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How do we know who may replace each other in triadic conflict roles?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2022

Lotte Thomsen Open the ORCID record for Lotte Thomsen [Opens in a new window]
Lotte Thomsen*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway lotte.thomsen@psykologi.uio.no Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Center for the Experimental-Philosophical Study of Discrimination, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
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Abstract

Group representations need not reduce to triadic conflict roles, although we infer group membership from them. A conceptual primitive of <group> as one solidary, bounded unity or clique may motivate and facilitate reasoning about cooperative group interactions in context with and without intergroup conflict and may also be necessary for representing which agents would replace one another in a triadic conflict.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e124
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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