7세기 불교인식론의 거장인 다르마끼르띠는 모든 인식은 知 자신의 인식, 즉 自己認識(svasaṃvedana)일 뿐이라고 말한다. 그에 의하면, 우리가 실제로 인식하는 것은 외부의 대상이 아니라 識 속에 나타난 대상의 형상을 의미하기 때문이다. 그와 같이 나타난 대상의 형상을 파악한다는 점에서 모든 인식은 知 자신의 자기인식이라고 말할 수 있다. 이러한 자기인식의 논리는 유식학파의 이론으로 정교하게 자리잡게 된다. 반면 중관학파에게 있어서는 유식학파를 비판하는 핵심적 대상으로 떠오른다.
본 논문은 자기인식을 매개로 하여 유식학파와 중관학파의 입장을 비교함으로써 유식학파와 중관학파의 대립구도를 명확히 살펴보고자 한다. 이를 통해 자기인식에 관한 비판과 옹호가 그들의 교리적 입장과 무관하지 않음을 알 수 있을 것이다.
유식학파는 자기인식의 이론을 전개하여 외부대상의 부정이라는 유식성의 논증에 효과적으로 도달하고 있다. 중관학파인 짠드라끼르띠는 자기인식은 언설에 있어서도 존재하지 않는다고 비판한 것으로 알려져 있다. 하지만 후기중관학파인 산따락시따는 ‘엄밀한 검토를 하지 않는 한 인정할 만한’이라는 용어를 사용하여 세속적 차원에서 자기인식을 용인하는 수용적 자세를 보여주고 있음을 알 수 있다.
This paper is composed with the theory of self-cognition(svasaṃvedana). The theory of self-cognition has developed with the theory of sākāravādin. It is insisted that the object of cognition is not the external object, but we can only recognize the ākāra which appears in awareness. The ākāra could be said the cognition itself. Therefore all the cognition is the reflexive awareness, namely 'the self-cognition'. Since Dignāga made an issue what is the object of cognition, Dharmakīti unfold the theory of ākāra, based on the epistemology of Sautrāntika and Yogācāra. And then he came to conclusion 'the theory of self cognition'. Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka became to controvert on the theory of self-cognition. For Yogācāra the self-cognition is regarded as Vijñaptimātratā in terms of the negation of external objects. For Mādhyamaka it is explained everything doesn't have its nature(niḥsvabhāva) and can not exist in itself. So they naturally criticized Yogācāra's theory, especially the self-cognition. It is worth while to notice whether the Mādhyamaka disapproved self-cognition on the level of paramārtha or saṃvṛtti. The Prasaṇgika such as Candrakīrti insisted it couldn't exist in common expression(vyavahāra). But Śāntarakṣita who was the latter Mādhyamika showed the receptive attitude. He said that as long as it does not strictly examined on the level of paramārtha, it could be approved. What is the self-cognition? Maybe it doesn't mean something that exist in entity(dravya). Rather it could be said a character of reflexive in awareness. Why the Yogācāra could not but defence the self-cognition? Why the Mādhyamaka could not but criticize the self-cognition? It seems that the debate of self-cognition connected with the Buddhist theoretical system between Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka. Śāntarakṣita undoubtedly disapproved the self-cognitionon the level of paramārtha, however it seems not to be considered his negation on the level of saṃvṛtti.
This paper is composed with the theory of self-cognition(svasaṃvedana). The theory of self-cognition has developed with the theory of sākāravādin. It is insisted that the object of cognition is not the external object, but we can only recognize the ākāra which appears in awareness. The ākāra could be said the cognition itself. Therefore all the cognition is the reflexive awareness, namely 'the self-cognition'. Since Dignāga made an issue what is the object of cognition, Dharmakīti unfold the theory of ākāra, based on the epistemology of Sautrāntika and Yogācāra. And then he came to conclusion 'the theory of self cognition'. Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka became to controvert on the theory of self-cognition. For Yogācāra the self-cognition is regarded as Vijñaptimātratā in terms of the negation of external objects. For Mādhyamaka it is explained everything doesn't have its nature(niḥsvabhāva) and can not exist in itself. So they naturally criticized Yogācāra's theory, especially the self-cognition. It is worth while to notice whether the Mādhyamaka disapproved self-cognition on the level of paramārtha or saṃvṛtti. The Prasaṇgika such as Candrakīrti insisted it couldn't exist in common expression(vyavahāra). But Śāntarakṣita who was the latter Mādhyamika showed the receptive attitude. He said that as long as it does not strictly examined on the level of paramārtha, it could be approved. What is the self-cognition? Maybe it doesn't mean something that exist in entity(dravya). Rather it could be said a character of reflexive in awareness. Why the Yogācāra could not but defence the self-cognition? Why the Mādhyamaka could not but criticize the self-cognition? It seems that the debate of self-cognition connected with the Buddhist theoretical system between Yogācāra and Mādhyamaka. Śāntarakṣita undoubtedly disapproved the self-cognitionon the level of paramārtha, however it seems not to be considered his negation on the level of saṃvṛtti.
