Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-4hhp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-30T21:16:34.041Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Plato, Socrates and the Myths

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

J. Tate
J. Tate
Affiliation:
The University, St. Andrews
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

I begin with a paraphrase of Plato Laws X 887de, which has suggested the arguments to be developed in this brief article. ‘The Athenian’ speaks to the following effect:

‘How can one admonish in all patience those who deny the existence of gods ? For no sufficient reason they disbelieve the myths which, in infancy, they heard from nurses and mothers in sportive or in serious vein. They disbelieve also those myths which, at sacrifices, from boyhood onwards, they heard recounted in prayers and saw represented in spectacles. They reject the testimony of their own parents, nay, of all Greeks and barbarians, who by continual prayer and worship show clearly their unanimous belief in the existence of gods. Despising all these things, they lay on us the burden of refuting by reasoned argument their perverse opinions.’

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 30 , Issue 3-4 , October 1936 , pp. 142 - 145
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1936

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

page 142 note 1 The paraphrase is correct even if we began a new sentence in d 2, reading, with the mss., οὖν (οὐ rightly, Stephanus and subsequent edd.): in which case Plato says that the atheists used to believe the myths in childhood and youth, but now perversely despise all such testimony.

page 143 note 1 Taylor, Plato, p. 147Google Scholar.

page 144 note 1 That there is a real inconsistency in Plato's attitude will appear from a comparison of our passage with 906e, 907b, etc. If the young do believe the myths, they will grow up believing, on the authority of Homer, etc., not only that the gods exist but that the gods are unjust. This belief constitutes the third form of impiety, which is the worst of all (excepting that of the human beast of prey 909a). Thus in escaping atheism they will fall into a far more grievous error. Plutarch (de superstit. 169F) agrees, as Professor H. J. Rose reminds me, with the more characteristically Platonic view (907b) that ‘superstition’ (which is roughly Plato's third form of impiety) is worse than atheism; whereas Julian takes over the inconsistency from Plato and exaggerates it by his own additions.

A less serious but not uninteresting oversight occurs in 901a where the argument hinges on Hesiod W. and D. 303–4. The Athenian, though clearly alluding to these lines, does not quote the really important words; these, apparently, Cleinias and Megillus are expected to know. Yet they have already been congratulated (866b) on their ignorance of Hesiod's Theogony; it seems improbable that they will know the w. and D. by heart. Further, they are expected to accept this Hesiodic statement on one characteristic of the gods (that they hate the idle man), though it is based on no proof other than the authority of the discredited author of the Theogony.

page 144 note 2 On the meaning of the first count see my articles in C.R. ‘Greed for “Atheism”’ (Feb. 1936) and ‘More Greek for “Atheism.”’ It should be unneceessary for me to add that in contending for what I believe to be the truth on these matters (against e.g. Taylor's, statement in Plato p. 163 n.Google Scholar I that a different interpretation of the indictment is ‘quite certain on linguistic grounds’) I intend no undindness towards Professor A. E. Taylor or the memory of Professor J. Burnet.