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Is Default Logic a Reinvention of Inductive-Statistical Reasoning?

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Abstract

Currently there is hardly any connection between philosophy of science and Artificial Intelligence research. We argue that both fields can benefit from each other. As an example of this mutual benefit we discuss the relation between Inductive-Statistical Reasoning and Default Logic. One of the main topics in AI research is the study of common-sense reasoning with incomplete information. Default logic is especially developed to formalise this type of reasoning. We show that there is a striking resemblance between inductive-statistical reasoning and default logic. A central theme in the logical positivist study of inductive-statistical reasoning such as Hempel’s Criterion of Maximal Specificity turns out to be equally important in default logic. We also discuss to what extent the relevance of the results of Logical Positivism to AI research could contribute to a reevaluation of Logical Positivism in general.

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  1. Erasmus University Research Institute for Decision and Information Systems (EURIDIS), Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands

    Yao-Hua Tan

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Tan, YH. Is Default Logic a Reinvention of Inductive-Statistical Reasoning?. Synthese 110, 357–379 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004999920152

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