Abstract
In this paper I argue from a number of positions that are, while not uncontested, at least common among analytic philosophers of religion for the possibility, and indeed the plausibility, of a doctrine of limbo. The account of limbo that I advocate is substantially different than the element of Catholic speculative theology that goes by the same name. According to that doctrine, the limbus infantium is a place or state of perfect natural happiness for those who, prior to the age of reason, die without baptism. Given the possibility of ‘baptism by desire’, the need for limbo, as I shall develop it, is not based on whether or not an agent has received the sacrament of baptism. Instead limbo is, I argue, a place where individuals who have not had sufficient opportunity to be reconciled to God in the present life will be given the opportunity to do so in the next life. Limbo, so understood, is a place which allows for the post-mortem healing and growth of individuals so that they are able to choose either for or against God in the way required for redemption in this life. On this view, limbo is not a place of ‘second-chances’, but rather a place of first-chances for those who were denied them in their terrestrial life.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For one of the few brief discussions of limbo in the contemporary philosophy of religion literature, see Griffiths (2008). The differences between this understanding of limbo and the account advocated below are numerous and fundamental.
See Walls (2002) for this sort of criticism.
For a discussion of why libertarianism is more common among philosophers of religion than among philosophers in general, see many of the chapters in Timpe and Speak (2016), but especially the introduction by the editors.
I do not think that the argument to follow requires libertarianism for it to work. I suspect that the compatibilist could, if she wanted, avail herself of much of what is to follow, particularly if she thinks that determinism is false and that we do have free will. So for such a compatibilist, I think that she should be interesting in seeing if the following arguments work on the assumption of libertarianism. For if it does, it is an argumentative strategy that she too could avail herself of. In this way, the situation is akin to the compatibilist who takes advantage of or even develops a response to the luck objection. However, see footnote 9.
I do not want to assume here that all human agents have free will though I think that, if the argument that follows work, I will have gone some distance towards making that claim plausible by providing a way of responding to some of the difficult cases that might motivate the belief that only some, and not all, humans have free will.
Save at least one, namely the human nature united to God in the incarnation. Depending on the exact nature of one’s theological views, there may be two humans that do not suffer from sin, actual or original. For present purposes, I am bracketing these exceptions. In what follows, this restriction should be assumed wherever relevant.
I do not think that reconciliation is limited to humans; ultimately, my eschatological hope is that all creation will be reconciled to God. But, following Aquinas, I think that grace perfects natures, rather than acts against it. So the reconciliation of other ontological kinds will depend on their natures. Insofar as a rock has neither rational faculties nor free will, it can be reconciled to God without the involvement of its (non-existent) will.
In the case of infants who have not yet developed free will, and thus could not have exercised it sinfully, this particular effect of sin will not be relevant. However, assuming the traditional Christian doctrine of original sin, the other of the two problems will apply to all humans, and will be sufficient for needing to give an account of human redemption. More on this below.
If, contrary to my earlier assumption of the truth of libertarianism, compatibilism were true, then the above is too quick. For if God can determine how we use our free will then God can ensure that all human are rightly oriented toward Himself. So, on the assumption of compatibilism, God can ensure to avoid the damnation of any by determining how humans will. However, insofar as most compatibilists think that God doesn’t ensure that we always use our will rightly—as the existence of moral evil demonstrates—then presumably there are goods served by the fails of universalism, goods which are incompatible with God’s determining agents to always will correctly, they would have to hold that there are certain goods that God can’t bring about if He also determines that we always will properly.
I think that Walls’ claim is too strong here. In virtue of what is it true that such individuals ‘would respond’ in a particular way? I think we can say that they might respond in this way. But given libertarianism (and the rejection of Molinism that Walls and I both share), I do not think that we can say that they would always respond positively to more light. So I am also assuming here the falsity of Molinism. But as Kate Rogers says in a recent paper,” I do not take it as a significant drawback of this project that I am forced to assume Molinism, which I think is necessarily false, is false.” (Rogers 2008: 128)
Consider the following from William Lycan:
Compatibilism, not just about free will but generally, on any topic, is the default. For any modal claim to the effect that some statement is a necessary truth, I would say that the burden of proof is on the claim’s proponent. A theorist who maintains of something that is not obviously impossible that nonetheless that thing is impossible owes us an argument. And since entailment claims are claims of necessity and impossibility, the same applies to them. Anyone who insists that a sentence S1 entails another sentence S2 must defend that thesis if it is controversial. If I tell you that “Pigs have wings” entails “It snows every night in Chapel Hill,” you need not scramble to show how there might be a world in which the first was true but the second false; rather, you would rightly demand that I display the alleged modal connection. And of course the same goes for claims of impossibility. The point is underscored, I think, if we understand necessity as truth in all possible worlds. The proponent of a necessity, impossibility, entailment or incompatibility claim is saying that in no possible world whatever does it occur that so-and-so. That is a universal quantification. Given the richness and incredible variety of the pluriverse, such a statement cannot be accepted without argument save for the case of basic logical intuitions that virtually everyone shares. (Lycan 2003: 109)
Elsewhere I have endorsed this argument as a good methodological starting point, and that logical possibility should generally be assumed until an argument can be given to show logical impossibility [See Timpe (2012: 21f)]. This, then, gives us some initial (defeasible) reason for thinking it is possible that there are free but sinful humans who die prior to having an opportunity to be reconciled to life in this life.
How wide is this category? Does it include the mentally ill? The cognitively disabled? The developmentally disabled? The emotionally disabled? Bob Hartman (in person) wants to know. On my view, it will include all those who, through no fault of their own, can no opportunity to become reconciled to God in the present life and are not able—due to age, development, disability or the like—to make such a choice at the time of their death. In another series of papers, I am currently exploring the ways that various kinds of disability might impact and impair moral agency. For an overview of this branch of research, see Timpe (forthcoming) Luke Henderson (in person) has asked if geographic factors can make one unable to be reconciled to God? Perhaps; I honestly don't know. Hartman also wants to know if the cut-off for ‘sufficient’ can be vague? If so, God goes to the first non-metaphysically vague sufficient opportunity and gives them at least that much—(in person).
I am not saying that there can be only one opportunity for reconciliation with God in limbo, but there can be no second-chances if there is not a first-chance. And I am primarily interested here in limbo as giving at least a first-chance.
Or as a young child, or in utero…. In these addition cases, the same conditions would hold. In what follows, this extension of my argument beyond infants proper should be understood wherever applicable.
Rogers has pointed out to me in conversation that Anselm does differentiate how non-baptized infants will be punished in hell from how those who commit actual sin will be punished: “Clearly there is a great difference between Adam’s sin and infants’ sin. For Adam sinned of his own will, but his progeny sin by the natural necessity which his own personal will has merited. Although no one thinks that equal punishment follows unequal sins, nevertheless the condemnation of personal and of original sin is alike in that no one is admitted to the Kingdom of God (for which man was made) except by means of the death of Christ, without which the debt for Adam’s sin is not paid. Yet, not all individuals deserve to be tormented in Hell in equal degree.” (Anselm 2000: 457)
Individuals who, in limbo, chose to reconcile with God may still need purgatory to make sure they are sanctified not just justified, and therefore fit for heaven. The process of sanctification, as I understand it, involves the will (see Timpe 2013, particularly Section 6.4).
Mike Rota, Tim Pawl, and Turner Nevitt have all raised a version of this worry (in person). My view also departs from Catholic theology insofar as limbo on my proposal runs afoul of parts of the Catechism:
Death puts an end to human life as the time open to either accepting or rejecting the divine grace manifested in Christ. The New Testament speaks of judgment primarily in its aspect of the final encounter with Christ in his second coming, but also repeatedly affirms that each will be rewarded immediately after death in accordance with his works and faith. The parable of the poor man Lazarus and the words of Christ on the cross to the good thief, as well as other New Testament texts speak of a final destiny of the soul—a destiny which can be different for some and for others. Each man receives his eternal retribution in his immortal soul at the very moment of his death, in a particular judgment that refers his life to Christ: either entrance into the blessedness of heaven-through a purification or immediately,—or immediate and everlasting damnation. (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1021 and 1022)
This, in my view, puts pressure on, among other things, various versions of the free will defense.
This, of course, could simply be a failure of my theological imagination or due to my lack of familiarity with Catholic sacramental theology.
See Timpe 2013, chapter 5 for why I think this. In particular, I’m inclined to think that necessarily universalism, the view that it is necessarily the case that every created free agent will in fact be redeemed, is false. I’m more open to the possibility of a contingent universalism, whereas as a matter of fact all created free agents will be redeemed. In what follows, I’m going to ignore even contingent universalism. If it turns out that, as a matter of contingent fact, all are redeemed without limbo playing a role in the salvation of any individual, then the account of limbo I give will be an unrealized possibility, but a possibility nonetheless.
Ryan Byerly has suggested that there will likely be a problem of divine hiddenness in limbo: just how obvious can God’s existence and demands upon humans be in limbo if humans are to remain free? I think that this is a good question, but it is not clear to me that the problem of limbic hiddenness will be in need of a different solution than is the problem of earthly hiddenness.
There may be other forms of dualism—such as emergent dualism—that are relevantly different than substance dualism of the Cartesian sort. I do not intend the considerations below to be directed at these other forms.
It should also be pointed out at this point that the kind of healing I’m suggesting is probably inconsistent with Lockean conceptions of personal identity. Thanks to both Luke Henderson and Andrew Bailey for making this clear.
See Timpe (forthcoming) for a treatment of the ways that different kinds of disability can impact and impair moral agency.
Carlson and Kittay 2010: 14; see also Francis and Silvers 2010, 251: “Forming ideas of the good functions both to formulate the aims one should pursue and to stimulate their realization.” Elsewhere, I have developed an account of free agency with affords a central role to the agent’s conception of the good. (see Timpe 2013, particularly Chapter 2)
But unlike purgatory, one could go from limbo to hell. That is, just as in this life, an individual would not be guaranteed to use her will to realign herself with God in the way needed.
References
2p15p16.1 Microdeletion Syndrome. 2014. Surrey, England: Unique.
Anselm, 2000. De Conceptu Virginali. In Complete philosophical and theological treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, ed. J. Hopkins, and H. Richardson, 427–465. Minneapolis, Minn: The Arthur J. Banning Press.
Carlson, Licia. 2010. Philosophers of intellectual disability: A taxonomy. In Cognitive disability and its challenge to moral philosophy, ed. Eva Feder Kittay, and Licia Carlson, 315–329. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Carlson, Licia, and Eva Feder Kittay. 2010. Introduction: Rethinking philosophical presumptions in light of cognitive disability. In Cognitive disability and its challenge to moral philosophy, ed. Eva Feder Kittay, and Licia Carlson, 1–25. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Castles, Elaine. 1996. “We’re people first”: The social and emotional lives of individuals with mental retardation. Westport: Praeger.
Catechism of the Catholic Church (2nd ed.). 2003. New York: Doubleday.
Evans, Daryl Paul. 1983. The lives of mentally retarded people. Boulder: Westview Press.
Francis, Leslie P., and Anita Silvers. 2010. “Thinking about the good: Reconfiguring liberal metaphysics (or not) for people with cognitive disabilities. In Cognitive disability and its challenge to moral philosophy, ed. Eva Feder Kittay, and Licia Carlson, 225–236. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Griffiths, Paul J. 2008. Purgatory. In The Oxford handbook of eschatology, ed. Jerry L. Walls, 427–445. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harris, J.C. 2006. Intellectual disability: Understanding its development, causes, classification, evaluation, and treatment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harris, James C. 2010. Developmental perspective on the emergence of moral personhood. In Cognitive disability and its challenge to moral philosophy, ed. Eva Feder Kittay, and Licia Carlson, 55–73. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Kittle, Simon. 2015. Grace and free will: Quiescence and control. Journal of Analytic Theology 3: 89–108.
Lycan, William. 2003. Free will and the burden of proof. In Minds and persons, ed. A. O’Hear, 107–122. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pawl, Timothy, and Kevin Timpe. 2009. Incompatibilism, sin, and free will in heaven. Faith and Philosophy 26: 396–417.
Pawl, Timothy, and Kevin Timpe. 2013. Heavenly freedom: A reply to Cowan. Faith and Philosophy 30: 188–197.
Rea, Michael C. 2007. The metaphysics of original sin. In Persons: Human and divine, ed. Peter van Inwagen, and Dean Zimmerman, 319–356. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rogers, Katherin. 2008. Anselm on freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stump, Eleonore. 2003. Aquinas. London: Routledge.
Swinburne, Richard. 2009. How god makes all the difference to morality. In The psychology of character and virtue, ed. Craig Steven Titus, 119–134. Arlington: The Institute for the Psychological Sciences Press.
The hope of salvation for infants who die without being baptised. 2007. Rome: Vatican.
Timpe, Kevin. 2007. Grace and controlling what we do not cause. Faith and Philosophy 24: 284–299.
Timpe, Kevin. 2012. Free will: Sourcehood and its alternatives, 2nd ed. London: Bloomsbury.
Timpe, Kevin. 2013. Free will in philosophical theology. London: Bloomsbury.
Timpe, Kevin. 2015. Cooperative grace, cooperative agency. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7: 223–246.
Timpe, Kevin. Forthcoming. Disabled moral agency. In Philosophy of disability, ed. Julie Piering.
Timpe, Kevin, and Daniel Speak (eds.). 2016. Free will and theism: Connections, contingencies, and concerns. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walls, Jerry L. 2002. Heaven: The logic of eternal joy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgments
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2014 Wesleyan Philosophical Society and at the Society of Christian Philosophers group meeting a the 2014 Central APA. A sustained discussion of this paper took place at the 2015 Interim State Writing Workshop, which was in turn sponsored by the Immortality Project at UC-Riverside, under the direction of John Martin Fischer, and funded by the John Templeton Foundation. On that occasion, Luke Henderson provided extensive comments. In addition, I want to thank Susan Brower-Toland, Chris Brown, Ryan Byerly, Jason Eberl, John Martin Fischer, Chris Franklin, Bob Hartman, Ross Inman, Tim Pawl, Jason McMartin, Turner Nevitt, Mike Rea, Patrick Todd (twice over), Andrew Bailey, Mike Rota, Daniel Rubio, Tom Senor, and Josh Thurow for helpful comments and discussions related to this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Timpe, K. An Argument for Limbo. J Ethics 19, 277–292 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-015-9208-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-015-9208-3