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The frustrating problem for four-dimensionalism

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Abstract

I argue that four-dimensionalism and the desire satisfaction account of well-being are incompatible. For every person whose desires are satisfied, there will be many shorter-lived individuals (‘person-stages’ or ‘subpersons’) who share the person’s desires but who do not exist long enough to see those desires satisfied; not only this, but in many cases their desires are frustrated so that the desires of the beings in whom they are embedded as proper temporal parts may be fulfilledI call this the frustrating problem for four-dimensionalism. In the first half of the paper I lay the groundwork for understanding the frustrating problem, and then in the second half, I will examine six possible responses to the frustrating problem on behalf of the four-dimensionalist, (i) the Parfit (1984) inspired claim that identity is not what matters, (ii) the personal pronoun revisionism of Noonan (Analysis 70(1):93–98, 2010), (iii) the indirect concern account of Hudson (A materialist metaphysics of the human person, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001), (iv) the sensible stages account of Lewis (On the plurality of worlds, Wiley Blackwell Press, Oxford, 1986), (v) a multiple-concepts account of desire satisfaction, and (vi) a No Desire View according to which subpersons have no mental states and thus no desires to frustrate. I argue that none of these solutions will help the four-dimensionalist; she does better to reject the desire satisfaction theory, while the defender of the desire satisfaction theory does better to reject four-dimensionalism.

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Notes

  1. This will no doubt strike many readers as an inversion of the usual order of philosophical operations, according to which we should do the metaphysics first and worry about the ethical consequences later. However, I think there is something to be said for preferring metaphysical views that complement our existing ethical beliefs and commitments with a minimum of revision. Perhaps some revision will be necessary in the end, but revision should be a last resort.

  2. The ever-growing list of philosophers who endorse four-dimensionalism, includes some of the most important figures in twentieth century philosophy: Armstrong (1980), Carnap (1967), Lewis (1983a; b; 1986), Quine (1960), Russell (1927), and Whitehead (1920) all held versions of the theory; as well as many excellent and able philosophers of twenty-first century, such as Balashov (2010), Hawley (2001), Heller (1999), Hudson (2001), and Sider (2001).

  3. According to Sider (2001, p. 59), x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at instant t = df (i) x exists at, but only at t, (ii) x is part of y at t, and (iii) x overlaps at t everything that is part of y at t. Except where noted, I shall use ‘instantaneous temporal part’ and ‘stage’ synonymously. Thus a person-stage is just an instantaneous temporal part of a person. The term ‘subperson’ has a wider extension (see Sect. 3 below for details).

  4. Three-dimensionalism has had many prominent defenders including: Baker (2000), Chisholm (1976), Geach (1972), Johnston (1992), Lowe (1989), van Inwagen (1990), and Zimmerman (1996).

  5. To my knowledge, the best discussions of the ethical consequences of four-dimensionalism are to be found in Hudson (1999, 2001, pt. II), and Olson (2010).

  6. Advocates of desire-satisfactionism, of one form or another, include: Brandt (1979), Rawls (1971), Overvold (1980), Haslett (1990), Noggle (1999), and Heathwood (2006).

  7. For a paradigmatic example of such a use of the spatial analogy, see Sider (2001, Chap. 1).

  8. Quine (1960, p. 171).

  9. Olson (2010) refers to these beings by the plural ‘subpeople.’

  10. Lewis (1983a, b, p. 76).

  11. For more on the stage theory see Hawley (2001) and Sider (1997, 2001).

  12. Philosophers who’ve endorsed hedonism include: Feldman (2004), Crisp (2006), Bradley (2009), and Heathwood (2006).

  13. Philosophers who can be characterized as defending an objective list theory include: Rawls (1971), Ross (1930), and Frankena (1973).

  14. One common refinement on this view has it that what really determines one’s well-being is that one’s ideal or all things considered desires are fulfilled, and not merely one’s subjective, or egotistical desires. I want to avoid this refinement and consider, instead, the simple view just outlined. I do this for two reasons: (i) ideal views have been critiqued for their inherent elitism, and not all desire satisfaction theorists accept them, and (ii) the Noonan style response that I will consider in Sect. 6.2 works best if we take the subperson’s interests to align with their egotistical propositional attitudes.

  15. In Sect. 6.6 below I consider the possibility that this claim is wrong and that, while persons have mental states, subpersons do not.

  16. I am indebted to Mark Spencer for first bringing the platitudinous reply to my attention.

  17. A similar strategy is pioneered by Olson (2010). However, Olson’s target is not four-dimensionalism per se, but rather what he calls “the generous ontology” (as opposed to the sparse ontology he favors). The generous ontology appears to be his name for any ontology that allows for merelogical universalism, whether four-dimensionalist or three-dimensionalist.

  18. Parfit (1984, pp. 254–255).

  19. For Parfit, personal identity consists in relation R + uniqueness.

  20. It bears reiterating that not all subpersons are instantaneous temporal parts. Many subpersons are longer-lived fusions of such parts, being sufficiently temporally “thick” to possess thoughts, beliefs, desires, and so forth.

  21. Hudson (2001, p. 165).

  22. Perhaps some will think that the stages would endure the suffering out of their concern for the person. Just as one might willingly sacrifice one’s own life to save or improve the life of one’s child or spouse. But in cases of such extreme familial sacrifices, the individual is usually aware of how their sacrifice will benefit their loved one and they are at liberty to decide for themselves whether to make the sacrifice or not. But the subperson who sacrifices for the person is not at liberty to decide to do otherwise, nor are they aware of what it is they are doing (they think they are the person).

  23. To my knowledge, this view has no precursor in the desire satisfaction literature, but it is inspired by recent work on the conceptual analysis of causation. Philip Dowe (2002), among others, has argued that we need multiple concepts of causation to account for both positive or “biff” causation, and negative causation (or causation by void or absence).

  24. I would like to thank anonymous reviewer for suggesting this response to the frustrating problem.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer at Philosophical Studies for many helpful comments, especially those that lead to the development of the argument in Sect. 6.6. I would also like to thank David Hershenov, Neil Williams, and Mark Spencer, for their tireless contributions at every stage of the development of this paper. I would to thank Berit Brogaard, Shane Babcock, and Justin Donhauser for many hours of helpful conversation on these matters. Finally, I would like to thank Maureen Donnelly, Randy Dipert, Ken Shockley, Matt Lavine, Patrick Ray, and the audience at the University at Buffalo works-in-progress colloquium for their many helpful remarks on an earlier draft of this paper.

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    A. P. Taylor

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Taylor, A.P. The frustrating problem for four-dimensionalism. Philos Stud 165, 1097–1115 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0009-2

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