Deflationary Normative Pluralism
- Deflationary Normative Pluralism
Let us give voice to this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values should itself, for once, be examined.
– Friedrich Nietzsche2
Anyone who, stimulated by education, has come to feel the force of the various obligations in life, at some time or other comes to feel the irksomeness of carrying them out, and to recognize the sacrifice of interest involved; and, if thoughtful, he inevitably puts to himself the question: "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act? … Should I not really be justified in simply trying to have a good time?"
– H.A. Prichard3
Questions regarding what we today refer to as the "normative force" of morality have been asked by philosophers for quite some time. Among the more radical of contributions to these debates were those of Friedrich Nietzsche and H.A. Prichard. Whereas Nietzsche took aim at morality itself, Prichard focused his critical glare on the tradition of moral philosophy. He believed that moral philosophy, as bequethed to us by the Ancients, rested on the mistaken assumption that its fundamental task is to answer the "Why be moral?" question. Contrary to the central projects of moral philosophers from Plato to Kant, the [End Page 231] normativity of morality is not something that can be gleaned by philosophic argument or analysis; it can only be apprehended "immediately and underivatively" by moral intuition. Like Prichard, I argue here for the radical claim that one cannot coherently ask "Why ought I act as I am morally obligated to act?" However, this is not due to the limitations of philosophic argument. Rather, it is because the question presupposes the existence of a "free unsubscripted" sense of "ought," which, according to the deflationary normative pluralism I defend in this paper, does not exist.
1. Introduction
The English expression "Why be moral?," and many of its variations, can refer to a number of distinct questions. For the purposes of this paper, I shall focus on two related interpretations. The first understands the question as asking for a vindication of the normative authority of morality; call it the authority question. Read this way, the issue essentially is whether moral considerations provide one with at least pro tanto reasons for action. Closely related is a concern over the comparative authority that morality has vis-à-vis other standpoints such as self-interest or the law. That is, one could interpret the "Why be moral?" question as asking, not whether morality simply produces pro tanto reasons, but whether it produces overriding reasons. Call this the supremacy question.
On either interpretation the question is illegitimate, according to Prichard, because it implicitly contains a false presupposition. Since the "Why be moral?" question begins with the fact of an action's rightness and proceeds to ask why that fact offers a sufficient practical justification of action, it contains the implicit assumption that goodness is prior to rightness when it comes to practical justification. This diagnosis is supported, to Prichard's mind, by an examination of the history of moral philosophy, which, on Prichard's reading, consists of a series of attempts at demonstrating the good, whether agent-relative or agent-neutral, that comes from acting morally. While there are convincing grounds for rejecting this line of argument,4 I think [End Page 232] Prichard is right to question what assumptions are built into the "Why be moral?" question. Even if the priority of goodness over rightness is not necessarily assumed in the question, there could be other questionable assumptions that would render either question illegitimate.
In this paper I shall focus on one specific assumption of both the authority and the supremacy questions, viz. that there is such a thing as unqualified justification of action. The question "Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways in which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?" employs the concept of an unqualified reason, what Philippa Foot called a "free unsubscripted 'ought'"5; however, the legitimacy of this concept is questionable. It is a feature of the view I...
