade, commerce and other means of earning livelihood, so he introduced the pattern prevailing in the central Asia. Mir Syed Ali Hamdani's keen interest inspired the sultan Qutub-ud-din to introduce the modes of life benefitting the Muslim courts and brought ample material prosperity to the region. Mohibul Hassan in his book "Kashmir under Sultan's Hands" stated that the shawl industry was founded by Syed Ali Hamdani (R.A) in 1378, because the shawl industry did not exist before the 13th century. There is no reference either in Kalhan's *Rajtarngni* or any other source and it was developed under the patronage of the Sultans with the help of weavers who came from Persia and Turkistan. These immigrants not only introduced new patterns but also a new technique in the twiltapestry technique which has a parallel in Persia and Central Asia, but nowhere in India and Pakistan. However, under Zainul Aabideen, Kashmir had become famous for its shawl when the Mughals conquered the valley. The Shawl industry was in well-developed state." The several vocations he introduced in the valley have provided a livelihood to the artisans of Kashmir for times. One of the important reasons of cultural and lingual exchange between Persia and Kashmir was the progress of Islam in the valley which was intimately associated with the missionary activities of Sufis from Persia. These Sufis in particular and other in general played an important role in bringing about an Iranian orientation of Kashmir culture and language.

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About the Book

This book has been written as a basic introduction to the Muslim Philosophy. It comprises of some fundamental philosophical problems on which Muslim Philosophy is based upon. Muslim Philosophy is the philosophical study of interpretations and knowledge derived from the Quran, the Hadiths and other significant sources of teachings of Islam. Among these, Quran is the divine source of philosophy which explains the different aspects of world and guides to the true knowledge. Muslim Philosophy is the philosophy which discusses the fundamental problems of the world like existence, universals, mind, thought, language, God, world, soul, reality, knowledge and values. However, these problems or questions demand answers from the philosophers' attitudes and points of view which are highlighted in this book at a beginner's level. It is also a matter of fact that these problems or issues could not be answered through other ways. The need of the hour is that the philosophical ways, Islamic principles and methods distinguish these matters of facts from other disciplines. So, this book is helpful for undergraduate, postgraduate, and multidisciplinary scholars and thinkers interested in studying the basics of the Muslim Philosophy. It is also a valuable source for those who are just interested in acquiring knowledge in the field of Muslim Philosophy. This work shall guide them to understand the basic principles of Islamic Philosophy. The most notable Muslim Philosophers who are mentioned in this book are: Al-Kindi, Al-Gazali, Ibn Rushd, Al-Farabi, Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, Ibn-Arabi, Sheikh Nurrudin Wali (Nund-Reshi), Ibn Tayamiyya, Ibn-Sina, Shah Waliullah, Hamza Makhdhoomi, Allama Iqbal and Lal Ded. Furthermore, a few other important concepts of philosophy that have been mentioned in this book are Mutazalism, Asharism, Sufism and Articles of Faith.

