Abstract
In this paper, we review Keith Lehrer’s account of the basing relation, with particular attention to the two cases he offered in support of his theory, Raco (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge, 1990; Theory of knowledge, (2nd ed.), 2000) and the earlier case of the superstitious lawyer (Lehrer, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311–313, 1971). We show that Lehrer’s examples succeed in making his case that beliefs need not be based on the evidence, in order to be justified. These cases show that it is the justification (rather than the belief) that must be based in the evidence. We compare Lehrer’s account of basing with some alternative accounts that have been offered, and show why Lehrer’s own account is more plausible.
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Notes
For another objection to Swain’s account of the basing relation, see Tolliver (1982).
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Another who disputes Lehrer’s assessment of his own cases is Audi (1983), who contends that Lehrer’s lawyer should not be counted as justified, because the way in which the lawyer came to believe what he did was not a process that would reliably produce true belief. Had the cards told the lawyer something false, the lawyer would have believed the falsehood instead. Hence, it was only “good fortune” that the lawyer seemed to have good evidence for his belief: “Surely if one’s belief that p is justified by good evidence, it cannot simply be good fortune that one did not believe something false instead” (Audi 1983, p. 406). We do not find this claim at all persuasive. No one disputes the fact that the lawyer’s belief was the product of an incredibly unreliable belief-forming process. The issue at hand, however, is whether the belief’s unreliable origin is enough to undermine its justification. Again, we find this implausible, for the process by which the lawyer re-examines his evidence is as reliable as the tarot cards are unreliable. A story is owed as to why the bad luck that affects the causal origin of a belief is enough to infect the justification of that belief. Lehrer replies to objections similar to the one made by Audi in Olsson (2003, pp. 322–326).
In (2000, 198), Lehrer changes the sentence somewhat: “Justification for acceptance of a belief that is known to be true is based on specific evidence if and only if [the knower’s] having that evidence explains how he knows that the belief he accepts is true.”.
We are not the first to have noticed this shift: See Audi (1983, p. 405).
References
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Tierney, H., Smith, N.D. Keith Lehrer on the basing relation. Philos Stud 161, 27–36 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9938-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9938-z