2 On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 8.

3 “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, Mind 21 (1912): 21-37 (at 21).

4 E.g., Schmidtz, DavidRational Choice and Moral Agency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995),Google Scholar chap. 6; revised version reprinted in this volume, “Because It's Right,” this volume, 63-95.

5 “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” in Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches, ed. 5. A. Gibbard, DarwallRailton, P. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 313-22;Google Scholar quotation taken from the 1977 postscript included as endnote 15, p. 320.

6 Ethics Without Principles (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 15.

7 Dialogue adapted from the script for the Seilzfeld episode “The Dinner Party“; http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheDinnerParty.html; accessed Dec., 2008.

8 “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” 315.

9 In Nagel's terminology, it is a “motivated desire“; see The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).

10 Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977), though for Mackie institutions only provide reasons for those who endorse the institution (see 77-82).

11 “Foundationalism and Practical Reason,” Mind 106 (1997): 451-73 (at 467).

12 One might argue that we should interpret their debate as regarding the content of the relevant social norms, rather than the authority of those norms. However, it is more consistent with George's character that he be interpreted as denying the authority of social norms.

13 “Foundationalism and Practical Reason,” 467.

14 As defended by, e.g., Jonathan Dancy, Etlzics Witlzout Principles; and Robinson, Luke “Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism,” Mind 115 (2006): 331-60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 This is not the same as the claim that there is no property common to all contributory reasons. It is possible that any normative relation must have the right kind of direction of fit between norm and domain covered by norm. But there are other properties of any particular instance of the favouring relation -e.g., whether it favours holistically or atomistically or whether it favours with overriding strength. My claim is that the properties of any particular favouring relation are determined by its corresponding normative domain.

16 Practical Reasoning ami Ethical Decision (New York: Routledge, 2006), 183.

17 Cf., among many others, Gibbard, Allan: “…what it is rational to do settles what to do,” Wise Choias, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 49;Google Scholar and Joshua Gert: “For me … rationality is the ftmdamental normative notion applying to action. Once one has shown someone that her act is irrational, that should be the end of the matter, as far as argument goes,” “Moral Reasons and Rational Status,” this volume, 171-196, at 178, original emphasis.

18 A Ia Hubin, Donald “The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality,“ foumal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 44∼8;Google Scholar and Copp, David “The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2005): 165–203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The following terminology of “Reason as such” is taken from Copp, “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason,” Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1997): 86-106.

19 I use the term “override” loosely here to mean that he ultimately decides to lj!. I do not want to rule out the possibility that consideration (3) entitles the agent in question to Ψ without thereby entailing that he has more reason to Ψ than to Φ. I leave open the possibility that the agent could correctly think that he would be both morally and rationally justified to either Φ or Ψ. That is, the claim I am making here does not presuppose the view Joseph Raz labels “rationalism” (111) in his “Incommensurability and Agency,” in lncommensurability, lncomparability, and Practical Reason, ed. Ruth Chang (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 110-28.

20 The Rejection of Collsequelltialism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982).

21 “Moral Reasons and Rational Status,” 171 (at 1). Strictly speaking, though, I think it more accurate to read Gert as concerned with a different question. Given that Gert believes “rationality is the fundamental normative notion applying to action” (ibid., 178), I think it is more accurate to characterize the quoted question as asking about permissibility from the standpoint of “Reason-as-such.” This, I think, is why Copp does not agree with Gert that “the best interpretation of [Copp's) ‘makes sense', in his contribution to this volume, is equivalent to my 'is rationally permissible“’ (ibid., 177n8). As a normative pluralist, Copp denies that there is a fundamental normative notion, thus he denies that we can coherently ask whether, according to the fundamental normative standpoint, it is permissible to act morally. That said, I argue in section 4 that Copp's notion of “makes sense” attempts to occupy an unstable middle ground.

22 What I am calling “agential choice” is equivalent to Sartrean “radical choice,“ insofar as I understand Sartre.

23 Nietzsche, The Gay Scimce, quoted in Tanner, MichaelNietzsche, Past Masters Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 38.Google Scholar

24 Williams, “Moral Luck,” in his Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 20–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25 Ibid., 22.

26 Ibid.

27 Feist, G.J. “The Influence of Personality on Artistic Creativity,” in Handbook of Creatil'ity, ed. Sternberg, R. J. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 273-96;Google ScholarEysenck, H.J.Genius: The Natural History of Creativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995);CrossRefGoogle ScholarAndreasen, N.C. “Creativity And Mental Illness: Prevalence Rates In Writers And Their First-Degree Relatives,” American foumal of Psyclziatry 144 (1987): 1288–1292.Google ScholarPubMed Nick Smyth, who directed me to this research, argues in “Necessary Evil: Morality and Creativity in Conflict” (MA project, Simon Fraser University) that the immorality of creative geniuses is ultimately justified because (a) there is what he calls a “necessary negative covariation“ between morality and a creative genius's pursuit of her project, and (b) as a society, we place tremendous value on the works produced by creative geniuses.

28 Cf. Brink, David “Kantian Rationalism: lnescapability, Authority, and Supremacy,“ in Ethics and Practical Reason, ed. Cullity, G. and Gaut, B. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 255-91.Google Scholar Brink distinguishes “norms” from “reasons” and argues, contra Foot, that standpoints like etiquette may generate norms (indeed, categorical norms), but they fail to generate practical reasons.

29 E.g., Darwall, : “It does not follow [from the fact the etiquette requires one to act in a certain way] … that there is a reason with genuine deliberative weight for so acting” (“Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction,“ in Moral Discourse and Practice, ed. Darwall, S.Gibbard, A. and ton, P. Rail305-12, at 306).Google Scholar

30 The reference is to a skit from Mcmty Pytlrcm's Flying Circus in which John Clecse turns down a grant applicant on the grounds that his gait is insufficiently silly.

31 “Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value,” in her Crcating the Kingdom of Ends,; (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 222-48, at 227 (emphasis added).

32 One notable exception is David Brink's “dualism of practical reason” in his “Kantian Rationalism.” I read Brink as advocating a kind of foundationalist view, but as recognizing two foundations rather than just one. As Brink puts it: “I am essentially not just a rational agent but also a partiwlar rational agent, numerically distinct from other agents” (287). Thus, Brink recognizes two foundational sources for reasons, viz. rational agency as such and one's particular rational agency; the former roughly corresponds to moral reasons and the latter to prudential reasons. Both have ultimate authority, but neither has supremacy over the other.

33 Not so much in the previously cited “Aristotle and Kant” paper, but in, e.g., The Sources; of Normativiity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

34 E.g., Brandt, RichardA Theory of the Good and the Right (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979);Google ScholarRailton, Peter “Facts and Values,” Philosophical Topic,; 24 (1986): 5–31;CrossRefGoogle ScholarRosati, Connie “Internalism and the Good for a Person,” Ethic, 106 (1996): 297–326.CrossRefGoogle Scholar I am not claiming that these, or the following, authors in fact see their views as versions of foundationalist monism, just that the views could plausibly be read that way.

35 E.g., Regan, Donald “How to be a Moorean,” Ethics 113 (2003): 651-77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

36 E.g., McDowell, John “Might There Be External Reasons,” in World, Miud, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bmrard Williams, ed. Altham, J.E.J. and Harrison, R. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995),Google Scholar 68-85-although McDowell uses the language of “having been properly brought up” rather than that of “practical wisdom.” See also his “Values and Secondary Qualities,” in Morality aud Objrctivity, ed. T. Honderich (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 110-29.

37 E.g., Smith, MichaelThe Moral Problem (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994)Google Scholar and “Internal Reasons,” Philosophy aud Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 109-31.

38 “Groundless Normativity.“

39 Ibid., 464.

40 Ibid., 466.

41 Ibid., 467.

42 Ibid., 466.

43 Ibid., 467-68.

44 “Ring of Gyges“; “Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason“; “The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?” this volume, 97-130; “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity,” in Normativity and Naturalism, ed. Schaber, Peter (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2004), 7–45;CrossRefGoogle Scholar “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” Philosophical Issues 19: Metaethics (2009): 21-37.

45 “Ring of Gyges,” 86-87.

46 “Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” 198.

47 Ibid., 195.

48 Ibid., 196 (emphasis added).

49 “The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?” 110.

50 I should note that I find Copp's view not only extremely rich and interesting, but complex and subtle. Despite Copp's best efforts through correspondence and conversation, I am not sure I fully understand the overall position. For this reason, I rely on quoted passages to do more of the expository work than is customary or ideal.

51 “Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” 197.

52 Ibid., 197 (emphasis added).

53 Ibid., 199.

54 Ibid..

55 Ibid., 196.

56 “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” 22.

57 Cf. Copp, Morality, Normativity, and Society; Copp, “Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism,” Social Philosopl1y and Policy 18 (2001): 1-43. Although Copp is not a deflationist, he is a normative pluralist (See Copp, “Ring of Gyges,” op. cit., “Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason“).

58 For example, the kind of “extemalist realism” defended by David Brink (“Externalist Moral Realism,” Soutl1em Journal of Philosophy, Supplement 24 [1986]: 23-42) -i.e., that which accepts what Darwall (“Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality“) has labelled “judgment externalism” -would fall short of the kind of normative realism under discussion here.

59 Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defense (New York: Clarendon Press at Oxford, 2003), 203–209.Google Scholar

60 Ibid., 206.

61 See Nelkin, Dana “Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom,” jornal of Plrilosoplry 97 (2000): 564-76,Google Scholar for a critique of neo-Kantian standpoint-arguments. Elsewhere I have argued that prominent Kantian constructivist arguments for the authority of morality depend on an assumption of transcendental freedom: “How Kantian Must Kantian Constructivists Be?” lnquiry 49 (2006): 524-46.