Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Expectancy and rational action prior to personal fission

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Some analyses of personal fission suggest that an informed subject should expect to have a distinct experience of each outcome simultaneously. Is rational provision for the future possible in such unfamiliar circumstances? I argue that, with some qualification, the subject can reasonably act as if faced with alternative possible outcomes with precise probabilities rather than multiple actual outcomes.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This idea is taken from Vaidman (1998) who employs it in the context of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics.

  2. This idea comes from Price (2010).

  3. My thanks to Lloyd Humberstone and particularly to an anonymous referee for very useful comments on previous drafts.

References

  • Gallois, A. (1998). Occasions of identity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Humberstone, I. L. (1980). You’ll regret it. Analysis, 40, 175–176.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1968). Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic. Journal of Philosophy, 67, 427–446.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merricks, T. (1997). Fission and personal identity over time. Philosophical Studies, 88, 163–186.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J. (1972). Can the self divide? Journal of Philosophy, 69, 463–488.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Price, H. (2010). Decisions, decisions, decisions: Can savage salvage Everettian probability? In S. Saunders, J. Barrett, D. Kent, & D. Wallace (Eds.), Many worlds: the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available online at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003886.

  • Sider, T. (1996). All the world’s a stage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 433–453.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sider, T. (2001). Four dimensionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Vaidman, L. (1998). On schizophrenic experiences of the neutron or why we should believe in the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science,12, 245–266. Available online at: http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/9609006.

  • Wallace, D. (2008). The quantum measurement problem: State of play. In D. Rickles (Ed.), The Ashgate companion to contemporary philosophy of physics. London: Ashgate. Available online at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003420.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Independent Researcher, 32 rue Sainte Euphémie, 26400, Crest, France

    Paul Tappenden

Authors
  1. Paul Tappenden
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Paul Tappenden.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Tappenden, P. Expectancy and rational action prior to personal fission. Philos Stud 153, 299–306 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9494-3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9494-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation