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Rowlands, Rawlsian Justice and Animal Experimentation

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Abstract

Mark Rowlands argues that, contrary to the dominant view, a Rawlsian theory of justice can legitimately be applied to animals. One of the implications of doing so, Rowlands argues, is an end to animal experimentation. I will argue, contrary to Rowlands, that under a Rawlsian theory there may be some circumstances where it is justifiable to use animals as experimental test subjects (where the individual animals are benefited by the experiments).

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Notes

  1. This is true of political philosophy more widely (not just contractarianism) see for instance Cavalieri and Kymlicka (1996, p. 5).

  2. It is therapeutic rather than non-therapeutic experiments that I want to discuss here. Therapeutic experiments are those with the potential to yield medical benefit: e.g. drugs, surgery. Non-therapeutic are those for products such as shampoo and bleach which have no medical benefit.

  3. Similarly, Cavalieri and Kymlicka argue that “asking individuals to decide what is best for themselves has the same consequence as asking them to decide what is best for everyone considered impartially” (1996, p. 9).

  4. Others agree that animals are at best only second-class moral citizens under contractarianism (insofar as any moral status they have is indirect). See, DeGrazia (1996) and Gauthier (1986, pp. 268, 285).

  5. Brian Barry also supports the orthodox view (1989, p. 212).

  6. Similarly, Cavalieri and Kymlicka argue that Rawls is inconsistent in saying that all and only humans should be subject to justice (1996, p. 10). They argue that the great apes should be included in the polis (1996, p. 27). Similarly, in Frontiers of Justice Nussbaum attempts to extend contractarian thinking to animals (2006).

  7. See also Regan (1983, p. 172) and VanDeVeer (1983, pp. 152–3).

  8. Andrew Cohen argues that “that contractarianism can consistently accommodate the notion that nonhuman animals are owed direct moral consideration” although animals “acquire their moral status indirectly” (Cohen 2007, p. 188). Cohen’s view is unorthodox in the sense that he says animals can be owed direct consideration but his view is orthodox insofar as it can only be acquired indirectly “when some persons take an interest in their interests” (Cohen 2007, p. 191).

  9. One of those who focuses on the social contract argument is Cohen who argues “[c]ontractarianism roots moral standing in an agreement among rational agents in the circumstances of justice” (Cohen 2007, p. 188).

  10. Cavalieri and Kymlicka say something similar. They argue that there are two strands to Rawls’ concept of justice—reciprocity and impartiality (similar to Rowlands’ two principles) (1996, p. 16). These two strands “reflect profound tensions at the very heart of Rawls’ theory” (1996, p. 16). Similarly Barry says that Rawls incorporates elements of mutual advantage into what is, in other respects, an impartialist theory (1989, pp. 148–152). And impartiality is “a criterion that gives all interests equal weight” (1989, p. 241).

  11. As Cavalieri and Kymlicka point out “Rawls’ rationale for the exclusion from justice of (allegedly irrational) animals is not that they could not hypothetically participate in the choice among alternative conceptions of justice, but that (allegedly) lacking rationality, they cannot have a sense of justice in the actual world, and as a result none of the contractors has a self-interested reason to reach an agreement with them” (1996, p. 18). Thus, it is only by giving priority to what Rowlands calls the Social contract argument that animals can be excluded. If the contract is seen as a device, however, and the intuitive equality argument is seen as the basis of justice then there is no good reason to exclude animals.

  12. Similarly Cavalieri and Kymlicka argue that it is not agreement that is important in Rawlsian contractarianism (1996, p. 26). They argue that impartiality is what matters: “The idea of a social contract… according to Rawls… embodies a basic principle of impartial deliberation—i.e. that each individual take into account the needs and interests of others” (1996, p. 8).

  13. Though, disappointingly Barry goes on to allow agreement a significant role. And he follows Rawls’ conclusion that animals are not owed justice (1989, p. 212).

  14. Similarly Cavalieri and Kymlicka argue that “once we drop the claim that justice is only owed to those with a sense of justice, then Rawls’ basis for excluding the great apes from the social contract disappears” (1996, p. 20).

  15. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.

  16. Rowlands calls his position neo-Rawlsianism, which is “Rawlsian contractarianism… purged of its unnecessary Hobbesian elements” (2009, p. 174).

  17. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.

  18. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.

  19. Rawls is clear on this, he says: people can “at any time enter the original position, or perhaps, better, simulate the deliberations of this hypothetical situation, simply by reasoning in accordance with the appropriate restrictions… To say that a certain conception of justice would be chosen in the original position is equivalent to saying that rational deliberation satisfying certain conditions and restrictions would reach a certain conclusion” (Rawls 1999, pp. 119–120, see also Rawls 1985).

  20. How the microscope is constructed has nothing to do with the content of what we are looking at (as the OCAWA implies).

  21. I have argued elsewhere that there is no morally relevant difference between marginal humans and animals (2005, 2006, 2009).

  22. It might be objected that comparing animal and human interests is difficult (part of the wider problem of comparing interests in general). But comparisons of some kind between humans and animals will have to be made for nearly any criterion that is used to assess the legitimacy of animal experimentation. It is, then, a problem shared by most approaches. But it is also, to some degree, a problem that is overstated. Doing comparisons is not as difficult as might first appear. There are ways of comparing pain (such as pain scales), which I will discuss further in section 4.2.

  23. For example, gene therapy research involves using animal models. See http://019221f.netsolhost.com/gt.shtml accessed 16 September 2009.

  24. The optimism-pessimism rule is similar (Resnik 1987, p. 32). It tries to reduce the excessive conservatism of maximin by combining it with maximax (i.e. maximise the maximum).

  25. Also see Luce & Raiffa (1957, p. 278).

  26. There are circumstances under which maximin is not the rational choice. If one used it all the time then life would be dull and one would not end up doing much or ever taking a risk. In a long run series, or chances, for example where one had a one in ten chance of winning £150 for a stake of £10 it might be rational to risk losing the £10. However, the point of maximin is not to avoid risk per se but to avoid serious harms. It is not the probability that matters but the amount of damage done.

  27. Cohen says something similar: “What does contractarianism say about the moral logic of situations where the welfares of two or more entities are at stake? From the start, it seems that contractors would agree to norms that express responsiveness to gains and losses to the welfare of any entity. The norms emerging from the agreement would support benefiting one entity when it is possible to do so without harming another (this is positive responsiveness), and the norms would oppose options harming an individual while benefiting no other entity (this is negative responsiveness)” (2009, p. 242).

  28. It might be argued that there is another way animals may be benefited; namely, members of the same species are benefited by experiments. There are, at least some, conditions that both humans and animals suffer from and when a treatment is found for the experimental subject then this treatment can be used on other members of the same species. (It should be noted that this only applies to some experiments as many experiments now recreate an illness in laboratory subjects from which their conspecifics would not otherwise suffer.) But this is not the kind of benefit the difference principle is interested in. It is direct benefits to the individual that matter not benefits to the species as a whole. It is whether the position of the individual is made worse off that is relevant, not whether the position of a species as a whole is better or worse off. If it were the position of the species that mattered then this would justify experimenting on humans as the position of the human species would undoubtedly be improved if human test subjects were used to find cures for human diseases/conditions.

  29. For the sake of simplicity I leave aside the issue of death here and concentrate on pain/suffering. Whether death can be a harm for animals is a hotly contested issue (the fact that they are not capable of making plans for the future leads many to argue that death cannot be a harm for them). I do not have space to enter into this debate here. It suffices to say that if death is a harm then this would be something that would need to be taken into account when applying the benefits principle.

  30. On the human tendency towards optimism see also Gilbert 2006, pp. 160–1.

  31. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.

  32. As the title suggests, in Better Never to Have Been Benatar (2006) argues that coming into existence is always a serious harm.

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Tanner, J. Rowlands, Rawlsian Justice and Animal Experimentation. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 14, 569–587 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9265-z

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