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GILSON, KRAPIEC AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY

The title of my article contains two big names: the one of Étienne Gilson (1884–1978),¹ a man whose enduring legacy and international fame make any attempt of introducing him simply redundant, and the other of Mieczyslaw Albert Krapiec, O.P. (1921–2008),² a long-time professor and president of the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland, and a tireless promoter of metaphysical philosophy, not only in the past years of the Soviet totalitarian regime when his University was the only enclave of free schol-

¹ For more information about Gilson, see Lawrence K. Shook, *Étienne Gilson* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984). To know why it is worth to refer to Gilson today, see Peter A. Redpath, “Why Gilson? Why Now?,” April 18, 2008, Warsaw, Poland (www.adler-aquinasinstitute.org/etienne-gilson-society/why-gilson-why-now/, accessed on Oct 15, 2015), and Peter A. Redpath, “The Importance of Gilson,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 1 (2012): 45–52.

² The original Polish spelling: Mieczysław Albert Krapiec (pronounced: myechisuaf albert krompyetz). For more information about Krapiec, see the Polish Thomas Aquinas Society’s website: www.ptta.pl/krapiec/index.php?id=glowna&lang=en, accessed on Oct 16, 2015. The actual influence of Krapiec can be confirmed by numerous publications referring to his thought, e.g., Gabriela Besler, “The Connection between M. A. Krapiec’s Existential Thomism and P. F. Strawson’s Analytic Philosophy,” *Congresso Tomista Internazionale: L’Umanesimo Cristiano nel III Millennio: Prospettiva di Tommaso d’Aquino* (Roma, 21–25 settembre 2003) (www.e-aquinas.net/pdf/besler.pdf, accessed on Oct 16, 2015); Natalia Kunat, “The Good as the Motive of Human Action According to Mieczyslaw Albert Krapiec,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 3 (2014): 155–166; Tomasz Duma, “To Know or to Think? The Controversy over the Understanding of Philosophical Knowledge in the Light of the Studies of Mieczyslaw A. Krapiec,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 3 (2014): 277–299; or Arkadiusz Gudaniec, “The Foundations of Mieczyslaw Albert Krapiec’s Metaphysical Personalism,” *Forum Philosophicum* 19:1 (2014): 61–96.

arly thought between Berlin and Seoul, but also recently at the dawn of the new millennium of Christianity.³

Although both these renowned scholars fully deserve their work to be studied and passed down to the next generations, the aim of my consideration here is not of a historical nature. I am not going to compare the Christian philosophy of Gilson with that of Krapiec to seek for similarities or differences between them. No, my aim is different. What I am going to do is to use their insights to resolve a problem of mine and of all those who profess to be both Christians and philosophers, and which can be expressed in the following question: is Christian philosophy possible today, now, at the present? We well know that Gilson promoted—accompanied by Krapiec and many other scholars—the possibility of identifying Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages, but what about its possible practice currently, in our time? The question seems to be of great importance due to the fact that what we usually encounter is bitter criticism which comes to us, Christians who earnestly try to do philosophy, from two sides at once: that of academy and that of the Church. Concisely speaking, for academy our philosophy is too Christian, and for the Church our philosophy is too academic.

Why Is It Difficult to Do Christian Philosophy in Academy?

The reason seems to be obvious: it is so because many scholars regard Christian philosophy as being too much dependent on Christian faith (or theology) and thus undeserving to be officially recognized as an academic discipline. Let us have, however, a closer look at the case.

In fact, the existence of Christian philosophy in the walls of the institutions of higher education should not be surprising because it is closely correlated with other branches of philosophy whose presence in the world of human science seems to be an undeniable and unimpeachable fact. For even if they do not label their departments or chairs with such names as “Islamic (or Muslim) philosophy,” “Jewish philosophy” or “Buddhist philosophy,” many Western universities offer courses in such subjects to their students. Nevertheless, the very idea of a philosophy with some religious

³ Especially as an originator and founder of *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy* whose English version is about to be released. To see a selection of its entries, visit the Polish Thomas Aquinas Society’s website: <http://www.ptta.pl/pef/index.php?id=glowna&lang=en>, accessed on Oct 16, 2015.

epithet or branding still seems to many people philosophically unacceptable.⁴

I am sure that both Krapiec and Gilson would understand our problem perfectly. For Krapiec used to be a dean of a university department of “Christian philosophy,” and Gilson tried to introduce “Christian philosophy” as a term into philosophical vocabulary. And they both had to deal with criticisms undermining philosophy done under the Christian auspices.⁵

One of the most prominent opponents to Christian philosophy was Martin Heidegger. In his *An Introduction to Metaphysics*,⁶ Heidegger challenged Christian philosophy while discussing the nature of philosophical questioning which—according to him—was the cornerstone of true philosophy. Classifying the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” as the basic philosophical question, Heidegger asserted that

In a historical setting that does not recognize questioning as a fundamental human force, the question immediately loses its rank. Anyone for whom the Bible is divine revelation and truth has the answer to the question “Why are there essents rather than nothing?” even before it is asked: everything that is, except God himself, has been created by Him. God himself, the increated creator, “is.” One who holds to such faith can in a way participate in the asking of our question, but he cannot really question without ceasing to be a believer and taking all the consequences of such a step. He will only be able to act “as if.”⁷

The next step of Heidegger was to show that Christians’ belief in the Bible, which effectively hinders them from entering the realm of true philosophy, by no means can prevent non-believers from doing true philosophy. Why? Because the words of Genesis, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth,” can provide no answer to the most basic philosophical question. He claimed:

⁴ Winfried Löffler, “Two Kinds of ‘Christian Philosophy,’” *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 5:2 (2013): 111.

⁵ Even if Krapiec, unlike Gilson, did not promote doing philosophy under the flag of “Christian” philosophy, but he was an ardent defender of Christians’ right and disposition to do authentic philosophy in academy. See Mieczysław A. Krapiec, *Człowiek—Kultura—Uniwersytet* [Man—Culture—University] (Lublin 1998), 149–277.

⁶ Trans. Ralph Manheim (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2005).

⁷ *Id.*, 6–7.

they are in no way related to it. Indeed, they cannot even be brought into relation with our question. From the standpoint of the faith our question is “foolishness.” Philosophy is this very foolishness.⁸

Concluding his pointed remarks on the correlation of religion and philosophy, Heidegger stated:

A Christian philosophy is a round square and a misunderstanding. There is, to be sure, a thinking and questioning elaboration of the world of Christian experience, i.e. of faith. That is theology. Only epochs who no longer fully believe in the true greatness of the task of theology arrive at the disastrous notion that philosophy can help to provide a refurbished theology if not a substitute for theology, which will satisfy the needs and tastes of the time. For the original Christian faith philosophy is foolishness.⁹

According to Heidegger, then, while professing his Christian faith, all the believer can do is pretend to be a philosopher. For, even if his faith beliefs have nothing to say about philosophy, each time he tries to practice philosophy, the believer can only act “as if.” For Heidegger, acting “as if” does not suffice for entering into the way of philosophy. The believer can make a theologian, but a philosopher not at all. For true philosophy is true foolishness for the believer, and it must be so because it forces him to compromise about that which he precisely professes to be uncompromising. That is why Heidegger saw an irremediable opposition between philosophy and religion and denied any true benefit for philosophy from collaboration with religious faith.¹⁰

Of course, Heidegger was not alone in attempting to discourage those who professed to be Christian philosophers. It is enough to recall the

⁸ Id., 7.

⁹ Id. Cf. Thomas D’Andrea, “Rethinking the Christian Philosophy Debate: An Old Puzzle and Some New Points of Orientation,” *Acta Philosophica* 1:2 (1992): 200.

¹⁰ D’Andrea, “Rethinking the Christian Philosophy Debate,” 203. Heidegger’s position seems to be close to that held by the opponents of Jacques Maritain, see Matthew S. Pugh, “Maritain and the Problem of Christian Philosophy,” *Maritain and America* (2009), 97: “Philosophy and Christianity describe two formally distinct orders. Philosophy operates under the light of natural reason, while Christian belief operates under the supernatural light of revelation. The premises of the arguments which philosophy uses are taken from reason and observation, while the premises of the arguments which Christian belief uses are given to reason by revelation. For this reason any use of Christian premises in philosophical argumentation turns philosophy into theology.”

case of Gilson who had to face the criticism from the generation of his colleagues like Emil Bréhier, who already in 1931 claimed that the idea of a “Christian philosophy” was as absurd as that of a “Christian mathematics,”¹¹ as well as from the generation of his students like Fr. John Wippel, who—in his articles from the sixties and eighties of the last century—raised his objections against Gilson’s understanding of Christian philosophy.¹² The main part of Fr. Wippel’s reservations regarding Gilson’s view was his fear that accepting Gilson’s position without qualification would lead one to holding that: 1) all Christians wishing to do authentic Christian philosophy would have—in a very real sense—to become theologians, and 2) such Christians would have to become theologians prior to their doing any Christian philosophy.¹³

In short, for many scholars Christian philosophy is indeed too much dependent on religious faith or theology to deserve positive recognition as a distinct discipline. Let us see now how Christian philosophy is in the contemporary Church.

Why Is It Difficult to Do Christian Philosophy in the Church?

Again the reason seems to be obvious: it is because many Christians today regard philosophy as being far away from the Church and her mission. How is that possible?

Let us start with admitting that since the Second Vatican Council the Catholic Church has undergone a considerable change in regards to her attitude toward philosophy. In 1992, Desmond FitzGerald wrote: “There have been moments since Vatican II when some of us teachers with a Thomistic background have wondered if the Thomism of our youth could carry beyond our century.”¹⁴ Of course, it was not Thomism which sought to abandon Catholic theology; it was rather theology which first sought to break its ties with Thomism. While the encyclical letter *Aeterni Patris* issued in 1879 by the Pope Leo XIII promoted Thomism in the area of

¹¹ Löffler, “Two Kinds of ‘Christian Philosophy’,” 115.

¹² D’Andrea, “Rethinking the Christian Philosophy Debate,” 197.

¹³ Id.

¹⁴ Desmond J. FitzGerald, “Gilson, *Aeterni Patris*, and the Direction of Twenty-First Century Catholic Philosophy,” in *The Future of Thomism*, ed. Deal W. Hudson, Dennis W. Moran (Notre Dame, IN: American Maritain Association, 1992), 83.

Catholic theology,¹⁵ the “New Theology” movement, arisen in the mid-twentieth century and represented by—for example—Fr. Henri de Lubac, S.J., encouraged theologians to experiment with modern philosophies.

According to Fr. de Lubac, the Catholic Church failed to understand the problems of a modern man, nor did she understand the sources of modernism, as a result of which she lost her universal dimension, that is, her catholicity. De Lubac aimed to restore a truly universal dimension to Church doctrine by opening up to each person, to the experiences of all epochs, cultures, peoples and religions. That aim was to be realized not only by returning to the roots of Christianity, but also by opening up to modernity, that is, by getting to know the intellectual situation of the world and confronting the problems of man, establishing relations with the new philosophical currents and proclaiming the Christian message in a language that is understandable for modern man.¹⁶ That was the initial thought which resulted in calling the Second Vatican Council and forming the Church we know today.¹⁷

The leading idea of the Church today is “mission” which involves a deep encounter of the Gospel with contemporary cultures. What seems to be indispensable for this mission are, for sure, biblical studies and knowing how to evangelize. But it would be regarded by many Catholics as strange indeed if any parish priest invited his parishioners to a Sunday course in philosophy as a vital preparation for proclaiming Jesus Christ to the world.¹⁸

¹⁵ *Nota bene*, Gilson claimed to be a Christian philosopher in the tradition of *Aeterni Patris*. See more in Étienne Gilson, *The Philosopher and Theology* (New York: Random House, 1962), 174–199. Gilson undermined, however, two of *Aeterni Patris*’ fundamental presuppositions: 1) that there was a single system shared by all the scholastic doctors, and 2) that post-Tridentine Thomism was the authentic expression of St. Thomas’ own thought (Gerald A. McCool, “Theology and Philosophy,” in *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America*, vol. 32 (Toronto 1977), 78).

¹⁶ Zofia J. Zdybicka, “Lubac Henri de,” in *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, vol. 6, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, S.D.B. (Lublin: PTTA, 2005), 530–531 [trans. David Daniel].

¹⁷ Some implicit echo of de Lubac’s diagnosis of the needs of the Church can be found in the opening address of John XXIII at the Council (Rome, Oct 11, 1962) where he said that the authentic doctrine of the Church “should be studied and expounded through the methods of research and through the literary forms of modern thought. The substance of the ancient doctrine of the Deposit of Faith is one thing, and the way in which it is presented is another” (*Gaudet Mater Ecclesia*, 6).

¹⁸ Cf. Craig G. Bartholomew, Michael W. Goheen, *Christian Philosophy* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013), 3.

Even if a Catholic gets some understanding of how much profit philosophy can bring to evangelization, still he rather thinks of philosophy with reservation: it will be worthwhile to study for him only if it is practical, if it helps resolve cultural problems, or better, if it gives him advantage in religious discussions. We can imagine how bitter his disappointment would be if he enrolled in a course in philosophy to improve his preaching skills, and—instead of getting assurance to become a persuasive evangelizer—he met a professor who already during his first lecture, with an ice-cold methodological correctness, separated philosophy from religion.

One can find a story of that sort told in a book entitled *Christian Philosophy* by two Calvinist philosophers: Craig G. Bartholomew and Michael W. Goheen. The anecdote tells about two friends who signed up for a course in philosophy. Abby has just written an email to Percy to tell him how much she is delighted with her first lecture, and then:

Having sent her email off to Percy, Abby took a sip of her piping hot coffee and pressed the refresh button on her email, reflecting on how much she missed Percy. What—a reply from him already? No, not a reply but a new message headed “HELP!” Abby hurriedly clicked on the email. What could be wrong? Percy too had just had his first class in philosophy, but what a different experience than that of Abby. His prof had started out by explaining the difference between philosophy and religion. Religion was based on faith, but philosophy was a science based on reason alone. In philosophy you are justified in believing something only if it can be established by reason. The prof acknowledged that many in the class might be believers, but in his class they were to leave their faith at the door—only reason was an acceptable criterion in their discussions. The prof went on about the importance of rational, human autonomy in the quest for truth and explained how philosophy emerged as certain ancient Greeks abandoned belief in the gods and sought natural explanations for the state of the world. One brave student asked if religion had no place in philosophy, to which the prof replied, “It does as a subject for analysis, but it is valid only if it can be shown to be true by reason.” “What do you make of this, Abby?” wrote Percy. “I was quite shaken when I left the class. It all sounds so logical, but as I reflect upon it, isn’t human autonomy the great temptation to which Adam and Eve succumbed in Genesis 3? This is going to be one tough class. Any suggestion as to how to survive this course, or

do you think I should just drop it for now? I'm not sure my faith is ready for this." Abby quickly replied: "I see my prof again on Thursday. Let me get his advice and see if he can help."¹⁹

Let us take advantage of having such prominent professors as Gilson and Krapiec to try to help those Christian students who have a similar experience to that of Percy, or who are used to think of philosophy as being far away from the Church and her mission.

Is Christian Philosophy Possible Today?

We can take for granted that both Gilson and Krapiec would answer this question affirmatively. For both Gilson and Krapiec distinguished not only the historical sense of the term "Christian philosophy," but also its psychological sense denoting a practitioner of this philosophy. As experienced professors, however, they would surely voice certain reservations regarding how to practice Christian philosophy. Let me try to predict these reservations.

1. Christian philosophy cannot be identified with an art of persuasion because its final end lies in gaining understanding rather than being persuasive. It can be evidenced, for example, by Gilson's doubt in a persuasive might of the philosophical proofs for the existence of God. According to him,

no philosophy, no natural knowledge of God, could put us in possession . . . of a knowledge of God's existence that belongs to the economy of salvation. [He wrote] "It is true that if the God of revelation exists, he is the Prime Mover, the First Efficient Cause, the First Necessary Being, and everything reason can prove about the First Cause of the universe. But if Yahweh is the Prime Mover, the Prime Mover is not Yahweh. The First Efficient Cause never spoke to me by his prophets, and I do not expect my salvation to come from him. The God in whose existence the faithful believe infinitely transcends the one whose existence is proved by the philosopher. Above all, he is a God of whom philosophy could have no idea . . . The God of reason is the God of science; the God of faith is the God of salvation."²⁰

¹⁹ Id., 11.

²⁰ Richard Fafara, "Gilson and Pascal," *Studia Gilsoniana* 3 (2014): 42, note 39.

For this reason Christian philosophy is primarily addressed to those people who do not need to be evangelized due to already being Christians. A Christian philosopher, then, should not expect to succeed in evangelizing the world, but rather in supporting the evangelized by providing them with the rational justification of their faith. For this is the nature of Christian faith that it seeks as much rational comprehension of revelation as possible, and in this area the Christian philosopher can look for a legitimate job.²¹

2. The first reservation necessarily entails the second one, which is: Christian philosophy is the work of a Christian. This aspect seems to be of great relevance, because Christian philosophy neither reduces itself to supporting the Christian doctrine, nor limits itself to a body of truths and principles constituting an abstractly considered system, it is something more, namely it is a habit. Gilson and Krapiec unanimously follow Aristotle and Saint Thomas in regarding philosophy as a perfection of the intellect acquired through repeated acts enabling its possessor to demonstrate truths through their causes or principles.²² Peter Redpath—while commenting on Gilson—calls our attention to the fact that

[t]he ancillary relation that the act of a philosophical habit always has within the Christian soul is an essential part of its being, not an accidental condition of its relative state. Christian philosophy considered in its absolute, or pure, state is philosophizing ordered to, and imbedded with, faith's grace. Philosophy does not exist as the act of a habit in the Christian soul like mathematics exists within military science. Military science does not give the mathematician answers or hints to the questions that the mathematician seeks to answer. Nor does military science enter into the mathematical habit, infuse it with intelligible light, and intensify its activity's precision. Supernatural faith does all these things within the philosophical habit of the Christian philosopher.²³

Of course, such an explanation seems to implicitly endorse Heidegger's claim that—due to its marriage with faith—Christian philosophy can

²¹ Cf. D'Andrea, "Rethinking the Christian Philosophy Debate," 193–194.

²² Cf. Fafara, "Gilson and Pascal," 40–41, note 33; and Peter A. Redpath, "Thomist Humanism, Realism, and Retrieving Philosophy in Our Time," *Congresso Tomista Internazionale: L'Umanesimo Cristiano nel III Millennio: Prospettiva di Tommaso d'Aquino* (Roma, 21–25 settembre 2003), 4 (<http://www.e-aquinas.net/pdf/redpath.pdf>, accessed on Sept 25, 2015). See also Krapiec, *Człowiek—Kultura—Uniwersytet*, 254.

²³ Redpath, "Thomist Humanism, Realism, and Retrieving Philosophy in Our Time," 6.

be at most an as-if-philosophy which does not satisfy a necessary condition of being a genuine philosophy which, when posing questions, it does it in order to know the truth, and not merely to check or support the religious revelation.

Heidegger's objection, however, does not seem to be unquestionable. Its weakness becomes visible in the light of Krapiec's understanding of religion.²⁴ For Krapiec, religion is the focus of culture, which means that religion is the only factor which—while permeating all the spheres of culture, that is, theoretical, moral and productive sides of human life—gathers them together around the vertical transcendence of man. In consequence, removing religion from culture equates with depriving man of his vertical transcendence, whereas replacing religion leads to an ideology whose kind depends on a substitute provided instead of religion. For example, in the case of progress being a substitute for religion we will have progressivism, in the case of nation—nationalism, in the case of state—statism, in the case of evolution—evolutionism, and so on.²⁵ In result, Heidegger's condition for genuine philosophy to be done exclusively by non-believers appears unacceptable. For it seriously undermines the structure of culture by creating an artificial condition for it to function and provoking a new ideology to come out of the resultant disorder. According to Krapiec, what philosophy needs in order to be a distinct academic discipline is to have its own object and its own method.²⁶ For if no other academic discipline is required to be done by non-believers, then why is philosophy?

3. The third reservation can sound like this: Christian philosophy, that is, that which is done by Christians in order to get more rational comprehension of their faith, cannot function alone, but must go in tandem with its natural ally.

It could seem that such an alliance cannot be understood otherwise than as its unification with theology resulting in Christian philosophy's status as a handmaid of theology.²⁷ Theology (or better: Christian faith)

²⁴ See Mieczysław A. Krapiec, "Religia ogniskową kultury" [Religion as the Focus of Culture], in *O życie godne człowieka*, ed. Bohdan Bejze (Warszawa 1990), 194–227.

²⁵ Cf. Mieczysław A. Krapiec, "Rozważania o narodzie" [Considerations about Nation], *Człowiek w Kulturze* 1 (1993): 33.

²⁶ Krapiec, *Człowiek—Kultura—Uniwersytet*, 254–255. Cf. also id., 184: "Both the object and the method of philosophy (viz., the factors determining a given science) are in themselves neither Christian, nor Muslim, nor pagan."

²⁷ Cf. Pugh, "Maritain and the Problem of Christian Philosophy," 98: "Later, Gilson broadened his notion of theology to include philosophy. Insofar as theology uses philosophy,

plays, however, a different role than that of an ally. Its proper role is rather that of an external controller or an acceptance inspector.²⁸

For both Gilson and Krapiec, the natural ally of Christian philosophy is the classical philosophy of being whose roots go back through the ages to Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, and the pre-Socratics.²⁹ Admittedly, the classical philosophy of being does not aim at knowing God and His revelation, but its concentration on that which really exists makes that Christian philosophers can be provided with a sound understanding of man and the world which surrounds him.

Gilson and Krapiec nowhere maintain that the deliverances of faith should serve as a rational basis for demonstration in the practice of Christian philosophy. In numerous places they explicitly maintain the opposite. They maintain that if Christian philosophy is to be true philosophy then it must be the one which proves its identity by having real being as its object and metaphysics as its method.³⁰

Conclusion

The view that emerges out of the thought of Gilson and Krapiec on the question whether Christian philosophy is possible today, can be summarized as follows: if it is to satisfy both scholarly standards and missionary vocation of the Church, Christian philosophy—which in essence consists in doing philosophy by Christians in order to get more rational understanding of their religious faith—should be identified with the perfection of the intellect achieved by practicing the classical philosophy of being. And as such Christian philosophy is possible today.

philosophy becomes a part of theology. In this case, philosophy becomes the handmaid of theology by presupposing the truths of revelation, and then attempting to prove them rationally. For the later Gilson, philosophy is completely bent to a theological end.”

²⁸ See Krapiec, *Człowiek—Kultura—Uniwersytet*, 184–185. And Richard J. Fafara, “Zmiana ‘tonu’ w Gilsona pojęciu filozofii chrześcijańskiej” [A Change in ‘Tone’ in Gilson’s Notion of Christian Philosophy],” trans. Fr. Pawel Tarasiewicz, *Studia Gilsoniana* 1 (2012): 25: “But with the faith Gilson acknowledged the Church as its guardian and unceasingly cited Pope Leo’s encyclical.”

²⁹ Cf. Redpath, “Thomist Humanism, Realism, and Retrieving Philosophy in Our Time,” 2.

³⁰ Cf. D’Andrea, “Rethinking the Christian Philosophy Debate,” 198; FitzGerald, “Gilson, *Aeterni Patris*, and the Direction of Twenty-First Century Catholic Philosophy,” 87. See again Krapiec, *Człowiek—Kultura—Uniwersytet*, 149–277.

GILSON, KRAPIEC AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY**SUMMARY**

The author undertakes an attempt to answer the following question: is Christian philosophy possible today? The question seems to be of great importance due to the fact that what Christians who try to do philosophy usually encounter is bitter criticism which comes to them from two sides at once: that of academy and that of the Church. In short, for academy their philosophy is too Christian, and for the Church it is too academic. Being indebted to the insights of Étienne Gilson and Mieczysław A. Krapiec, the author comes to the conclusion that Christian philosophy is possible today only if: 1) it is not identified with the art of persuasion, as its final end lies in gaining understanding rather than being convincing, 2) it is the work of a Christian, and 3) it has the real world as its object and metaphysics as its method. For Christian philosophy—which in essence consists in doing philosophy by Christians in order to get more rational understanding of their religious faith—should be identified with the perfection of the intellect achieved by practicing the classical philosophy of being.

KEYWORDS: Christian philosophy, Gilson, Krapiec, metaphysics, university, Church, faith, theology, evangelization.