Abstract
At first pass, internalism about justification is the view that there is no justificatory difference without an internal difference. Externalism about mental content is the view that there are differences in mental content without an internal difference. Assuming (complete) mental contents are the primary bearers of justificatory features, the two views are in obvious tension. The goal of this paper is to determine how the tension is best resolved.
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Tillman, C. Reconciling justificatory internalism and content externalism. Synthese 187, 419–440 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9827-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9827-y