We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2012
There is much hand-wringing in the arms control trenches these days over the role and future of arms control in U.S. policy. Liberal supporters of arms control lament what they see as a decade of missed opportunities to pursue deep cuts in the world's nuclear arsenals and to strengthen the regimes for controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Those on the right, perceiving grave weaknesses in Cold War–era arms control regimes, prefers to move ahead with “assertive isolationism,” happily unencumbered with the comprehensive test ban or soon, they hope, the Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. After a promising start in arms control at the beginning of the 1990s, both sides see U.S. arms control policy drifting in purpose and slackening in momentum, with arms control officials spread thin over a proliferating agenda.
1 Roberts, Brad, “The Road Ahead for Arms Control,” Washington Quarterly 23 (Spring 2000), pp. 219–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 For a review of some of these ideas, see Fisher, Cathleen, Reformation and Resistance: Nongovernmental Organizations and the Future of Nuclear Weapons, Report No. 29 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, May 1999Google Scholar).
3 Philipp, C. Bleek, “U.S. and Soviet/Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Arms Control Today 30 (December 2000)Google Scholar.
4 Cirincione, Joseph, “Republicans Do It Better,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56 (2000), pp. 17–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 Jonathan Dean and Laurenti, Jeffrey, Options and Opportunities: Arms Control and Disarmament for the 21st Century (New York: United Nations Association, 1997), p. 6Google Scholar.
6 Holum, John D., director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Arms Control: A Central Element of U.S. Foreign Policy,” USIA Electronic Journal 2, No. 3 (August 1997)Google Scholar.
7 Dean, and Laurenti, , Options and Opportunities, pp. 3–9, 74Google Scholar.
8 Ibid., p. 6Google Scholar.
9 Franck, Thomas M., The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990Google Scholar).
10 Public Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons: An Opportunity for Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998), p. 26Google Scholar.
11 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense, “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations,” Joint Pub 3–12 (April 29, 1993). This was reaffirmed in Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDD 60) by President Clinton in November 1997 (“Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Guidance”). For further discussion, see Kristensen, Hans, “Targets of Opportunity: How Nuclear Planners Found New Targets for Old Weapons,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53 (1997), pp. 22–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 Nolan, Janne E., “Preparing for the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,” Arms Control Today (November 2000Google Scholar).
13 Theresa, Hitchens, “Nuclear Weapons: Expensive Relics of ‘Dead Conflicts.’ Key Issues for the Nuclear Posture Review,” Issue Brief 5, No. 2, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers (January 19, 2001)Google Scholar.
14 Betts, Richard, in Steinbruner, John D. and Sigal, Leon V., eds., Alliance Security: NATO and the No First-Use Question (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 35Google Scholar.
15 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our, Response. A Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, May 3, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholit Conference, 1983Google Scholar); Yost, David S., “The Delegitimation of Nuclear Deterrence?” Armed Forces and Society 16 (Summer 1990CrossRefGoogle Scholar).
16 Trachtenberg, Marc, “A ‘Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954,” International Security 13 (Winter 1988/89)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
17 Roberts, “The Road Ahead for Arms Control.”Google Scholar
18 Lee Butler, George, “Abolition of Nuclear Weapons” (speech presented at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., December 4, 1996)Google Scholar; available at http://www.wagingpeace.org/butlerspeech.html.
19 Schell, Jonathan, “The Folly of Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs 79 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
20 See Perkovich, George, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999Google Scholar).
21 Steinbruner, John, “Renovating Arms Control Through Reassurance,” Washington Quarterly 23 (Spring 2000), pp. 197–206CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
22 Butler, , “Abolition of Nuclear Weapons.”Google Scholar
23 “Chernov, Oleg: Globalization Makes Russia Even More Sensitive to New Missile Challenges,” PIR Arms Control Letters, Center for Policy Studies in Russia (November 27, 2000Google Scholar).
24 Graham, Thomas, “Strengthening Arms Control,” Washington Quarterly 23 (Spring 2000), pp. 183–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
25 Price, Richard, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” International Organization 52, No. 3 (Summer 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 The Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons is available at http://www.psr.org/canberra.htmGoogle Scholar.
27 For more extensive discussion, see Fisher, NGOs and the Future of Nuclear WeaponsGoogle Scholar.
28 Ware, Alyn, “The World Court and Nuclear Weapons: Who Is Listening?” UN Chronicle 36, No. 4 (1999), pp. 49–50Google Scholar.
29 Graham, “Strengthening Arms Control.”Google Scholar
30 “Germany Raises No-First-Use Issue at NATO Meeting,” Arms Control Today (1998), p. 24Google Scholar.
31 Graham, , “Strengthening Arms Control.”Google Scholar
32 Wittner, Lawrence S., Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 182Google Scholar.
33 Knopf, Jeffrey, Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on U.S. Arms Control Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998Google Scholar).
34 “Firestorm of Protest Radiates from Pacific,”Christian Science Monitor, August 11, 1995; “Pacific Critics Use a Megaphone against Chirac: Amplified Denunciations May Finally Get France to Stop Its Nuclear Testing,”Christian Science Monitor, November 7, 1995Google Scholar.
35 For an extended discussion of U.S. government secrecy regarding nuclear weapons, and its costs, see Schwartz, Stephen I., ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998Google Scholar).
36 See, in this volume, Hartung, William, “The New Business of War,” Ethics & International Affairs 15, No. 1 (March 2001), pp. 79–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
37 Van Crevald, Martin, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1991Google Scholar).
38 Keck, Margaret and Sikkink, Kathryn, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998Google Scholar).
39 Telegram from the Department of State to the U.S. Embassy in Korea, October 31, 1966, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS] 1964–68, Vol. 11, pp. 399–400.Google Scholar
40 Memorandum from the Director of ACDA (Foster) to the Committee of Principals, “Arms Control on the Seabed,” April 12, 1968, FRUS 1964–68, Vol. 11, p. 579Google Scholar.
41 Brown, Harold, “Is Arms Control Dead?” Washington Quarterly 23 (Spring 2000), pp. 173–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
42 Charles, L. Glaser, “The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament,” Survival 40 (Spring 1998), pp. 112–28Google Scholar.
