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Discussion : "Analogy" is Analogous

On the meaning of "Analogy is Analogical"*

In his recent book *The Logic of Analogy*,¹ Ralph M. McInerny makes the repeated claim that "'analogy' is analogous". In the pages that follow this claim will be examined in some detail and an attempt made to fill out McInerny's terse account. The issues raised by the dictum "'analogy' is analogous" are extremely difficult and complicated. This present paper, therefore, does not pretend to solve these problems. The reflections of this paper are offered rather in the hope that the problems may be somewhat clarified and the issues at stake brought once again into clear focus.

To facilitate the examination of the meaning of "'analogy' is analogous", we shall take as our point of departure Austin Farrer's view that analogy presupposes complexity in the things compared.² The adoption of this insight commits us to the following general formulation of analogy: " x is analogous to y with respect to z ". If we substitute for the word "analogy" the word "like" we shall be further committed, at least tentatively, to treat analogy as a *species* of likeness. It will somewhat simplify matters if the linguistic issues are kept distinct from the ontological issues. We have in mind here McInerny's distinction between *dicuntur* and *sunt* and between *rationes* and *entia*. This qualification demands a revision of the proposed schema so that it reads: the expression 'a' is like the expression 'b' with respect to C (where C is a property signified by 'a' and 'b' in a given context).³ Such a general formulation of analogy is calculated to rule out, at least for the purposes of the present paper, the need to consider *things* claimed to be analogous.

* I am grateful to Professor Ralph M. McInerny of the University of Notre Dame and to Professor Romane L. Clark, of Duke University, for their helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper. I must assume full responsibility for any obscurities that remain, particularly where our views tend to differ.

1. Ralph M. McInerny, *The Logic of Analogy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), pp.4, 33, 168ff. It is clear from the last two references that McInerny is concerned with the expression "analogy".

2. One can foresee the problems for this view in the case of God's nature which, according to tradition, is simple. We shall have to advocate at least a notional distinction of, for example, essence and existence in God if our analogical schemata are to have any purchase.

3. The schema focusses attention on the properties as signified rather than the properties as exemplified.

The view of analogy proposed here is very much like a definition *per genus et per differentiam* in the following way : both proceed on the assumption that some properties signified by expressions are complex in the sense of being analyzable into two or more properties. We offer as a paradigm for complex property the property of being human signified by the word "man". This property can be analyzed into the property of being animal and the property of being rational (signified, respectively, by the expressions "animal" and "rational" in terms of which "man", traditionally, has been defined).

In addition to providing a paradigm for complex property (and indirectly for complex expression) demanded by the rubric "*x* is like *y* with respect to *z*", the word "man" is useful in carrying the inquiry into the meaning of "'analogy' is analogous" one stage farther.

Employing the *Lxyz* formula let us consider what it would mean to say "man" and "horse" are analogous in meaning. Let "man" signify the properties of *being an animal* and of *being rational* (dubbed respectively A and R) and let "horse" signify the properties of *being an animal* and *being a quadruped* (dubbed respectively A and Q). We are now in a position to claim that "man" is analogous to "horse" with respect to A. Customarily, however, the expression "animal" as predicated of horses and men is acknowledgedly univocal.¹ We cannot, therefore, harmonize the general schema of analogy with the claim that "animal" is univocal, for on the latter assumption the comparison of "man" and "animal" is an instance of the rubric "*x* is the same as *y* with respect to *z*" rather than of the rubric "*x* is like *y* with respect to *z*". Nevertheless our example seems to meet Aquinas' criterion that analogy be a *via media* between univocity and equivocality.² To be univocal two expressions must have exactly the same signification *i.e.* signify exactly the same properties (e.g. "a" signifying FG and "b" signifying FG). By parity of reasoning two expressions are equivocal if they signify no properties in common (e.g. "a" signifying FG and "c" signifying LM). The example offered above avoids both extremes, the expressions 'man' and "horse" are partly univocal (*i.e.* they have A in common) and partly equivocal ("man" signifies R and "horse" signifies Q). The admission of partial univocity, however, seems to be ruled out by McInerny's caution (which seems to be well founded in the Thomistic tradition) . . . "we must never confuse the *ratio communis* of an analogous name with the *ratio communis* of the univocal name".³ Granted this proviso, the likeness at the basis of analogical comparisons cannot be univocity. This insight could be made more explicit in the case of the example under consideration as follows :

1. Speaking "*secundum intentionem*".

2. *Ia*, q.13, a.5.

3. McINERNY, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

(1) m and h are analogous in meaning if m signifies A_1R and h signifies A_2Q and A_1 is like but not identical with A_2 i.e. $[L(A_1, A_2)] \ \& \ (A_1 \neq A_2)$

The clause $[L(A_1, A_2)] \ \& \ (A_1 \neq A_2)$ tells us (a) A_1 is like A_2 (in some undefined sense of "like") and (b) specifies that however "like" is to be defined it must not be defined in terms of identity. The clause fails, however, to furnish any positive clue whatsoever about the nature of likeness which would qualify for incorporation into an adequate definition of analogy.

In his *The Logic of Analogy* McInerny speaks of the . . . "*commune analogicum* which is opposed to the *genus univocum*".¹ We shall attempt to understand this within the framework of our proposed schema. Could the *ratio communis* of analogous expressions be analogy?² As unpromising as this idea sounds let us pursue it a little farther. For $[L(A_1, A_2)] \ \& \ (A_1 \neq A_2)$ let us substitute $AN(A_1, A_2)$. The introduction of this clause in (1) would involve treating the genus of animal as analogical. McInerny does speak of treating genus, in certain contexts, *largo modo*, though it is quite clear that the genus of animal would *not* be included in this category. At this point we shall persist in drawing out the lessons of our chosen example while recognizing that it constitutes an extension of McInerny's genus *largo modo*. The difficulties with treating analogy as the *ratio communis* of analogous expressions can be brought out in the following manner. Generalizing (1) we arrive at the following definition of analogy :

(2) Two expressions x and y are analogous if x signifies G_1F and y signifies G_2H and $[(L(G_1, G_2)] \ \& \ (G_1 \neq G_2)$

If for $[L(G_1, G_2)] \ \& \ (G_1 \neq G_2)$ we substitute $AN(G_1, G_2)$ we derive the following formula :

(3) Two expressions x and y are analogous if x signifies G_1F and y signifies G_2H and $AN(G_1, G_2)$

A number of difficulties emerge in connection with (3). *First*, the definition is overtly circular in that it defines analogy in terms of itself. *Second*, if one attempts to avoid the circularity by an appeal to difference of types claiming that the clause $AN(G_1, G_2)$ is concerned with analogous properties rather than analogous expressions, it is difficult to see what has been gained. Presumably what it means to say G_1 and G_2 are analogous is that G_1 and G_2 are analyzable

1. McINERNY, *op. cit.*, p.135.

2. Put this bluntly the proposal would be rejected by McInerny. Since, however, we are seeking to get at the adjectival form of "analogy" in "analogy is analogous", if not analogy then something very much like it seems to be called for.

respectively into, say, LM_1 and M_2N . Such an interpretation is open to two objections. In the first place, even if it does not mean the same to say that properties are analogous as to say expressions are analogous, the notion of analogous properties is no clearer than the notion of analogous expressions. No clarity has been achieved by the introduction of the clause $AN(G_1, G_2)$. In the second place, the same difficulties recur in the case of M_1 and M_2 as with G_1 and G_2 . To subject M_1 and M_2 to the same analysis of G_1 and G_2 would lead to an infinite regress. Nor could the regress be avoided by claiming that the expression "s" (signifying G_1) and "t" (signifying G_2) are analogous, since the same claim would now have to be made for, say, "v" (signifying M_1) and "w" (signifying M_2) and so on *ad infinitum*.

Third (and this is directly related to this last comment) if we are to succeed in specifying a meaning for "'analogy' is analogous", it would seem that the expression "analogy" itself must be included among the possible substitution instances for x and y in (3). Failing this we should be specifying what it means to say that two expressions *other than* the word "analogy" (but falling under the general definition of analogy) are analogous. The moral of this being that a part of what is meant by "'analogy' is analogous" is that the expressions "analogy" itself can be a substitution instance for x and y in (3). We shall now explore this possibility in some detail.

On the basis of the submission just made, the claim "'analogy' is analogous" involves a comparison of two occurrences of the expression "analogy" itself. Let us begin with a comparison of " a_1 " and " a_2 " (two occurrences of "analogy" in the sense of analogy of attribution). We shall first analyze " a_1 " along the following lines. The expression " $healthy_1$ " and " $healthy_2$ " are analogous by analogy of attribution. This claim is to be made good by showing that " h_1 " and " h_2 " conform to the $Lxyz$ formula. There is, however, a prior question that demands attention, namely: In virtue of what characteristic or characteristics are " h_1 " and " h_2 " analogous by analogy of attribution? On closer scrutiny " h_1 " and " h_2 ", respectively, turn out to be elliptical for " x is the cause of health" and " y is the sign of health"¹ where *health* in the expanded expressions is being employed in the primary sense (i.e. as predicated of living organisms). We shall now attempt to specify the necessary characteristics of analogy of attribution.² They are: (A) " h_1 " and " h_2 " are dyadic predicate terms of the form "...R..."; (B) the first slot in

1. For the justification for this analysis see *Ia*, q.13, a.6; *De Nominum Analogia*, cap.2, para.8, and E. L. Mascall's *Existence and Analogy* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1949), p.101ff.

2. I am not here prepared to do battle for these characteristics. They have been arrived at simply on the basis of generalizing examples taken from Aquinas, Cajetan and Mascall for the purpose of illustrating the *sort* of thing needed to clarify the meaning of "'analogy' is analogous".

"...R..." is a place marker for an individual variable; (C) the second slot in "...R..." is a place marker for a monadic predicate term employed in its primary sense.

It is not difficult now to show that "a₁" (the comparison of "h₁" and "h₂") conforms to the *Lxyz* formula. The substitution instances for *x* and *y* are dyadic predicate terms of the form "...R..." ("h₁" and "h₂" are such terms) while *z* serves as a place marker for the characteristics ABC. Making the appropriate substitutions we get Lh₁h₂ABC which is clearly of the *Lxyz* form. What it means, then, to say that "h₁" and "h₂" are analogous by analogy of attribution is that they are similar with respect to ABC. Strictly speaking we *should* say that "h₁" and "h₂" are *the same* with respect to ABC, but if we do we run afoul of McInerny's caution... "we must never confuse the *ratio communis* of an analogous name with the *ratio communis* of the univocal name". Have we not done this very thing here? But this is not the only difficulty. So far we have not even succeeded in comparing "a₁" and "a₂". We have been preoccupied with showing that "h₁" and "h₂" are *bona fide* instances of analogy of attribution. To facilitate a comparison of "a₁" and "a₂" we could analyze "wealthy₁" and "wealthy₂" along the lines of "healthy" above and let this count as an analysis of "a₂". We encounter the same difficulty as before. Since "a₁" (analyzable into "h₁" and "h₂") and "a₂" (analyzable into "w₁" and "w₂") share the characteristics ABC both are univocal in that respect. We have worked our way back to a view of analogy of attribution, at least, that is based on univocity, a position which presumably the dictum "'analogy' is analogical" was originally calculated to avoid.

Possibly the difficulty just raised could be avoided by pointing out that the dictum "'analogy' is analogous" does not legislate for cases where two occurrences of the expression "analogy" with exactly the same signification (*viz.* analogy of attribution) are in question but only for cases where different though related senses of "analogy" are involved. The word "analogous" in "'analogy' is analogous" tries to pick up this "different though related senses" just alluded to. Presumably, then, a comparison of "a₁" (analogy of attribution) and "a₃" (analogy of proper proportionality) would be a fairer sample of the situation for which the dictum prescribes. We shall now explore this possibility.

If we take as definitive Aquinas' claim that analogy of proper proportionality is "a similitude of two proportions",¹ we can then make some headway in preparing the ground for a comparison of "a₁" and "a₃". Both Aquinas' and Cajetan's treatment of proper proportionality is based on the mathematical model 2: 4:: 3: 6 with the appropriate weakening of *identity of relations* (here "half of") to

1. . . . "similitudo duarum ad invicem proportionum" . . . *De Ver.*, q.2, a.11, c.

similarity of relation in fields of investigation where mathematical precision is impossible.¹ In the familiar proportionality schema — God's essence is to God's existence as a man's essence is to a man's existence — given St. Thomas' proviso we are comparing R_1 (the relation of the divine essence to the divine existence) with R_2 (the relation of human essence to human existence). To facilitate the comparison one could substitute "...is appropriate to..." for R_1 and R_2 . Granted difficulties will be encountered in specifying a precise meaning for "...is appropriate to...", nevertheless it serves meanwhile to focus attention on the fact that we are comparing two expressions of the form "...R...". As with analogy of proper proportionality we shall attempt to enumerate the characteristics of " a_3 " and to show that it conforms to the $Lxyz$ formula. The characteristics are: (A) x and y in the $Lxyz$ formula are place-markers for dyadic predicate terms of the form "...R..."; (D) the comparison of such terms (e.g. "...is appropriate to₁..." and "...is appropriate to₂..." is with respect to "...R..." (contrast this with analogy of attribution where R_1 = "...cause of..." and R_2 = "...sign of..."); (E) The slots in "...R..." are place markers for variables ranging over individuals, properties, activities and so on. That " a_3 " is of the $Lxyz$ formula can be shown by making the appropriate substitutions thus $L(R_1, R_2)$ (ADE). We are now in a position to compare " a_1 " and " a_3 ". They are similar with respect to A but different in the following respects — " a_1 " has characteristics BC and " a_3 ", characteristics DE. We now run again into the old Phocian rampart ... "we must never confuse the *ratio communis* of an analogous name with the *ratio communis* of the univocal name". Working within the prescribed limits we have set for ourselves, we are committed to the view that " a_1 " and " a_3 " are the same with respect to A and clearly "the same with respect to A" or " x and y in the $Lxyz$ formula are place markers for dyadic relations of the form '...R...'" are as univocal as one can get. Perhaps the way around this difficulty is to attempt to *weigh* the characteristics. That " a_1 " and " a_3 " exemplify the form Rxy is such a general property, that given this criterion alone all dyadic relational terms are analogous. But rather than eliminate this characteristic all together perhaps one or more of the other characteristics could be ranked higher in order of importance. On the face of it, it would be a tall order to arbitrate between BC and DE (since these are the respects in which " a_1 " and " a_3 " are claimed to differ). In principle, one line of analysis is closed to us, namely, the unpacking of AB and DE (treated as complex properties) in the quest for a common core. This is *not* to say that it is impossible to arbitrate between BC and DE or that in singling out BC and DE that the last word has been said on the selection of the characteristics of analogy of attribution and of analogy of proper proportion-

1. *Ia*, q.13, a.2, c.f. ; *De Ver.*, q.9, a.12 and 13 ; *De Nom. Anal.*, cap.3, para.24.

ality. It is safe to say, however, that the task of weighting the given characteristics or the quest for further characteristics, if successful, would solve the problem of analogy. If one can contribute to that ultimate solution even if only by erecting the sign *cul de sac* over certain lines of investigation, then this will be its own reward.

The reader is likely to be as disappointed with this paper as a freshman with one of Plato's dialogues. The problem posed by the dictum "'analogy' is analogical" is still unsolved. It may be objected that the failure to avoid univocity in the foregoing account springs from (a) the classification of analogy as a species of likeness and (b) from the choice of the man-horse model which is acknowledgedly based on univocity. This objection is not without force. By way of rejoinder, however, it should be pointed out that the alternative classification of analogy as a species of equivocity does not avoid the difficulties encountered above. One would still have to show that "a₁" and "a₃" are not totally equivocal or that they have some property or properties in common. We are at once confronted with our self-appointed task of finding "something common" other than univocity. Furthermore, while it is true that the man-horse model is based on univocity, it primarily functions *negatively* to rule out identifying the *ratio communis* with the *genus univocum*.

While no positive solution to the problems posed by "'analogy' is analogous" has been achieved in the foregoing pages, the following indications of the direction in which the solution should be sought may prove of value. First, the clue to the understanding of "'analogy' is analogous" is to be sought in a comparison of (at least) two occurrences of the expression "analogy" itself and two occurrences like "a₁" and "a₃" rather than two occurrences like "a₁" and "a₂". This insight emerged where it was suggested that the range of substitution instances for *x* and *y* in (3) be extended to include the expression "analogy" itself. Second, this last insight suggests another possibility — that the definition of analogy is self-referential. Third, clearly what stands in the way of specifying the meaning of "'analogy' is analogous" is the failure to solve the problem of the *ratio communis* of analogous expressions. It would appear that we need something sufficiently like analogy to warrant saying "'analogy' is analogous" rather than "'analogy' is univocal" or "'analogy' is equivocal" but not so like it as to blur the distinction between the *commune analogicum* and the *genus univocum*. This sounds like an impossible task, but the limits within which the meaning of "'analogy' is analogous" must be clarified have been set by tradition and not by the present writer. The difficulties encountered in this paper are the direct consequence of these limits.

John E. THOMAS.

“Analogy” is Analogous

The claim that “analogy” is analogous has sometimes been made in comparing so-called analogy of attribution with so-called analogy of proper proportionality when the meaning of “primary analogate” in these two putative types of analogous name is questioned. The claim, it has always seemed to me, has a rhetorical if not intimidating ring to it. One is being told, presumably, what analogy is and when he seeks clarification about an element of the explanation he is told that it is analogous. Well, of course, one finds the word “dictionary” in the dictionary but if one were sent to the dictionary to look up the word “dictionary” it would be fair to ask if the trip is necessary. Similarly, if one could be expected to understand the claim that “analogy” is analogous, made in the course of an explanation of analogy, one would scarcely be in need of enlightenment in the first place.

Despite such uses of it, I am convinced that the statement “‘analogy’ is analogous” makes perfectly good sense. What it comes down to saying is that “analogy” has several meanings one of which is privileged and explanatory of the others. Now, as it happens, to say that is to invoke *one* of the meanings “analogy” has — a meaning which is not the first or privileged meaning of the term — in order to explain the relationship between the several meanings of “analogy”. That is, the meaning of “analogy” which enables us to make sense of the statement that “‘analogy’ is analogous” has to do with the relation between many meanings of a common term. However, not every meaning of “analogy” has to do with the meanings of words.

The preceding paragraph is exact, if complicated, but doubtless the reader will be more struck by its complexity than its exactness. In what follows, I shall attempt a circuit which will bring us back to our beginning ; during that circuit I shall first say a few things about the paper of Professor Thomas and then go on to attempt a succinct statement of what it means for a word to be analogous. That done, we can apply what we have said to the word “analogy”.

Professor Thomas’ paper could serve, for those who are unacquainted with the literature of analytic philosophy, as an excellent introduction to this style of philosophizing. The precision with which Professor Thomas’ paper progresses, its drive for clarity, its unassuming honesty and lack of pretentiousness, will be apparent to every reader. I will try to summarize the major moments of his analysis in my own less lucid way and indicate why he and I appear to be speaking of somewhat different things when we confront the claim that “analogy” is analogous.

Because he wants to separate linguistic from ontological issues, Professor Thomas proposes the following formula for analogy: "the expression 'a' is like the expression 'b' with respect to C (where C is a property signified by 'a' and 'b' in a given context)." He then introduces the notion of complex property by pointing out that *the property of being human* (what "man" signifies) can be analysed into *the property of being animal* and *the property of being rational*. With this as background, Professor Thomas soon finds himself in the embarrassing situation of seeming to have to agree that "man" and "horse" are analogous in meaning. The names of the species of a genus agree in signifying the generic property. What occurs to me here, of course, is that we are faced with talk about analogous meaning where no common name is involved. That is, "man" and "horse", being two different names, cannot qualify as examples of analogy if by analogous meaning we are speaking of the different significations of the *same* term. Professor Thomas seems at this point to indicate that he regards his analysis of "man" and "horse" to be an analysis of the customary view that "animal" is predicated univocally of horses and men. But what he began with was something like "*x* is a man" and "*x* is a horse" and not "man is animal" and "horse is animal". If "animal" too signifies a complex property, as it does, *that* complex property has not been analysed by Professor Thomas. In short, I have difficulty right at the outset with the values Professor Thomas will allow for "a" and "b" in his general formula. They are said to be two expressions and not two tokens of the same expression. For the same reason, his definition of "to be univocal" seems to me too commodious for it can embrace what we nowadays call synonymous terms. (Aristotle's *συνώνυμα* is, of course, translated by *univocals*.)

In the second major moment of his paper, Professor Thomas considers what happens when we substitute "analogy" for the variables in his formula numbered (3). Before he can do this, however, he has to consider some first-order terms of which we can say that they are analogous. Here he considers an example where we have tokens of the same expression: $healthy_1$ and $healthy_2$. "On closer scrutiny ' h_1 ' and ' h_2 ', respectively, turn out to be elliptical for '*x* is the cause of health' and '*y* is the sign of health' where *health* in the expanded expressions is being employed in the primary sense (i.e. as predicated of living organisms)." He then enumerates three characteristics of "analogy of attribution" to which he will later refer as ABC. Terms analogous in this sense have meanings of the form "...R..." and the place before the symbol of relation can be filled by a variable whose value is an individual while the place after the symbol of relation can be filled by "a monadic predicate term employed in its primary sense." That third characteristic seems faulty to me for reasons I will give later. On the basis of this

similarity of form on the part of meanings of a term said to be analogous, Professor Thomas concludes that "h₁" is like "h₂" because they share the three characteristics enumerated. If now we should introduce "w₁" and "w₂", analysed in the way "h₁" and "h₂" have been, Professor Thomas asks if they share the three characteristics (ABC) in exactly the same way as "h₁" and "h₂" or not. "Since 'a₁' (analyzable into 'h₁' and 'h₂') and 'a₂' (analyzable into 'w₁' and 'w₂') share the characteristics ABC both are univocal in that respect. We have worked our way back to a view of analogy of attribution, at least, that is based on univocity, a position which presumably the dictum '*analogy is analogical*' was originally calculated to avoid." But is that the import of the dictum? Surely not, I should say, and Professor Thomas, foreseeing this, continues on a different tack. This time, he will compare "analogy of attribution" and "analogy of proper proportionality" to see if their comparison enables us to avoid univocity in speaking of analogy. His point here turns out to be that analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality have at least one characteristic in common, that this is grounds for univocal community between them and that, finally, this casts doubt on the dictum that "analogy" is analogous. The characteristic they share, however, namely *Rxy*, is so general that Professor Thomas notes it would warrant saying that all dyadic relational terms are analogous. After careful and painstaking analysis, Professor Thomas concludes that he has been unable to find a way to avoid appealing to univocity in speaking of analogy and that this must cause doubts about the claim that "analogy" is analogous.

Despite the misgivings I have indicated, I found Professor Thomas' paper a joy to read. Any student of analogy will recognize the problems raised by Professor Thomas as inevitable. I want now to address myself to one of his final remarks. "It would appear that we need something sufficiently like analogy to warrant saying '*analogy is analogous*' rather than '*analogy is univocal*' or '*analogy is equivocal*' but not so like it as to blur the distinction between the *commune analogicum* and the *genus univocum*." I hope my approach to it will not seem needlessly oblique.

The immediate signification of a word is called its *ratio* and it must always be something complex.¹ Professor Thomas introduced the notion of complex property which, in the example he used, analyses into a genus and specific difference. I prefer to speak of the complexity of what the word signifies in terms of *res significata* and *modus significandi*; perhaps Professor Thomas could express this

1. Cf. *In VII Metaph.*, lect.9, n.1460: "Dicit ergo primo quod omnis 'definitio est quaedam ratio,' idest quaedam compositio nominum per rationem ordinata . . ." — *Ibid.*, lect.15, n.1614: "Necessarium esse omnem definitivam rationem esse ex pluribus nominibus."

in the following way. Any term signifies a property in a certain fashion or manner. Thus, we might say that "man" and "humanity" signify the same property but in different ways, concretely and abstractly, respectively. Other examples would be "healthy" and "health". If Professor Thomas will accept this, I can go on to give definitions of univocal, equivocal, synonymous and analogous terms. (1) Two tokens of the same term are univocal if they signify the same property in the same way in the uses which interest us. Alternatively, we could say that two things are univocal if two tokens of the same term are predicated of them and the tokens signify the same property in the same way. (2) Two tokens of the same term are equivocal if they signify different properties in the uses which interest us. Or, things are named equivocally when tokens of the same term are predicated of them and the tokens signify different properties. (3) Tokens of different terms are synonymous if, though they are tokens of different terms, they signify the same property in the same way in the uses which interest us. Or, something is named synonymously if tokens of different terms are predicated of it and the different terms signify the same property in the same way. (4) Tokens of the same term are analogous if they signify the same property but in different ways and one way of signifying the property is primary and privileged because it enters into our explication of the other ways of signifying the same property, in the uses which interest us. St. Thomas sums up what we have been attempting in these definitions by saying that univocal things are divided by differences, equivocal things by *res significatae* and analogous things by *modi significandi*.¹

What the foregoing implies, of course, is that the analogous term, being a term, has certain characteristics in common with any term whatsoever. Thus, any word within an appropriate range signifies a *ratio* which can be analysed into *res* and *modus*. Univocity, equivocity and analogy come in when we consider the word as predicable of several things. If someone could manage to discuss analogical signification without any reference to univocity or equivocity, he might come up with the *res/modus* analysis as something peculiar to and constitutive of analogy as such. Then, when he came to see that these are involved in univocal and equivocal predication as well, he would be in a position similar to that of Professor Thomas when he reached the point of extracting Rxy from his analyses of analogy.

1. "Ad secundum dicendum quod aliter dividitur aequivocum, analogum et univocum. Aequivocum enim dividitur secundum res significatas, univocum vero dividitur secundum diversas differentias; sed analogum dividitur secundum diversos modos. Unde cum ens praedicatur analogice de decem generibus, dividitur in ea secundum diversos modos. Unde unicuique generi debetur proprius modus praedicandi." — *In I Sent.*, d. 22, q.1, a.3, ad 2.

Let me now make a *hysteron proteron* move. Professor Thomas, in his paper, noticed that the meanings of the names of species of the same genus have a common element and restated that to read : species₁ is like species₂ with respect to that common element. On that basis, he briefly entertained the possibility that "man" and "horse" might be said to be analogous but dropped it in deference to the traditional view that "animal" is univocally and not analogously predicated of its species. My point earlier was that the remark about "animal" is not what militates against speaking of "man" and "horse" as analogous. Rather it is the absence of two tokens of the same term. But let us take what is indeed a term common to man and horse, namely, "animal". This term signifies a *ratio* which is generic to man and horse and the community involved causes us to say that "animal" in this situation is a univocal term. Now, according to our definition of univocal terms, this means that "animal" as predicated of man and horse signifies the same property in the same way. Despite the univocity of the generic term, there has been continued discussion of the so-called "analogy of genus" which answers to Cajetan's analogy of inequality and to the *analogia secundum esse sed non secundum intentionem* of a famous text of St. Thomas.¹ How can the generic notion be equally shared by species which are unequal with respect to animality itself? The question is only posed now ; I raise it to show that Professor Thomas' difficulty is not a private one.

Like most of us Professor Thomas finds "healthy" a convenient example when speaking of analogy. Personally, I do not share his apparent conviction that the traditional division of analogy into attribution and proper proportionality can stand up to close scrutiny from either a theoretical point of view or from that of textual analysis of Aquinas. But perhaps Professor Thomas is simply accepting the division as good money. We begin with a list of statements.

- (1) The dog is healthy.
- (2) Food is healthy.
- (3) A cold nose is healthy.

In our three statements the predicates are tokens of the same term and we want to analyse the meanings of these instances of "healthy". If "healthy" were predicated univocally of the dog, food and a cold nose, it would signify the same property in the same way, i.e. the same *rem significatam* and the same *modum significandi*. We can say that in each of these instances "healthy" signifies the same property, the same *rem significatam*, namely, health. The *way* health is signified by "healthy" differs, however ; in (2) it signifies the cause of health and in (3) a sign of health. Professor Thomas

1. CAJETAN, *De nom. anal.*, cap.1 ; ST. THOMAS, *In I Sent.*, d.19, q.5, a.2, ad 1.

wrote, we remember, that "health in the expanded expressions is being employed in the primary sense (i.e. as predicated of living organisms)." Now, it seems to me he should have spoken, not of the primary sense of *health*, but of the primary sense of *healthy*, the meaning it has in (1). In (1), "healthy" signifies health in a certain way, namely, the subject of health. If "health" is given a meaning such that it is clear that only a living organism, as a whole, can be the subject of such a property, then "subject of health" is the meaning of "healthy" in (1). And that, as Professor Thomas indicates, is a privileged way of signifying the property for the precise reason that *that* way of signifying it enters into our explication of other ways of signifying the same property.

Let us attempt to cast the content of the preceding paragraph into the terminology of Professor Thomas and then into that of St. Thomas. Professor Thomas wrote that the meanings of "healthy" in our (2) and (3) exhibit the common form "...R..." I see no reason not to include its occurrence in (1) under the same form if we can interpret "...R..." as "habens respectum ad sanitatem" or "habens sanitatem" or "id quod habet sanitatem." The participle *habens* and the phrase *id quod habet* provide both "a place marker for an individual variable" (or, perhaps better, give the variable) and indicate its relation to the property which would go in the slot after R. However, and this was Professor Thomas' point, in explicating the meaning of "healthy" in (2) and (3) we would come up with something like "that which is a cause of health in such things as dogs" and "that which is a sign of health in such things as dogs" where it becomes clear that the explication of the way health is signified when "healthy" is predicated of the dog does not involve reference to other ways of signifying health. Nevertheless, of all these *rationes* of "healthy" we can say that they signify the same *res* but in different ways.

We can now ask what, for Aquinas, is the *ratio analogice communis*? In answering the question we can indicate the root of our dissatisfaction with Cajetan's division of analogous names into analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionality. Consider the following passage :

Sciendum est quod, quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut *animal* in qualibet specie animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur.¹

Why does St. Thomas speak of the *ratio* signified by "animal" predicated of man and horse as a *ratio propria*? As a generic notion,

1. *Ia*, q.16, a.6. c.

we should expect him to call it a *ratio communis*. It is the generically common notion that is here called a proper notion ; the proper notion common to man and horse insofar as they are called animals involves a *res* and *modus* : the usual and therefore proper way of signifying animality. What now does *ratio propria* mean in the statement about analogy ? What is analogically predicated of many things is said to be found in only one of them according to its *ratio propria*. If we consult Cajetan's commentary on the article in which our passage occurs, we encounter an identification of *ratio propria* and the *res significata* of the term, an identification which eventually leads Cajetan to reject St. Thomas' description of analogy. Actually, Cajetan says, it is a description only of analogy of attribution. Why ? Because analogy of attribution is such that the perfection signified by the name (the *res significata*) exists in only one of the analogates and the secondary analogates are named by the name in question only by extrinsic denomination. It is precisely this Cajetan takes St. Thomas to be saying when he writes "illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur." Of analogy in the strong sense, Cajetan's analogy of proper proportionality, we must say what St. Thomas here says of univocity : "illud in quolibet eorum secundum rationem propriam invenitur." Fortunately, however, there is no need to do such violence to the text.

In the case of the analogous name, can we identify its *ratio propria* and its *ratio communis* as we did in the case of the generic and univocal name ? Let us return to "healthy" and ask what its *ratio communis* would be. I suggest the following : *habens aliquem respectum ad sanitatem*. The basis of this suggestion is the oft-repeated *ratio communis entis : habens esse* or *id quod habet esse*. What the *ratio communis* gives us is the *res significata*, health or *esse*, and what Professor Thomas might call a variable whose values would be determinate *modi significandi*. If that is the *ratio communis* of the analogous name, what is its *ratio propria* ? I suggest that it is the *res* and a determinate way of signifying it : e.g. "subject of health" and "id cui debet esse in se et non in alio." With these explanations, there is nothing restrictive or mysterious about Aquinas' "illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum." *Invenitur* does not as such require a restrictive and determinate ontological situation ; after all, that in which the *ratio propria* of "healthy" is found is still denominated extrinsically by the term. In some analogous names, it may well be that a number of modes of signifying the *res* involve the intrinsic possession of the *res*, but that is not the import of "illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur" nor is it precluded by "illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum."

The foregoing interpretation of the *ratio communis* and *ratio propria* of the analogous name seems best to me ; nevertheless, men-

tion might be made of the way in which the *ratio propria* of the analogous name is common to all the *rationes* analogically signified by the name. That is, the privileged way of signifying the *res* enters into our explication of the other meanings of the name and can therefore be said to be either what the name means or an element of what it means.

With particular reference to Professor Thomas' paper, I would not want to interpret the statement "*analogy* is analogous" to mean the denial that different instances of analogous naming are instances of the same kind of naming. It seems to me that what St. Thomas comes up with in his logical analysis of analogously common names is exemplified by any term he takes to be analogous. That is, I take the description of analogy found in *Ia*, q.16, a.6 to be saved and saved in exactly the same way by every instance of analogous naming. I see nothing to prevent our saying that "analogous" in "*Healthy* is analogous" and in "*Being* is analogous" is univocal. If "*analogy* is analogous" were a denial of that, the statement would seem to me simply an invitation to vertigo. What then does the statement mean?

We have arrived where we began. I find in Professor Thomas' paper a statement he might have exploited to his profit. He is speaking of proper proportionality. "Both Aquinas' and Cajetan's treatment of proper proportionality is based on the mathematical model 2:4::3:6 with the appropriate weakening of *identity of relations* (here 'half of') to *similarity of relations* in fields of investigation where mathematical precision is impossible." What that remark calls to our attention is this: "analogy" had a use in mathematics which is prior to its use by the logician for whom it means a type of community of the name. St. Thomas put it this way. "Dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram; secundum quod duplum, triplum et aequale sunt species proportionis. Alio modo, quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum."¹ *Proportio* is merely a synonym for "analogy" and what this passage is saying is that "analogy" has a number of meanings. Its first meaning, and we can call this its *ratio propria*, is a "determinate relation between quantities." Usage evolves a *ratio communis*, "any relation between things", a determinate mode of which is the relation or proportion or analogy of creature to God as effect to cause. If this is correct, "analogy" has two meanings, one of which is privileged since, if we are asked why we call the relation of creature to God an analogy, we would invoke the quantitative mode to explain our usage. If now we should say "*analogy* is analogous" we have not yet given a meaning of "analogy" which explains the adjective in our remark. What St. Thomas did was to employ

1. *Ia*, q.12, a.1, ad 4.

the term "analogy" to speak about the relation between several meanings of a common term. And it is just this meaning of "analogy" which is invoked when we say that "analogy" is analogous. Let us spell this out. "Analogy" means (1) a determinate relation between quantities ; e.g. double, triple, equal ; (2) any relation between things, a determinate mode of which is the relation of effect to cause ; (3) the relation between several meanings of a common term where all the meanings are ways of signifying the same *res significata* and one way of signifying the *res* is privileged because it enters into the explication of the others, e.g. "healthy", "being", "analogy". That is to say, meaning (3) of "analogy" explains the way "analogy" signifies (1), (2) and (3). That is what is meant by the statement, "*analogy* is analogous". While complicated, the meaning of the statement is clear. Therefore, although the statement may continue to be used to obfuscate, to postpone explanations, it need not be so used. It has a definite and defensible meaning.¹

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1. The following texts are of importance for settling the question of the "analogy of genus" raised earlier. *Ia*, q.29, a.4, ad 4 ; *Quaest. quodl.* III, q.3, a.1. The most lucid, perhaps, is this : "Sed dicendum quod unum dividendum aliquod commune potest esse prius altero dupliciter : uno modo, secundum proprias rationes, aut naturas dividendum ; alio modo, secundum participationem rationi illius communis quod in ea dividitur. Primum autem non tollit univocationem generis, ut manifestum est in numeris, in quibus binarius secundum propriam rationem naturaliter est prior ternario ; sed tamen æqualiter participant rationem generis sui, scilicet numeri : ita enim est ternarius multitudo mensurata per unum, sicut et binarius. Sed secundum impedit univocationem generis. Et propter hoc *ens* non potest esse genus substantiae et accidentis : quia in ipsa ratione *entis*, substantia, quae est *ens* per se, prioritatem habet respectu accidentis, quod est *ens* per aliud et in alio." — *In I Periherm.*, lect.8, n.6.