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TEACHING VIRTUE: CHANGING ATTITUDES

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ABSTRACT: In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution about the efficacy of direct instruction about virtue and of stimulating emulation through exposure to positive exemplars.

KEYWORDS: virtue epistemology, vice epistemology, intellectual arrogance, education, attitude, self-affirmation

Philosophers and educationalists alike often claim that formal education and exposure to exemplars are effective strategies for educating students to acquire some intellectually virtuous traits such as open-mindedness, curiosity and intellectual humility.¹ This paper voices a note of caution about the efficacy of this approach.² I base my reservation on the view, which I also defend in this paper, that intellectual modesty and the vices that oppose it are strong attitudes toward one's cognitive make-up as a whole and its components.³ My pedagogical recommendations are not wholly negative. I conclude the paper with a suggestion that self-affirmation techniques help to predispose students to become more receptive to teachers' efforts to promote virtue in the classroom.

The paper has two main aims. The first is to offer an original account of modesty and some of its surrounding vices. The second is to draw some of the educational implications of the account. The paper consists of six sections. In the

¹ See e.g., Jason Baehr, "Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 47, 2 (2013): 248-262; Heather Battaly, "Responsibilist Virtues in Reliabilist Classrooms," In *Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology*, ed. Jason S. Baehr (New York and London: Routledge, 2016), 163-183; Ron Ritchhart, *Intellectual Character: What It Is, Why It Matters, and How to Get It* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002).

² Both Baehr, "Educating for Intellectual Virtues" and Battaly, "Responsibilist Virtues" suggest that practice of virtuous actions is also important. I shall not address the issue of habituation here.

³ This paper is only concerned with the intellectual versions of these virtues and vices. However, for brevity sake, I often drop the qualifier 'intellectual' when talking about these character traits.

first I argue that intellectual modesty is one component of intellectual humility and that modesty does not require underestimation of one's epistemic abilities nor indifference toward one's intellectual successes. In the section two I explain the notion of an attitude as social psychologists understand this construct. In the third section I defend the view that modesty is a strong attitude directed at one's epistemic successes which serves knowledge and value-expressive functions. In the fourth and fifth sections I argue that the vices that oppose modesty are arrogance and self-abasement. I explain what attitudes these are and contrast them with their interpersonal varieties: haughtiness (*superbia*) and servility or obsequiousness. In the final section I consider some pedagogical implications based on the literature on attitude formation and on attitude change.

1. Intellectual Modesty

Modesty about one's successes and achievements is an essential component of intellectual humility. The two notions are so close that Julia Driver's account of modesty has generally been taken as providing a theory of humility.⁴ However, modesty about one's good qualities is only one aspect of humility since the ability to accept or own one's limitations is equally important if a person is to be truly humble.⁵ Although in my view humility comprises both modesty about successes and self-acceptance of limitations, this paper is exclusively concerned with providing an account of the relationships between modesty and some of the vices that oppose it.⁶

Following Driver modesty is often characterised as a virtue of ignorance or underestimation.⁷ In Driver's view the modest person is either ignorant of her good features or underestimates their significance. There is, as others have pointed out,⁸ something fishy about thinking of ignorance as a pre-requisite of virtue; the

⁴ See Julia Driver, "The Virtues of Ignorance," *The Journal of Philosophy* 86, 7 (1989): 373-384.

⁵ Several accounts of humility have focused exclusively on the limitation owning or knowing aspect of the virtue. See for instance, Nancy E. Snow, "Humility," *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 29, 2 (1995): 203-216 and Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and Daniel Howard-Snyder, "Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, doi: 10.1111/phpr.12228 (2015): 1-31.

⁶ I have presented my account of intellectual humility in Alessandra Tanesini, "Intellectual Humility as Attitude," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12326 (2016):1-22.

⁷ Driver, "The Virtues of Ignorance;" Julia Driver, "Modesty and Ignorance," *Ethics* 109, 4 (1999): 827-834; Julia Driver, *Uneasy Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

⁸ See J. L. A. Garcia, "Being Unimpressed with Ourselves: Reconceiving Humility," *Philosophia* 34, 4 (2006): 417-435 at n 6, p. 419.

view is especially counter-intuitive when applied to intellectual virtue since the failure to have true beliefs about one's qualities could not possibly be a defining feature of any intellectual excellence.⁹ In addition one can offer counter-examples that show that ignorance or underestimation is neither necessary nor sufficient for intellectual modesty. An individual who is fully aware of her successes may nevertheless be genuinely modest about them by refraining from boasting, acknowledging the contributions others made to help her succeed, and avoiding seeking the limelight. Thus, ignorance or underestimation is not necessary.¹⁰ It is also not sufficient since a person may underestimate the real importance of his achievements, which becomes clear only with hindsight, and yet be arrogant in the way he treats his co-workers.¹¹

More plausibly modesty concerns one's stance toward one's good qualities, rather than the failure to possess an accurate estimation of them. The individual who is modest cares about her good features, since the person who is indifferent to them will lack the motivation to improve or at least maintain her current strengths and achievements. However, the modest individual cares about her good qualities in a way which is incompatible with self-aggrandizement. This thought guides those accounts of modesty that take it to be a matter of adopting a stance toward oneself and one's good qualities of being unimpressed by them, of avoiding dwelling or delighting in them.¹² Despite some plausibility these accounts are ultimately incorrect since modesty cannot consist in the absence of a hot motivational or emotional state about one's good qualities.¹³ At least in so far as modesty is compatible with proper pride about one's own achievements, it seems possible that a person is modest and yet feels elation and pride because of a success which is the outcome of much work and sacrifice. The same person may even gain in self-confidence because of this success and she may develop a habit of

⁹ Driver is, of course, aware of the fact. In her view what makes modesty interesting is precisely its incompatibility with self-knowledge.

¹⁰ For this kind of counterexample see Owen Flanagan, "Virtue and Ignorance," *Journal of Philosophy* 87 (1990): 420–428; G.F. Schueler, "Why Modesty is a Virtue," *Ethics* 107 (1997): 467–485; Garcia, "Being Unimpressed" and Alan T. Wilson, "Modesty as Kindness," *Ratio* 29, 1 (2016): 73–88.

¹¹ This point is also noted by Garcia, "Being Unimpressed" and by Wilson, "Modesty as Kindness."

¹² Examples of accounts of this sort are: Garcia, "Being Unimpressed" and Nicolas Bommarito, "Modesty as a Virtue of Attention," *The Philosophical Review* 122, 1 (2013): 93–117.

¹³ Hot cognitive states are states that essentially involve arousal. For an account see Paul Thagard, in collaboration with, Fred Kroon, Josef Nerb, Baljinder Sahdra, Cameron Shelley, and Brandon Wagar, *Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition* (Cambridge and London: MIT, 2006).

reminding herself of it so as to stave off self-doubt.¹⁴ Modesty thus is not incompatible even with dwelling on one's own successes and reminding oneself of their impressiveness.

I have argued so far that accounts of modesty as absence of true beliefs about one's good qualities or absence of positive emotional states directed at the same features fail. They fail because they both explain modesty as a disposition to ignore one's good qualities. In Driver's account one ignores these features because one does not know about them, in Garcia's one is aware of their existence but directs the focus of one's concern elsewhere. In my view modesty is not characterised by the absence of a belief or of a hot psychological state such as an emotion or a desire but by the presence of a certain kind of care or concern for one's good features. Modesty is in this sense self-centred.¹⁵

In order to see that modesty is best thought as a way of being concerned rather than a manner of being unconcerned, imagine a person who does not care whether or not she has good qualities. This person has no desire to improve. She does not think of herself as either smart or stupid.¹⁶ She does not dwell or delight in her good qualities and does not wish to draw attention to them. She may even not be aware of any qualities she may have. In sum, she simply does not care. Undoubtedly such a person would exemplify several defects and vices. It is also true that we would not think of her of immodest. Similarly, however, we would not think that she is modest either. Indifference to one's good qualities or epistemic success is not what makes one modest about them; what modesty requires is that one is concerned about these features of the self. The difference between modesty and immodesty lies with the character of that concern.

¹⁴ The person who needs to boost her confidence in this manner may be modest but is likely to suffer from intellectual timidity. Such an individual has a negative estimate of her abilities and thus tends to keep quiet so as to go unnoticed. Reminding oneself that one has good qualities helps the timid to find the courage of her convictions.

¹⁵ I thus disagree with Wilson "Modesty as Kindness" who thinks that modesty is driven by a concern with the well-being of others. At least with regard to intellectual modesty his account is incorrect. It is plausible that a person who is not concerned with other people or their feelings may nonetheless be modest about her epistemic successes. One can imagine a very nerdy software engineer who is fully focused on producing a new kind of coding. She relishes the challenge and the technology is all she cares about. She is rather indifferent to other human beings. Yet for all I have said when thinking about her achievements she may be modest in her assessment.

¹⁶ I do not mean these remarks to imply that the person who is modest must display a high degree of self-reflective awareness. It is possible to think of oneself as smart and manifest this conviction in one's behaviour without having formed conscious judgements about one's intellectual prowess.

The individual who is not modest because he is arrogant is concerned with his good features and epistemic successes because of how they reflect on his sense of self-esteem. Whilst self-confidence is not the same thing as arrogance, the arrogant always display self-confidence in the manner of a defence shield.¹⁷ The arrogant person uses his own positive estimation of his own abilities and successes as a way of protecting and boosting his self-esteem. If this is right, given that modesty is incompatible with arrogance, it seems plausible to think of modesty as exhibiting a different kind of self-confidence. The person who is modest also has a positive attitude toward at least some of her qualities and features which she views as successes. However, her positive stance which grounds her self-confidence does not serve the need to defend the ego. Instead, the person who is intellectually modest cares for her successes because of their epistemic worth and because they are a manifestation of the values to which she subscribes. Hence, a modest scientist may display confidence in her own abilities because she has a positive evaluation of these. However, her stance toward her own successes is a concern that they promote the acquisition of epistemic goods and express support for epistemic values such as truth and knowledge.

Before offering a defence of this account of modesty as a positive stance toward one's own good features which is a way of caring for them for their worth rather than because of their ability to protect one's self-esteem, I need to take a detour in section two to explain the social psychological notion of an attitude. I return to modesty in section three in order to supply the details of my account and to begin its defence.

2. Attitudes

The notion of an attitude is the core construct of social psychology. It was introduced by Allport and has been adopted ever since.¹⁸ There are different definitions and accounts of attitudes in the psychological literature. Nevertheless, there is a consensus that attitudes are summary evaluations directed at an object.¹⁹

¹⁷ In this the arrogant and the haughty are not alone. Timid individuals also use self-confidence as a defence mechanism.

¹⁸ See G. W. Allport, "Attitudes," In *Handbook of social psychology*, ed. C. Murchison (Worcester: Clark University Press, 1935), 798–844.

¹⁹ See Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Larisa Heiphetz, "Attitudes," In *Handbook of Social Psychology*, eds. Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert and Gardner Lindzey (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 353–93 and Russell H. Fazio and Michael A. Olson, "Attitudes: Foundations, Functions and Consequences," In *The Sage Handbook of Social Psychology*, eds. Michael A. Hogg and Joel Cooper (London: SAGE, 2007), 141. Anything whatsoever at any level of generality can be the object of an attitude since these include items such as my umbrella or ideals such as freedom.

More specifically, they are associations of a valence (positive or negative) with an object. One can think of attitudes as preferences and dislikes. They can cause the agent to interact with, or approach, the object when one likes it, or to avoid an object that is disliked. They also comprise positive or negative emotions directed at the target object. Attitudes so conceived should therefore not be confused with propositional attitudes since the latter concern psychological relations to propositions. Attitudes as social psychology understands them do not have propositional contents.

Attitudes are learnt. They are formed on the basis of experience, past behaviour, other attitudes, background beliefs, needs, desires and emotions. One may think of the attitude itself as a cognitive shortcut. Over time individuals evaluate objects for their good and bad features; they carry out these evaluations based on the information supplied by their relevant beliefs, desires and emotions and by their past encounters with the objects. Individuals will tend to form an overall or summary view of an object weighing up all of these considerations, which results in the object being positively regarded (liked) or negatively considered (disliked).²⁰ It makes sense to hypothesise that individuals do not re-assess objects anew every time that they encounter them, as this processing would involve significant cognitive loads. Instead, individuals may store in memory the final outcome of their evaluations, ready to be retrieved and direct behaviour when one is confronted with the target. These stored representations are the attitudes.²¹

The psychological states which represent the information on which the attitude is based are said to be the content or basis of the attitude. According to the classic account of attitudes these contents always include evaluative beliefs, affective states, and dispositions to behave. But the attitude is not just determined by the information represented in its content, an important role in the formation, preservation and modification of attitudes is played by their functions. Attitudes record the evaluations of objects; but how objects are evaluated depends on the needs served by the evaluations as well as the information possessed about the object. For example, one evaluates objects for their contribution to one's survival.

²⁰ It is also possible that a person may end being ambivalent about an object because they feel both positively and negatively about it for different reasons. I shall not discuss ambivalent attitudes here. They have been shown not to be cross- situationally stable, see Gregory R. Maio and Geoffrey Haddock, *The Psychology of Attitudes and Attitude Change* (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2009), 34.

²¹ There is some disagreement as to whether attitudes are stored or made on the hoof every time one encounters the object. See, Banaji and Heiphetz, "Attitudes." Either way the attitudes are the outcome of evaluations which they summarise.

hence, one forms positive attitudes toward items which are edible, and negative ones toward those which are inedible. One will, as a result, avoid those items that one dislikes and eat those one likes.

There is some agreement on several of the functions that attitudes may serve. Among these the best established are: knowledge, utilitarian, object-appraisal, ego-defensive, social-adjustive, and value-expressive.²² Attitudes that serve the knowledge function are acquired and sustained to satisfy the need for knowledge and understanding.²³ Attitudes that have the function of assessing objects for their preference-satisfying qualities have a utilitarian function. Those with ego-defensive function serve the need to defend the individual against threats while the social-adjustive function serves the need to fit in with one's affinity group. Attitudes which are value-expressive have the function of expressing a person's values.²⁴ Finally, the object-appraisal function is often singled out as playing a special role. It is sometimes thought as the sum of the utilitarian and knowledge functions. It is also said to be a function served by all attitudes irrespective of their other functions.²⁵

The causal effectiveness of attitudes (and their informational contents) is largely dependent on their strength. The term 'attitude strength' is used to refer to different features of attitudes, but it is most commonly read as a measure of the strength of the associative connection between the object and the positive or

²² See, Russell H. Fazio, "Accessible Attitudes as Tools for Object Appraisal: Their Costs and Benefits," In *Why We Evaluate: Functions of Attitudes*, eds. Gregory R. Maio and James M. Olson (Mahwah and London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000), 1-36; Gregory R. Maio, Victoria M. Esses, Karin H. Arnold, and James M. Olson, "The Function-Structure Model of Attitudes: Incorporating the Need for Affect," In *Contemporary Perspectives on the Psychology of Attitudes*, eds. Geoffrey Haddock and Gregory R. Maio (Hove: Psychology, 2004), 9-33.

²³ See, Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 24, 2 (1960): 163-204.

²⁴ Maio et al., "The Function-Structure Model." One may have an attitude serving this function toward an object which is not itself a value but which symbolises, or is in other ways associated with, values or deeply significant features of the self. Hence, a supporter's attitude toward her football team is likely to be value-expressive. Conversely, one may have ego-defensive or social-adjustive attitudes toward values when one is positive about them because feeling that way makes one feel good about oneself or helps one to fit in with one's crowd.

²⁵ Fazio, "Accessible Attitudes." In my opinion the psychological literature on this issue often displays confusions since it risks a vacuous identification of object-appraisal with the evaluation that serves the function of evaluating. In addition, there is a tendency to presume that one may seek to acquire knowledge only as a means to utilitarian ends. In order to avoid these pitfalls, I treat the knowledge and utilitarian functions as distinct, and interpret talk of object-appraisal function as being ambiguously about either or both of these functions.

negative valence that make-up the attitude.²⁶ Thus, the strength of the attitude does not mark how much one likes or dislikes the object. Instead it measures the strength of the association between the object and the positive or negative valence. For example, a moderate preference for ice-cream could be a strong attitude if mere exposure to ice-cream always activates the attitude and thus triggers a positive (although not intense) feeling. An intense dislike for spinach could be a weak attitude if the extreme reaction to it is only occasionally present when one encounters, or thinks about, this vegetable. Strong attitudes are highly accessible or easily activated because they are attitudes in which the valence is strongly associated with the object so that when one is present, the other is triggered.²⁷

In section three I argue that virtues and vices are clusters of strong attitudes together with their informational bases serving given functions. For now, I wish to alert the reader to some features of strong attitudes that make them suitable as candidates for the states that would show virtues and vices to have psychological reality. Virtues and vices are often said to be effective in guiding behaviour; to be capable of directing visual attention; perhaps to have characteristic motivations; to be closely related to characteristic emotions; to express deep features of the person's character, and to be stable across situations. Strong attitudes possess all of these features. They guide behaviour; they direct visual attention;²⁸ they have affective, cognitive and behavioural bases;²⁹ they can be expressive of the values with which an agent identifies³⁰ and they are cross-situationally stable.³¹ These are empirically robust results. They have been obtained independently of any thought about virtues and vices, since in the social psychological literature no connections are drawn between attitudes and the philosophical notions of virtues or vices.

²⁶ Greg Maio and Geoffrey Haddock, "Attitude Change," In *Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles*, eds. Arie W. Kruglanski and E. Tory Higgins (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), 565-586.

²⁷ Fazio, "Accessible Attitudes."

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Fazio and Olson, "Attitudes."

³⁰ Gregory R. Maio and James M. Olson, "Emergent Themes and Potential Approaches to Attitude Function: The Function-Structure Model of Attitudes," In *Why We Evaluate: Functions of Attitudes*, eds. Gregory R. Maio and James M. Olson (Mahwah and London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000), 417-442.

³¹ Fazio, "Accessible Attitudes."

3. Modest Attitudes

Modesty is best understood as a cluster of strong positive attitudes, together with their informational bases, directed toward features of one's own cognitive make-up which serve knowledge and value expressive functions. The aims of this section are: first, to flesh out and explain this claim; second, to argue for its plausibility.

I use the notion of cognitive make-up broadly to include an agent's cognitive habits, skills, abilities, and their products such as beliefs, theories and perceptions as well as the agent's character traits.³² Hence, capacities such as memory, traits like open-mindedness, and psychological states such as a belief that whales are mammals are all components of the agent's cognitive make-up. Most adult human beings have a "feel" for their intellectual strengths and weaknesses. They do not necessarily have explicitly formulated opinions, based on well-developed reasons, about which features of their cognitive make-up count as their strengths or weaknesses. Instead these are evaluations to which they may have arrived unthinkingly and which they may adopt unreflectingly. None the less, individuals' problem-solving strategies, levels of self-confidence, and general approach to daily life are in part guided by their summary evaluation of their intellectual abilities, of their character, and of their views. It is, therefore, extremely likely that most adults have attitudes towards their own cognitive make-up as a whole and many of its components. These attitudes may serve several functions.

Consider a person who treats doing maths as one of her intellectual strengths. This person may consciously believe that she is good at math, but she may also simply behave like someone confident in her mathematical abilities without having ever reflected on her skill. Nevertheless, if she were asked to think about it, she may say that mathematics is indeed one of her strengths. In sum, this person has a positive attitude toward her facility with numbers. She will have acquired this attitude over time on the basis of her past experiences and her background beliefs. This attitude serves a knowledge function if it has been formed, and is maintained, to serve the need for knowledge and understanding.

The person who has a positive attitude toward her mathematical ability likes this aspect of her cognitive make-up. If the attitude serves a knowledge function, this person has acquired this preference because in the past her reliance

³² One may wish to include books, papers, machinery and artefacts among the products of an agent's cognitive abilities. I shall bracket here the question as to whether these are to be included in an agent's cognitive make-up. I am, however, inclined to believe that attitudes toward these objects would figure as components of modesty. Thanks to the editors of this issue for raising this point.

on her mathematical skills has promoted her acquisition of knowledge and understanding. She has thus learnt that using her numerical abilities is a good strategy for her when she wants to acquire epistemic goods. As a result, this person likes this aspect of herself but she does so as a result of its role in facilitating her acquisition of knowledge and understanding. In a word, their promotion of epistemic goods is what causes this person to care for her numerical skills.

If the attitude also serves a value-expressive function, the individual likes this aspect of her cognitive make-up because expressing a preference for it is a way of endorsing her values.³³ In this instance, the values in question must be epistemic values since this person likes those aspects of herself which, serving a knowledge function, promote those values. Hence, this individual's positive attitude toward her mathematical ability is an expression of her valuing of truth and knowledge. If this attitude is strong, it is easily accessible and thus effective to guide behaviour and attention in numerous contexts.

It is my contention that the person who is intellectually modest possesses strong attitudes toward those aspects of her cognitive make-up which she regards as positive that play exclusively knowledge and value-expressive functions. This is a person who has over time formed evaluations of her cognitive make-up; she has formed these evaluations on the basis of her past experience of which of her traits and features have served her well. Since her past reliance on aspects of her cognitive make-up was driven by the need for knowledge and understanding, she has, as a result, developed a preference for those traits that seemed to assist the achievement of these goals. In addition, she takes these preferences to express her values, which must be epistemic values since it is those traits that promote these values that she takes to express her commitments.

I have argued in the first section of this paper that modesty is a concern with one's own good intellectual features. This concern is manifested as a positive stance toward one's intellectual qualities rather than an attitude of indifference or a lack of knowledge about what they are. However, this positive evaluation must not be motivated by the desire for self-esteem or the need to fit in with one's affinity group. The person who possesses these attitudes may make mistakes and underestimate or overestimate the actual value of some of her intellectual traits. However, these will be honest mistakes since her attitudes are based on her past experience of pursuing knowledge and understanding. In addition, this person is

³³ This notion of expression bears not connection to expressivism as a position in meta-ethics. In this context the expression of a value is any activity that allows one to re-enforce or make manifest a value one endorses.

not prone to self-aggrandizement since she cares for her qualities because they are good and not because they make her feel good about herself or accepted by her peers. Further, the person whose attitudes serve the knowledge function must be focused on improvement since she will tend to dislike those of her traits that prevent her from satisfying this need. As a result, she possesses a motivation to change them, rather than to ignore her limitations.

I have given so far several reasons to believe that intellectual modesty is a positive stance toward some aspects of one's cognitive make-up but not others. These patterns of evaluations are partly based on information acquired by past experiences of relying on components of one's cognitive make-up to satisfy the need for knowledge and understanding. These evaluations are not beliefs about the epistemic qualities of these components, although they may be based on such beliefs. The evaluations themselves are attitudes which consist in associations of the object evaluated with a negative or positive affective state. It is these attitudes and their informational bases that explain the behaviours that are characteristic of modesty such as being a willing team player, not boasting or bragging, being sensible about which risks are worth taking, showing a concern for the correctness of one's views over caring that one's discoveries show one to be intellectually talented.

One of the clearest arguments, however, in favour of identifying modesty with this cluster of attitudes is based on the relation of modesty to its surrounding vices. The framework of attitudes sheds new light on the nature of vices such as arrogance, haughtiness, self-abasement and servility and their relation to the virtues to which they are opposed. In what follows I provide an account of these four vices and of their relations. This account supplies further evidence in support of the view of modesty I have articulated in this section.

4. Arrogance and Haughtiness (Superbia)

Arrogance is a cluster of strong attitudes directed toward features of one's cognitive agency which serve an ego-defensive function (and, possibly, other functions as well). Haughtiness (*superbia*) is the interpersonal version of arrogance consisting of attitudes toward aspects of one's cognitive make-up, serving the same ego-defensive function, which are informed by evaluative beliefs consisting in judgements comparing one's abilities to those possessed by selected others.

Arrogant behaviour is both widespread and heterogeneous. We think of the bankers who lost other people's savings as arrogant, and we would think that a person, who thinks of himself as invulnerable, and thus takes excessive risks with his and others' lives as being equally arrogant as well as irresponsible. Intellectual

arrogance often takes the form of a sort of hyper-autonomy. It is characterised by a sense that one has no intellectual debts to anybody else so that one's achievements are wholly creditable to oneself. It is also manifested in an excessive form of epistemic self-reliance understood as an unwillingness to take any other epistemic agent to be trustworthy. The wholly arrogant individual gives no evidential weight to the beliefs held by others, whilst putting a lot of trust in his own views.³⁴

Arrogance can also be manifested in conversation by those who think they have all the answers, who are 'full of themselves', who boast about their abilities, who respond angrily to proper criticism, who are condescending and often use 'put-downs', who speak over other people without respecting their conversational turn. In addition, there are arrogant bodily postures or habits which include so called 'manspreading' in shared public spaces. Some of these behaviours exemplify arrogance proper, understood as epistemic hyper-autonomy, whilst others exhibit the sense of superiority and disdain for others which is characteristic of a vice that I label 'haughtiness' although the term may not be fully adequate to the concept I wish to describe.³⁵ What I have in mind is what Dante refers to as *superbia* in his *Comedy* where he describes this trait as a desire to see others' worth diminished so that one can excel.^{36,37}

The person who wishes to do others down so that he can feel superior is trying to claim for himself some kind of epistemic achievement or entitlement while attempting to deny it to others. For example, such a person may talk up their contribution to a collective success and he may also intimate that the contributions made by others are not as significant as one may have previously thought. He may even dismiss the views put forward by others. For this reason,

³⁴ Tiberius and Walker note that arrogance is an obstacle to acquiring information from other people. See, Valerie Tiberius and John D. C. Walker, "Arrogance," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 35, 4 (1998): 382. On the idea of excessive epistemic self-reliance see Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, *Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), especially ch. 3.

³⁵ See also, Alessandra Tanesini, "I - 'Calm Down, Dear': Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing and Ignorance," *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 90, 1 (2016): 71-92.

³⁶ Purg., XVII vv 91-100 and 115-17. Dante Alighieri, *La Commedia Secondo L'antica Vulgata*, ed. by Giorgio Petrocchi. 2a ristampa riv. ed. (Firenze: Casa editrice Le lettere, 1994).

³⁷ '*Superbia*' is generally translated into English as 'pride'. However, this translation is in my view misleading since pride as is commonly understood in the contemporary English speaking world is closer to what the medieval thought of as self-love. Self-love finds expression in the desire to excel and to improve. It is not generally thought to be vicious. *Superbia* is a distortion of self-love which is in part characterised by behaviours aimed at thwarting other people's aspirations to excel.

haughtiness is best thought as a vice opposed to proper pride. The latter concerns claiming authority and entitlements that are commensurate to one's intellectual successes and achievements; whilst the former is an attempt to secure some kind of special status for oneself.

I have argued above that modesty is neither a matter of being ignorant of one's good features nor of underestimating their extent. In a similar vein, overestimating one's qualities is neither necessary nor sufficient for arrogance or haughtiness. It is not sufficient because a person may overestimate the import of her good features due to an honest mistake. It is also not necessary because it is in principle possible for a person, who is in fact very talented, to have the measure of his talents but be arrogant about them.

Earlier I also showed that modesty is compatible with proper pride in one's achievements. It follows that being happy about one's good features is not necessarily a manifestation of arrogance. Consider a scientist who, after years of toil, makes a significant discovery and responds to the hard-won result with delight and even a sense of pride. This scientist may be either modest or haughty and arrogant. She is modest if she feels relief that the discovery has now been made; and her delight is directed toward the significance of the result. However, she is haughty or arrogant if she feels relief that it was her who made the discovery (rather than say another scientist); and her delight is directed toward the fact that this great achievement is hers.³⁸ In short, the modest scientist cares that a significant discovery was made; what matters most to the arrogant one is that it was made by her.³⁹ So individuals who are arrogant or haughty value their good qualities, not primarily because of their worth, but because of how they reflect on their self-esteem. It is for this reason that arrogance, but also haughtiness, is associated with an inflated sense of self-worth.

What these examples show is that neither arrogance nor haughtiness are best explained by the presence of some beliefs about one's intellectual abilities. They are also not to be characterised in terms of the emotional state of being delighted about these. Both belief and emotion are compatible with modesty and thus cannot be sufficient for arrogance. The difference between arrogance,

³⁸ The arrogant person need not be aware that she possesses this psychological structure. See Tanesini, "Calm Down, Dear."

³⁹ Hence, arrogance is often accompanied by stinginess or lack of intellectual generosity. The arrogant frequently fails to give others the credit that they are due and, when haughty, may also seek to deprive others of important information so as to put obstacles in the way of their epistemic achievements. See Robert Campbell Roberts and W. Jay Wood, *Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 293-298. Thanks to J. Adam Carter for highlighting this connection.

haughtiness and modesty lies with the needs satisfied by the positive stance one takes toward some aspects of one's cognitive agency or make-up.

Arrogance as haughtiness is also often accompanied by a sense of one's own intellectual superiority. The person who cares for her achievements because of how they reflect on the self is also likely to think of herself as intellectually superior to others and consequently deserving of special treatment. Nevertheless, thinking this way is not sufficient for arrogance, nor- arguably- is it necessary. It is not sufficient because it is perfectly possible for someone who is actually intellectually superior to those around him to be aware of this fact without being immodest. For instance, a brilliant doctor who is also accomplished in other areas may rightly believe that her knowledge, skills and abilities are better than those around her. This belief will influence her actions but need not lead to treating others in disrespectful ways or to dismiss their contributions.⁴⁰ Equally it seems possible to be innocently mistaken about one's own intellectual superiority without thereby being immodest. A person, who believes that she is superior to her colleagues because she justifiably thinks that she has made a momentous discovery, is not rendered arrogant if it turns out with hindsight that she had overestimated the lasting significance of her work. So a belief in one's intellectual superiority even when that belief is actually false is not sufficient for arrogance.

This claim may sound odd, but its oddity can be attributed to a shared background belief common in liberal societies that no individual is actually superior to all others in all intellectual respects. Consequently, it would seem plausible to infer that if one thinks of himself as superior in this way, this sense of superiority must be motivated by arrogance or haughtiness rather than by taking stock of one's abilities and track record. Thus, for instance, it seems perfectly possible that without arrogance a person may judge herself as the most suited for carrying out a difficult task compared to other members of the team. What seems implausible is that somebody would think in this way about every task without being arrogant.

The belief that one is intellectually superior to everybody else is also plausibly not necessary for haughtiness or arrogance. It is possible for an individual to sustain a supreme confidence in his own abilities and to take such delight in them because of how they inflate his own sense of self-esteem by being selective in one's comparative assessments of one's intellectual successes. This individual can display haughtiness without consciously thinking of himself as superior to all others. As a matter of fact, such person may positively avoid

⁴⁰ Roberts and Wood *Intellectual Virtues* make the same point at p. 243 using the historical example of Alfred Schweitzer.

considering ways in which he may be dissimilar from very accomplished individuals in the fear that he may as a result be diminished in his own eyes. Instead, he may, without being fully aware of the fact, choose to consider only the ways in which he differs from individuals who are clearly less accomplished than he is in the domain under evaluation. In this manner, a haughty individual may sustain a sense of intellectual superiority without fully believing that one is intellectually superior to everyone else. Alternatively, the person who has acquired arrogance proper, which I have described as a kind of hyper-autonomy, may not have any beliefs about other people's comparative talents and abilities. Since he values being completely epistemically independent from all others, he has not need to assess their relative abilities in order to understand whom he could depend on.

Roberts and Wood have identified arrogance with an illicit claim to entitlements based on one's alleged intellectual superiority.⁴¹ I have just argued that thinking of oneself as intellectually superior to others, even when that belief is false, is neither sufficient nor necessary for haughtiness or arrogance. Nevertheless, Roberts and Wood are onto something here. What they are pointing to is not a feature of arrogance *per se*, but a characteristic of haughtiness which is arrogance in interpersonal relations. Haughtiness does not require belief in one's intellectual superiority but it requires that one feels and acts in superior ways, which is to say, it requires that one arrogates special epistemic entitlements for oneself.

Arrogance and haughtiness tend to go hand in hand. However, individuals may be arrogant without being haughty when they are not concerned with establishing their intellectual superiority over others. It is instead difficult to think that a haughty individual may be totally free of the hyper-autonomy which is characteristic of arrogance. It may therefore be tempting to think of haughtiness as arrogance when combined with feelings of superiority and superior behaviour. This conclusion, I believe, is mistaken. Arrogance without haughtiness can be a worse vice than ordinary haughty arrogance.⁴² The person who exhibits it manifests such excessive confidence in his own abilities that he no longer feels the need to compare himself with others. We may perhaps think of this behaviour as hubristic. In sum the haughty individual still needs to compare himself positively with some others to sustain his arrogant self-conception, the person who is purely arrogant no longer feels this need because he somehow thinks of himself as

⁴¹ See Roberts and Wood, *Intellectual Virtues*, 243.

⁴² For an argument that arrogance is a worse obstacle to proper engagement in the epistemic practice of asserting, see Tanesini "Calm Down, Dear."

radically different from other ordinary agents. This attitude is exemplified in literature and myths by the figures of Faust and of Icarus. Both embody the idea of an individual who behaves as if he has transcended ordinary human abilities, and acquired those of a different kind of being. Thus, Faust is meant to have unlimited knowledge, whilst Icarus flies. The truly arrogant individual does not behave as if he were better than other people; he behaves as if he were unique, as if he were the only agent who is unquestionably and always intellectually trustworthy.

Thinking of these vices as clusters of strong attitudes directed toward components of one's cognitive agency or make-up helps to understand their nature and the relations between them and the virtues they oppose. I have described arrogance and haughtiness as a positive stance toward one's own intellectual abilities which is compatible with possessing an accurate assessment of them. What separates the arrogant from the modest is that the former but not the latter adopts this stance because having it contributes to securing high self-esteem.

This description can be captured using the framework of attitudes. I have argued that the person who is modest has strong positive attitudes toward some aspects of her cognitive make-up, which she therefore treats as her epistemic strengths or successes, and that these attitudes are formed to serve a knowledge function. However, a person may have a similarly positive evaluation of his abilities which is formed to serve a different function.

Imagine someone who has a positive attitude directed at his mathematical skills. The attitude is the result of past experiences that have led one to associate using one's mathematical skills to feeling good about oneself. As a result, one has acquired a positive evaluation of one's mathematical skills. Since these are skills to solve problems and acquire knowledge and understanding, to treat them as one of one's good features, as this person does, is to take oneself to be skilled at mathematics. In other words, this individual treats his mathematical skills as one of his intellectual strengths or good features. However, this evaluation serves a ego-defensive function. This person likes his mathematical skills not because he is good at mathematics, but because these skills make him feel good about himself.

This person may or may not actually be good at math, what is crucial for the acquisition of the attitude, is that past employment of the skill have resulted in situations that have enhanced one's self-concept so that one has learnt to use math to protect one's own self-esteem against threats that may diminish it.⁴³ A person

⁴³ The threats in question need not be threats to one's self-assessment of one's mathematical abilities in particular. They can be threats to any other aspect of one's self-estimation. Feeling good about one's ability to do math or any other positive attitude toward an aspect of the self can be used to neutralise the threat. See Ian McGregor, Paul R. Nail, Denise C. Marigold, and

with average ability may have a history of positive experiences with mathematics if others expect him to be good at the subject. These expectations mean that his failures will often be explained away. Teachers may say that the problem was too hard for kids of his age, or that he was having a bad day. It may also mean that he will receive praise and credit when he succeeds. Consequently, even a person who is not particularly good at it may nevertheless initially form a positive attitude about his mathematical ability serving a knowledge function.

As this individual grows up, however, he would also find himself in situations that offer him with opportunities to calibrate his attitude to his actual ability. If this person's attitude serves the need to feel good about oneself, the individual in question may seek to avoid situations that put his abilities in question by, for instance, ignoring questions, and commanding or cajoling someone else to carry out a given task. But if these situations cannot be avoided, he will seek to discount them. He may blame other people's poor efforts; he may choose to carry out some other allegedly more challenging task. He may simply forget various failures while choosing to remember and 'big up' any success. In short this individual will maintain his attitude in the light of evidence of its inappropriateness, because the function served by the attitude is not that of facilitating the acquisition of knowledge or understanding. Instead, the attitude satisfies the need to preserve one's self-esteem. Provided that opportunities to engage with mathematics continue for the large part to help one to feel good about oneself, the positive attitude is maintained. Further, because the individual in question feels good about his mathematical abilities, he is in effect treating these as among his intellectual successes or strengths since it would not be rationally consistent to feel good about them unless one were good at mathematics.

Although this attitude serves an ego-defensive function, the individual who has it is very unlikely to be fully aware of the true causes of his attitude formation. Plausibly, he does not know about this aspect of his psychology, because such knowledge would undermine the attitude. One's positive attitude toward one's own mathematical abilities bolsters one's confidence. But confidence can only be sustained if one is not aware that it is caused by the fact that confidence makes one feel good about oneself so that one has an incentive to maintain it. If one were

So-Jin Kang, "Defensive Pride and Consensus: Strength in Imaginary Numbers," *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology* 89, 6 (2005): 978-996.

aware that one's confidence in one's mathematical prowess is unrelated to one's actual abilities, one would be forced to abandon one's positive attitude.⁴⁴

The arrogant person exemplifies what social psychologists have characterised as a defensive high self-esteem. Such individuals have high self-esteem as this is measured explicitly by means of self-reports, but appear to be low in self-esteem according to implicit measures such as those delivered by evaluative priming tests. There is now empirical evidence that these people tend to have strong attitudes, that their attitudes tend to serve ego-defensive functions⁴⁵ and that they exhibit arrogant behaviour.⁴⁶

Social comparison is one of the routes to arrogance. It is well-established that human beings often compare their abilities to those possessed by others. These social comparisons result in evaluative beliefs in which one represents oneself as similar to, or different from, some other person used as a kind of standard in the social comparison judgment.⁴⁷ One of the motives for engaging in this process is self-enhancement. Those who possess this motive compare themselves to others who are reputed to possess an epistemic strength to test the hypothesis that they are similar to these models, and to others who are not thought as particularly strong in some ability to test the hypothesis that they are dissimilar from them. Given the known cognitive bias in favour of evidence which confirms the hypothesis under consideration, rather than evidence that disconfirms it, these individual will retrieve information about themselves that makes them similar to capable individuals and dissimilar to those who are less able. As a result, these individuals succeed in thinking more highly of themselves, and in facilitating the future retrieval of favourable information about the self. In short the person who engages in social comparison due to a motivation of self-enhancement thinks that he is different from others whom he judges to be inferior, but similar to those who are thought to be extremely talented.

I have argued above that the arrogant individual is the person who forms strong positive attitudes towards one's own cognitive agency as a whole and a

⁴⁴ The belief that one's confidence is unwarranted would become part of the information base of the attitude and lead to change toward a more negative attitude and thus undermine self-confidence.

⁴⁵ See Geoffrey Haddock and Jochen E. Gebauer, "Defensive Self-Esteem Impacts Attention, Attitude Strength, and Self-Affirmation Processes," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 47, 6 (2011): 1276-1284.

⁴⁶ See McGregor et al. "Defensive Pride."

⁴⁷ For an overview see Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler, "Social Comparison: Motives, Standards, and Mechanisms," In *Theories in Social Psychology*, ed. Derek Chadee (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 119-139.

great many of its components. These positive evaluations though serve an ego-defensive function so that the person has developed a preference for those aspects of one's cognitive make-up that make him feel good about himself and treats those as his intellectual strengths. We are now in a position to see that these attitudes are not formed exclusively through a process of classic conditioning (where one associates two stimuli because they tend to occur together) but they are also derived from the attitudes informational contents which include comparative judgments about one's intellectual abilities as well as information about the same. These judgements, if they are the outcome of social comparisons motivated by the desire for self-enhancement, are biased. But they inform the formation and preservation of positive attitudes serving an ego-defensive function.

I take it, therefore, that an important difference between haughtiness and arrogance proper lies in the attitude content or informational basis. The haughty individual is the person in whom evaluative comparative beliefs motivated by self-enhancement are explanatorily important to explicate the processes of attitude formation and preservation and to understand the behaviour caused by the attitudes. The person who is arrogant without being haughty is person for whom social comparison does not play a significant role.

5. Self-Abasement and Servility

I have argued that arrogance is a vice that opposes modesty by involving a positive evaluation (an approval) of one's own intellectual character or make-up and of its components which does not serve the need to find out their actual epistemic worth, but to boost one's own sense of self-worth. Correspondingly, self-abasement is a vice that flanks modesty in the opposite direction. It comprises an overall negative evaluation (dislike) of one's own cognitive agency or make-up (and some of its components) whose function is not to assess its epistemic qualities, but which instead serves the need to fit in with other people. Hence, self-abasement is a vice possessed by individuals who are thought by other members of the community to lack intellectual strengths or abilities, and who adopt that low evaluation for themselves because of the need for social acceptance.

The self-abasing person is someone who does herself down and who belittles her own abilities and achievements. She may be aware of her successes, but she is likely not to think of them as achievements (it was just luck) or as her own (by giving all the credit to others or underplaying their originality or significance). The self-abasing person, like the arrogant, evaluates her own successes primarily because of what they show about her cognitive make-up. But, whilst the haughty individual's concern for her successes is explained by their

contribution to her sense of self-worth, the evaluation of the self-abasing results from a focus on what others will make of her.⁴⁸ In addition, the self-abasing individual may feel shame because of the poverty of her achievements, and engage in self-humiliating behaviour by belittling herself and deprecating her own stupidity. W.E.B. Du Bois refers to behaviour of this sort when he discusses the educational policies for black colleges promoted by Booker T. Washington. He notes that self-abasement and obsequiousness are always a risk for those whom, in Du Bois' words, develop a "sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others."⁴⁹

Du Bois' observation points to two further features of self-abasement: it typically affects members of stigmatised or otherwise subordinated groups; and it is linked to intellectual servility. This is no surprise since it is individuals who belong to these groups who tend to be widely held in low esteem in society so that even absolute strangers will be prone to harbour prejudices about their abilities. It is also no surprise that a person who belittles her own abilities is likely to be intellectually servile and constantly to defer to the opinions of others whom she judges to be her intellectual superiors.

Once again the framework of attitudes sheds light on these two vices, on their mutual relations and their opposition to modesty. Self-abasement is a cluster of strong attitudes directed toward one's cognitive agency and its components which are mostly negative and that serve a social-adjustive function. Hence, whilst the arrogant comes to associate several aspects of his cognitive make-up with positivity because of how they have served him in his defence of the ego against threats, the self-abasing associates his cognitive make-up and many of its components with a negative valence because they have hindered him in his attempts to be part of the in-group. His true abilities and skills have not assisted him in the past because other members of the group are willing to accept him only in so far as he conforms to their expectations about his low status. In addition, those features of his cognitive agency that have served him well are those that have helped him to secure membership in society. Thus, he will have formed positive attitudes, and see as his intellectual strengths, traits of his intellectual character that ingratiate him to individuals who are members of the in-group, confirm his low status and promote self-humiliating behaviour. Hence, this person

⁴⁸ A person may be haughty and also concerned with being held in high esteem by other people. When this happens the individual in question is intellectually vain as well as being haughty. A full discussion of the relation between these vices is beyond the scope of this paper.

⁴⁹ See W. E. B. Du Bois, *The Souls of Black Folk* (New York: Vintage Books/Library of America, 1990). The quotation is from p. 7.

behaves as if he has no intellectual strengths and prefers those aspects of his cognitive make up that in fact support the overall negative assessment of his intellectual abilities. He may, for example, treat his ability to defer to the views of others as one of his cognitive strengths.

Intellectual servility or obsequiousness is the interpersonal version of self-abasement. The obsequious is the person who has lost all pride in his own abilities and does not demand to be granted the epistemic credit which is due to him. The individual who is servile is quick to accept the views of others, to take them to be his superiors, and to allow others to take credit for what are in fact his contributions. Individuals who are servile are also prone to self-abasement since both are coping strategies with humiliation. The person who is told time and again that he is stupid and no good may deal with the pain inflicted by this sort of treatment by thinking that it is warranted and adopt it in his attitudes toward his own abilities. The same person may also cope by learning to parrot the views of those who insult him in the hope of being accepted, at the same time he may in words and deeds demonstrate that he takes them to be his intellectual superiors. The relation of servility to self-abasement is analogous to that of haughtiness to arrogance. Thus, although servile people tend to self-abase, self-abasement can be the worse vice when one thinks that one is so low that one is not even able of slavish imitation. Hence, the person who is servile may retain a certain amount of self-respect by thinking that there are others lower than him. He may exhibit this belief by displaying vanity in his parroting.

Also like in the case of haughtiness, judgements of social comparison play a central causal role in the formation of attitudes of the obsequious because they are included in their contents or informational bases. The individual who is servile compares himself negatively to others whom he considers as being superior. In particular, he compares himself to others who are reputed to possess an epistemic strength to test the hypothesis that he is dissimilar to these models, and to others who are not thought as particularly strong in some ability to test the hypothesis that he is similar to them. These comparisons are demoralising and lead to the formation of negative attitudes about one's intellectual capacities. These attitudes serve a social-adjustive function if they assist the person's ability to fit within the social group that attributes a low status to one.

6. Changing Attitudes

Recommendations for virtue education in the philosophical literature generally focus on four methodologies which have been characterised by Porter as the

standard approach.⁵⁰ These are: (1) direct and formal instruction about the virtues; (2) exposure to exemplars leading to emulation of positive models; (3) practice of virtuous behaviours and (4) enculturation into virtue. The arguments developed in this paper for the identification of virtue and vices with attitudes suggest that at least some of these methodologies are likely not to be very effective when students have already formed non-virtuous attitudes. For reasons of space I shall consider only the first two methodologies here. Intuitively speaking, the shortcomings of these strategies are fairly obvious. Formal instruction may work only if those who are so instructed are willing to listen. Yet those students who are the furthest away from intellectual virtue are precisely those who are less likely to pay attention. Exposure to exemplars might work only if it stimulates emulation. It is counterproductive if it leads to demoralisation or if it fans an already inflated conception of the self. Sadly, those students who have developed non virtuous habits are most likely to react to models in precisely these ways.

The effectiveness of a message on an audience does not exclusively depend on the strength of the arguments contained therein but also on the receptiveness of the audience. This much I think would be universally acknowledged. The extensive empirical literature on attitude change shows that the functions played by attitudes make a substantial difference to the effectiveness of messages encouraging one to change one's mind. The most prominent accounts of attitude change are the elaboration likelihood model (ELM)⁵¹ and the heuristic systematic model (HSM).⁵² Both predict that unless an audience has the opportunity and the motivation to process the content of the message, it will rely on cues and other proxies to determine whether to be persuaded by it. In addition, ELM predicts that messages are subject to scrutiny for their argumentative content only if they are tailored to the function served in the audience by the attitude that they are designed to change. In other words, direct and well-argued instruction will be scrutinised only by those students whose attitudes already serve a knowledge function, whilst its persuasive power on other students is more likely to be determined by other considerations which function as cues such as the length of

⁵⁰ Steven L. Porter, "A Therapeutic Approach to Intellectual Virtue Formation in the Classroom," In *Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology*, ed. Jason S. Baehr (New York and London: Routledge, 2016), 221-239.

⁵¹ Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo, "The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion," In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, ed. Leonard Berkowitz (Orlando: Academic Press, 1986), 123-205.

⁵² Shelly Chaiken, Akiva Liberman, and Eagly Alice H, "Heuristic and Systematic Processing within and Beyond the Persuasion Context," In *Unintended Thought*, eds. James S. Uleman and John A. Bargh (New York: Guilford Press, 1989), 212-252.

the message or the attractiveness of its source. Despite its differences from ELM, HSM too predicts that a message recipient's motivations are one of the most important factors that determine how it is received. In particular, unless the audience is already motivated to form accurate attitudes, the motives of ego defence or of social impression management will bias their responses to the arguments offered. In short it seems that only those students who already possess reasonably strong attitudes serving knowledge functions are in a position to respond to persuasive messages arguing for the value of adopting virtue by paying attention to, and critically assess, the content of the message. Other students may be more influenced by cues surrounding the message; the message may persuade them to some extent so that the affective or cognitive base of some of their attitude may change. However, it is unlikely to affect the function played by them. Yet this is crucial if the account of vice offered in this paper is correct. Direct instruction only works with students who are already somewhat virtuous.

Exposure to exemplars suffers from a similar weakness since it inspires and encourages self-improvement only in those who already have fairly virtuous attitudes. There is a possibility that a student, who is exposed to a model and also told why the person in question is admirable, fails to accept the exemplar as an ideal. Instead, I assume here that the student honestly believes that the model is admirable and worthy of emulation. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the student is thereby motivated to emulate the exemplar. This point has already been noted by Zagzebski who observes that individuals might react with spiteful envy or with egoism, rather than with emulation, to the recognition that another person is admirable.⁵³ The discussion of social comparison in section four above has highlighted another possible reaction: demoralisation leading to self-abasement.

Those students who possess a defensive high self-esteem and thus are predisposed toward haughtiness and arrogance are disposed to compare themselves for dissimilarity to others whom they believe are their inferiors. In addition, if they are encouraged to compare themselves to a person presented as an ideal to emulate, they respond to the encouragement by testing the hypothesis that they already possess some of the admirable features embodied by the exemplar. As a result, instead of encouraging self-improvement, when the haughty and the arrogant are made to compare themselves with admirable individuals, they will as result become even more deluded about their own actual self-worth.

⁵³ See Linda Zagzebski, "I—Admiration and the Admirable," *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 89, 1 (2015): 205-221.

The promotion of admirable exemplars is equally damaging for students who suffer from self-abasing and obsequious tendencies. The encouragement to compare themselves to exemplars is likely to result in a strengthened belief that they do not possess the required qualities and that they never will. When a student thinks of himself as stupid or as not talented confrontation with those who exhibit intellectual qualities is bound to offer further evidence in favour of their own negative self-assessment.

These considerations should not lead to pessimism about the possibility of educating students for intellectual virtue. In addition to the possible efficacy of both practice and enculturation, the considerations offered above suggest that educators should target students' ego-defensive motives or social-adjustive tendencies to share socially prevalent low evaluations of members of a social group to which one belongs. There is increasing evidence that self-affirmation techniques have some success in building individual sense of self-esteem so as to reduce both defensiveness and low self-esteem.⁵⁴ These strategies include emphasis on the fact that "intelligence is expandable" rather than fixed and the assignment of repeated self-reflective exercises where students are asked to explain what they value most and why.⁵⁵ These exercises allow the students to think about those good things that define them. In this manner, they affirm their self-worth so that it is less in need of protection against threats. This technique thus would reduce the defensiveness of the arrogant and enhance the explicit self-esteem of the self-abased.⁵⁶

By reducing the ego-defensive motive and by encouraging students to reject negative self-assessments based on societal expectations, self-affirmation changes the needs that guide students' formations of attitudes. If this is right, it is a prerequisite for removing obstacles to the cultivation of the need for knowledge. Once students' attitudes are guided by this need, it is more likely that both education and exposure to exemplars become effective in bringing about attitude

⁵⁴ See Haddock and Gebauer, "Defensive Self-Esteem" for evidence that self-affirmation techniques are effective to reduce defensiveness in individuals who have high explicit self-esteem but low implicit self-esteem and therefore tend to be very ego defensive. The efficacy of self-affirmation to boost performance in stereotype threat conditions can be seen as evidence for the effectiveness of this technique with people with low explicit and implicit self-esteem, see Claude Steele, *Whistling Vivaldi and Other Clues to How Stereotypes Affect Us* (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 2010), especially pp. 172-179.

⁵⁵ See Steele, *Whistling Vivaldi* especially ch. 9 for a presentation of the techniques and of their success in educational contexts.

⁵⁶ What I propose here is not dissimilar in spirit from Porter's intellectual therapy, although the techniques endorsed are not the same. See Porter, "A Therapeutic Approach."

change and in strengthening these attitudes so that they acquire the stability of virtue.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ I have presented some of the ideas included in this paper at an International Conference on Intellectual Humility held in Oxford in April 2015, at the Eidynd Workshop on Humility and Education (Edinburgh) in May 2015, at an international conference on the epistemic vices held in Durham in September 2015. My sincere thanks go to the organisers, co-presenters and audiences at all these events for their constructive comments and encouragement. Special thanks to J. Adam Carter for useful comments on the penultimate draft of this paper.