^{page 142 note 2} Diog. Laert. II. 11.

^{page 142 note 3} Tatian, , ad Graec. 21Google Scholar.

^{page 143 note 1} See Diels, , F. der V. I., p. 414Google Scholar; Gomperz, , G.T. I., pp. 378, 574Google Scholar.

^{page 143 note 2} Philodemus in Diels, ibid.., p. 418 (Homer intended ‘Zeus’ to mean ‘air’).

^{page 143 note 3} Syncellus, , Chron. 140cGoogle Scholar (Diels, Ibid., p. 414). (Zeus=mind, Athena=art; the first is probably one of Anaxagoras' own, in view of his doctrine of νοῦσ.)

^{page 143 note 4} Fr. 2 (Diels): Tritogeneia means that wisdom (Athena) consists of three parts (cf. C.Q., January, 1929, p. 43); fr. 30: Zeus=air; cf. fr. 24.

^{page 143 note 5} Plato, , Charm. 163dGoogle Scholar; Crat. 384b. It seems probable that Prodicus used his etymologies to support his rationalistic views concerning the gods(Cic. N.D. I. 118).

^{page 143 note 6} Fr. 32(Diels): Zeus and σῦν.

^{page 143 note 7} See Gomperz, , G.T. I., pp. 258, 563Google Scholar.

^{page 143 note 8} Symp. III. 6.

^{page 143 note 9} 530d.

^{page 143 note 10} He may be the same person as the Glaucon mentioned by Aristotle, Poet. 1461b, as protesting against overhasty interpretation and condemnation of passages in the poets. If this is so, he probably used allegory for defensive purposes.

^{page 143 note 11} See Plato, , Hipp. IIGoogle Scholar.

^{page 143 note 12} Prot. 316d.

^{page 143 note 13} Crat. 4O7ab.

^{page 143 note 14} Cf. Phaedrus 229c sqq.

^{page 143 note 15} Adam on Rep. 378d, 24.

^{page 144 note 1} Frr. 28, 40, 42, 57, 104 (Diels).

^{page 144 note 2} Die platonische Homerkritik und hre Nachwirhung (Philologus LXXXII., pp. 121 sqq.). See pp. 124–125 and n. 13.

^{page 145 note 1} Thus the allegorists might be accused of blasphemy (Plutarch, Amat. 757c).

^{page 145 note 2} Cf. Cornutus, c. 17; ps.-Plutarch, , Vit. Hom. 97Google Scholar.

^{page 145 note 3} On ὑπόνοια and its later equivalent ἀλληγορία see Plutarch, , De Aud. Poet. 19eGoogle Scholar; Heraclitus, , Quaest. Hom. 5Google Scholar; Roberts', Rhys [Longinus], p. 194Google Scholar.

^{page 147 note 1} Rep. 383a; cf. 389e.

^{page 147 note 2} Laws 682a.

^{page 147 note 3} Ibid., Meno 99.

^{page 148 note 1} Meno 98a; Apol. 22bc; Phaedr. 278c (cf. Rep. 490b). Cf.Ion 534d; and Francis Thompson:

‘We speak a lesson taught we know not how,

And what it is that from us flows

The hearer better than the utterer knows.’

^{page 148 note 2} Apol. 22bc: φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἑ ν θ ο υ σ ι ά ξ ο ν τ ε ς. Cf, Meno 99e: οῠτε διδακτὸν ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοἰρᾳ … ᾰνευ νοῦ.

^{page 148 note 3} The commonsense view, and the Homeric account of the matter. Phemius is self-taught, but the gods have implanted lays in his heart (Od. XXII. 347; cf. Finsler, , Homer I.², p. 267)Google Scholar.

^{page 148 note 4} Ion 533e sqq.; Phaedr. 2415a; Laws 719C.

^{page 148 note 5} See Adam on Rep. 601e, 32.

^{page 148 note 6} Cf. Rep. 506c on οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάξοντες.

^{page 148 note 7} Rep. 492e–3a.

^{page 148 note 8} v. 27; cf. Strabo I. 2, 9.

^{page 148 note 9} Rep. 382ea.

^{page 149 note 1} Laws 719c (the inspired poet contradicts himself and the laws); 682a (κατὰ θεόν πως εἰρημένα κατὰ φύσιν). One can only suppose that the inspired poet when wrong has the symptoms of inspiration without the reality. (Cf. Phaedo 69c, [Longinus], On the Sublime III. 2: οὐ βακχεὐουσι ἀλλὰ παίξουσι).

^{page 149 note 2} Rep. 398a.

^{page 149 note 3} Rep. 401C: τοǺς εὐφυῶς δυναμένους. Cf. Phaedr. 269–70: oratory requires a natural gift (φύσις) as well as practice (μελέτη) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Hence Aristotle took his distinction between the εὐφυής and the μανικός (Poet. 1455a, 32).

^{page 149 note 4} Put most clearly in the pseudo-Platonic, Alcibiades II. 147bcdGoogle Scholar.

^{page 149 note 5} Prot. 347e; Hipp. II. 365d.

^{page 149 note 6} Apol. 22c.

^{page 149 note 7} E.g. Bacon in the Advancement of Learning (Cowl, , Theory of Poetry in England, p. 302)Google Scholar.

^{page 149 note 8} Apol. 21b (αἰνίττεται); Phaedo 69c; Laws 719. Cf. Heraclitus (fr. 93, Diels) who finds a parallel for his obscure and symbolic style in the practice of the oracle of Delphi. Cf. also Pindar, the Muse's prophet (fr. 150), whose arrows are only for the wise (Ol. II. 83).

^{page 150 note 1} De Dis et Mundo, c. 3.

^{page 150 note 2} Cf. Lysis 214b.

^{page 150 note 3} Ion 533d sqq.

^{page 150 note 4} prot. 347e.

^{page 151 note 1} Phaedr. 277–8.

^{page 152 note 1} De Antro Nympharum 28.

^{page 152 note 2} Phaedr. 229e ᾰγροικός τις σοφία.

^{page 152 note 3} Two modern examples will make my meaning clear: (1) The derivation of Saxon from Issac's son, which ‘proves’ that the Anglo-Saxons (whoever they may be) are Israelites; (2) the derivation of atonement from at-one-ment so frequently cited to ‘prove’ that the doctrine contains no idea of reparation. Etymologies are no argument. But when those on which argument is based are wrong, the humour of the situation is increased. ‘Atone’ (pace the N.E.D.) comes from the legal phrase testibus idoneis (see Wiener, L., Commentary to the Germanic Laws, Harvard, 1915, pp. 167–8)Google Scholar.

^{page 154 note 1} Cf. Seneca, , Epist. 88Google Scholar, 5: ‘demus illis Homerum philosophum fuisse; … ergo illa discamus quae Homerum fecere sapientem.

^{page 154 note 2} Prot. 347cd; Phaedr. 278a.

^{page 154 note 3} Cf. Enn. IV. 3, 14, and Whittaker, T., The Neoplatonists, p. 98Google Scholar.