

You and I

Some puzzles about 'mutual recognition'

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Predicating “ξ has a bruised nose” in speech

NOMINALLY:

“Hannah has a bruised nose”

DEMONSTRATIVELY:

“This girl has a bruised nose”

FIRST PERSONALLY:

“I have a bruised nose”

Slide 1

Where these are made true by the same bruised nose,

- ▶ the first might be said by anyone,
- ▶ the second by anyone present,
- ▶ and the third by the injured party herself, Hannah.

In particular, if Hannah is given to her own senses – in a mirror, for example – *she herself* might employ any of these three forms of predication.

The inner basis of outward speech

Outward Speech

Hannah said "*Hannah* has a bruised nose"

Hannah said "*This girl* has bruised nose"

Hannah said "*I* have a bruised nose"

Belief



Hannah believed she had a bruised nose
Hannah believed she had a bruised nose
Hannah believed she had a bruised nose



Knowlege

Hannah knew that she had a bruised nose
Hannah knew that she had a bruised nose
Hannah knew that she had a bruised nose

Slide 2

When Hannah does employ one of these sentences, she is not just saying words, but saying *something*, or *claiming* something; she is perhaps also expressing a *belief*; and perhaps also manifesting *knowledge* and *imparting knowledge* to her hearers.

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But whatever she says, it's the same bruised nose that's in question: her own, not Martha's or Solomon's.

There is, as we might say, just one fact in question, one content available, and it pertains to her. We might thus represent the more intellectual states of affairs as follows.

English has a little trouble representing the distinctions

Hannah said “*Hannah* has a bruised nose” Hannah knew that *she* had a bruised nose
Nominal cognition (?)

Hannah said “*This girl* has bruised nose” Hannah knew that *she* had a bruised nose
Demonstrative cognition

Hannah said “*I* have a bruised nose” Hannah knew that *she* had a bruised nose
First person cognition
cognition de se

But these forms of representing her intellect will seem a little coarse!

Hannah — she

This girl –she

I –she

Following the words we use for the linguistic phenomena, philosophers speak of :

- ▶ *first personal knowledge* in the first case
- ▶ *demonstrative knowledge* in the second case

and we might speak of

- ▶ *nominal knowledge* in the first case

A similar distinction is natural for *belief* and *claiming* and so forth.

It is perhaps a simple-minded thought, but it is, for example, natural to think of Hannah's "cognitions" as exhibiting a certain order of logical dependence. The forms of logical inference, Frege says, are precisely forms of "coming to know" *from knowing*. So mustn't there be different knowledges corresponding to our three forms of speech, all knowledges 'of oneself'?

Suppose Hannah notices the bruise while looking in a mirror. She is apprehending the bruised nose as she might apprehend any bruised nose, or as anyone might apprehend hers. We might represent the order in her three cognitions as related as in the first tree.

This representation of the order of her ideas would be natural wherever she knows about herself from observation, etc. - that is from intuition of herself as an external substance, given "as something alien, from without through the medium of the senses" .

But if she knows something 'about herself' through public testimony employing proper names, the second sort of inference is representative.

In some cases the first person is the starting point as with the

Les pronoms logophoriques

Some languages explicitly mark the specifically “first personal” propositional attitudes.

Geach-English

Hannah said “*I* have a bruised nose” Hannah knew that *she herself* had a bruised nose
Hannah said “*Hannah* has a bruised nose” Hannah knew that *she* had a bruised nose

Castaneda-English

Hannah said “*I* have a bruised nose” Hannah knew that *she** had a bruised nose
Hannah said “*Hannah* has a bruised nose” Hannah knew that *she* had a bruised nose

Some languages explicitly mark the specifically “first personal” propositional attitudes.

For example Geach introduced a variant English with an emphatic use of *she herself* in a paper from the late '50's

Casteneda later introduced the scheme of supplying an asterisk =- *he 'star'* , *she 'star'*

Geach pointed out that Ancient Greek had such a form.

The name 'logophoric pronoun' was introduced for such a thing in the seventies by Claude Hagège on the basis of the study of west african languages.;

In fact languages do not find the matter pressing because the cases where we want to affirm that “X knows that she is F” but deny that “X knows that “she herself” is F” are not too common in ordinary life. It is because the case is a bit unusual that the philosopher's attention is riveted by the famous passage in Ernst Mach: where he describes stepping onto a train, looking across the aisle, and thought “What a miserable-looking school-teacher *he* is!” – and then realizing that he was looking into a mirror.

Or cases where someone comes to nominal knowledge from testimony without realizing that he is the one under discussion.

Frege/Evans

Hannah		believes that		Hannah has a bruised nose
Martha		believes that		Hannah has a bruised nose

Hannah		believes that		she* has a bruised nose.
Martha		believes that		she* has a bruised nose.

Hannah		believes that		$\hat{\text{U}}\text{D}$: has a bruised nose.
Martha		believes that		$\widetilde{\text{*}}\text{*}$: has a bruised nose.

Casteneda's device in particular kept the issue before philosophers' minds; but he was merely fixing the location of the problem; he, like Geach, was bringing philosophical English up to the standard that is taken for granted in West Africa.

But there is still the question how to understand the distinction, once it is marked.

One great dispute is whether we should understand "first personal belief" and "first personal knowledge" as taking anything like a 'proposition' or 'thought', in the sense of Frege and Russell as its content.

Frege and Evans (to take two great examples) do emphasize the peculiarities of first personal representation, but insist on maintaining metaphysical parallelism with other cases.

Just as we would parse "Hannah believes that *Hannah* has a bruised nose" and "*Martha* believes that Hannah has a bruised nose" respectively

as: ...

So we should parse "Hannah believes that she herself has a bruised nose" and "Martha believes that she herself has a bruised nose"

Anscombe/Lewis

Anscombe and Lewis reject the analysis of the facts in question as:

Hannah		believes that		she* has a bruised nose.
Martha		believes that		she* has a bruised nose.

in favor of:

Hannah		believes that she*		has a bruised nose.
Martha		believes that she*		has a bruised nose.

The contents are the same and apprehensible by everyone – it is just that they are not “complete propositions”. The kind of belief or knowledge or saying-that that is involved in these cases is not a “relation to a proposition”, but to something else.

This is not a mere struggle over words.

Of course Frege can accept this partitioning , or analysis, of the thought, or of the fact, if it is a fact. He is large, he contains multitudes. The Anscombe/Loar/Lewis/Chisholm view is negative: it rejects the subject - attitude - proposition analysis in this sort of case.

Now, *what about the second person?*

Outer

Hannah said "Michael is a fool"
Hannah said "This guy is a fool"
Hannah said "You are a fool"

Inner

Hannah thinks Michael is a fool
Hannah thinks *this guy* is a fool
Hannah thinks ? ? ? ? ?

Is there a special "second personal" form of intellection associated with the last of these these?

The verdict of Richard Heck

As a matter of its standing meaning, an utterance of 'you' refers to the person addressed in that utterance. But in the sense that there is such a thing as a self-conscious, first-person belief, there is no such thing as a second-person belief, or so it seems to me. Of course, I can identify someone descriptively, as the person to whom I am now speaking, and may have beliefs whose contents involve that descriptive identification. But that is not what I mean to deny: I mean to deny that there is any such thing as an essentially indexical second-person belief. The phenomenon of the second-person is a linguistic one, bound up with the fact that utterances, as we make them, are typically directed to people, not just made to the cosmos.

Do Demonstratives Have Senses?, Philosopher's Imprint 2002

Propositional attitude vs. propositional relation

I will argue that

1. The letter of the Heck passage is right: *states of individual souls – belief, knowledge, etc. – cannot take a 'second personal' form of thinking-about-another, as there is a 'first-personal' form of thinking-about-oneself.*
2. The spirit of the Heck passage is wrong. The idea that there is a deep contrast – that the second person is mere language, mere dross on the surface, is false.
3. There is no reason to think that so-called 'intensional' contexts are generated only by states of single individuals. In addition to *propositional attitudes* in Russell's sense, we must recognize *propositional relations* or *propositional nexuses* of agents. We shall see several sorts of such nexus.
4. Once we see this, we will see that in fact many accounts of intuitively social phenomena in terms of agents' beliefs "about each other" are complete nonsense.
5. We will also see – I think – that a Fregean account of first person knowledge and belief is ill-advised for the simple reason that it cannot be extended to cover these cases.; I think we can also see that Lewis' version of the 'self-attribution of properties' view must also break down.

Circular concepts in practical philosophy

It is natural to think that X cannot promise anything to another unless X *knows* that he is promising, and *intends* to promise, etc.

A promise is usually given with a bare future tense statement – “I will take out the garbage” , “Yeah, I’ll be at the concert too” . Take away the understanding and will, and the promise is not there.

It is the same with *exchanging*, *marrying*, and many other action concepts.

(A weaker claim is true of an immense range of action concepts, that though an agent can do them unknowingly, unintentionally, etc., still, the existence of the concept rests on its being employed *in action*, e.g. turning something on.

A still weaker claim is true of concepts like that of wronging someone, or someone's having a claim on someone or a duty to someone.

But cases like promising, marrying, buying and selling – where it looks like we can say that the fact isn't there to be registered in thought, until it is registered in thought, are easier to consider.

The ungroundedness of the promise concept and its fellows

As many writers have noticed – e.g. Hume, Anscombe, Barwise – this makes for kind of ungroundedness in concepts like *promising*, *marrying*, *exchanging* and so on.

An empiricist picture of their content as founded on a relation to experience seems hopeless – as it doesn't with, say, “sliding across ice” or “falling over”.

How can I come to possess the concepts of promising, marrying, etc. if each is the concept of something the existence of which essentially contains ... the exercise of that concept?

I would have to possess the concept before I can possess it.

The relational character of these phenomena

I prefer to meditate on another aspect of action-forms like marrying, promising, buying, etc. :

1. that they are relational and social, and
2. that *the same cognitive and volitional requirement must hold of the other party.*

If X is marrying or promising, then, we say, she must understand, know, will this. But what about the other one?
Y too must know that she is receiving and accepting a promise, and is getting married, if the phenomenon of a promise or marriage is to be 'constituted'.

The marriage case, more closely examined

Let everything be as it in a normal wedding:

- ▶ the preacher is there,
- ▶ the loved ones are sobbing in the pews, and
- ▶ everyone thinks the two are getting married

Everyone thinks that ... *except the bride.*

She is confused by fear . She thinks it's just the 'second rehearsal'.
She doesn't think she's getting married.

- ▶ In that case, we want to say: *There has been no wedding. One of the constituents is missing.*

Which pronoun would they use in proto-Bantu?

But we have seen that the claims:

She doesn't think she's getting married.

and:

She thinks she's getting married

are somewhat indeterminate, at least in English.

Is it enough that she knows, thinks and wills that “she” is getting married in *any of* three ways we crudely distinguished above?

Calculemus.

What Michelle knew

Let us consider a more ordinary case. The would-be bride is, let us say, Michelle.

Is this what Michelle needs to think or know:

Michelle is getting married. (Nominal Thought)

Is this it:

This woman is getting married (the one whose hands she sees close by, sweating.) (Demonstrative Thought)

Nominal

Probably, but will that be enough? Note this is something the wedding party knows (if the marriage is in fact occurring), or readers of the engagements announced in the Times.

Demonstrative

Probably she must be that much together mentally! Again, she can hardly be more clueless than the wedding party who might be close enough to share this presentation of sweaty hands.

—

But it is clear that neither nominal nor demonstrative thought can provide the essential thing.

Michelle's cogito

It is plain that knowledge must be first personal thought.

- ▶ She must think and know this, that

she herself is getting married. (le pronom
geachien)

- ▶ I.e., she must think or know this, that

she is getting married.* (le
pronom castañedaiën(??))

- ▶ I.e., she must think or know what she might express in speech by saying:

"I am getting married".

This cognition of Michelle's will hardly be enough either, but let us briefly pass over to the other side of the aisle.

What Barack knew

We will perhaps need it that:

Barack knows that Barack is getting married
(Nominal)

and perhaps something on the order of

Barack knows that this man is getting married
(Demonstrative)

The decisive thing must again be “*first-personal*”:

Barack knows that “he himself” is getting married.
Barack knows that that he is getting married.*

The cognitive and volitional demands on the groom are similar.

Still, we are far from grasping the relation of the marriage nexus to the cognition of the parties – a cognition which we take in some sense to enter into the constitution of the nexus — as similar knowledge does in promising, buying and selling, etc.

What Michelle and Barack knew.

To think:

I am getting married.

is to think:

I am getting married to someone.

But in the case in question, we must demand a prior thought or knowledge of the form:

I am getting married to _____.

In particular, we want to say:

They (each) must know that they are marrying each other.

But how must the other be represented?

In fact it is clear that two parties, each of whom thinks that “she herself” or “he himself” is getting married *simpliciter* - that each of whom thinks “*I’m getting married*” - need not be getting married. This might happen even if they are otherwise surrounded by all the material facts adequate for a wedding, they are together before the preacher and the assembled, etc.

It is clear, though, for starters, that each must think that he is marrying *someone*, i.e., *someone in particular*, i.e., *a certain someone*. And this must somehow be the right one.

If two pairs of identical twins all raised apart are to get married in different chapels in this cathedral, but the grooms have somehow been mixed up, that no one has gotten married.

Our little dialected repeated for the opposing term in the relational thought: (1) Nominal thought

Is the condition we are looking for *this*:
that we have the paired thoughts:

Barack thinks that he is marrying Michelle?*

Michelle thinks that she is marrying Barack?*

It's not as bad as amnesia, but again, probably neither cannot be so far out of the loop as not to know this! This would exclude the mixed up twins. But is a quasi-legal point. It has the significance of the demand that Barack knows that *Barack* is getting married, and that Michelle knows that *Michelle* is getting married.

Our little dialectic repeated for the opposing term in the relational thought: (2) Demonstrative thought

Is the condition we are looking for this,

that we have the paired thoughts:

Michelle knows that she herself is marrying this man*
– i.e., the one given to her senses here at the
altar,
– i.e.. Barack?

Barack knows that he himself is marrying this woman*
– i.e., the one given to his senses here at the
altar?,
– i.e., Michelle?

Again, something like this is probably necessary.

note that this is something the mixed up twins did or would have had.

But more importantly, we are still at at position in developing the mode of presentation of the relatum that we found inadequate in considering the agents severally.

The crisis of the so-called second person

The crucial point is that the 'thoughts' known or affirmed or willed are so different for the two parties— respectively that
she herself is marrying this man.*

and that

he himself is marrying this woman*

These

things are more remote from each other than either is from the thought of the weeping onlookers,

this man is marrying this woman

or, what is the same:

this woman is marrying this man.

This thought at least has one representation in common with the thought of one or another party.

Their own thoughts have nothing in common but the relational concept: ξ is marrying ζ .

First-personalization *a deux*

The difficulty is that we can find no way to delete the demonstrative elements *this man* and *this woman* in the thoughts that

he himself is marrying this woman*

and that

she herself is marrying this man.*

What

we want is, as it were, the thought that:

he himself is marrying her* herself*

or equivalently:

she herself is marrying him* himself*

But

how can either of these be things that someone thinks or knows?
How can my thought or knowledge be so to speak doubly first personal?

But how can either of these be things that someone thinks or knows?

How can my thought or knowledge be so to speak doubly first personal?

Someone might want to say that we are chasing a will o' the wisp: these cases are not that important; if we must reject a certain intuition about the knowledge that is necessary so be it.

But the principal difficulty is much more far reaching.

Three 'reductive' accounts of social phenomena: Grice and Scanlon and (the young) Lewis

I will consider a subtle feature of three theories,

1. Grice's theory of communication
2. Scanlon's theory of assurances, and
3. the doctrine of 'common knowledge' in game theory (most famously developed in Lewis' dissertation, *Convention*.)

The are all very hard headed, but we will see that they are incredibly insouciant with pronouns – or variables

Scanlon's "Principle F"*

If

(1) in the absence of objectionable constraint, and with adequate understanding (or the ability to acquire such understanding) of his or her situation, A intentionally leads B to expect that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing so;

(2) A knows that B wants to be assured of this;

(3) A acts with the aim of providing this assurance, and has good reason to believe that he or she has done so;

(4) B knows that A has the beliefs and intentions just described;

*(5) A intends for B to know this, and knows that B does know it;
and*

(6) B knows that A has this knowledge and intent;

then:

in the absence of special justification, A must do X unless B consents to X's not being done.

Scanlon's theory is tailored precisely not to engender the specific circle Hume and Anscombe outline. The agents who form the assurance *do not operate with the concept of a promise* (or assurance.)

They just exhibit various mental states and actions, in various causal relations, and also employ the concepts of those states and causal relations.

Collapsing the numbered conditions...

Principle F $R(A,B)$

\Rightarrow

in the absence of special justification, A 'must' do X
unless B consents to X's not being done.

or equivalently:

Principle F $R(A,B)$ and B doesn't consent to A's not doing X
and A had no special justification not do do X

\Rightarrow

A 'must' do X.

I think in fact that we can help ourselves to a *B*/conditional if we study the surrounding text.

Scanlon refers to the 'specific' obligation that is formed through F, and distinguishes it from various imposters. This specific obligation, which as Aristotle might put it, is 'of' A and 'to' B and 'to do' X can only be constituted by R(A,B).

In particular, Scanlon tells us that he is explaining the *kind* of obligation that is generated by a promise – call it F-obligation – though he thinks that what is called promising is not necessary for its formation.

The biconditional latent in Scanlon is something like:

R(A,B) and A has no special justification not to do X and B doesn't consent to X's not being done

\Leftrightarrow

A is F-obliged to B to do X

The claim that Scanlon must hold something like this is not

Remark

In the past when I faced a theory like this, I confess that I would experience immediate revulsion. Scanlon claims that this is how things stand wherever we ordinarily think we have promised; and that this is what obliges us to act; this half page text expresses the 'reason' upon which the just agent founds her deed.

But I feel "It cannot be so complicated ... How can a writer of such singular taste and judgment go in for such a thing..."

Against such inarticulate complaints of the soft-minded, the practitioners of this sort of philosophy have many devices: "Why should our mental states be so familiar to us as you are thinking?; We don't mean it has to run through your mind; it is an 'ideal'; etc."

But on the other hand...

Unpacked recursively:

Here are the first 8 conjuncts of the consideration upon which the Scanlonite promise-keeper would ideally act:

- (1) A intentionally leads B to expect that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (2) A knows that B wants to be assured that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (3a) A acts with the aim of providing B the assurance that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X
- (3b) A believes that he or she has provided B with the assurance that that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X - and has good reason for this belief;
- (4.1) B knows that A believes that he or she has provided B with the assurance that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (4.2) B knows that A knows that B wants to be assured that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (4.3) B knows that A intends for B to expect that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (4.4) B knows that A intends to provide B the assurance that that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;

The next eight conjuncts:

- (5a.1) A intends that B know that A believes that he or she has provided B with the assurance that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (5a.2) A intends that B know that A knows that B wants to be assured that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (5a.3) A intends that B know that A intends for B to expect that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (5a.4) A intends that B know that A intends to provide B the assurance that that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (5b.1) A knows that B knows that A believes that he or she has provided B with the assurance that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (5b.2) A knows that B knows that A knows that B wants to be assured that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (5b.3) A knows that B knows that A intends for B to expect that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (5b.4) A knows that B knows that A intends to provide B the assurance that that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;

At this point - though, or because, soft-minded - I really did contemplate trying to compose a program to do the typing.

The last eight conjuncts:

- (6a.1) B knows that A knows that B knows that A believes that he or she has provided B with the assurance that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X
- (6a.2) B knows that A knows that B knows that A knows that B wants to be assured that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (6a.3) B knows that A knows that B knows that A intends for B to expect that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (6a.4) B knows that A knows that B knows that A intends to provide B the assurance that that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (6b.1) B knows that A intends that B know that A believes that he or she has provided B with the assurance that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (6b.2) B knows that A intends that B know that A knows that B wants to be assured that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X;
- (6b.3) B knows that A intends that B know that A intends to provide B the assurance that that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X; ...AND...
- (6b.4) B knows that A intends that B know that A intends to provide B the assurance that that A will do X unless B consents to A's not doing X.

Grice's theory of communication

The following formula is a sort of superimposition of versions:

U means it that p in saying w to A

⇔

U intends, in saying w, for A to believe that p

and moreover for A to believe it

because A sees t

↑↑*this*↑↑

Note the choice of letters in the definiens:

...U intends, in saying w, for A to believe that p - and moreover for A to believe it precisely because A sees that U intends this.

It is a fool's trap to suggest that in the use of "U" ("utterer") and "A" ("audience") Grice is appealing to certain 'roles'. It is precisely a sinister Cambridge doctrine about the 'roles' that he is bent on destroying; and appeal to any such a concept would beg the question.

Scanlon has agents A and B; Grice has agents U and A.
The vendor of such accounts would surely seek a more all-embracing generality....

Typical “definition of a game” *

Typical blather characteristic of the hard-minded:

A game is determined by a set of agents $x_1 - x_n$; each agent x_i faces $k(i)$ choices $a^1_i - a^{k(i)}_i$. Thus we have a sort of space with n dimensions, one for each agent; the positions on each axis are the choices available to the agent. The vectors, or points, in the space will be sets of compossible choices, assigning one choice to each agent.

The crucial factor determining the character of a game is the diversity in the preferences each agent has over each of these possibilities, or the associated outcome.

If the preferences are the same for all agents, and rank the outcomes for each, there is no problem. We can say that they severally act rationally in choosing that act associated with the set of acts that each ranks best. So it is generally if there is a unique best outcome that is that same for all. If there are two or more such sets of choices, we have a co-ordination problem. In that case, etc.,etc., etc., ...

ATTEND CLOSELY TO THE USE OF VARIABLES.

Common knowledge

o impose our fancy game-theoretic advice on $x_1 - x_n$, we have to suppose something about their intellects, not just their wills:

1. $x_1 - x_n$ all know the the facts contained in the foregoing description,
and
2. $x_1 - x_n$ all know 1
3. (iii) $x_1 - x_n$ all know 2,
4. etc. etc ad inf.

This is sometimes said to be an 'ideal'. There are really cool ways of writing it.

AGAIN, FRIEND, ATTEND CLOSELY TO THE USE OF
VARIABLES, IT LOOKS SO SUAVE.

How can we escape these ugly theories?

The appeal to the philosopher's taste and sense of reality has turned out to be unavailing. Perhaps they are right to be unimpressed.

But *the true objection is not of this kind.*

We soft-minded romantic types, we are distracted by the ugliness of it all, the unreality, the unfamiliar mental state pileup, the tall stacks of doxastic pancakes.

We ought to have realized that the wound from which these overly technical accounts bleed, and from which we bleed in the study of them, is a TECHNICAL error. We thought we did practical philosophy because we “couldn’t do the math” – or rather “couldn’t do the mereology”. But no, I say as usual, it was because we couldn’t not do philosophy.

The error is, I think, technical in character, but it is as simple as philosophy always is, according to soft-minded romantic conceptions.

The failure of all such theories is immediate, and resides in a fault which, if we were not blinded by free variables, we would realize was covered in *Analytic Philosophy* 101, Week 1.

The error is illiterate ‘quantifying in’ or rather something of which that is an example.

Indeed the proof of the falsehood and contradictoriness of these theories is *so simple* that the question how they ever arose is the more interesting one.

The answer is that this tradition got going 50's, with Grice in Oxford, for example – before Quine had made plain to all the difficulties associated with 'quantifying in' and that sort of thing; but more importantly, before the work of Geach, Castaneda and others had impressed on the world the peculiarity of the *first person* as it appears in such contexts.

My exhibition of the error follows. It would be a bit more compelling if one could frame it with demonstratives, but the following will do. (It is amusing to explain it to a couple of people where, with them, you are facing a mirror, and can 'share' with them demonstrate representations that are of each of them.)



Keep in mind the sorts of 'social' things our sophisticated experts are attempting to elucidate with heaps of doxastic pancakes, e.g.:

ζ told ξ that it was raining (Grice and co.)

ζ assured ξ that he wouldn't kill himself (Scanlon)

ζ and ξ knew that they were in game XYZ (Lewis and co.)

ζ married ξ (ourselves, perhaps, before we broke off the discussion)

These

are *real relations* into which real pairs of human individuals might fall. It doesn't matter what you call these people: the associated sentences aren't false with some representations of them, true with others. The contexts here exhibited by " ζ " and " ξ " are 'transparent', and the Fregean use of " ζ " and " ξ " to abstract the sign of a relation is legitimate.

A typical philosophers' fable: the setting*

We place ourselves in the dark days of the Depression: Clark Kent and Lois Lane are reporters for the *Daily Planet*, a Metropolis newspaper. Mr. Kent is Superman, a heroic figure whose deeds are a frequent topic of their reporting, but this fact - this *identity* - is not known to anyone but himself. His inevitable 'scoops' in connection with the developing Superman story frequently sting Miss Lane's journalistic vanity, but wrongly: the *Daily Planet* is just a day job for her. She is in fact Rippers Alboots, the anarchist poet and pamphleteer, a writer of great power, her works well-known wherever the black flag waves - though again this identity is secret to all but a few trusted friends, most of them now fighting in Spain.

A typical philosopher's fable: the action*

One day, let us suppose, Alboots asks where the paper clips are, and her colleague Superman says, "They're in the third drawer." [Testimony.]

An hour later, Alboots, feigning receipt of tickets from a sick friend - in fact a syndicalist tenor - proposes a date at the Metropolis Opera, and Superman irritably agrees, "Okay, okay, I'll meet you out front at a quarter to eight." [Promise, assurance.]

A typical philosopher's fable, Scanlon instantiated (part 1):

- (1) Superman intentionally leads Rippers Alboots to expect that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;
- (2) Superman knows that Rippers Alboots wants to be assured that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;
- (3a) Superman acts with the aim of providing Rippers Alboots the assurance that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera
- (3b) Superman believes that he or she has provided Rippers Alboots with the assurance that that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera - and has good reason for this belief;
- (4.1) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman believes that he or she has provided Rippers Alboots with the assurance that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;
- (4.2) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots wants to be assured that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;
- (4.3) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman intends for Rippers Alboots to expect that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;
- (4.4) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman intends to provide Rippers Alboots the assurance that that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;
- (5a.1) Superman intends that Rippers Alboots know that Superman believes that he or she has provided Rippers Alboots with the assurance that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;
- (5a.2) Superman intends that Rippers Alboots know that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots wants to be assured that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;
- (5a.3) Superman intends that Rippers Alboots know that Superman intends for Rippers Alboots to expect that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;
- (5a.4) Superman intends that Rippers Alboots know that Superman intends to provide Rippers Alboots the assurance that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(5b.1) Superman knows that Rippers Alboots knows that Superman believes that he or she has provided Rippers Alboots with the assurance that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(5b.2) Superman knows that Rippers Alboots knows that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots wants to be assured that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(5b.3) Superman knows that Rippers Alboots knows that Superman intends for Rippers Alboots to expect that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(5b.4) Superman knows that Rippers Alboots knows that Superman intends to provide Rippers Alboots the assurance that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(6a.1) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots knows that Superman believes that he or she has provided Rippers Alboots with the assurance that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera

(6a.2) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots knows that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots wants to be assured that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(6a.3) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots knows that Superman intends for Rippers Alboots to expect that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(6a.4) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots knows that Superman intends to provide Rippers Alboots the assurance that that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(6b.1) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman intends that Rippers Alboots know that Superman believes that he or she has provided Rippers Alboots with the assurance that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(6b.2) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman intends that Rippers Alboots know that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots wants to be assured that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(6b.3) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman intends that Rippers Alboots know that Superman intends for Rippers Alboots to expect that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera; ...AND...

(6b.4) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman intends that Rippers Alboots know that Superman intends to provide Rippers Alboots the assurance that that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera.

Let us focus on just the last eight, considering what they predicate of Rippers/Lois.

(6a.1) ξ knows that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots knows that Superman believes that he or she has provided Rippers Alboots with the assurance that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera

(6a.2) ξ knows that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots knows that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots wants to be assured that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(6a.3) ξ knows that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots knows that Superman intends for Rippers Alboots to expect that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(6a.4) Rippers Alboots knows that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots knows that Superman intends to provide Rippers Alboots the assurance that that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(6b.1) ξ knows that Superman intends that Rippers Alboots know that Superman believes that he or she has provided Rippers Alboots with the assurance that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(6b.2) ξ knows that Superman intends that Rippers Alboots know that Superman knows that Rippers Alboots wants to be assured that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

(6b.3) ξ knows that Superman intends that Rippers Alboots know that Superman intends for Rippers Alboots to expect that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera;

AND, finally....

(6b.4) ξ knows that Superman intends that Rippers Alboots know that Superman intends to provide Rippers Alboots the assurance that that Superman will show up at the Opera unless Rippers Alboots consents to Superman's not showing up at the Opera

This stuff she knows is stuff that anyone could know, exactly as she knows it.

We need only state matters this way to see that most of the appearances of names would do better to be replaced by pronouns - and moreover by pronouns of the type introduced to us by Geach and Casteneda, logophoric pronouns.

It will develop thought that this is impossible where two agents are involved, but we are stuck with one-subject intensional verbs like "intends" and "knows".

But let us carry on with what the elucidators have given us.

Grice instantiated

Again, let us keep in mind that it is plain that if $X = Z$ and $Y = W$, then X tells Y that p iff Z tells W that p .

U intends, in saying w , for A to believe that p - and moreover for A to believe it precisely because A sees that U intends THIS.

This becomes, given our *Daily Planet* data:

Rippers Alboots intends, in saying "They're in the third drawer," for Superman to believe that the paper-clips are in the third drawer - and moreover for Superman to believe it precisely because he sees that Rippers Alboots intends this.

Strang

thing to say of Lois, since she doesn't think she's ever met Superman, and surely thinks that he's nowhere around.

On the hypothesis that *if $X = Z$ and $Y = W$, then $G(X, Y, p)$ iff $G(Z, W, p)$* , where G is whatever it is that Grice is Gricing (intuitively: is telling), the following propositions will be equivalent:

Rippers Alboots intends, in saying "They're in the third drawer," for Superman to believe that the paper-clips are in the third drawer - and moreover for Superman to believe it precisely because he sees that Rippers Alboots intends this.

Lois Lane intends, in saying "They're in the third drawer," for Clark Kent to believe that the paper-clips are in the third drawer - and moreover for Clark Kent to believe it precisely because he sees that Lois Lane intends this.

But

our case would be one in which the first is false but the second true. Grice would seem to have failed of his intention.

Common knowledge *ad inf. et ad abs.* (Stage 0)

Here it is perhaps best to dispense with Rippers and Superman.

Suppose I have special names “ X_1 ” . . . “ X_{10} ” for ten of the people I care for in the asylum. They’re not too far gone, they just studied too much game theory.

Now, I happen to know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ are in a 10-dimensional game of some specific form, a sort of Lunatics’ Dilemma, say.

I assemble all my patients including these ten. They all trust me, rightly.

No one knows which patients I have assigned these names, but they know they are names, perhaps also that they are names of people among them.

Common knowledge in the asylum (Stage 1)

I then read the game-description, which as merely mildly disturbed imitators of John Nash, they all comprehend as we wouldnt because its kind of technical:

Blah blah X_1 blah X_2 ... X_9 blah blah X_{10} blah blah,

I say. So now my patients all *know* that blah blah X_1 blah X_2 ... X_9 blah blah X_{10} blah blah just as much as I do.

Common knowledge in the asylum (Stage 2)

In particular, since they are present, $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that blah blah X_1 blah $X_2 \dots X_9$ blah blah X_{10} blah blah.

So I tell my flock, what I just told you, and is now true:

Moreover, $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that blah blah X_1 blah $X_2 \dots X_9$ blah blah X_{10} blah blah

So now my patients all know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that blah blah X_1 blah $X_2 \dots X_9$ blah blah X_{10} blah blah.

Common knowledge in the asylum (Stage 3)

In particular, since they are present, $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that blah blah X_1 blah $X_2 \dots X_9$ blah blah X_{10} blah blah.

So, again, I tell my flock, what I just told you, and is now true:

$X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that blah blah X_1 blah $X_2 \dots X_9$ blah blah X_{10} blah blah.

So now my patients all know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that blah blah X_1 blah $X_2 \dots X_9$ blah blah X_{10} blah blah.

Common knowledge in the asylum(Stage 4)

In particular, since they are present, $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that blah blah X_1 blah $X_2 \dots X_9$ blah blah X_{10} blah blah.

So, again, I tell my flock, what I just told you, and is now true:

Moreover, $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that blah blah X_1 blah $X_2 \dots X_9$ blah blah X_{10} blah blah.

So now my patients all know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that blah blah X_1 blah $X_2 \dots X_9$ blah blah X_{10} blah blah.

Common knowledge (Stage 5)

In particular, since they are present, $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that blah blah X_1 blah $X_2 \dots X_9$ blah blah X_{10} blah blah.

So, again, I tell my flock, what I just told you, and is now true:

Moreover, $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that blah blah X_1 blah $X_2 \dots X_9$ blah blah X_{10} blah blah.

So now my patients all know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ know that blah blah X_1 blah $X_2 \dots X_9$ blah blah X_{10} blah blah.

I don't mean to torture anyone with this.

Or maybe I do

Maybe I want to get even.

Common knowledge, meta-reflection

It is plain that no amount of the knowledge I keep pouring forth upon them brings $X_1 \dots X_{10}$ any closer to what is intended under the heading of 'common knowledge'. None brings them closer to what what make it rational for any of them to apply the orthodox solution of Lunatics' Dilemmas, whatever it is.

Not one step.

There is really *nothing* in these fancy definitions, no matter how many Nobel prizes are awarded for producing them. It is what is known as complete bullshit, as the soft-minded, with their short stacks, might have told you. But they foolishly emphasized the shortness of their stacks, not the ludicrous ineptness with pronouns.

Free variable reductions, meta-reflection *

The trouble with these theories is that they attempted to elucidate a general relation between agents that evidently involves their intellects and wills by putting the signs of generality that characterize a general elucidation of a property or relation into direct and indirect contexts alike and indifferently. But such a formula can no more formulate a relation than “is so called because of his size” can formulate a property potentially possessed by many, a *Begriff* under which they might fall.

Thus instantiations with unfamiliar names, or demonstratives will have the agents themselves thinking via these unfamiliar names and demonstratives. But it shouldn't matter how we instantiate, the relation being elucidated hold of a pair of agents or doesn't hold, irrespective of how anyone is naming or perceiving them.

Free variable reductions, meta-meta-reflection *

It might be thought that this can be repaired by using Castaneda's "he*" or Geach's "she herself" in appropriate locations.

The trouble is that "X believes that ..." and "X intends that ..." and "X knows that ..." can only support one such variable at a time.

This is implicitly noticed by Richard Heck

Free variable reductions, meta-meta-reflection

What is needed in all of these cases – in the representation of marriage and the knowledge that accompanies it, for example, with which we began – is a way to make sense of a pair of opposed Geach-Casteneda pronouns.

But this will involve the recognition of 'verbs' that produce an intentional context, but take more than one subject. This I will call a PROPOSITIONAL NEXUS or PROPOSITIONAL RELATION, in distinction from what Russell called a PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE (of a single subject.)


Of course this is what all those theories were trying to avoid. It must rather be accepted, as first-person belief and knowledge are. Of course this is not the end of philosophy on these topics but the beginning.

Free variable reductions, meta-meta-reflection

Let us begin again, and consider how we might represent relations in which agents “think of each other”.


I will give some goofy symbolic representations of simple forms of knowledge and belief. They are calculated to admit the phenomena we are interested in, as we will see. We will begin with knowledge and belief and relations like informing and learning from, but our quarry is the knowledge of Barack and Michelle.


1. *Michael knows that Barack has won:*

Michael  Barack has won

Michael  Barack has won


2. *Michael believes that the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand:*


Michael  the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand

Michael  the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand

Propositional teaching (informing)

3. *Michael informs Hannah that Barack has won:*

Michael  Barack has won
Hannah

Michael  Barack has won
Hannah

Spread of opinion (doxa)

4. Michael convinces Hannah that the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand:

Michael
Hannah


	— the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand
--	------------------------------------


Michael
Hannah

the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand

Knowledge about oneself “as other” vs. self-attributive knowledge

5. *Barack knows that Barack loves Michelle:*

Barack  — Barack loves Michelle


Barack  Barack loves Michelle

How does he know this? He might be an amnesiac who reads it in the paper, but this is unlikely.

Of course he only knows this because he knows that *he himself is Barack*, and that *he himself loves Michelle*.

I.e. because


6. *Barack knows that he (himself) loves Michelle:*

Barack (ϵ)  ϵ loves Michelle


Barack (ϵ)  ϵ loves Michelle

and,

Barack knows that he himself is Barack


Barack (ϵ)  ϵ loves Michelle


and

Barack (ϵ)  ϵ is Barack


The form of self-attributive knowledge


If he is looking in the mirror, or at his hands, he also knows:

Barack (ϵ)  ϵ is this animal, or this human being

Barack (ϵ)  ϵ is this animal, or this human being


The last several propositions are cases of the general form 'knowing oneself to be' which we may write:

_____ (ϵ)  ... ϵ ...

_____ (ϵ)  ... ϵ ...

These forms require completion by a representation of a subject and a predicative element. So, to take a typical Fregean example, we have....

5. *Barack knows that he, himself, voted for himself.*

Barack (ϵ)  ϵ voted for ϵ

Barack (ϵ)  ϵ voted for ϵ

Anscombe and Lewis on the first person

The famous teaching of Anscombe, that “I” is not a referring term”, and Lewis’ famous doctrine of first-person belief and knowledge as immediate “self-attribution” amount to the claim that our forms:

----- (ε) **I** — ... ε ...

----- (ε) **...** ε ...

cannot be reduced to general ‘propositional’ knowledge or belief:

----- **I** —

----- **...**

It is simply a different relation. The first attitude is not properly ‘propositional’. The identity has lately been proclaimed by Kripke, which annoyed but also emboldened me. Famously Lewis attempts to reduce all seeming propositional knowledge to the first person knowledge. Anscombe thinks, if I understand, that self-attribution and first-person knowledge are to be understood by maintaining a

First-personal informing or 'teaching'

6. *Barack informs Michelle that he (himself) voted for himself*

Barack
Michelle



voted for ϵ

Barack (ϵ)
Michelle



voted for ϵ

Of course, as Aristotle would point out, this is the same as the proposition

Michelle learns from Barack that he, himself, voted for himself

Or indeed,

Michelle knows from Barack that he, himself, voted for himself.

Second personal informing or 'teaching'

8. *Barack informs Michelle that she, herself, has mud on her face*


Barack
Michelle (ϵ) ϵ has mud on ϵ 's face

Barack
Michelle (ϵ) ϵ has mud on ϵ 's face

The crucial thing to notice is that there is no difference here. I use my little “ ϵ ” again, but move it to the lower position. We can say that here there is second personal teaching, and first personal learning, but these are the same.

9. Now at last we are in a position to represent an intrinsically second-personal, i.e. two-personal, or recognitional, phenomenon:

Barack (ϵ)
Michelle (η)



ϵ loves η

Which of course is the same as:

Barack (η)
Michelle (ϵ)



η loves ϵ

Here the *eta* and the *epsilon* have the same function. The necessity of multiplying them is like the necessity of multiplying variable “x” and “y” and “z” in school algebra.

Thus I say that in *rerum natura*, “the second person is the first person”

We considered earlier the propositions:

Barack \vdash ϵ is marrying Michelle (or: this woman)

Michelle \vdash Barack (or: this man) is marrying ϵ

this last amounting to the same as:

Michelle \vdash ϵ is marrying Barack (this man)

These seemed inadequate to explain the cognition implicit in the act of marriage.

The marriage cognition

We can now see that it is something like:

Barack ε is marrying η Michelle

that should represent the knowledge contained in a fact like:

Barack is marrying Michelle

The two propositions are equivalent.

In falling into this relation the agents 'relate themselves to each other' through it, just as in, say falling under an action concept, I bring myself under it.

Where we have a concept $\xi R \zeta$ – something's being R to something – we also have what we might call the associated Fregean reflexive $\xi R \xi$ – something's being R to itself. To this we may oppose a more properly Aristotelian reflexive. Here $\xi V \xi$ will be of a piece with $\xi V \zeta$ – V'ing is *of* one, and *by* ... another – or 'itself as other'. But in suitable cases ('moves', for example) there will be another concept, self-V'ing.

Similarly we have a Fregean reciprocal. The reciprocal of the relation $\xi R \zeta$, i.e. and ξ and ζ are R "to each other" is explained as when $\xi R \zeta$ & $\zeta R \xi$. To this we may oppose a would be Aristotelian reciprocal.

Similarly,

Barack ϵ is agreeing with η that ϵ will do A and η will do B — Michelle

represents the knowledge implicit in:

Barack is agreeing with Michelle that he will do A and she will do B.

We can see how this phenomenon could be extended to many agents agreeing on a scheme of action.

The promise is just a one-sided case of this, that is:

Barack \vdash ϵ is promising η that ϵ will do A \dashv Michelle

is the knowledge contained in:

Barack is promising Michelle that she will do A.

(SKIP)

Of course, if she overhears the school nurse say “Hannah has a bruised nose” the order of cognition would be different:

Hannah has a bruised nose I am Hannah
I have a bruised nose

And of course in that case Hannah’s knowledge that Hannah has a bruised nose will spring from the nurse’s cognition, which we might represent thus:

This girl has a bruised nose This girl is Hannah
Hannah has a bruised nose

How are we to understand the relation of one agent to another in the operation of the virtue of justice?

How are we to understand the peculiar causality or impact of one upon another – the dent each makes in the agency of the other – where they live by this virtue, or apparent virtue.

What is it for agents to be ‘persons in relation to each other’ in the

Why the practical philosopher must attend to such considerations

The question of first-personal and second-personal intellectual operations would seem from my point of view be a bit of a scholastic exercise if it were not that:

The focus of ethical theorizing, action in a certain robust sense, seems to be necessarily or necessarily typically accompanied by a first person representation

