A Modern Coleridge

Cultivation, Addiction, Habits

Andrew Keanie

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

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List of Abbreviations

AR	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. *Aids to Reflection*. Ed. John Beer, Vol IX of *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.
BL	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, *Biographia Literaria*. Eds James Engell and W. Jackson Bate, 2 vols. Vol. VII of *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.
Ch & St	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, *On the Constitution of the Church and State*. Ed. John Colmer. Vol. X of *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 42–43.
CL	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, *Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Ed. Earl Leslie Griggs, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1956–1971.
CPP	*Coleridge's Poetry and Prose*. Selected and Edited by Nicholas Halmi, Paul Magnuson, and Raimonda Modiano. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004.
F	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. *The Friend*, Ed. Barbara E. Rooke. 2 vols. Vol. VIof *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969.
L	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, *Logic*. Ed. J. R. D. J. Jackson. Vol. XIII of *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.
LS	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, *Lay Sermons*. Ed. R. J. White. Vol. VI of *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972.

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LL	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, *Lectures 1808–1819 on Literature*. Ed. R. A. Foakes. 2 vols. Vol. V of *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.
N	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. *The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge,* Vol. I: 1794–1804. Ed. Kathleen Coburn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957.
OM	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, *Opus Maximum*. Eds. Thomas McFarland and Nicholas Halmi, Vol. XV of *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
PW	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, *Poetical Works,* Ed. J.C.C. Mays, 6 vols. Vol. XVI of *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge,* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
"Review"	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 'Review of Matthew G. Lewis, *The Monk*, *The Critical Review*, February, 1797, 194–200.' *Romantic Links, Electronic Texts and Home Pages*. http://www.english.upenn.edu/~mgamer/Etexts/coleridge.reviews.
SL	Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, *Selected Letters*. Ed. H. J. Jackson, Oxford: Clarendon, 1987.

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Introduction

> addiction [...] appears to belong to culture as culture's own proper disease (Brodie and Redfield, 4)

The discourses of cultivation, addiction, and habit have so far been treated separately in Coleridge scholarship; this book will establish a conceptual continuity between them, and show the political and ethical consequences of the intricate network they constitute. Offering new readings of Coleridge's poems and prose works, it will particularly examine the ways in which Coleridge's writings stage, or fail to stage, processes of cultivation and education; the ways in which they critically comment upon the mechanisms of addiction and intoxication; and the ways in which they perform the workings of habit. Doing so, the book will depart from the overall assumption that both cultivation and addiction revolve around a post-Enlightenment conception of freedom, and, therefore, around an eminently modern idea of the 'human'. The term 'cultivation' forms the basis of our modern, Western conception of 'culture' (Williams), generally understood, via Matthew Arnold, as 'humanity's "intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development"' (Brodie and Redfield, 2.). More importantly, it is a key concept for Coleridge: defined as 'the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that characterise our *humanity*' (*Ch & St*, 42–43), it determines Coleridge's modern idea of the human, characterised, above all, by 'free will' (*AR* 88–89) and 'free agency' (*F* I., 509). The second term, 'addiction', brings to mind Coleridge's struggles with opium; however, this book will show that the phenomenon of addiction emerges from Coleridge's writings independently

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of opium, but its stakes are much higher than critics have previously thought. Largely defined as an 'epidemics of the will' (Sedgwick, 133–134), addiction, this book contends, challenges Coleridge's idea of the 'human': putting in jeopardy Coleridge's conviction that the human mind cannot function without the 'interference of the will' (*BL* I., 111), it turns individuals into passive automatons, craving for the various virtual stimuli offered by what Coleridge calls a 'civilisation' in excess. The third eponymous term, habit, has also emerged in Coleridge scholarship with reference to Coleridge's opium habit (Youngquist, *Monstrosities*; Mazzeo), and its positive sense has been examined in the context of 17th to 18th century thought (with reference to Locke, Hume, or Burke), or of Wordsworth's writings; indeed, the Romanticism associated with the name of Coleridge has been mostly seen as an argument *against* the significance previously attached to the automatisms of habits. This book, however, suggests that habit plays a crucial role in the process of Coleridgean cultivation, and, particularly, in its transitive form, education: briefly, it will show that the ultimate aim of Coleridgean education is to turn the working of free will into the automatism of habit while maintaining the illusion of freedom. Shattering the human/non-human, free will/automatism, activity/passivity binaries, habit can therefore act as a third term between cultivation and addiction.

Critics have linked the emergence of the related concepts of culture and addiction to a modernity associated to the second half of the 19th century to argue that 'addiction [...] appears to belong to culture's own proper disease' (Brodie and Redfield, 4). In cultural theory, 'modernity' generally refers to 'a way of living and of experiencing life which has arisen with the changes wrought by industrialisation, urbanisation and secularisation' (Childs, 5). It is often linked to the rise of a 'bourgeois', 'capitalist', or 'industrial society,' governed by *techné*, 'instrumental rationality', 'exchange value', and the expansion of 'commodity form' (Heller; Lowy and Syre; Simpson, 117.) At the same time, 19th century modernity also gave birth to a conception of 'culture', which can effectively *counter* the 'dangerous' effects of the modernity understood as a 'way of life' associated with the effects of the Industrial and the French Revolutions. Agnes Heller calls these two sides of modernity 'rationalistic enlightenment' and 'romantic enlightenment' respectively; and her argument that it is 'romantic enlightenment' that gave rise to historical consciousnesses

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and nationalisms can indeed contribute to our understanding of any 19th century idea of 'culture'. Meanwhile, notwithstanding the tensions between these two poles, claims Heller, modernity is principally founded on the idea of freedom (1). The modern idea of freedom is associated with moral and intellectual autonomy (largely understood in the Kantian sense), and with social and political rights, as decreed by the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. In what follows, this book will argue that even though modernity is most often associated with the second half of the 19th century, Coleridge's writings make it possible to date modernity from the immediate aftermath of the Industrial and the French Revolutions.[1]

The co-presence of 'rationalistic enlightenment' and 'romantic enlightenment' in modernity can also be theorised as the successive, almost joint, emergence of what Habermas calls the 'public sphere' (see also, Bygrave, 31) *and* of what Benedict Anderson has conceptualised as the rise of the Romantic 'imagi-nation'. The medial possibility conditions of these processes (including Heller's two Enlightenments), are also very similar: while Habermas pinpoints the rise of print culture or, put another way, the democracy of print as the most important factor contributing to the appearance of the 'public' and, ultimately, to the development of democratic thought, Anderson outlines how the spread of literacy, of journalism, and of the novel gave rise to 19th century nationalisms. These, at the same time, all contribute to and often complicate those 19th century discourses (and counter-discourses) of culture, which are based on a post-Kantian idea of moral and spiritual autonomy. Many of these discourses, such as Coleridge's, are attached to the idea of the nation-state, and express an anxiety that the emergence of the democracy of print might 'become confluent with the evils, it was intended to preclude' (*LS* 42).

Indeed, throughout his life, Coleridge was engaged with the problems of moral, social, and political *freedom*, and with the advancement of *techné* in a more and more secularised world. His writings often display the tensions between what Heller has succinctly called 'rationalistic' and 'romantic' enlightenments: searching for various ways of living and experiencing life in a rising modern civilisation (that he associates, precisely, with the rise of the printing press, and with the effects of the French Enlightenment and of the Industrial Revolution), Coleridge urges the necessity of individual and national cultivation. By 'cultivation', he generally means a religious and moral

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pattern of individual and national development that can serve as both a preventive and an antidote against the effects of 'over-civilisation', resulting in the rule of instrumental reason or *techné*, and a misconceived idea of freedom (*Ch & St*, 42). As he argues in *The Friend*:

> Never can a society comprehend fully, and in its whole practical extent, the permanent distinction, and the occasional contrast, between cultivation and civilisation; never can it attain to a due insight into the momentous fact, fearfully as it has been, and even now is exemplified in a neighbour country [France], that a nation can never be a too cultivated but may easily become an overcivilised race. (*F* I., 494)

The present book will depart from the assumption that the task of Coleridgean 'cultivation' is to prevent or remedy the 'direful consequences' (*F* II., 120–121) of 'overcivilisation'. It will show that Coleridge's idea of 'cultivation' is bound up with an eminently modern idea of 'humanity', the most 'pre-eminent part' of which is the free exercise of the will (i.e. 'the will is an especial and pre-eminent part of our Humanity', *AR*, 88–89). In other words, this will, in order to make us human, must be 'free', and 'responsible' (*AR*, 88–89); according to Coleridge, 'free agency' is 'a *fact* of immediate consciousness' (*F* I., 509). Coleridge's emphasis on free will in his definitions of humanity implicates an eminently post-Kantian conception of cultivation, which, therefore, radically deviates from any 18th century notion of culture. (On these latter, see Williams; and Bygrave.)

Although this book will focus on the controversial role 'activity', 'free will', 'autonomy', and 'agency' occupy in Coleridge's conception of 'humanity', it will not present Coleridge as a Kantian.[2] For even if, as is well known, the 'writings of the illustrious sage of Köngigsberg […] took possession of [Coleridge] as with a giant's hand' (*BL* I., 153), Coleridge has important reservations about Kant's ethical philosophy. On the one hand, as I will outline both in the first and third parts of this book, Coleridge attributes a major role to the Christian idea of love in his thinking about humanity, and offers us what critics often call a Christianised version of Kantianism, in which the ultimate *telos* of human free will is its unity with God's will (Vallins, 126–127.) In almost the same vein, Coleridge, as

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opposed to Kant, also attributes a great role to 'affections' in morality. In 1817, he writes: 'I reject Kant's stoic principle, as false, unnatural, and even immoral, where in his Critik der Practischen Vernun[f] the treats the affections as indifferent in ethics' (*CL*, 791–792) Yet, Coleridgean affections are far from undermining agency; on the contrary: as Timothy Corrigan equally demonstrates, feelings, emotions, and passions are always *active* powers, and (good) passions are often identified with action in Coleridge's writings (105).

The related ideas of 'free will', 'humanity', and 'cultivation' are also endowed, in Coleridge's thinking, with a rather controversial political and religious (and, therefore, historical) significance.[3] On the one hand, in line with his reservations about Kant, he makes it clear that 'The WILL has to struggle upward into FREE-WILL – but observe that Freedom which is impossible except as it becomes one with the Will of God' (*OM*, 144). In other words, during the process of cultivation, the 'will' of the individual always has to approximate to the will of God, which is (ideally) represented by the institution of the Church. On the other hand, to his definition of cultivation, Coleridge adds the important supplement, 'We must be *men* in order to be citizens' (*Ch & St*, 42–43, original italics), indicating that cultivation is also the necessary prerequisite of the responsible citizenship. In fact, as the full title of his last published work, *On the Constitution of the Church and State, According to the Idea of Each*, indicates, he believes that the will of the community and the will of God should ultimately be realised by the institutions of the Church and the State.

'Free will', often called the 'responsible will', not only occupies a chief position in Coleridge's thinking about the human, but is presented as the very essence that distinguishes us from natural, merely biological beings, and from machines. In *Aids to Reflection* he not only claims that 'the will is an especial and pre-eminent part of our Humanity' (*AR*, 88–89), but also that '[i]f there be aught *Spiritual* in Man, the Will must be such' (*AR*, 135). By claiming that 'the Will is ultimately self-determined, or it is no longer a Will under the law of perfect Freedom, but a Nature under the mechanism of cause and effect' (*AR*, 285), he aims to draw a clear dividing line between nature, determined by natural or physical laws, and man, who is endowed with a free will that is self-determining. He describes the 'rise' from the animal to the human precisely as the gradual manifestation of free will:

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> the Spontaneous rises into the Voluntary, and finally after various steps and a long Ascent, the Material and Animal Means and Conditions are prepared for the manifestation of a Free Will, having its Law within itself and its motive in the Law – and thus bound to originate its own Acts, not only without but even against alien Stimulants'. (*AR*, 98)

Here, Coleridge's ideal of humanity is described in Kantian terms: as opposed to animals, humans are autonomous, and are governed by the Law within. Humans are free from both outside stimulants, and involuntary spontaneity. It is precisely our God given free will that allows us to act even against 'alien stimulants' and to counter the involuntary spontaneity that is, at the same time, equally proper to (our) nature (*AR*, 98). Cultivation, by developing those specific 'qualities and faculties that characterise our *humanity*', thus helps us to rise above other living beings, which are passively determined by natural laws and outside stimuli.

However, even though humans are supposed to be free, and their actions governed by the Law within, they often act upon the influence of 'alien Stimulants', or the 'immediate impressions of the senses' (*BL* I., 31). And since, according to Coleridge's post-Kantian conception of subjectivity, the 'stimulating substance is no stimulant except in relation to, and in consequence of, the stimulatability' (*OM*, 143), the propensity to succumb to the effects of 'alien Stimulants' is partly due to one's inherent 'stimulatability'. 'Stimulatability' is, therefore, a *human* characteristic that has the potential to undermine the workings of the will: it may render individuals similar to those passive beings that are governed by 'alien stimulants', or as we will see, even to automatons or machines, determined only by physical laws. In other words, to beings that are effectively similar to LaMettrie's *homme machine*. Translating the lack of free will and of agency, stimulatability thus renders manifest a peculiar disease of the will. Hence, it is possible to posit a hypothetical opposition between Coleridge's Christian-Kantian ideal of 'free will' on the one hand, and 'stimulatability'(*OM*, 140–141) and the 'excess of stimulation' (*BL* I., 189), which, as we will see, characterises his own age, on the other.

Neil Vickers inscribes 18th century discourse on stimulation and stimulatability in an analysis of Coleridge's speculations about his opium habit, without placing the problem of stimulants into the

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wider context of Coleridge's thinking about the 'human'. However, 'stimulatability' has much wider implications in Coleridge's thinking; in fact, he places the problem of stimulants and stimulatability into the general context of being 'human'. Apart from the fact that stimulatability renders humans (who are supposed to give law to themselves) similar to passive animals, governed by external stimuli, stimulatability, just like free will, is also endowed in Coleridge's writings with political significance. In *Opus Maximum*, he importantly translates 'stimulatability', via Albrech von Haller, as 'irritability' or 'sensibility' (*OM*, 140–144), which terms have, of course, strong moral and political overtones.[4] In *Biographia Literaria*, for example, he connects 'restlessness' and 'irritability' to individuals' susceptibility to fanaticism, and calls 'the restless interim from 1795 to the commencement of the Addington administration' a period of an 'excess of stimulation',[5] thanking providence for 'disciplining all Europe into *sobriety*' (*BL* I., 189, italics added). Second, just like Wordsworth, who links man's 'degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation' ('Preface') to the repercussions of the French and Industrial Revolutions, or, more generally speaking, to the effects of a rising modernity (Simpson, 116–117), Coleridge also sees the increase in the amount of stimuli, as well as man's stimulatability, as an effect of 'over-civilisation'. In other words, Coleridge regards stimulatability, which could well be translated, via Eve Sedgwick's definition of addiction, as an 'epidemics of the will' (Sedgwick, 133–134), a specifically modern problem, a historical threat specifically related to the rise of modernity.

Since 'epidemics of the will' is Sedgwick's definition of addiction, some further remarks have to be made on this eponymous concept. The word itself rarely appears in Coleridge's writings: he criticises Hazlitt for being 'addicted to women, as objects of sexual Indulgence', (*CPP*, 633) but never uses the term in relation to opium, nor does he mention 'addiction' or 'addict' when speaking about stimulants, stimulation, or stimulatability. Thomas H. Schmid summarises recent findings on the absence of the concept of addiction in the Romantic period, and the relevance of this absence for discussions of Coleridge's opium habit as follows:

> Berridge and Edwards have influentially argued that 'Addiction, in fact, was not the point at issue for nineteenth-century users of

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> opium, including Coleridge and De Quincey' (60–1), while both Vickers (92–3) and Youngquist have agreed that, in Youngquist's words, 'however tempting it may be to describe Coleridge as an opium addict historical accuracy requires other terms. … *Addiction* as a physio-cultural concept emerged later in the nineteenth century, the effect of a multiplicity of [cultural] forces' ([*Monstrosities*], 196, n.1; italics in text). (Schmid, 169)

Agreeing with Schmid on the late-19th-century emergence of the *concept* of addiction as something related to substance use, but reconsidering the historicity of the *phenomenon* of addiction as a *problem* being *un*related to substance use, the present book will theorise addiction both as a threat to Coleridge's post-Kantian conception of the will, of humanity, and, therefore, to his idea of cultivation, *and* as a political problem. In other words, departing from Sedgwick's contention that *anything* can turn into a drug depending on the way it is used, and, therefore, addiction has to be defined through the way in which individuals *relate* to certain activities or substances (as Coleridge so succinctly put it: the 'stimulation substance is no stimulant except in relation to, and in consequence of, the stimulatability'; *OM*, 143), the present book will investigate the political implications of addiction as a specifically modern phenomenon in Coleridge's writings. To theorise the ways in which culture and addiction are related to modernity, this book will not only have recourse to recent theories of addiction, but will also make ample use of Walter Benjamin's analyses of the emergence of the 'addict' as being symptomatic of modernity. The 'addict', according to Benjamin, rather than being (only) a drug addict is constantly craving for the overwhelming stimuli (such as the crowd or journalistic information) offered by modernity. This latter, famously theorised as the age of mechanical reproducibility, is intimately bound up with urbanisation, industrialisation, with the rise of print culture and journalism. Addiction is, therefore, equally *un*related to any kind of substance use in Benjamin's writings; it appears, instead, as a compulsive, meaningless, and mechanical repetition, fragmenting temporality, memory, and 'tradition', turning individuals into automatons, or alternatively, rendering them the precise replica of mechanical reproducibility itself.

The present book will argue that Coleridge's descriptions of the effects of civilisation importantly anticipate Benjamin's analyses of

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the effects of modernity. It will theorise addiction via both Benjamin' writings and more recent theories of addiction (Derrida, 'The Rhetoric of Drugs'; Sedgwick; Reith, *The Age of Chance*; Redfield, 'Introduction') to suggest that addiction poses one of the most powerful threats to Coleridge's (Kantian-Christian) idea of the 'human', which can only be prevented and/or remedied, according to Coleridge, through the process of cultivation. Hence, the discourses of culture and addiction implicit in Coleridge's texts will be shown to anticipate at least by half a century those, such as Baudelaire's poems and essay, or Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* (Benjamin, 'Second Empire'; Marder; Redfield, 'Introduction'), which have generated the critical consensus that that addiction is a specifically modern disease of culture in the first place (Brodie and Redfield, 4.).

As a preliminary, one may establish the following, hypothetical binaries between cultivation, which contributes to the 'well-being' of the modern political community, and addiction, which, as will be shown, most often emerges as its latent 'disease'. These binaries will, of course be amplified, and complicated in the course of this book: (1) While the idea of cultivation is predicated on a belief in active agency and free will, addiction is a passion that translates the lack of free will and autonomy; (2) While the process of cultivation, consists of the construction of past and present 'events' into a meaningful, 'organic' narrative, into the linearly unfolding temporality of both individual and national progress (*LS*, 9), addiction is the 'mechanic', meaningless repetition of the same, which fragments, and ultimately yields the forgetting of and the temporality of cultivation and experience (*BL* I., 48; *LS*, 9); (3) While cultivation is generally posited as a 'natural' process, and is predicated on a belief in the organic wholeness of the individual and the political body, addiction is most often associated with 'alien stimulants' (*AR*, 98), with the foreign and the artificial, or else, with the incorporation of some threatening 'other' (Brodie and Redfield; Ronell), for example, the opium associated with the Orient (Leask, 'Kubla Khan and Orientalism'); (4) While the process of cultivation ideally results in the individual's integration into and contribution to the (political) community, addiction, and, particularly, intoxication, as will be shown, not only drives the individual away from this community, but also poses a threat to this community; (5) While the idea of cultivation is grounded in activity, in a protestant work ethic that dictates hard work and results in the

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economic advancement of both the individual and the nation, the addict is passive, 'lazy', and whiles away the time in what Coleridge calls a 'a sort of *beggarly* daydreaming' (*BL* I., 48, italics added). All in all, although addiction is often considered as an escape from the 'real' world, it is, quite paradoxically, also considered as a (political and social) threat to this 'real' world.[6] Meanwhile, it is crucial to note the artificial and historical character of these binaries: it is not only, as I describe in Chapter 5, that the hierarchy between them is culture and history bound, but the idea lying at the heart of the matter, namely 'free will', is also extremely problematic. For if 'drugs thematize the dissociation of autonomy and responsibility that has marked our epoch since Kant' and 'are crucially related to the question of freedom' (Ronell, 59), then it is not only the *loss* of autonomy or freedom that can be at stake; the taking of drugs is also often considered as the *expression* of autonomy or free will, precisely against the prison house of norms. In this sense, addiction, as a figure, may equally subsume those discourses of counter-culture, which subvert the conservative narratives of modernity.[7]

At the same time, although in the present book the term 'addiction' will only be used as a figure to designate the various symptoms of a modernity spreading an 'epidemics of the will', Coleridge's own opium habit can, of course, be equally considered as one of these symptoms. Even though he quite characteristically denies (as be discussed later) that he had 'at any times taken the flattening poison as a *stimulus*, or for any craving after pleasurable sensations' (*SL*, 223, italics added), he often complains that his opium habit poses an impediment to the workings of his 'volition', which he considers the instrument of the Will.[8]

> By the long long Habit of the accursed *Poison to my Volition* (by which I mean the faculty *instrumental* to the Will, and by which alone the Will can realise itself – it's Hands, Legs, & Feet, as it were) was completely deranged, at times frenzied, dissevered itself from the Will, & became an independent faculty: so that I was perpetually in the state, in which you may have seen paralytic Persons, who attempting to push a step forward in one direction are violently forced round the opposite. (*SL*, 175)

Coleridge does not see himself deprived of the Will, but only of its instrument, 'volition', which realises the 'Will's' dictums. His

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faculties inscribe themselves in the tropology of the body: the 'Will' is the head and volition pertains to the members. Yet, while the Will itself is still free from bodily or physical determinations; 'volition', once severed from this Will, becomes mere body, that is, it is reduced to the status of bodily members (hands, legs, and feet), the movements of which are determined by some alien stimulant. Hence, what an opium habit, as the 'accursed poison' to his 'Volition' puts into jeopardy is, precisely, Coleridge's 'humanity', or else, his self-image as a human, endowed with free will and agency.

The first part of this book discusses the place of free will, cultivation, and education in Coleridge's aesthetic, political, and religious thinking. It makes ample use of already existing discussions of 19th century notions of culture and their intersection with conservative discourses of nationalism (Raymond Williams; Lloyd and Thomas; Redfield, *The Politics of Aesthetics*; de Graef and Vermeulen), in which Coleridge has sometimes served as an important point of reference. Although it takes for granted the intrinsic link that has long been established between cultivation and education (the latter that, as will be discussed later, has the task to 'elicit' those 'qualities and faculties that characterise our *humanity*'), it differs from Alan Richardson's *Literature, Education, and Romanticism* (1994), or Philip Connell's *Romanticism, Economics, and the Question of 'Culture'* (2001), which have offered accounts of the scope of Coleridgean education, as well as from Michael John Kooy's *Coleridge, Schiller, and Aesthetic Education* (2002), which has outlined the ways in which Coleridgean cultivation transforms the Schillerian ideas of aesthetic education and aesthetic state. Equally deviating from Stephen Bygrave's more recent *Uses of Education, Readings in Enlightenment England*, which focuses on 18th-to 19th-century debates on education, the present book offers, instead, close readings of Coleridge's poetry and prose as if they were windows with a view on a section of these debates. More specifically, the first part 'Cultivation' places the Coleridgean idea of cultivation in a philosophical, political, *and* poetic context, to concentrate on the tensions between Coleridge's philosophic-aesthetic-political theories of cultivation and education on the one hand, and the textual performance, or, put differently, the poetics informing the textual staging of some pedagogical practices, on the other.

Cultivation itself is both a transitive and an autotransitive process. As an autotransitive verb, it is synonymous with 'self-realisation' or

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'self-formation', the development of one's own latent 'humanity'. This, as the etymology of the term indicates, is imagined according to a biological model (see also, Shaffer, 199; Pfau, 'Bildungsroman', 124; Redfield, *Phantom Formations*, 47). As a transitive verb, it is synonymous with education, the 'artificial' 'drawing forth' of the individual's latent 'humanity' from its 'bud' (*L*, 12–13; *LL* I., 585). In critical discourse, cultivation is often associated with the German idea of *Bildung*, which implies both self-cultivation and education. It designates the 'narrative progression and spiritual ascent whereby latent images [*Bild*, such as God's] are gradually 'developed'' as well as the 'drawing out' (*ausbilden*) of the individual's latent potentials though education (Pfau, 'Bildungsroman', 124–125; Redfield, *Phantom Formations*, 47). As I will show in my first chapter, the German idea of *Bildung* exerts a considerable influence on Coleridge's thinking about cultivation and education (see also, Kooy), and while cultivation is often presented by Coleridge as a process similar to the natural growth of plants (*LL* I., 585), Coleridge also underlines that this growth needs to be induced by 'artificial' means, that is, by education (*L*, 12–13). In fact, education, as the transitive form of cultivation, acquires unprecedented significance in Coleridge's thinking. By the time he composed his last work, *On the Constitution of the Church and State*, the institution of national education had become not only a means to develop the latent 'humanity' of the individual, but, as the '*nisus formativus* [from the German *Bildungstrieb*] of the body politic', it became the most important prerequisite of nation formation as well. Indeed, the number of Coleridge's individual essays and lectures, and the various passages dealing with education, reveal that the idea of education kept Coleridge engaged throughout his life. His writings on education include discussions of pedagogical debates (e.g. his 'Supernumerary Lecture on Education', 1808) and of the early education of children (in *Opus Maximum* or *Logic*), a project concerning the institution of national education (in *On the Constitution of the Church and State*), and many commentaries on the etymology, the meaning, and the implications of the term 'education' (in *The Friend*; in his 'Lectures on Shakespeare and Education', 1813; in *The Statesman's Manual*, 1816; or in the *Church and State*). Apart from the influence of the German idea of *Bildung*, his frequent discussions of proper pedagogical models betray, as we will see, his engagement with the specifically British pedagogical debates

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of his time: for example, he revised Andrew Bell's *Madras School or Elements of Tuition* (1807) to defend it against Joseph Lancaster's rival educational scheme and criticised the didactic tales of the Edgeworths because he found them too 'goody' (*LL* 1., 106–108). His educational writings display the impact of Locke's famous *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*. At the same time, his critique of the rigour of Kantian morality through an emphasis on 'sympathy and love' also emerges in an educational context (*LL* I., 106–108, *F* I., 168–175) disclosing the joint influence of Christianity and 18th century British moralists. Further, his idea that national education is the formative drive of the body politic also found its way into something eminently British, namely, the thinking of the eminent Victorian, Matthew Arnold. Arnold not only transcribes Coleridge's 'cultivation' as 'culture' (which, according to Arnold, 'seeks to develop in us [...] our best self'),[9] but also strengthens the connection Coleridge has already established between culture and the state (cf, Lloyd and Thomas).[10]

Chapter 1 departs from a brief discussion of Coleridge's understanding of cultivation to examine his aesthetic and political ideas on education, or, put differently, to examine the politics of Coleridge's aesthetics of education. Partly inspired by Marc Redfield's and Thomas Pfau's analyses of the political implications of the aesthetic idea of *Bildung* it suggests that education emerges from Coleridge's writings as an aesthetic force (he explicitly calls education a 'shaping and informing spirit', *Ch & St*, 41), bringing both the individual and the nation into existence. Rather than offering any radical reconsideration of the actual content of Coleridge's idea of education (a task wonderfully accomplished by Richardson, *Literature, Education, and Romanticism*; Kooy; or Conell), it examines Coleridge's rhetorics, or, poetics of education. It particularly concentrates on the etymology he creates for the term 'education' and the links he establishes between education and the imagination. It shows, on the one hand, that the way in which education elicits the 'latent man' is analogous not only to the way in which the flower is 'educed' from the 'bud' (*LL* I., 585) and to the unfolding of the histories of the Scriptures (these 'living *educts* of the imagination', *LS*, 29, italics added), but also, and much more importantly, to the coming into being of the organic work of art. In this scheme, which will be compared to Schiller's discussion of the 'political' and the 'pedagogical artist' in the *Letters on*

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the Aesthetic Education of Man, the educator not only proves to be a representative of God and the state, but also the embodiment of the genius creating a work of art. In other words, particular emphasis will be placed on the figure of the educator, whose work is analogous to that of the artistic genius creating an organic work of art, and whose formative power, as Coleridge definition of the secondary or poetic imagination equally indicates, is 'always co-existing with the conscious will' (*BL* I., 304.). Consequently, the critical emphasis, which has so far been placed on Coleridge's organicist idea of the 'aesthetic state', and on the role 'imagi-nation' plays in creating it (see, Pyle; Kooy; Kaiser; Frey) will be shifted to education as the most significant aesthetic driving force (i.e. *'Bildungstrieb'*, *Ch & St*, 41) of the body politic, bringing the nation into existence.

The second chapter examines three different narratives of cultivation complicating Coleridge's aesthetic ideas on education, and, particularly, the place of free will in this scheme. More specifically, it shows the ways in which the intertextual connection Coleridge establishes between the essay 'The Appeal to Law' in *The Friend*, Dr Andrew Bell's educational treaties, a manuscript of Wordsworth's 'Peter Bell', and 'The Ancient Mariner' comments upon his politics and poetics of cultivation. It investigates first 'The Appeal to Law' (*F* I., 168–175), which is Coleridge's account of an exemplary disciplinary system in *The Friend*, and describes the ways in which Alexander Ball (the governor of Malta whom Coleridge served as a secretary from 1804 to 1805) 'elicits' the awareness of the Kantian 'Law' from a crew of mutinous mariners. While ostensibly awakening moral autonomy in the form of 'conscience', Ball also enacts 'sympathy and love' (*LL* I., 107) throughout the educative process. This chapter, like Chapter 1, focuses throughout on the poetics of Coleridgean education: drawing on the detail (so far unnoticed in critical literature) that Coleridge read out the manuscript of Wordsworth's 'Peter Bell' for Alexander Ball, for whom the ballad represented 'the practicability of reforming the most hardened minds' (*F* II., 290), while 'Peter Bell' itself was Wordsworth' corrective response to 'The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere' (Jordan, 23), it offers a comparative reading of the two ballads in the context of *The Friend* essay. It argues that while Wordsworth's 'Peter Bell' and Coleridge's 'The Appeal to Law' stage successful processes of education, and show the individual's integration into the (political) community, the 'Rime' (still without

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the glossary added) is at odds with Coleridge's aestheticopolitics of subject formation and nation building. The chapter concludes with a reconsideration of the political and ethical stakes involved in Coleridge's politics and poetics of cultivation, via recent theories of the aesthetics of nationalist narratives of *Bildung* (Redfield; Hartman; Vermeulen).

The third chapter elaborates Coleridge's rhetorics of 'sympathy and love' (*LL* I., 107), which have emerged as crucial in the process of cultivation described in the previous chapter. Drawing on Coleridge's prose works, the chapter first shows that Coleridge rejects any 'contagious', passive, potentially subversive version of sympathy, stemming from the sympathiser's 'stimulatability', or, alternatively, from his or her 'excessive and unhealthy sensitiveness' (*AR*, 58). Both sympathy and love are *active* powers in Coleridge's conception, involving individual agency and free will. In fact, as this chapter shows, the active working of the sympathetic imagination present in Coleridge's ideals of educational practice, and displayed in both 'The Appeal to Law' and 'Peter Bell', is predicated on the kind of aesthetic *distance* that is proper to Adam Smith's 'aesthetic' theory of sympathy,[11] being itself a critical response to Shaftesbury's 'contagion' model (Chandler, *An Archeology*, 240). (In the second part of the present book, this latter will be linked to intoxication and fanaticism.) The chapter further suggests that the spectral figure of Adam Smith's 'impartial spectator', and its embodiment, the '*real* spectator', equally found their way into 18th and 19th century disciplinary practices, and, particularly, into Coleridge's monitorial models of pedagogy, aiming, as the previous chapters have equally shown, at the awakening of conscience. Thus, the chapter demonstrates that Kant's idea of moral autonomy and individual freedom is endorsed by Coleridge only as an educational principle, but is hardly present as a pedagogical practice.

In the second part of the book, I turn to the problem of addiction. As a preliminary, it must be emphasised again that I do not discuss addiction as a psychological or medical condition, but rather use it as a catachresis that is able to capture the different aspects of modernity that threaten Coleridge's idea of 'humanity' and the 'human'. These latter are grounded in a belief in the universality of a God given free will, and in the conviction that 'will, reason and judgment' (*BL* I., 111) are latently there in each individual. Hence, before proceeding further, a heuristic distinction has to be made between

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intoxication and addiction: while intoxication implies the suspension of reason and judgment (Willis, 136), and a temporary state of ecstasy (from the Greek 'ek' (out) and 'stasis' (standing) as 'standing out of oneself'), addiction mostly concerns the will: it consists of the compulsive, mechanical repetition of the same, and results in the erasure, or, in the infinite suspension of the subject's autonomy. At the same time, both addiction and intoxication can be considered subversive of our modern concepts of intentionality and subjectivity; however, while the figure of addiction appears as an effect of modernity, intoxication is a phenomenon that is much less historically bound, but has equally important political consequences.[12]

The first chapter in the 'Addiction' part of the book argues that even though addiction as a *concept* related to substance use did not exist in the Romantic period, Coleridge conceived the *phenomenon* of addiction as a 'threat' to cultivation, and, therefore, to nation-formation; however, his anxiety was independent of his own opium use or of any political anxiety related specifically to the 'Orient'; rather, the chapter outlines the ways in which the phenomenon of addiction emerges from Coleridge's writings on the 'mixed good' of civilisation (*LS*, 8). Departing from the claim that the effects of civilisation, being symptomatic of an emerging modernity, may constitute the 'hectic of disease' (*Ch & St*, 42) that Coleridge wants to prevent, or at least remedy, by introducing the idea of cultivation, it focuses on the *de-humanising* aspects of modernity, on the ways in which the overstimulation proper to civilisation can deprive humans of their 'humanity', including their free will and agency. It argues that civilisation – especially the mechanical reproduction of books and newspapers, the rise of literacy, the emergence of the 'reading Public' and the 'increase of Cities' (*LL* I., 186–187) – is staged by Coleridge as a 'drug', a remedy that can poison and a poison that can remedy, which creates a constant and increasing need for itself. This drug equally brings a specific type of individual into existence, who, anxiously and restlessly 'craving' (*LS,* 8) for the various virtual stimuli offered by modernity, poses a constant threat to Coleridge's project of cultivation. Considering that it is Walter Benjamin who was the first to establish a relationship between the emergence of the 'addict' and that of modernity, and he was also the first to dissociate addictions from drugs, the chapter then examines Coleridge's writings on the effects of civilisation in the light of Benjamin's theoretisations of

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the addict as a 'traumatophile type', addicted to the traumatic shock of modernity. Benedict Anderson and Marc Redfield have demonstrated, via Benjamin's writings, that the shock of modernity (including the spread of novels and newspapers) was one of the essential technical conditions of the rise of nationalist narratives.(Anderson; Redfield, *The Politics of Aesthetics* 45–73) However, the chapter foregrounds that, according to Benjamin, modernity equally generates the coming into being of a new type (exemplified by the 'man of the crowd', the 'gambler', the 'worker at the machine', or the individual 'devouring' journalistic information), who is constantly craving for, and endlessly repeats, the various kinds of stimulation offered by modernity. The 'addict', as will be shown, cannot be accommodated by discourses of cultivation and nationalism: they are 'commodity souls,' who 'live their lives as automatons', and have entirely 'liquidated their memory' (Benjamin, 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', 173–174). That is, they perform, precisely, those 'bad repetitions' (Derrida, 'Rhetoric') that undermine the idea of both individual and national *Bildung*, including individual and national constructions of narratives of history and tradition.

Elaborating on a footnote in Chapter 2 of *Biographia*, attacking the 'devotees of circulating libraries', Chapter 6, 'Craving for Novelties – Craving for Novels: The Politics of Intoxicated Reading', shows how Coleridge criticises those 'traumatophile types' who crave for, and effectively indulge in, a state of intoxication generated by strong, mostly virtual stimuli, while turning into the replica of mechanical reproducibility itself. Coleridge's distaste for novels is well known; however, the chapter's main contention is that Coleridge does not attack the addictive qualities of the novels themselves, but rather the 'stimulatability' of the public, the way in which these novels are read – or, rather, *non*-read – and the 'trance' generated by the visions rising from the printed pages of the book. The experience of intoxicated reading proper to the 'devotees of circulating libraries' is presented by Coleridge as the joint consequence of the lack of any hermeneutic *activity*, and the skipping of the medium, writing. At the same time, Coleridge calls novel reading a 'kill time', implying that novel reading literally kills the kind of experience that, as was demonstrated in the previous chapters, should characterise the process of *Bildung*. In this sense, the compulsive character of novel reading (associated, by Coleridge himself, to repetitive, bad habits) proves to be

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precisely the kind of 'bad repetition' that digresses the mind from the 'good repetition' involved in the work of the Imagination ('the repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I am', *BL* I., 189), which should actively contribute to the construction of all narratives of cultivation.

Indeed, despite Coleridge's insistence that the human mind cannot do without the will, in the passage on the circulating libraries, the absence of the interference of the will appears as an actual *historical* threat: the printing office turns the mind into a machine, into a (Lockean) 'camera obscura', transmitting the trance it was generated by. My chapter shows that intoxication, which ultimately results from the mind's 'stimulatability', or, its propensity to succumb to 'alien stimulants', may be fed not only by gothic romances, but also by various other virtual 'stimuli': Christabel intoxicated by Geraldine's story, a theatrical audience under the spell of 'stage delusion', or fanatics indulging in the overwhelming experience of the crowd, all display the subversive effects of intoxication (the suspension of 'will, reason and judgement', *BL* I., 111), which, at the same time, is equally related to the experience of passive sympathy as a kind of dangerous contagion.

The next chapter 'He "did not *write*, he *acted* poems": Kubla Khan, Luther, and Rousseau' first shows that 'Kubla Khan' (c. 1797) and the introductory note Coleridge attached to it at the poem's first publication (1816) constitute an instance of the intersection of the discourse on intoxication and the discourse of addiction, while equally establishing an explicit connection between intoxication, intoxicated reading, and politics, more particularly, politically dangerous performatives. These connections, I argue in this chapter, come to the fore if we place the poem and the preface in the context of Coleridge's essay on Luther and Rousseau in *The Friend*. The 'Author' of the preface, like Luther, has a 'vision in a dream': falling asleep over Purchas's *Pilgrimage*, he has a vision of Kubla's dome, while Luther, falling asleep over the Bible, has a hallucination of the devil. The chapter argues that apart from the fact that Coleridge speaks about Luther very much as he does of himself in the preface, both the poem supplemented by the preface and the essay on Luther and Rousseau offer commentaries on the political implications of the relationship between intoxicated reading, poetic vision, and the intoxicating power of words. In fact, Luther, like the 'Author' of

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the preface, appears to be a 'great poet'; however, being 'possessed' by his visions, and 'acting', rather than 'writing' poems, he resembles, according to Coleridge, the 'crazy Rousseau', whose 'eloquent' words had 'direful' consequences (*F* II., 110–121). The *danger* involved in Rousseau's power of speech, and, by analogy, Luther's, derives from that fact that, according to Coleridge, their audience (like that of the circulating libraries) conceive their words as pure medium in the mystique sense of the term, through an erasure of their historicity, that is, eminently written character. The *Friend* essay can thus bring into sharp focus the dangerous political potentials of 'Kubla Khan': of the 'Author's' original, intoxicated vision, of Kubla's performative 'decree', as well as that of the state of intoxication characterising the 'I' of the last stanza. The chapter eventually shows that the introductory note to 'Kubla Khan' is a second 'decree', a written declaration that distances the conservative Coleridge from his own poem: *staging* the absence of the interference of 'will reason, and judgement', it also *marks* such an interference, in order to give birth to an author figure, who can 'reflect on his own reflections' (*BL* I., 132).

The third part of the book deals with habits, and shows that, quite paradoxically, the constant interference of 'will, reason, and judgement' should, or even must, turn, according to Coleridge, into an automatism characterised by the absence of the interference of the will. Daniel Mangiavellano, draws attention to the importance of habits in 19th century discourses of education, and shows the ways in which a positive sense of the term re-emerges in the 19th century. Yet, analysing Coleridge's writings, he only deals with the negative senses of habit, just like other scholars, who tend to focus solely on Coleridge's opium habit (Youngquist, *Monstrosities*), or his habit to 'plagiarise' (Mazzeo). The third part of this book, however, demonstrates that it is not only possible to dissociate habits from an opium habit (and, therefore, from the phenomenon of addiction), but also to endow Coleridgean habits with a positive valence. More particularly, it shows that habits occupy a chief position in Coleridge's thinking about cultivation, which ultimately aims at turning the will into a mechanism that is proper to habits. 'Habit' will thus be introduced as a third term between cultivation and addiction, shattering the complicated binary between the human and the inhuman. In *Opus Maximum*, Coleridge argues that volition turned into habit through education and practice can make one an 'excellent

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musician', for example, whose fingers perform the most difficult labyrinths 'spontaneously'. *This* spontaneity is also a 'habit', which (exactly like an opium habit) 'result[s from] the incorporation of antecedent distinct acts of *will*' (*OM*, 140–141, italics added). We may remember that the ascent from 'animal' to 'human' happens when 'the Spontaneous rises into the Voluntary' (*AR*, 98); in the case of the musician (or of any artist, for that matter) we witness a contrary process: the voluntary 'rises' into the spontaneous and becomes what Youngquist calls (with reference to Coleridge's opium habit) a kind of 'somatic memory' (*Monstrosities*, 94): distinct acts of the will are incorporated into habit. That is, the acts of the will become, again, one with the body from which they had been initially severed, or, alternatively, above which they were supposed to 'rise'.

Indeed, although Coleridge considers the will 'the pre-eminent part of our humanity' (*AR*, 88–89), he attributes great significance to the development of proper 'habits of reflection' and 'virtuous habits', which can work without the constant interference of the will. The first chapter on habits demonstrates that while Coleridge rejects both Hume's and Burke's conception of habit and foregrounds the role of the will in the workings of the human mind, his discourse on education is thoroughly intertwined, quite counter-intuitively, with a partly Lockean, partly Aristotelian discourse on habits. Apart from the famous description, in *Biographia*, of his own formative years in Christ's Hospital, where Reverend James Boyer 'habituated' his tastes (see also, Mangiavellano, 28), the beginning of *Logic* explicitly deals with the development of proper 'habits of reflection' in early childhood. These mental habits, which will later serve the proper use of words, resemble, as will be shown, the automated movements of the well trained body (*L*, 12–13). In *Opus Maximum*, and the 'Suprenumerary Lecture on Education', Coleridge describes the child's early bond with the mother and the moral education of school children, foregrounding the practical conditions of the later eliciting of 'virtuous habits', or virtue as a habit, which he understands, as we will see, in a quasi-Aristotelian sense. More particularly, while *Opus Maximum* treats how the child is awakened to a sense of 'life as a unity' through the close proximity of the mother who serves as an intermediary between God and the child, the Lecture outlines the ways in which the child's heart can be stimulated to love in the later stages of education. In this chapter, it will be shown

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that the precondition of the harmony between the free will of the individual and the will of God, or, put differently, of the 'proper', automatic working of free will, is the early eliciting of 'virtuous habits' through love. This, of course, has important implications regarding Coleridge's conservative politics: Coleridge eventually sacrifices individual free will for the benefit and the love of the Church and the State.

As is well established, Coleridge's relationship with his mother lacked warmth, and he did not even attend her funeral (Ashton, 12). This biographical detail, placed next to Coleridge's insistence on the importance of the mother's love as the mediator of God's, may shed some new light on the sense of absence that lingers in many of Coleridge poems. The next chapter examines 'Dejection: an Ode', the only poem where Coleridge uses the term 'habit'; however, he associates the term with 'abstruse research', and endows it with a negative valence. The chapter shows how the poem's meanings unfold in the context of a notebook entry (*N* I., 1421), which, dealing with the relationship between 'desire', 'Fruition' (fulfilment), and 'habit', defines habit as a 'desire of desire' only to render, as I suggest, the loss of desire unforgettable. Then, drawing on Anya Taylor's insight that the title 'Dejection' derives from Milton, the chapter places the poem in the context of Milton's Sonnet XIX, 'When I consider how my Light is Spent': while Milton's speaker is blind (both literally and metaphorically), Coleridge's can *see* but is unable to *feel*, and feeling is not feeling *per se*, but rather is, or derives from, a feeling of God's loving presence in the Universe. In 'Dejection: an Ode', it seems as if it were the founding figure of the mother, as the repository of the love of God, that had been retrospectively withdrawn. The chapter argues that the speaker ascribes this absent love to the 'Lady', who is not asked to love him *back* (i.e. the speaker himself is devoid of feelings), but rather to 'stimulate his heart to love' (as Coleridge phrases one of the eminent aims of education in his lecture) through the love (i.e. 'Joy') she possesses within. Yet, all this is a visionary hope. In the present, the speaker is left with 'reality's dark dream', and the habit of 'abstruse research'. By placing this habit in the context of the notebook entry evoked in the beginning, the chapter concludes by outlining the difference between good and bad habits. Good habits as opposed to bad ones: (1) are grounded in love; (2) make the subject forget about the 'habithood' of their habits; and (3) '*bind*

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[them] to the Law within' (*N* 1., 1421, italics added), maintaining the illusion of free will.

My concluding chapter resumes the themes of addiction and cultivation, and supplements these with Coleridge's account of the way in which love elicits virtuous habits. It offers a comparative reading of 'Effusion XXXV' (1796; 1803) and its canonised version 'The Eolian Harp' (1817; 1834). It argues that the poems display a complicated process of cultivation, modelled on a spiritual narrative of fall (staged as intoxication), conversion (staged as self-reflection), and redemption through love. While critics agree that both versions of the poem present two incompatible viewpoints ('heretical pantheism' and 'conservative, orthodox Anglicanism', *PW*, I, 234–235, n.60.) there is a disagreement whether the poems opt for any of these. This chapter points to the original context, in *The Analytical Review*, of the French footnote attached to 'Effusion XXXV' to suggest that the quotation from Madame Roland's *Appeal to Impartial Posterity* in the footnote not only complicates the hierarchy between these two religious stances, but also presents a third alternative, which, around 1795–1796, might have been Coleridge's own. This footnote, as will be shown, had to be erased from the subsequent versions so that the poem can present a 'proper' narrative of cultivation. With reference to Coleridge's critique of Jacob Boehme in *Biographia*, the chapter argues that the 'one Life' theme of 'The Eolian Harp' (which has often been read as bearing Boehme's influence) cannot represent Coleridge's poetic, or, rather, political, ideals. Instead, it stages the kind of possession or intoxication that Coleridge rejects in his attack on Boehme, whom he calls an '*uneducated* man of genius' (*BL* I., 150). The chapter thus contends that the later version of the poem opts indeed for the moralising solution represented by Sara in the conclusion. More particularly, it suggests that Sara, as a loving and 'real' spectator, embodies Coleridge's ideal of educator. Digressing the speaker from the 'stimulants' of his fancy, she elicits a faith that *inly* feels, and allows for the speaker's *Bildung*, his integration into a domestic community, standing for the political communities of the Church and State. The poem's journey from being 'Effusion XXXV' to becoming 'The Eolian Harp' can thus make us conclude that while Coleridge often seems to endorse a *poetics* of addiction and intoxication, he always opts for a *politics* of cultivation.

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Part I
Cultivation

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1
Cultivating Reason and the Will

In *On the Constitution of the Church and State*, Coleridge calls for the necessity of 'cultivation', a process that he defines as 'the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that characterise our *humanity*' (*Ch & St*, 42). Then, supplementing the definition with specifying its aim, he adds, 'We must be men in order to be citizens' (*Ch & St*, 43, italics in the original). Raymond Williams notes that this is the first time the word 'cultivation' has been used to 'denote a general condition, a "state or habit" of the mind' (66–67). Stephen Bygrave, outlining the English etymology of 'cultivation', has shown that this agricultural term had been used as a metaphor for education from the mid-18th century onwards (34, 190–191nn). However, David Lloyd and Paul Thomas, as well as John Kooy, have also underlined that although the term was already embedded in the English discourses on education, it was the 'German' notion of culture' (Lloyd and Thomas, 66), and, especially Friedrich Schiller's idea of aesthetic education or *Bildung* (Kooy), which exerted the greatest influence on Coleridge's notion of 'cultivation'. Kooy places the emphasis on the liberal aspects of Schillerian *Bildung*, arguing that Coleridgean 'cultivation' shares with Schiller's 'aesthetic education' the 'ambition to develop in an undetermined and unimpeded way *all aspects of one's personality*' (161, italics added); Lloyd and Thomas, however, foreground the relationship Coleridge establishes between cultivation and the state, and stress the conservative, Burkean aspects of the term: cultivation 'develop[s] in individuals the capacity to be citizens for the state' (67). Indeed, as has already been suggested by Williams, Coleridgean cultivation importantly anticipates Mathew

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Arnold's explicitly politicised notion of 'culture', which already 'suggests the idea of *the State*' (*Culture and Anarchy*, 89)

In what follows, I shall first linger on Coleridge's understanding of 'humanity', which, being the precondition of citizenship, cultivation has to develop. Doing so, I shall focus on the controversial role Coleridge attributes to free will and agency in his conception of the 'human'. Kooy explains the potential content of 'cultivation' by quoting Coleridge's '3 principles, by which Human Nature is distinguished from the Brute, and which therefore ought to be developed in all Men alike -- the *Rational*, the *Moral*, and the *Religious* principles' (Kooy, 159). In *The Friend*, Coleridge differentiates between the animal and the human along similar lines by attributing *active* agency to the latter as opposed to the natural passivity of the former: man shares with animals the property of Sense, that is, 'whatever is passive in our being', the 'sensations, and impressions' (*F* II., 104), but he is distinguished from them in equally possessing active faculties: 'the faculty of thinking and forming *judgements* on the notices furnished by the Sense', as well as 'Practical Reason, [...] the power by which we become possessed of Principles (the eternal verities of Plato and Descartes) and of Ideas, (N.B. not images) as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle in Mathematics; and of Justice, Holiness, Free-Will, &c. in Morals' (*F* II., 104). Coleridge's emphasis on the faculty of judgement and, especially, 'Practical Reason'[1] suggests that he does not define 'humanity' on the basis of social provenance. Instead, he establishes an opposition between 'man', on the one hand, and 'the barbarian, the savage, and the animal' on the other: by cultivation, he writes, '[w]e do not mean those degrees of moral and intellectual cultivation which distinguish man from man in the same civilised society, much less those that separate the Christian from the this-worldian; but those that constitute civilized man in contra-distinction from the barbarian, the savage, and the animal' (*Ch & St*, 74).

Indeed, Coleridge's 'man' is always civilised: he can develop his qualities and faculties, because he is part of human society. Coleridge is convinced that 'the very constitution of our humanity [...] supposes the social state' (*Ch & St*, 13), and that our 'humanity' can only develop (i.e. cultivation can only happen) in a social context: society, he writes, is 'the prepared ladder by which the lower nature is taken up (into), and made to partake of the higher' (*OM*, 91). However,

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while 'humanity' can only develop *in* society, and, therefore, cultivation (the full development of the 'human faculties') requires the individual to be living in a social state, what cultivation allows him to do is precisely to *transcend* both his natural and his social determinations, and identify with what Coleridge conceives as the (almost, but not quite) 'universally' human (i.e. 'the civilized man in contradistinction from the barbarian, the savage, and the animal', *Ch & St*, 74). All in all, cultivation is supposed to impart and develop those universal human qualities and faculties that are independent of the individual's social status, but distinguish 'man' from 'animal'.[3]

Coleridge phrases this important distinction via Kant; while animals (as well as barbarians and savages) are doomed to remain 'slaves', that is, only 'means', humans are 'persons', and 'ends' in themselves (*Ch & St*, 15); they 'are responsible Agents; Persons, and not merely living Things' (*AR*, 78). As was mentioned in the Introduction, the 'rise' from animal to human is described by Coleridge in similarly Kantian terms, as the gradual manifestation of free will: 'in irrational Agents the Law constitutes the Will. In moral and rational agents the Will constitutes, or ought to constitute, the Law' (*AR*, 300n). Differently put, whereas 'the barbarian, the savage, and the animal' are *determined* by natural laws, 'civilised' and 'cultivated' individuals are free and autonomous in the sense that they are able to determine the Law for themselves. As he further writes: 'the Will is ultimately self-determined, or it is no longer a Will under the law of perfect Freedom, but a Nature under the mechanism of cause and effect' (*AR*, 285).

It is also 'the will' that forms the 'ground and condition' of our individual '*personality*, or Moral being' (*F* I., 155); according to Coleridge, 'we become persons exclusively in consequence of the will' (*OM*, 164–165). Of course, Coleridge's ideas on religious and moral development are deeply intertwined: in his Christianised version of Kantianism (Mary Perkins, *Coleridge's Philosophy*, 84) the ultimate *telos* of human agency, activity, and free will is their unity with God's (see also Vallins, 126–127). Hence, while the will that characterises humans as opposed to the 'Brute' is only meaningful insofar as it approximates, in order to eventually unite with, that of God,[4] our '*personality*, or Moral being' (*F* I., 155) equally strives towards the ideal of divine 'Personëity' (*OM*, 164) or 'personeity' (*OM*, 177).[5] During the process of 'cultivation', therefore, the 'will'

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struggles upward to become 'free will', but only to become one with the 'Will of God', while the moral 'person' or 'personality' (latently there in each of us) struggles to approximate the idea of the Divine Personëity.

In Coleridge's ideal State, the class endowed with the task of cultivation would be a disinterested 'Clerisy', the essence of which is epitomised by Coleridge's ideal man, the Parson. This 'persona *exemparis*' (*Ch & St*, 53n) acts as the earthly representative of the Divine Personëity, and embodies both the Christian idea Love and the Kantian idea of Personality. At the same time, however, as the repository of the values attributed by Coleridge to the institutions of both the Church *and* the State, the clerisy not only act as moral and religious guide to the population, but also prepare them for responsible citizenship: they 'diffuse through the whole community, and to every native entitled to its laws and rights, that quantity and quality of knowledge which was indispensable both for the understanding of those rights, and for the performance of the duties correspondent' (*Ch & St*, 42–43). As Joshua King also explains:

> the 'most *crucial* responsibility of the clerisy' would be 'to accompany explanations' of the 'laws and rights' to which British citizens are 'entitled' (CS [*Ch & St*] 44) with the awakening of what Coleridge called 'the potential divinity in every man' (CS [*Ch & St*] 52), each person's intuitive but latent knowledge of the 'responsible will' and the 'ultimate' ethical 'ends' toward which it is to be directed. (27)

Indeed, Coleridge's idea of 'humanity' is thoroughly politicised. And politicised not only in an ideal sense (e.g. the clerisy has to teach the rights and the duties of the citizen) but also in a very concrete one. For example, the members of the clerisy are also endowed with the task to prepare the members of the community for military service: they should 'form and train up the people of the country to obedient, free, useful, organisable subjects, citizens, and patriots, living to the benefit of the state, and prepared to die for its defence' (*Ch & St*, 54). According to this definition, in which the subject is paradoxically interpellated as both free and obedient, individual free-will harmonises with both the will of God and that of the State. As Coleridge puts it earlier in *The Friend*:

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> If therefore society is to be under a *rightful* constitution of government, and one that can impose on Rational beings a true and moral obligation to obey it, it must be framed on such principles that every individual follows his own Reason while he obeys the laws of the constitution, and performs the will of the state while he follows the dictates of his own reason. (*F* I., 192, italics in original)

Coleridge's argument, at the same time, also exemplifies François Lyotard's claim that post-Enlightenment narratives of legitimation are always based on a Kantian idea of freedom informed by the Rousseauvian idea of the *Social Contract*. According to this narrative, writes Lyotard, the laws the subject 'makes for itself are just [...] because the legislators are, constitutionally, the very citizens who are subject to the laws. As a result, the legislator's will [...] will always coincide with the will of the citizen, who desires the law and will therefore obey it' (34). Of course, Coleridge rejects the Rousseauvian concept of the 'general will', which he understands as the *imposition* of the laws of abstract Reason on individuals:[7]

> all which is said in the *Contrat social* of that sovereign Will, to which the right of universal Legislation appertains, applies to no one Human Being, to no Society or Assemblage of Human Beings, and least of all to the mixed Multitude that makes up the PEOPLE; but entirely and exclusively to REASON itself, which, it is true, dwells in every Man *potentially,* but actually and in perfect purity is found in no Man and in no Body of Men. (*F* II., 127–128)

Yet, Coleridge's emphasis on the potentiality of Reason in every man indicates that he never actually opposes the Kantian-Rousseauvian idea of Reason conceived as a 'universal' faculty. This (relatively) enlightened Kantianism comes to the fore if we place it in the context of Edmund Burke's conservative thought. Burke is convinced that '[w]e are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages'(129). Unlike Burke, Coleridge already uses 'Reason' in a Kantian sense, and believes that Reason is potentially, or latently, there in (almost) every

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man (i.e. that Reason is, potentially, universal) and that, therefore, it can and has to be *developed* through the process of cultivation.

However, since man has not *yet* emerged 'from his self-imposed immaturity',[8] the State has no other option, for the moment, than to have recourse to the solution also proposed by Burke: to enforce the application of 'traditional laws … enlightened by past experience' – which 'become just because they happen to be expedient' (*F* I., 198–199).[9] Coleridge's advocacy of tradition *as* political expediency results from a conviction that only cultivation, the full development of those active faculties that characterise our 'humanity', will render people suitable for responsible citizenship. In other words, only cultivation (a process always *en procès*) can pave the way towards the actualisation of Reason, towards what Kant would call man's 'maturity'. And since Reason is not only private but also has a public role to play, cultivation equally proves to be the possibility condition of Coleridge's idea of the constitution, which can only come into being *when* Reason has already been developed in each individual.

Yet, while Coleridge believes in the (quasi-)universality of Reason, he remains *uncertain* all through his life whether 'every native' should be allowed to rely on, or even to improve, his Understanding, what Burke has termed 'his own, private stock of reason'. Differently put, Coleridge remains uncertain whether 'universal learning', which includes, among other things, the universal teaching of reading and writing, may not 'become confluent with the evils, it was intended to preclude' (*LS*, 42, italics added). On the one hand, at the time of composing 'The Statesman's Manual' in 1816, he was convinced that 'it is folly to think of making all […] men of systematic knowledge, [b]ut it is duty and wisdom to aim at making as many as possible soberly and steadily *religious*' (*LS*, 69, italics added). Specifically, he believes, as will be discussed more in detail in the second part of this book, that printed words, which could be made available to all by the unprecedented spread of literacy (further enhanced by the reading and writing taught at National Schools) and by the fast diffusion of printing, can be both used and abused by readers who are, as yet, not sufficiently *cultivated*.[10] Hence, the lower classes will have the right to 'universal learning', when they become sufficiently cultivated to monitor themselves.

On the other hand, however, by the time of composing the *Church and State*, he became aware that it was impossible to restrain the

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diffusion of knowledge, and that it would be 'silly', that is, politically dangerous not to let the people educate themselves. As he put it, 'it was at all times wicked to wish [...] and it would be now silly to attempt' that 'the requisite means of intellectual development and growth should be withheld from any native of the soil' (*Ch & St*, 88). Further, the knowledge acquired through individual learning has to be, according to Coleridge, equally rewarded by political power: 'the gifts of the understanding, whether the boon of genial nature, or the reward of more persistent application, should be allowed fair play in the acquiring of that proprietorship, to which a certain portion of political power belongs, as its proper function' (*Ch & St*, 88). Deeming the divorce of the possession of knowledge from the possession of propriety also dangerous from a political point of view he proposes that those who succeed in acquiring knowledge should also acquire political power, which has to be bound up with the possession of property. At the same time, he remained convinced that knowledge coupled with power can turn into a most dangerous weapon if it is not grounded in 'cultivation'. Only moral and religious education permits the individual to actualise its learning possibilities without posing a threat to the institutions of the Church and the State: 'the mere possession of knowledges' has to be 'regularly accompanied with a Will in harmony with Reason', and the 'facts of science' have to be superseded by 'the humanizing influences of the moral world' (*Ch & St*, 87). Thus, the reason why Coleridge placed such a great emphasis on moral and religious education as a preliminary to any particular knowledge or skill was precisely his awareness of the unprecedented rise of a lower class intelligentsia, of what E.P. Thompson has called an 'autodidact culture' emerging in the 1820s (734).

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2
The Shaping Spirit of Education

Forest Pyle and Anne Fry have foregrounded, via Benedict Anderson's influential *Imagined Communities*, the role imagination plays in Coleridgean subject formation and nation building. In what follows, I shall suggest that education, as the transitive form of cultivation, gradually takes over, in Coleridge's thinking, the role that has been previously attributed to the 'imagi-nation'. Simply put, education is, or gradually becomes, Coleridge's political application of the concept of the imagination.[1]

In the *Church and State,* Coleridge defines 'NATIONAL EDUCATION' as 'the *nisus formativus* of the body politic, the shaping and informing spirit, which *educing*, i.e. eliciting, the latent *man* in all natives of the soil, *trains them up* to citizens of the country, free subjects of the realm' (*Ch & St*, 48). The definition indicates that by 1829, Coleridge not only considers education a means to elicit the coming-into-being of the autonomous, moral person, whose will, as the oxymoron 'free subject' also indicates, is able to freely harmonise with the will of the State, but also an aesthetic, imaginative power (i.e. 'a shaping spirit'), which is able to mould both the individual and the nation into one.

The term 'nisus formativus' is Coleridge's own Latin translation of Johann Heinrich Blumenbach's term *Bildungstrieb* (formative drive),[2] which he renders as 'vis plastic, or vis vitae formativus' in the rifacciamento of *The Friend* (*F* I., 493n). Indeed, from his middle years, he considers 'the science of EDUCATION' 'the appointed PROTOPLAST of true humanity' (*F* I., 494) and the '*nisus formativus* of social man' (*F* I. 493),[3] and refers to the 'increasing interest which good men of all denominations feel in the bringing about of a national Education'

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(*F* II. 289)' as early as 1809. The organic metaphors at the same time indicate that around this time, Coleridge still believes, following Blumenbach's thread, that education is 'natural', and our 'humanity' simply develops as flowers do; as he claims in his 1813 lecture on 'Shakespeare and Education': education has 'to educe, to call forth; as the blossom is educed from the bud, the vital excellencies are within; the acorn is but educed or brought forth from the bud', *LL* I., 585).[4] In *Logic* (compiled around 1825), however, he underlines not only the similarity, but also the difference between 'nature' that 'educes' and 'man' who, subsequently, 'educates' or 'trains up': 'What Nature has educed, man *educates*, or trains up' (*L*, 9). In other words, Coleridge comes to the conclusion that the 'natural' growth of our 'humanity' needs to be induced and guided by the active, human power of education, 'this shaping and informing spirit', which is intrinsically bound up with the power of the (God given) *human* imagination, or 'esemplastic' power (*BL* I., 295).

Indeed, Coleridge has long established an etymological connection between the German idea of *Bildungstrieb* and the active, performative power of the *human* imagination (cf, also, Kooy, 51), which is based on the aesthetic element involved in both the German *Bild*, and its derivative *Einbildungskraft*, that is, imagination, which he (mis)translates as the 'faculty that forms the many into one, in eins Bildung' (*N* III., 4176). In the 'Statesman's Manual' (1816), as I will show, he also creates a conspicuous etymologico-metaphorical link between 'educe', 'educt', and imagination.

The 'Manual' itself, subtitled 'The Bible the Best Guide for Political Skill and Foresight', serves an explicitly educative purpose: in the general context of offering a 'plea for the conduct and understanding of political life in the light of Biblical principles' (Balfour, 256), it aims to instruct the high intelligentsia of society, namely, the politicians and the clergy. By advocating the 'symbolic' reading of the Scriptures to shape the nation's future in accordance with its past,[5] Coleridge particularly wishes to counteract the 'general contagion', by 'mechanic philosophy', of the histories and political economy of his age, which he calls the '*product*[s] of an unenlivened generalising understanding' (*LS*, 28, italics added). It is instead of the passive acceptance of these mechanically produced 'products' that he proposes the active reading of the histories of the Bible, these 'living *educts* of the Imagination' (29).[7] There is an analogy, therefore,

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between the histories of the Bible, these 'educts', which are supposed to be 'organically' unfolding from the Imagination, and the *Bildung* of 'man', who is the 'educt' of the 'shaping and informing spirit' of education.

The histories of the Scriptures, however, have to be *actively*, imaginatively drawn out through the 'symbolic' reading of the dead words so that they can reveal themselves as 'educts' rather than 'products':

> The main hindrance to the use of the Scriptures, as your Manual, lies [precisely] in the notion that you are already acquainted with its contents. […] You say, you are already familiar with the Scriptures. With the *words*, perhaps, but in any other sense you might as wisely boast of your familiar acquaintance with the rays of the sun, and under that pretence turn away your eyes from the light of Heaven (*LS*, 25–26)

The histories thus have to be educed from the fixed words of the Bible with the help of the imagination, otherwise, they remain 'essentially fixed and dead' (*BL* I. 304)[8] Hence, what Coleridge's etymologies reveal is that education (this transitive, active form of cultivation) is, in fact, the performative imagining of the endless, organically progressing history (i.e. the *Bildung*) of 'man'. And since 'it is with nations as with individuals' (*LS*, 15), this history of man is in a synechdochic relationship with both the history of the nation and the histories of the Bible.[9] In fact, it is also along these lines that Coleridge imagines the function of his educative order, the clerisy; for the clerisy is not only endowed with the task to educate the nation, but is also a reading order: through the proper reading of the Scriptures, they have to 'to *preserve* the stores, to guard the treasures, of past civilisation, and thus to *bind* the present with the past; to perfect and add to the same, and thus to *connect* the present with the future' (*Ch & St*, 42, italics added.), that is, they have to create, to performatively imagine and construct the organic, linearly unfolding narrative of the nation.[10] Thus, the 'national EDUCATION' of the *Church and State* is precisely this active, 'living' power, which moulds the history of both the individual and the nation into one.

Anne Frey has recently outlined the relationship between the Coleridgean organic form and the Coleridgean state: the state, like the work of art, is an organised body, to which each element is

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connected by being both an end in itself and a means that contributes to the end of the whole (23–24). Indeed, it is possible to substitute the term 'Body' by Body politic in Coleridge's explanation of the relationship between the part and the whole of an organic work of art: 'a living Body [Politic] is necessity an organised one – & and what is organisation, but the connection of Parts to a Whole, so that each part is at once End and Means!' (*LL* I., 494) Frey's parallel between the Coleridgean state and the work of art, however, still leaves the idea of education as the most important formative drive (*nisus formativus*) of the 'body politic' intact: while the state is similar to the organic work of art, the process of education, as I will show, importantly parallels the *creation* of organic forms. For education's close connection with the imagination may already indicate that Coleridge's educator bears close resemblance to the artistic genius, and that the processes of 'educing' and 'eliciting' in his definition of education parallels the way in which the genius assists in the full development of the 'inherent' form of the organic work of art.

Coleridge's famous distinction between 'organic' and 'mechanic' work of art opposes the 'good' rules that bring out what is 'innate' in the spirit of poetry to 'mechanical' rules imposed upon the work from the outside:

> the true ground of the mistake [...], lies in the confounding mechanical regularity with organic form – The form is mechanic when ~~to~~ on any given material we impress a predetermined form, not necessarily arising out of the properties of the material [...] The organic form on the other hand is innate, it shapes as it develops itself from within, and the fullness of its development is one & the same with the perfection of its outward Form. (*LL* I., 495)

Coleridge's 'latent man' equally shapes and develops itself from within, like the organic form, due to gentle processes of educing, eliciting, and training. As he argues in *The Friend* 'all true and living knowledge must proceed *from within*; that it may be trained, supported, fed, excited, but can never be infused or impressed' (*F* I., 500, italics added).

And since, according to Coleridge, neither artworks, nor individuals or nations can simply flourish like flowers do, it is the power of

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education/imagination that has to bring forth what is latently 'within', and is in harmony with 'the properties of', the material.

Meanwhile, the argument that education can never be imposed on anyone *ab extra* equally parallels his rejection of the Rousseauvian 'general will' that he conceives as a form of terror. Rousseau misunderstood the 'properties of the material': he 'was doomed to misapply his energies to materials the properties of which he misunderstood, and happy only that he did not live to witness the direful effects of his system' (*F* II., 120–121) He was imposing 'mechanical rules', and a 'predetrmined form' on individuals, without any regard for their innate or latent properties. Coleridge himself, in contrast, considers both man and nation as 'ever originating' (*Ch & St*, 15) organic works, and the ideal educator as figure similar to the 'natural genius', who is able to draw forth what is latently there in the 'material'.

This analogy between the 'artist' proper and 'the political and pedagogical artist' is equally present in Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*:

> When the artist lays hands upon [the material of the artwork], he has [...] little scruple in doing it violence; but he avoids showing it. [...] the eye which would seek to protect the freedom of the material he will endeavor to deceive by a show of yielding to this latter. With the pedagogic and the political artist, for whom humanity is at once his material and his task, things are very different. Here the end turns back into the material, and it is only because the whole serves the parts that the parts should submit to the whole.

Schiller, as Marc Redfield also shows[11] tries to maintain an (unstable) difference between the artist, on the one hand, and the pedagogic and political artist on the other: the artist hides the violence he is doing to his material, while the pedagogue, apparently, does not even have to use violence. Coleridge, on the other hand, is very much aware of the power and agency 'driving' (*trieb*) the creation of both 'man' and the work of art. For example, his emphasis on Shakespeare's 'rules' that govern the unfolding of the organic work of art parallel the gentle violence involved in the imagining of 'man' from the 'latent man' through the shaping spirit of education: as he writes about Shakespeare, 'Imagine not I am about to oppose Genius to Rules – No! [...] The Spirit of Poetry like all other living Powers,

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must of necessity circumscribe itself by Rules' (*LL* I., 494). Like artistic creation, education is equally circumscribed by rules, which must be in harmony with the 'properties of the material'.

Indeed, Coleridge criticises Rousseau not only for imposing the rules of abstract Reason upon individuals, but also for the radically natural education he presents in Émile. This attack against natural education equally inscribes itself into an overall *aesthetics* of education, intertwining the discourse of cultivation with the discourse of art. In his 1808 'Suprenumerary Lecture on Education', Coleridge, 'digressing on Rousseau', calls the radical John Thelwall's 'miserably neglected garden' a garden 'educated according to Rousseau's principles' (*LL* I., 106). In his 1813 lecture on 'Shakespeare and Education', he condemns those who think that Shakespeare is a wild, unruly genius, 'a sort of African Nature, fertile in beautiful Monsters, [or] as a Heath, and does so' precisely in order to launch another attack against Thelwall, whose mind he again compares to an *uncultivated* garden. As the records of his lecture testify: 'the Lecturer had a garden, it was over-run with weeds, it had received no *culture*; he took Thelwall to it, and told him, it resembled his mind, it was free from prejudice; but all that was rank and wild grew in it' (*LL* I., 586). Although Thelwall's mind was laudably free from received opinions and prejudices (a characteristic much praised in *Aids to Reflection*, as we will see), he was uncultivated, that is, his thinking was not circumscribed by Rules acting in harmony with the Law, which (like the organic form of the work of art) should have 'develop[ed] itself from within (*LL* I., 495).

Yet, however 'gentle' the eliciting of the Law appears during the process of education, as the close readings in my second chapter will immediately show, it is, precisely, this conception of the individual as the organic part of a perfect artwork that makes it possible for the educator to use violence, and, by effectively transcending the singularly temporal/mortal character of individual bodies, to present their pain, humiliation, and death as necessary for the maintenance of the (aesthetic) idea of the State.

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3
Staging Education
'The Appeal to Law', Wordsworth's 'Peter Bell', and 'The Ancient Mariner'

> The 'State resorts to the narrative of freedom every time it assumes direct control over the *training* of the "people", under the name of the "nation", in order to point them down the path of progress.' (Lyotard, 32, italics added)

> The 'nation's aesthetic ideology depends on the complete erasure of the inassimilable singularity of finitude and loss [...]. The nation's abstraction of death is also an erasure of death; it is a form of mourning that simply forgets the particular losses on which it thrives.' (Vermeulen, 104)

Between July 1804 and September 1805, Coleridge served as a secretary to the governor of Malta, Sir Alexander Ball, 'the best and greatest public character' he had ever met (*F* II., 99). 'The Ancient Mariner' (1802) famously occupied Coleridge's mind during the trip to the island (Ashton, 224), and he even revised a passage of the poem en route (Lockridge, 52). However, as the 'Sketches of the Life of Sir Alexander Ball' testifies, Coleridge brought Wordsworth's 'Peter Bell' (MS 1, 1798, MS 4, 1802) to the governor's attention. Ball received 'Peter Bell' with 'warm interest' (*F* II., 290), and Coleridge reported his reaction to the poem in the 21st issue of *The Friend* (25 January 1810) as follows:

> [I]t was evident to me, that it was not so much the poetic merit of the Composition that interested him, as the Truth and

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> psychological insight with which it represented the practicability of reforming the most hardened minds, and the various accidents which may awaken the most brutalized Person to a recognition of his nobler Being. (*F* II., 290)

Departing from this rare example of the potential influence of aesthetic education on pedagogical practice, in what follows, I will examine the ways in which 'The Appeal to Law' interacts with both 'Peter Bell' and 'The Ancient Mariner'. I suggest that whereas both 'Peter Bell' and 'The Appeal to Law' stage successful processes of *Bildung*, and fit in well with Coleridge's conservative politics of national education, the Rime (without the glossary added) is at odds with his aestheticopolitics of subject formation and nation building. In other words, I propose that Coleridge showed Sir Alexander Ball Wordsworth's 'Peter Bell' rather than his own 'Ancient Mariner' because 'Peter Bell' illustrated the political educational theory he shared with Ball while 'The Ancient Mariner', especially the 1802 version without the glossary, illustrates no political didactic purpose.[1]

The main instrument of Coleridgean education, as we have seen, is the cultivated 'clerisy'. In Coleridge's ideal system, its members form a pyramidal network: while some remain the invisible 'fountain heads of the humanities,' the majority are 'distributed throughout the country so as not to leave even the smallest integral part or division without a resident guide, guardian or instructor' (*Ch & St*, 42–43). In this paternalistic scheme, based on the personal presence of the educator, the exemplary schoolmaster is the Parson, this '*persona exemplaris*' (*Ch & St*, 53), who actually embodies Coleridge's Kantian-Christian ideal of '*Personeïty*' (Mary Perkins, 84), and introduces 'love' in the workings of the educative state. In fact, the Parson may be a solution to the problems Coleridge had been tackling during his almost lifelong interest in the ethics and politics of education. In 1808, he held a 'Supernumerary Lecture of Education', which describes Coleridge's take on pedagogy. The content of the lecture will be analysed in detail in Part III of this book, suffice to say for the moment that Coleridge never ceases to emphasise the importance of feelings, and, particularly love, in the educative process: 'work by love and so generate love' (*LL* I., 105). He is convinced that everything must be taught and communicated through 'sympathy and love', and if the heart is 'stimulate[d] to love', then all other

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virtues will rise of their own accord, and all vices will be thrown out' (*LL* I., 106–107). At the same time, although he opposes all 'disgraceful' corporeal punishments, he defends, pleading the 'cause of *humanity*' (italics added), the means that can awaken a sense of 'honour', including the practice of flogging; even if he also underlines that honour should never 'substitute for virtue and principle' (*LL* I., 106, n. 31)

The *Church and State*, or Coleridge's lecture on education, constitutes the theoretical and ideal, rather than the practical outline of a project. This would make it difficult to examine the ways in which Coleridge's educative projects, based on a Kantian-Christian morality, might be realised in the empirical world.[2] Yet, as Coleridge puts it in *Aids to Reflection*: 'For as a law without a Lawgiver is mere abstraction; so a *Law* without an Agent to realise it, a *Constitution* without an abiding executive, is, in fact, a not a Law but *an Idea*!' (*AR*, 402). So *The Friend* contains a scene of instruction that dramatizes some aspects of Coleridge's ideal of education. This passage, which first appeared in the seventh issue of *The Friend* (*F* II., 99–101) and was entitled 'The Appeal to Law' from the 1812 edition onwards (*F* I., 169–171), has largely escaped critical attention, even though its main figure, Sir Alexander Ball, did gain some recognition, having been examined by both Tim Fulford and Regina Hewitt as the embodiment of Coleridge's 'Abstract idea of a wise & good Governor' (*F* I., xciv).[3]

According to Tim Fulford, Sir Alexander Ball could not have 'offered a solution to the problems of contemporary politics at home and in the colonies,' because his 'paternalism based on personal example could only be effective in a society small enough to know their governor' ('Catholicism and Polytheism', 242). However, Coleridge's presentation of Ball in *The Friend* anticipates the ideal educator he describes in the *Church and State*, personally superintending his disciples.[4] Ball's virtues 'as a master, a husband, and a parent' are exemplary (*F* I., 535), and, just like the later Parson, he is often addressed as 'Father' (Fulford, 'Catholicism and Polytheism', 240). Further, it is in a footnote attached to the 'Sketches' of Ball's life that Coleridge mentions for the first time the idea of 'eliciting', which, as we have seen, will form the basis of his definition of national education in the *Church and State*: education consists in '*educing*, or to adopt Dr Bell's expression, *eliciting* the faculties of the Human Mind, and at the same time subordinating them to Reason and Conscience' (*F* II.,

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288). Although in 'The Statesman's Manual,' Coleridge will call Bell's system a 'vast moral steam engine',[5] in 1808, he revises the drafts of Bell's *Madras School, or Elements of Tuition*, and enthusiastically defends it against Joseph Lancaster's scheme (*LL* I., 96–109).

Coleridge's allusion to Dr Bell in the sketches of Ball's life is part of the educational debate that started to engage Coleridge around the time of his 'Suprenumerary Lecture on Education'. As the editorial notes of Foakes to Coleridge's lecture on education indicate, the debate between Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster concerned the efficient education of the poor. In 1787, Bell superintended the Male Orphan Asylum in Madras, India, where he introduced a new method of teaching children by the use of monitors. In his pyramidal system of teaching and surveillance, the more advanced students served as both tutors and monitors for the less advanced ones. The efficacy of this system, based on competition and the vigilance of the many tutors, was such that it made punishment almost unnecessary. This panoptical scheme of education finds its way into Coleridge's thinking as well; as he asserts in 'The Statesman's Manual': 'The true perfection of discipline in a school is – The maximum of watchfulness with a minimum of punishment' (*LS*, 41). Bell's denominational system was supported by the Church of England, which was the other reason why it also gained Coleridge's support. The rival, secular system of Lancaster was introduced in London in 1798. It was based on the same monitorial method as Bell's, but was neither controlled, nor supported by the Church, and also differed from it in its system of punishments. In Lancaster's school, children who committed an offence had to undergo the most humiliating punishments, such as, spending hours in a sack suspended from the roof, being yoked together with other offenders and walking backwards in the school, or bearing a heavy log round the neck (cf, *LL* I., 96–104). As if to illustrate Foucault's contention that by the end of the 18th century, the true object of discipline had become the soul, Coleridge, opposing this 'disgraceful' system of corporal punishments, wholeheartedly endorses, as we will see, the idea of the Panopticon.

In the *Madras School*, Andrew Bell offers the following summary of his educational scheme:

> Look at a regiment, or a ship, &c. You will see a beautiful example of the system which I have recommended for a single school.

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> Look at the army and navy, &c, and you will see the grand system of superintendence which pervades all the works of men, and which will guide you in the general organisation of your schools. Only yours is a far less complicated machine. (312)

In fact, the educational discourse surrounding the monitorial system, including Bell's, often revolved around military metaphors (Richardson, *Literature, Education, and Romanticism*, 94). Coleridge, however, regarded the body politic itself as something different in degree but not in kind from the small community of a ship, superintended by a single individual. In other words, rather than considering the state as an intricate network of institutions that exceeds state power, or regarding the nation as a community that is purely imagined, Coleridge opts for a paternalistic scheme in which the educators, the members of the clerisy, are 'distributed throughout the country' (*Ch & St*, 42–43) like the monitors in a school. Sir Alexander Ball, this perfect screen of projection for Coleridge's idea of the ideal educator, is also presented as the commander of a military ship. (Considering that this ship, as I will show, represents in miniature Coleridge's ideal of the educative state, the coincidence that 'The Ancient Mariner' is equally set on a ship, and portrays, precisely, a (failed) process of *Bildung* or cultivation, will be of relevance in the second part of this chapter). 'The Appeal to Law' itself wishes to offer an example for the way in which 'man [is] to be governed' (*F* I., 170). Thinking about the practical 'education of the poor' (*LL* I., 108), Coleridge also anticipates here his later emphasis on the necessity of both the religious *and* the civic training of the population. The tentatively Kantian title suggests that Coleridge's ideal educator advocates Kantian morality. In 'Sketches and Fragments of the Life and Character of Sir Alexander Ball', Coleridge attributes the following thoughts to the governor '[S]ober education naturally inspires self-respect. But he who respects himself will respect others; and he who respects both himself and others must necessarily be a brave man' (*F* 1., 258).[6] Apart from (apparently) endorsing Kantian ethics based on the respect for the Law within, Ball is also a practicing pedagogue: he wishes to elicit the awareness of the Law in the members of his crew.

As the commander of a mutinous navy, he introduces a 'new system of discipline' to regulate his crew composed of 'uneducated

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Irishman' (*F* I., 169). In order to do so, he first affixes a set of rules in some conspicuous part of the ship, and makes sure that each member of the crew understands them. If any rule is violated, the violation has first to be acknowledged by the offender, and then punished with his own consent. Ball's emphasis on contract and consent backs up Coleridge's conclusion to the essay: 'if there be any difference between a Government and a band of robbers, an act of consent must be supposed on the part of the governed' (*F* I., 174–175). However, Ball's contract is, of course, only seemingly consensual: even if he avoids 'in his own person the *appearance* of any will or arbitrary power to vary, or to remit punishment' (*F* I., 169, italics added), he can hardly hide the not so gentle violence that makes the working of his system possible in the first place. Between the acknowledgement of the offence, the 'solemn' passing of the sentence, and the actual execution of the punishment, there are brief spaces interposed, supposedly for self-reflection and repentance (*F* I., 170). Coleridge omits the description of the punishment itself;[7] but lays emphasis on the conversion of the soul, or else, on the awakening of conscience. As one of Ball's mariners is reported to say: 'we heard [from the offenders] the most earnest entreaties for the forgiveness of their commander, not *before* the punishment but days after it [...] when the physical pain was remembered but as a dream' (*F* I., 170). Coleridge gives a lengthy description of the mariners' awakening to the power of Law, in which he uses mostly religious terms; indeed, the moment of their 'conversion' is strikingly similar to the Ancient Mariner's blessing of the water snakes 'unawares': 'Ruffians, who like old Buccaneers, had been used to inflict torture on themselves for sport, or in order to harden themselves beforehand, were *tamed and overpowered, how or why, they themselves knew not*' (*F* I., 170, italics added). In fact, despite the Kantian title, 'the success' of this system (*F* I., 170) does not consist in the elicitation of what Kant himself calls '*respect for ourselves* in the consciousness of our *freedom*' (*PP*, 161, italics added) but, in line with what Fulford calls 'paternalism,' in its ability to conjure up an overpowering, ghostly figure of conscience, and evoke a sense of guilt, which awaits some (endlessly deferred) redemption.

Nevertheless, following the description of the system, Coleridge stages a Kantian contest of faculties in which this 'awful power of Law' defeats the 'the very struggle of the wilder passions to keep

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uppermost' (*F* I., 171). Here, the 'Spirit of Law' already appears as an uncanny, haunting double.[8] Concluding the passage in first person singular, Coleridge writes: '*for me* its power is the same with that of my permanent self, and all the choice, which is permitted to me, consists in having it for my Guardian Angel or Avenging Fiend' (*F* I., 171). The non-phenomenal Kantian Law is thus rendered as a hallucinatory, quasi-gothic figure: 'it has no substance, that my hands can grasp, or my weapons find vulnerable – it commands and cannot be commanded – it acts and is insusceptible to my reactions' (*F* I., 171). The Spirit of Law thus metamorphosed into a ghost eventually turns into a persecutory fantasy: 'the more I strive to subdue it, the more I am compelled to think of it – and the more I think of it, the more do I find it to possess a reality out of myself, and not to be the phantom of my own imagination' (*F* I., 171). Hence, Coleridge's ghostly 'Spirit' entirely reverses Ball's supposedly Kantian scheme: rather than acquiring the capacity for law-giving that stems from within, the individuals become subjected to the gothic spectre of an authority, which cannot be 'subdued' (*F* I., 171).[9]

The subjective experience of the sailors clearly parallels (as we will see) the Ancient Mariner's endless haunting by spirits. However, Ball's mariners, as opposed to the Ancient Mariner, do become the proper subjects of a (political) community. How is this possible?

Coleridge explicitly points to a clash in Ball's attitude towards his navy between what he sees as the transcendental, Kantian Law on the one hand, and empirical feelings on the other. In the description of the governor's disciplinary scheme, Coleridge emphasizes that the governor was not only the rigid, 'inflexible organ of the Law', embodying the spirit of conscience, but also someone who '*suffered* previous to and during the execution of the sentence' (*F* I., 170, italics added). Sympathy is at odds with Kant's moral philosophy; Kant considers sympathy as a mere 'inclination' belonging to the 'sensible propensities of [our] nature':

> It is very beautiful to do good to human beings from love of them and from compassionate benevolence, or to be just from love of order; but this is not yet our conduct's genuine moral maxim appropriate to our station among rational beings *as human beings*. [...] Duty and obligation are the only designations that we must give to our relation to the moral law. (*PP*, 82)

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Despite his Kantian stance, the Governor was often guided by his fellow-feelings in his dealings with the Maltese. For instance, he put the overall political situation on trial when he defended a starving Maltese, who stole bread (Hewitt, 96–97). Ball felt so strongly for the ones he punished that the crew believed he took the punishment 'more to heart than the fellow himself' (*F* I., 170). Indeed, like Coleridge's conviction that everything must be taught by 'sympathy and love,' it is the Governor's sympathy and love towards his subjects that constitutes the most effective contribution to the success of his educational scheme. He also lives up to Coleridge's educative ideal: he not only 'work[s] by love', but also 'generate[s] love', (*LL*, 105) – especially a love for himself, and for the system he represents.

Tellingly, however, even though Ball suffers during the execution of the sentence, he does not sympathise with the physical pain that he, in the guise of his system, inflicts. Instead, he operates a *rhetoric* of sympathy, which typically transcends bodily pain. In Coleridge's quotation, he says: 'It is not the pain that you are about to suffer which grieves me! [...] but that, being a man, and one who is to fight for his king and country you should have made it necessary to treat you as a vicious beast' (*F* I., 170, italics added). The Governor's sympathy is, therefore, purely figural: Ball physically treats his mariners as 'beasts,' while verbally, or figuratively, he treats them as 'men' – aware of the power of interpellation, or else, metaphors that substitute the spirit for the body, overcoming pain, suffering, and humiliation. As he is reported to have pointed out elsewhere: 'no body of men can for any length of time be *safely* treated otherwise than *as* rational beings' (*F* I., 154, italics added). Ball does not believe in the 'true' universality of Reason, or in the idea of a universal humanity, but is convinced that the safety of the Empire requires that all men be treated *as if* they were rational beings. In fact, Coleridge equates 'eliciting' precisely with Ball's act of interpellation, and his purely figurative move of sympathy. As he writes: 'It was the aweful power of LAW [that quelled the mariners] acting on natures *pre-configured* to its influence' (*F* I., 171, italics added). When Ball interpellates the mariners as 'men' rather than 'beasts', he implies that they are 'ends in themselves' rather than 'means' (cf, *Ch & St*, 15). By the same token, however, the mariners are also transformed into mere figures ('men'), who (or rather, which), elevated above the materiality of their (natural or animal) bodies, transcend physical

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pain. Being sympathetically preconfigured as subjects, or else, personified as 'men' (while being treated as 'beasts'), the mariners undergo a conversion that generates the process of *Bildung* upon which their potential representation in a (political) community is predicated. Coleridge's tacit advocacy of corporeal punishment,[10] that is, his tacit acknowledgment that individual bodies can be treated as 'beasts' as the 'means' to an end – which actually means the erasure of the body (and, ultimately, death) for the sake of political expediency – thus anticipates the way in which his ideal educators will produce docile bodies in the *Church and State*: the clerisy 'form and train up the people of the country' into 'obedient, free, useful, organisable subjects [...] living to the benefit of the state and prepared to *die* for its defence' (*Ch & St*, 54, italics added).

However counter intuitive it may seem, Coleridge's educative project is also illustrated in Wordsworth's 'Peter Bell'. Alan Bewell, who offers the most sustained analysis of the poem, contends that 'Peter Bell' (like Sir Alexander Ball) seeks to answer the following questions: 'What kind of education suits the social position and the intellectual needs of these English sans-culottes? How is an English Revolution to be avoided?' (117–118) According to Alan Liu, 'Peter Bell' is Wordsworth's quintessential tale of an unfeeling man converted to feeling by the mere idea of punishment' (296). Liu, in his brief discussion of the poem argues that Peter (just like Ball's mariners) is exposed to 'a cosmic tribunal' and that the purpose of 'such pure mentalité of punishment is that Peter *feels* ... and ends by rejoining the world of his fellow men' (296).

At the same time, 'Peter Bell' is also considered to be the 'apotheosis of the sympathetic imagination' (Steven Jones, 33). Staging the main tenets of Coleridge's 'Supernumerary Lecture on Education', he is taught 'by love', his heart is 'stimulate[d] to love' (*LL* I., 107), and to realize that 'The heart of man is a holy thing' (Wordsworth, 1312). Eventually, his virtues rise, his vices sink, as Coleridge put it in his lecture, 'of their own accord' (*LL* I., 107), and Peter becomes 'a good and honest man' (Wordsworth, 1505). Although some objected to the didacticism, Coleridge himself considered 'Peter Bell' Wordsworth's 'most wonderful as well as admirable' poem (Jordan, 7). Meanwhile, the ballad also impressed Sir Alexander Ball: as *The Friend* testifies, it remained 'the only poetical composition, of which [Coleridge] ever heard him speak' (*F* II., 290).

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Nevertheless, 'Peter Bell' served first as instruction for Coleridge himself. Wordsworth famously criticised 'The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere' in a note to the 1800 edition of the *Lyrical Ballads* as follows:

> The Poem of my Friend has indeed great defects; first, that the principal person has not distinct character, either in his profession of Mariner, or as a human being who having been long under the control of supernatural impressions might be supposed himself to partake of something supernatural: secondly, that he does not act, but is continually acted upon: thirdly, that the events having no necessary connection do not produce each other; and lastly, that the imagery is somewhat too laboriously accumulated. (318–319)

Jordan, in his introduction to 'Peter Bell' contends that while 'there are obvious similarities between the basic redemptive plots of the two poems', Wordsworth tried to correct the 'defects' he found in the 'Rime': the hero of his poem has a 'markedly distinct character [...] acting in a causally related sequence of events' (23). In what follows, I shall only compare the two texts as possible narratives of inward cultivation or *Bildung*, and focus on the ways in which they illustrate the development of 'humanity', the formation of subjecthood, and Coleridge's cherished idea of 'eliciting'.

The poem starts with a prologue in which the narrator, instead of a tale on the 'land of Fairy' (Jordan, 111), chooses to tell the story of 'Peter Bell the Potter' (line 135) to an audience composed of the ordinary people of his native land. He takes an ironic and pitiful (rather than sympathetic), stance towards 'Poor Peter' (1051), and the telling of the tale is interrupted all along by narratorial comments, guiding the audience through the 'proper' interpretation of the tale. Peter Bell is an outlaw at the opening of the poem. He is wandering in the woods, and his lack of love is attested by the absence of sympathetic imagination; he finds no meaning in nature: 'A primrose by a river's brim / A yellow primrose was to him / And it was nothing more' (219–220). He encounters a solitary ass, a literal 'beast', which he beats brutally until it bleeds. David Perkins, in *Romanticism and Animal Rights*, observes that he has not read 'a longer, more detailed description of the beating of an animal' than the one in 'Peter Bell'.[9] Nonetheless, the ass fondly licks Peter's hand, and, as the Biblical connotation also suggests, remains the repository of 'love' all

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through the poem. While riding the donkey, Peter's conscience and feelings are gradually awakened.

When, as a first response to the beating, the donkey 'gives a horrible bray', Peter finds the echo of the rocks fearsome and threatening – as if he was indeed subjected to what Liu calls a 'cosmic tribunal' generating the awakening of his conscience.[12] Similarly, when the ass leads Peter to the drowned corpse of his dead master, this 'ugly sight' transforms into a spectre haunting his mind. ('Is it a gallows there pourtrayed / Is Peter of himself afraid? / Is it a coffin or a shroud?', Jordan, 578–580). Then, at the third stage of his subject-formation, Peter is persecuted by the image of his sixth wife, the Highland Girl, who died of 'a broken heart' (1165) because of his insensitivity, and Peter is again persecuted by an uncanny phenomenalistaion of some 'Spirit of Law': '[a]nd now the Spirits of the mind/Are busy with poor Peter Bell' (1166–1167) Finally, persecuted by the foreboding 'Repent!, repent' (1196) of a Methodist, he collapses with tears and joy.[13]

However, as long as Peter treats the donkey as a beast, rather than an end in itself, he remains haunted by the ghostly images of his conscience: for example, encountering the donkey's 'family', he is overflown with sympathy, but his past still emerges in the form of traumatising, overwhelming hallucinations; he is unable to construct a coherent narrative of himself or the events: he is 'crippled sore in his narration' (Jordan, 1275). In fact, Peter's eventual redemption is ultimately predicated upon the sympathetic anthromorphisation of the ass itself into a fully-fledged moral subject: 'Oh would, poor beast that I had now /A heart but half as good as thine' (1339–1140). And his deliverance is definitive: whereas the Mariner remains a subject *en procès*, possessed, endlessly haunted by spirits, Peter's *Bildung* is successful: he becomes a subject with an agency (i.e. who' act[s]' and is *not* 'continually acted upon'). Accordingly, as opposed to the circular plot of the Rime, Wordsworth's poem closes with the overtly didactic solution of the narrator, showing Peter as a characteristically displaced, evasive, and privatised version of the 'good citizen':

> And Peter Bell who, till that night,
> Had been the wildest of his clan,
> Forsook his crimes, repressed his folly,
> And, after ten month's melancholy,
> Became a good and honest man. (Jordan, 1496–1505)

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Clearly, the success of this work of mourning, which Wordsworth calls melancholy, is predicated upon a figurative imperative. Peter has to acquire the capacity to transfigure the 'thingness' of things, including not only the primrose by the river's brim, but also the literal body of the beast so that the events of his past can become successfully worked through, and his sins unconditionally redeemed. Thus, 'Peter Bell' is, indeed, the 'apotheosis of the sympathetic imagination' (Steven Jones, 33), and Peter's *Bildung* or cultivation is, in fact, an aesthetic education into the mastery of figuration, endowing what Coleridge (via Kant) would call 'things' with a transcendental significance. And since sympathy has a specular structure in the poem, in Peter's case, this knowledge, or skill, is elicited by the presence of a loving and exemplary teacher – the donkey. At the same time, however, it is equally figuration (what Coleridge, in 'The Appeal to Law' calls 'preconfiguration') that allows for closure, that is, for the forgetting, and the eventual erasure of the literality of all pain, death, and violence inflicted, and for the concomitant sublation of the events into a coherent narrative of *Bildung*.

However, these are only the implications of Ball's sympathetic preconfiguration of individuals, of his transcendental death denial that effaces the literality of the body, as well as the materiality of pain and death for the sake of political expediency that bring into focus the ethical consequences of Wordsworth's poem that shows up sympathy as figuration and figuration itself as the moral norm. In other words, the poem would not even be of much interest if it had not served the aesthetic education of a statesman, that of Ball, and was not originally written as a response to 'The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere', where this process clearly fails. The moral of the two tales, that we should love all things, including albatrosses and donkeys, is obviously very similar.[14] Yet, the 'Rime' stages a failed process of *Bildung*, and a failed process of mourning, or else, the mariner's endless melancholy. First, the Mariner does not have a teacher, and the presence of a benevolent, loving, or at least sympathetic God is also highly questionable. It seems that the Mariner's lack of proper subjecthood does bear some connection to this absence: since there is no loving '*persona exemplaris*' (*Ch & St*, 53) personifying the love of God, the killing of the albatross cannot be redeemed. As if consequently, the Hermit's question, 'What manner of man art thou?' does not yield the constitution of subjectivity: the events of the Mariner's

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life remain disconnected, and the Mariner, as Wordsworth equally remarks, never becomes a 'character,' or strictly speaking, a 'subject' at all. Abstaining from any coherent narrative, the 'Rime' without the glossary added, thus fails the task in which Wordsworth excels and that Coleridge will later ascribe to the clerisy, namely, 'to bind the present with the past; to perfect and add to the same, and thus to connect the present with the future' (*Ch & St*, 42).

Accordingly, as opposed to Peter, metaphorical substitutions never work for the Mariner: these do not imply either working through, or redemption in the 'Rime'. Even though it is 'instead of the cross' that the albatross is hung about the Mariner's neck, and the blessing of the water snakes is followed by the fall of the bird's corpse, neither the difference between the image of a resurrecting Christ and the ghostly Mariner, nor the gap between the literal death of the albatross and the figural beauty of the water snakes are worked through. The literality of death remains: the albatross falls 'like *lead*' into the sea, just like the ship itself in the end, but it is not simply left behind: the literal corpse, this left-over, or residue of death offers a resistance, and precisely that of the matter, which precludes the success of the work of mourning, and, therefore, the unfolding of any totalising, redemptive narrative identity. In other words, if Peter's *Bildung* translates his acquisition of the capacity to transfigure the thingness of things that, by the same token, relieves the literal gravity of his acts, then this kind of *Bildung* is rendered impossible in the Rime. Aesthetic substitutions do not redeem moral failures, nor do they generate the institution of a moral subjecthood.

And yet, the Mariner's tale inspires sympathy – as if it showed up a version of sympathy that can do without metaphorical substitutions. The absence of 'recollection' and interiorisation allows for each repetition of the tale to attest to the memory of a singular event, or else, to the memory of a single albatross that was shot. The silence of the Wedding Guest equally suggests that 'sympathy' does not necessarily have to turn into a feeling that is predicated on 'preconfiguration' (*F* I., 171) but can remain silent, and restrict itself to a sad and wise non-comprehension.[15] In other words, the Wedding Guest's missing the marriage feast and the company of his fellow men evoke an affect that resists aestheticisation, and also withdraws itself from the economy of figuration upon which the representation in any (political) community rests. Hence, the 'Rime' stands in sharp contrast

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with both Ball's poetical-politics and Wordsworth's political-poetics. It can hardly be recovered for Coleridge's politicopedagogical project of subject formation and nation building, and points to a version of ethics, which offers a plea for those who are beyond representation.

There is, indeed, a possible tension between the poem's 'ethics' (cf: Haney)[16] and the negative view advanced by New Historicists concerning Coleridge's conservative politics. While Coleridge's ethics seems to be exemplified by the 'Rime', his opposing, conservative politics is expressed in 'The Appeal to Law' and 'Peter Bell'. Despite this tension, however, his later political writings, and the late politics of his writings, as we will equally see in the next chapter, most often convey his advocacy of the interests of the Empire and the Nation-State.

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4
Sympathy
Adam Smith and Coleridgean Education

Coleridge makes a thorough distinction between the 'Moral Principle' on the one hand, and 'Sensibility, i.e., a constitutional Sympathy with Pain and Pleasure', which is 'not even a sure pledge of GOOD HEART' (*AR*, 57–58) on the other. Sympathy, understood as sensibility, has '*passive* nature' and is linked to the 'effeminate Selfishness' pertaining to an 'over-stimulated age' (57–58). All these stand in sharp contrast with 'Choice' and 'Reflection', which, according to Coleridge, constitute 'Morality' (58–59). In other words, sympathy, if it translates an 'excessive and unhealthy sensitiveness', and results in the '*contagion* of pleasurable or painful Sensations in different persons' (58) goes against the Kantian tenets of Coleridgean morality, against its emphasis on the active faculties of the human mind, and, particularly, on the Free and Responsible Will (*OM*, 17). As we have seen, 'The Ancient Mariner' does inspire sympathy: in fact, the Mariner's listener experiences sympathy precisely as a kind of contagion; the Wedding Guest loses his 'free agency' (*F* I.,, 509), he cannot 'choose but hear', and becomes mesmerised, contaminated by the Mariner's tale.[1] However, having listened to the tale, he becomes both a 'sadder' and a 'wiser' man: he is able to recuperate his personhood or, identity, and can, therefore, undergo the 'organic' process of cultivation that the Mariner, even after his 'conversion', still has to fail. Meanwhile, the later supplementation of the poem with a glossary creates a distance between the reader and the teller of the tale: the glossary writer's 'explanatory' notes forestall the reader's 'contamination', or, put differently, they prevent the transport of sympathy.

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However, Coleridge not only opposes passive 'sensibility', but also, as we have seen, the Kantian rigour resulting in the complete dismissal of sympathetic feelings and emotions from the sphere of morality. In 1817, as quoted in the Introduction, Coleridge writes:

> I reject Kant's stoic principle, as false, unnatural, and even immoral, where in his Critik der Practischen Vernun[f]t he treats the affections as indifferent in ethics, and would persuade us that a man who disliking, and without any feeling of Love for, Virtue yet acted virtuously, because and only because it was his Duty, is more worthy of our esteem, than the man whose affections were aidant to, and congruous with, his Conscience. (*CL* IV., 791–792)

In fact, Coleridge criticises *both* Kant's disinterested morality *and* passive sensibility in order to endorse the middle ground of *active* feelings and affections. These are well represented by Alexander Ball: the governor advocates sympathy *as* morality, but, rather than experiencing sympathy as a 'contagion', he advocates a version of sympathy predicated upon aesthetic distance and forms of aestheticisation. This, as well as the monitorial/panoptical pedagogical system endorsed by Coleridge, as I will show, bears strong connections to the social model emerging from Adam Smith's theory of sympathy.

The two attitudes to fellow feeling reflect the two prevailing trends in 18th century theories of sympathy: On the one hand, Hume and Shaftesbury (as Nigel Leask, Adela Pinch, Miranda Burgess, and James Chandler also argue[2]) consider sympathy as potentially dangerous 'contagion', or 'affective migrancy' (Burgess, 297). At the same time, they often express anxieties concerning individual agency and the boundaries of the self, which are translated, in political terms, as 'anxieties of empire' (Leask quoted in Burgess, 296). On the other hand, Adam Smith's theatrical conception of sympathy (Marshall) keeps the boundaries between self and other intact. As Chandler notes, '[Shaftesbury's] contagion model of sympathy proves to be exactly the model that Smith rejects' (*Archaeology of Sympathy* 240). Smithean sympathy necessitates impartial judgement, and is predicated upon an aesthetic distance to be always insufficiently bridged by an always 'deceitful' imagination (Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 7).

Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* is thus an eminently aesthetic theory: Smith predicates the awakening of sympathy on both

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aesthetic distance and, even more importantly, a primary act of aestheticisation. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* famously starts as follows:

> How selfish soever man may be supposed to be, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except *the pleasure of seeing it*. *Of this kind* is pity or compassion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. (Smith, 3, italics added)

What is even more problematic than to find pleasure in seeing the other's misery is the fact that only the aesthetic, that is, the pleasure of seeing or the pleasure of conceiving 'it', can yield compassion. In fact, the possibility to find pleasure in, and even to conceive of, the other's pain is explicitly predicated, in Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, upon a previous aesthetic formalisation. Characteristically, we are unable to sympathise with the excessive hunger of our companion, but 'we can still sympathise with the distress which excessive hunger occasions, when *we read the description of it* in the journal of a siege' (Smith, 33, italics added). A danger that presses too close precludes the pleasure of sympathy, and only in case we do not suffer with, but suffer for the ones in pain can we feel sympathy for them. Otherwise, as Smith points out, the closeness of the others' misery is somewhat traumatising, and leads to our desensitisation: when they express 'in any strong degree passions which arise from a certain situation or disposition of the body' (33), or when the *narration* of their distress 'is every moment interrupted by those natural bursts of passion which often seem almost to choke them in the midst of it, [...] we may even inwardly reproach ourselves with *our own want of sensibility*' (65, italics added). If the accidental irruption of the other's incontrollable body suspends aestheticisation, or resists the sublation of his or her pain into a coherent, aesthetic narrative, compassion is not aroused, sympathy does not work, and we simply lose our 'natural' moral sense. At the same time, it is also on account of our insensibility to any pain that presses too close that we find the individuals' transcendence of bodily pain so moving; as Smith puts it, it is 'on account of this dull sensibility to the afflictions of others

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that magnanimity amidst great distress appears so divinely graceful' (66). The fact that only the aesthetic ('graceful') subject can arouse our sympathy, translates Smith's aversion towards the literal.[3]

Coleridge's critique of Wordsworth's 'The Idiot Boy' is driven by a similar anxiety concerning the literal, or else, concerning the lack of aesthetic formalisation. In *Biographia Literaria*, he pinpoints that (in a way much different from 'Peter Bell') 'the author [Wordsworth] has not, in the poem itself, taken sufficient care to preclude from the reader's fancy the disgusting images of morbid idiocy [...] He was even by the "burr, burr, burr", uncounteracted by any preceding description of the boy's beauty, assisted in recalling them' (*BL* II., 48). Without offering aesthetic pleasure by framing his 'disgusting images', Wordsworth offends Coleridge's feelings. The pain presses too close, and the intrusion of the literal is shocking to the point of posing an obstacle to the awakening of his (aesthetic) pleasure – which is, ideally, the immediate object of poetry. This shock of the literal results in Coleridge's desensitisation, which, at the same time, pre-empts the awakening of his sympathy.[4]

In Smith's theory, sympathy is the 'main pillar that upholds the whole edifice' of society (*Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 125), and plays a great role in the maintenance of 'justice'. Smith (unlike Ball and Coleridge), however, places the emphasis on the individuals' fear of punishment in their consent to justice, which results from their capacity to sympathise: 'in order to enforce the observation of justice, nature has implanted in the human breast ... those terrors of merited punishment, which attend upon its violation, as the great safeguards of the association of mankind' (126). Humans can imaginatively place themselves into the situation (i.e. the terrors) of those who are punished, but their consent to justice (i.e. that this punishment is 'merited') derives from their being capable of equally sympathising with (imaginatively place themselves into the situation of) those who represent justice, and inflict this suffering.

> 'We examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator who would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, we thoroughly enter into all the passions and motives which influenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of this supposed equitable judge'. (Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 162)

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David Haney contends that 'it would be unlikely' that Coleridge was unfamiliar with Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) despite the lack of textual evidence (Haney, 193). Examining Coleridge's play *Remorse*, Haney argues that 'remorse's externalisation of conscience blurs the line between the real and the imagined in a kind of perversion of poetic faith' (198). Meanwhile, he equally observes that Smith's 'impartial spectator is able to issue what looks very much like the *categorical imperative*' (195, italics added).[5] In *Aids to Reflection*, Coleridge effectively transforms the haunting figure of conscience (which is independent from any fear of punishment) into the spectre of an 'invisible Judge':

> 'How deeply seated the conscience is in the human Soul is seen in the effect which sudden Calamities produce on guilty men' even when it is 'unaided by any determinate notion or fears of punishment after death': [...] he 'interprets the calamities into *judgments*, Executions of a Sentence passed by an *invisible* Judge' (*AR*, 127, first italics added).

Indeed, the figure of this 'invisible Judge' may remind us of both Coleridge's phenomenal presentation of the ghostly 'Spirit' of the Kantian Law and Smith's spectre of the 'impartial spectator'. However, even though Coleridge himself often externalises the Kantian law, which, thus, becomes a haunting figure similar to Smith's spectator, it must be kept in mind that whereas Smith, in accordance with his spectatorial, theatrical, or else, externalised version of morality, asserts that we observe justice for fear of some outward punishment, Coleridge keeps emphasising that we observe the Law because the Law has been awakened *in* us, because our conscience has been elicited, by the educator, from within.

Nevertheless, monitorial/panoptical schemes of education, which are also endorsed by Coleridge, often appear as the political and practical applications of Smith's theatrical system of sympathy for educative purposes. Andrew Bell even echoes Smith, when he claims in the *Madras School* that it is 'in the hands of an *impartial Superintendent*' that the children 'fall upon what is easiest and best to be done' (310, italics added). These models of education are all predicated upon the interiorisation of the point of view of an 'invisible judge', which is embodied by the educator.

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In fact, despite recent scholarly emphasis on the panoptical, disembodied gaze of Smith's impartial spectator, Smith also underlines that we need real spectators, that is, educators, who represent, and awaken our susceptibility to, the idea of the impartial spectator: 'the man within the breast, the abstract and ideal spectator of our sentiments and conduct, requires often to be awakened and put in mind of his duty, by the presence of a real spectator' (Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiment*, 216). While the process of education itself consists of the imitation of this real spectator who sets an example of perfection (Smith, 166), Smith also and quite paradoxically underlines that 'it is always from that [the real] spectator, from whom we can expect the least sympathy and indulgence, that we are likely to learn the most complete lesson of self-command' (216). This phrasing indicates, on the one hand, that since what we have to *learn* is perfect self-command, for Smith, the aestheticized subject, in perfect command of his body, is indeed, the moral norm. On the other hand, it draws attention to the fact that what this real (as well as the impartial) spectator lacks, is, precisely, 'sympathy': he is the one 'from whom we can expect the least sympathy and indulgence' (216). Instead, he is characterised by a perfect detachment. For although we may sympathise with him (i.e. imagine his point of view), he, in turn, does not sympathise with us: he regards us from an aesthetic distance. In fact, the real spectator, who will turn into our educator, would potentially be able to sympathise with us (i.e. imagine our point of view, or project himself in our situation), precisely because he regards us from the distance necessary for sympathy to rise. However, he refrains from exercising his sympathetic imagination, and withholds his actual sympathetic feelings.

In this sense, the 'fellow feeling' (Hewitt) attributed to Alexander Ball appears, in fact, as a version of Smithean sympathy: instead of passively indulging in some politically suspect 'effeminate' or contagious sensibility, this protagonist of 'The Appeal to Law' (who, we may remember, is presented by Coleridge as a spokesman of Kantian morality) reminds us of Smith's educator, this real spectator, embodying the figure of the impartial spectator. 'Sympathising' with his mariners' pain but refusing to share it, the spirit of Law he represents can indeed turn, as we have seen, into the ghostly, uncanny figure of Coleridge's 'invisible Judge' (*AR*, 127). The Law appears as a disembodied gaze: constantly watching, without ever actually 'loving'.[6]

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Part II
Addiction

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5 Re-reading Culture and Addiction

Coleridge's Writings on Civilisation and Walter Benjamin's Analysis of Modernity and the Addict

In the *Church and State*, Coleridge outlines the antagonism between what he sees as the principles of 'permanence' and the principles of 'progression'. The former is represented by the aristocracy or the 'landed interest', while the latter is connected to the mercantile, the manufacturing, the distributive, and the professional classes. The idea of the nation presupposes both 'permanence' and 'progression'. By progression, Coleridge means 'the progression of the state, in the arts and comforts of life, in the diffusion of the information and knowledge [...], in short, *all advances of civilisation*, and the rights and privileges of citizens' (25, italics added). However, civilisation, taken in itself, is a 'mixed good', a *pharmakon*: a remedy that can poison and a poison that can remedy:[1]

> [C]ivilisation is itself but a mixed good, if not far more a corrupting influence, the hectic of disease, not the bloom of health, and a nation so distinguished can more fitly be called a varnished than a polished people; where this civilisation is not grounded in *cultivation*: the harmonious development of those qualities and faculties that characterise our *humanity*'. (*Ch & St*, 42)

The context of Coleridge's definition of cultivation, with which this book started, thus reveals that cultivation is, in fact, offered as a remedy, or rather prevention against the potentially direful effects of the spread of civilisation. For civilisation is like an inoculation: it is rightly administered to a nation, whose citizens are 'healthy', always already cultivated. However, in case, as is always the case, the individuals of

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the state are not yet fully-fledged subjects, with the full development of their active faculties, civilisation proves to be a poison the injection of which generates disease, and the corruption of the individual and national body. In other words, it is in order to remedy this disease of the 'natural' body politic that Coleridge offers his idea of cultivation, culminating in the project of national education, as a counter-poison. In the 1829 *Church and State*, Coleridge repeats the claim (quoted in the Introduction with reference to *The Friend*) that one should:

> rightly appreciate the permanent *distinction*, and the occasional *contrast*, between cultivation and civilisation; or be made to understand this most valuable of the lessons taught by history, and exemplified alike in her oldest and her most recent records – that a nation can never be too cultivated, but may easily become an over-civilised race. (*Ch & St*, 49)

At the time of publishing *The Friend*, Coleridge thought that the epidemic of 'over-civilisation' originated in France,[2] and considered the overrating of 'instruction' as one of its worst effects:

> Alas! How many examples are now present to our memory, of young men the most anxiously and expensively be-schoolmastered, be-tutored, be-lectured, anything but *educated*; who have received arms and ammunitions, instead of skill, strength, and courage; varnished rather than polished; perilously over-civilised, and most pitiably uncultivated! (*F* I., 500)

From a historical point of view, the danger of over-civilisation (which Coleridge typically renders in military terms) is here associated with a new conception of knowledge related to the (French and Scottish) Enlightenments, and with a political and historical crisis bound up with the repercussions of the French Revolution in England – with a modernity related to what Ágnes Heller calls 'rationalistic enlightenment'. But the French Revolution, rather than being the poison itself, or the cause of corruption, is regarded by Coleridge as an effect, and the *effect*, precisely, of a *civilisation without culture*. In the 'The Statesman's Manual', enumerating the *causes* of the French revolution, he anticipates almost word by word his later definition of civilisation:

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> we have learned to trace them [the main causes of the revolution] back to the rising importance of the commercial and manufacturing class, and its incompatibility with the old feudal privileges and prescriptions; to the spirit of sensuality and ostentation, which from the court had spread through all the towns and cities of the empire; to the predominance of a presumptuous and irreligious philosophy; to the extreme over-rating of the knowledge and power given by the improvements of the arts and sciences' (*LS*, 33, italics added).

This passage from 1816 expresses Coleridge's existing anxiety concerning the violent forces of 'progression': the rise of 'the commercial and manufacturing class', the 'extreme over-rating of knowledge', and the 'improvements of the arts and sciences', in other words his fears concerning 'rationalistic enlightenment'. At the same time, the seemingly paradoxical juxtaposition of the 'spirit of sensuality' proper to the French aristocracy and the 'extreme overrating of knowledge', which was generated by those French *philosophes*, who overturned the reign of the same aristocracy is not accidental: both betray the lack of cultivation, of the development of those active moral qualities and faculties that characterise our 'humanity'.

In 'The Statesman's Manual', he uses the trope of malady, similar to the one in the *Church and State*, to argue against the advances of civilisation and the threats posed to the health of the body politic, unless this body politic is formed by cultivation. Specifying the aim of the manual (this educative tool for the higher classes), Coleridge claims that he particularly searches for 'an antidote to that *restless craving* for the *wonders of the day*, which in conjunction with the *appetite* for *publicity* is *spreading* like an efflorescence on the surface of [the] national character' (*LS*, 8). On this occasion Coleridge's overall nationalist rhetoric of health and hygiene inscribes itself into a more specific discourse: the symptoms of *this* 'hectic of disease' consist of insatiable, compulsive and repetitive bodily needs ('craving' and 'appetite'), and the individuals' slavish subjection to 'alien [mostly virtual] stimulants' (such as the 'wonders of the day' and 'publicity'), defying both 'free agency' and 'free will'. And the 'antidote' to this specific epidemics of the will, as he goes on to say, 'must be sought for in the *collation* of the present with the past, in the habit of thoughtfully *assimilating* the events of our own age to

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those of the time before us' (*LS*, 9, italics added). In other words, only the active construction of national history can offer, according to Coleridge, the 'steadfast frame of hope which affords the only shelter from the throng of self-realising alarms, at the same time that it is the natural home and workshop of all active virtues' (*LS*, 9). The key concepts used to present the antidotes to the threat civilisation poses to the concept of individual and national cultivation include the active, imaginative construction of the 'organic' narrative of the nation (i.e. 'the collation of the present with the past'), autonomy and free agency ('active virtue'), productivity ('workshop'), strength and resilience ('steadfast'-ness), domesticity ('natural home'), and boundaries ('frame'). These are posited as the values of the 'cultivated' that can save the English from the levelling effects of the (quasi-)universal availability of the printed press (i.e. the fast 'diffusion of information and knowledge', *Ch & St*, 25),which goes hand in hand with the excessive and compulsive consumption of the news (i.e. a 'restless craving for novelties'), the virtual hunger to appear in the daily press (appetite for publicity), and a general susceptibility to self-excitement (self-realising alarms),[3] or, 'stimulatability'.

In the first part of this book, it was argued that that cultivation aims to elicit 'humanity', which, in principle (and, as we have seen, only in principle), revolves around the idea of a free will that is 'bound to originate its own Acts, not only without but even against alien Stimulants' (*AR*, 98). However, the above passage testifies that even though humans (as opposed to animals and machines) are supposed to be free from outside determinations, and their actions are supposed to be governed by the Law within, they often act upon the influence of 'alien Stimulants'. For the human mind *can*, under certain circumstances, be driven by an urge to involuntarily suspend the interference of the will, and to mechanically crave and hunger after the enjoyment of strong, mostly virtual, stimuli. And since the '[t]he stimulating substance is no stimulant except in relation to, and in consequence of, the stimulatability' (*OM*, 143) this absence of free will (i.e. stimulatability) here appears as a *historical* threat, related to the emergence of a civilisation in excess. In other words, despite the fact that Coleridge argues throughout his life against empiricist theories of the mind, here, that the human mind is being passively determined and even entirely driven by external impressions,

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sensations, and outward forces is displayed as an actual danger to both individual integrity and national 'health'.

In his 1802 'Preface' to *Lyrical Ballads*, Wordsworth famously phrases a problem very similar to the one Coleridge describes in the *Church and State*, but the remedy he proposes is slightly different:

> [A] multitude of causes, unknown to former times, are now acting with a combined force to *blunt the discriminating powers of the mind*, and, *unfitting it for all voluntary exertion*, to reduce it to a state of almost savage torpor. The most effective of these causes are the *great national events* which are daily taking place, and the increasing *accumulation of men in cities*, where the uniformity of their occupation produces a *craving for extraordinary incidents*, which the *rapid communication of intelligence* hourly gratifies. [...] When I think upon this degrading *thirst after outrageous stimulation*.... ('Preface', 43, italics added)

Like Coleridge, Wordsworth proposes to counteract modern man's incapacity for 'voluntary exertion', his 'craving for extraordinary incidents' as well as his 'degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation'. He similarly finds the causes of this symptomatic lack of free-will, self-control and of this general need for repetitive self-excitation in the excesses of a civilisation accompanied by a political crisis: the 'great national events that are daily taking place,' the 'accumulation of men in cities', the 'uniformity of occupations', and the 'rapid communication of intelligence'. In the meantime, he also points to the rise of a modernity characterised by that accelerated, repetitive temporality that Coleridge alludes to in his attack upon the captivating 'wonders of the day'. Yet, what Wordsworth proposes to remedy this direful state of affairs are his own poetry and 'certain inherent and indestructible qualities of the human mind, and likewise certain powers in the great and permanent objects that act upon it', that is, what one could, in a simplifying way, call the power of *nature*. In contrast, Coleridge, from his forties, sees modern man as being *naturally* inclined to be overwhelmed by the artifice of *civilisation*, in case his nature is not 'grounded in cultivation' (*Ch & St*, 42, italics added). In other words, it is precisely man's natural inclination to be passive, like animals or even automatons, and to mechanically succumb, therefore, to being determined by the effects of civilisation,

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that has to be counteracted, or rather prevented, by cultivation, by a 'humanity' bound up with the God-given, active Will.

In what follows, I shall examine Coleridge's writings in the light of Walter Benjamin's theorisations of the 'addict', this figure *par excellence* of modernity, who, according to Benjamin, is constantly craving for the overwhelming stimuli offered by modernity. It will be argued that Coleridge's writings on the new, 'alien stimulants' emerging with the spread of 'civilisation' importantly anticipate many of Benjamin's insights concerning the 'shock', or else, the overwhelming excess of stimuli characterising modernity.

In his notes to the opening lecture of his 1811–1812 series on literature, Coleridge already expresses his fears concerning the direful effects of an overreaching civilisation, accompanied by the formation of big cities, the spread of new forms of communication and the increase of stimuli. He enumerates the historical obstacles to 'a sound Judgement concerning the comparative Merit of Poems' as follows:

> 1. The enormous stimulant power of Events making the desire to be strongly stimulated almost an appetite in a large majority of the World – &c &c &c – 2. […] the unexampled Influence of Opinions on the conduct of young men &c, have made us a World of Readers – 3. The passion for public Speaking – / 4th Reviews, Magazines, Selections – these with Newspapers & *Novels – (here introduce the passage concerning Novels)* constituting 9/10th of the Reading of 9/10th of the reading Public from their habits as readers – 5th This combined with the increase of Cities & therewith the starvation of ordinary gossip produced a substitute for the ever dema[nd]ing appetite – […] a rage for a more dignified Gossip about *public* Characters […] – 6th – the enormous multiplication of Authors & Books […] 7 – & lastly […] all the causes from Luxury, Lotteries, &c' (*LL* I., 186–187).

Coleridge, as Joshua King also notes, is '*unremarkable* for [his] time in protesting the mindless overconsumption of printed works' (43). Yet, Coleridge both lists the stimuli that induce the desire for being further stimulated, and emphasises modern man's craving for stimuli: stimulation, like the drug, triggers a need for itself, and enhances the desire to be further excited. The increase of Cities generates

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the formation of a city crowd, where gossip comes to constitute a virtual, but always unsatisfactory substitute for food: as opposed to natural hunger that can be satisfied, the craving for gossip is 'ever-demanding'.[4] Authors and books, just like reviews, magazines, selections, newspapers, and novels multiply excessively, and, apart from contributing to the further growth of the industry of mechanical reproduction, they trigger the excessive 'habit' of reading. The wide availability of information provokes an 'anxiety' to receive even more, while lotteries not only generate the 18th and 19th century habit of gambling, but are also associated to luxuries, which, according to the middle-class Coleridge, are sheer commodities lacking any real, or inherent value. Meanwhile, the form of Coleridge's inventory is, ironically, the precise replica of its content: isolated items follow each other in a disrupted, self-repetitive series, itself approaching excess (e.g. the repetition of 'reading' three times in the same sentence). Hence, the list convincingly displays the threats the impact of emerging modernity, which he calls 'civilisation', pose to the working of the esemplastic power of the imagination, which as we have seen, should also 'collate' and 'assimilate' (*LS*, 9).

In 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', Walter Benjamin almost appears to repeat Coleridge's description of the 'accidental' obstacles to 'a sound Judgement concerning the comparative Merit of Poems' (Coleridge, *LL* I., 186) when he explains the reasons why the 'positive reception of lyric poetry' has disappeared (Benjamin, 152). By lyric poetry, he mostly means Romantic poetry, that of Lamartine (152), or Victor Hugo (153). His argument revolves around the main assumption that this 'may be due to a change in the structure of experience' (153).

Benjamin differentiates between two kinds of experiences: *Erfahrung*, or long-lived experience on the one hand, and *Erlebnis*, short-lived experience or 'event' on the other. *Erfahrung* is linked to remembrance or memory, to the capacity to assimilate the past into consciousness, whereas events resist this integration.[5] Approvingly quoting Freud's 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', he argues that 'becoming conscious and leaving behind a memory trace are processes incompatible with each other' (157). In this essay, Freud famously analyses the consequences of accident neuroses, or individual traumas, and argues that when the subject is suddenly assaulted

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on all sides by a powerful amount of outside stimuli, these stimuli do not enter consciousness. As Benjamin explains:

> The greater the share of the shock factor in particular impressions, the more constantly consciousness has to be alert as a screen against stimuli; the more efficiently it does so, the less do these impressions enter experience (*Erfahrung*), tending to remain in the sphere of a certain hour in one's life (*Erlebnis*). Perhaps the special achievement of shock defense may be seen in its function of assigning to an incident a precise point in time in consciousness at the cost of the integrity of its contents. (159)

One may call these non-experiences, via Lacan, 'missed encounters', there *is* an encounter with the event, but it is not integrated by consciousness. Traumatic events cannot become integrated into the temporality of what Benjamin calls 'experience': they cannot be willingly remembered, nor can they become symbolised, metaphorically displaced, or metonymically transferred in dreams. Yet, according to Benjamin, they do bring about a change in the structure of experience, that is, in the structure of temporality. What is interesting for Benjamin, however, are not the individual traumas Freud investigates. Rather, the relationship between trauma and the emergence of modernity on the one hand, and trauma and addiction on the other.

Benjamin equates the increasing amount of stimuli proper to modernity with what Freud calls 'shock'. He argues that modern man is 'increasingly unable to assimilate the data of the world around him by way of experience', and as examples, he gives the shock of the city crowd (171), and journalistic information. The latter is characterised by brevity, the freshness and the sensational character of the news – and 'above all', by 'a lack of connection between individual items' (155). The effects of industrialisation invading the 'Paris of the Second Empire' yield, in their turn, the withering of experience. As he argues: the 'replacement of the older narration by information, of information by sensation, reflects the *atrophy* of experience' (155, italics added).

One may remember Wordsworth's use of the term 'torpor', the state to which the mind is reduced by 'the great national events which are daily taking place, and the increasing accumulation of men in cities'. Placed in a Benjaminian context, these terms indicate

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that the mind is reduced to torpor because the number of stimuli is so large, and their shock is so powerful that they cannot be 'felt', and, therefore, they can neither be integrated into experience (*Erfahrung*), nor can they be assimilated into memory.[6] And without recollection, there is simply no experience: 'recollection is … an elemental phenomenon which aims at giving us the time for organising the reception of stimuli which we initially lacked' (159).

Another reason for the isolation of information (or generally speaking, of stimuli and shock) from experience, according to Benjamin, is that 'the former does not enter tradition'. In fact, by experience, Benjamin means both individual *and* collective patterns of memory: 'Where there is experience in the strict sense of the word, certain contents of the individual past combine with the material of the collective past' (156). In 'The Storyteller', the link between tradition and experience becomes even clearer. Here, Benjamin links experience and memory (*Gedächtnis*) to the existence of a community to explain why 'the art of storytelling [the 'older narration'] is coming to an end' (*Illuminations*, 83). Establishing an intrinsic link between memory and storytelling ('memory is the epic faculty *par excellence*', 96), he claims that modern man is no longer able to exchange experiences, because the community of listeners has disappeared. The fragmentation of community is due, in its turn, to the fragmentation of memory itself: '*Memory* [*Erinnerung,* remembering] creates the chain of tradition which passes a happening from generation to generation' (97).[7] Memory and community create tradition together by means of the repetition, the epic remembrance of the story. Benjamin calls the story's integration into the listener's experience 'assimilation', and emphasises that the greater the degree of this assimilation is, the greater will be the listener's 'inclination to repeat it to someone else' (90).

We may remember the *community* of listeners present in Wordsworth's poem 'Peter Bell', and the ways in which it fulfils the task of the 'Romantic' ballad, which, as Pfau observes, is 'to contribute […] to the "invention of tradition" and to formulate the idea of a nation's "cultural heritage" as an ongoing interpretative social project, education in the broadest sense' (*Wordsworth's Profession*, 209). In fact, as is well established, it is precisely in order to reconstruct or recreate a tradition that, according to Benjamin, has long been lost that Wordsworth reinvents the ballad form (cf, also, Duggett).

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Meanwhile, Benjamin equally underlines that the fact that the art of storytelling is dying out is not a particularly modern symptom which would characterise, let's say, the Paris of the second half of the 19th century.

> The art of storytelling is reaching its end because the epic side of truth, wisdom, is dying out. This however, is a process that has been going on for a long time. And nothing would be more fatuous than to see in it merely a "symptom of decay", let alone a "modern symptom". It is, rather, only a concomitant symptom of the secular productive forces of history. ('The Storyteller', 86)

The question arises therefore: what has replaced tradition and experience? Benjamin argues that 'the earliest symptom of a process whose end is the decline of storytelling is the rise of the novel' (87). Then, he goes on to enumerate the elements that distinguish the novel from the story and 'from the epic in the narrower sense' (87):

> What differentiates the novel from all other forms of prose literature – the fairy tale, the legend and even the novella – is that it neither comes from oral tradition, nor goes into it. This distinguishes it from storytelling in particular. The storyteller takes what he tells from experience [...] And he in turns makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale. The novelist has isolated himself. (87)

Apart from the facts that the novelist is isolated and his readership is absent, Benjamin equally points to the role *printing* has played in the invention of a (hi)story *replacing* the tradition, which has long been declined. For the novel is essentially dependent on the book, and the dissemination of the novel on the invention of printing. At the same time, the *Bildungsroman* has implanted a new idea of progress to replace tradition '[b]y integrating the social processes with the development of a person' (87).[8]

As if from a third remove from storytelling, a new form of communication confronts the epic, and, therefore, memory: information. As opposed to both the story and the novel, it lays claim to 'prompt verifiability', and 'must be understandable in itself' (87). In fact, the 'dissemination of information' and the replacement of the

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novel by information constitute the biggest challenge to experience. Benjamin tellingly calls information a 'stranger': 'it turns out that it [this new form of communication] confronts storytelling as no less of a stranger than did the novel, but in a more menacing way, and that it also brings about a crisis in the novel. This new form of communication is information' (88). This stranger, however, is, in fact, something uncanny: there is something familiar in its strangeness. Its technical condition of possibility, printing, and dissemination, are equally constitutive of the rise of the novel, and, particularly, of that of the *Bildungsroman.*

Benedict Anderson, in his influential *Imagined Communities* bases his theory of Romantic nationalism on Walter Benjamin's writings on tradition, history, and experience. Anderson draws on Benjamin's discussions of modernity to investigate the possibility conditions of the rise of nationalisms that he links to the Romantic theme of the 'creative imagination'. His basic claim is that since all community is fundamentally something '*imagined*' because its members never perceive each other, the nation is the most radical of Romantic fictions made up as a response to specific historical and political crises. Solving the paradox of the 'objective modernity of nations in the historian's eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalist', he argues that 'nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it *invents* [nations and national traditions] where they do not exist' (5–6).[9].

The claim that the nation is always already 'imagi-nation' is supported by an investigation into the underlying medial or technical conditions of these fictions. Anderson's main scope is the way in which the spread of novels and newspapers contributed to the idea of the nation in the 19th century. In the important subchapter 'Apprehensions of Time', he argues that instead of the 'simultaneity-along-time' that characterised Medieval thinking, in which all elements of history were teleologically linked to Divine providence (i.e. they were simultaneously something that has always been and something that will be fulfilled in the future), the spread of the novel and literacy in the 18th–19th centuries made it possible to think of 'a homogeneous empty time'.[10]

According to Anderson's narrative, the spread of the novel enforced readers to construct homogenous and imaginary textual spaces of possible but not actual encounters[11] and, representing time

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as 'homogeneous and empty', it also permitted readers' identification with a community that 'mov[es] steadily down (or up) history'. At the same time, the mechanical reproduction of writing equally brought about the dissemination of newspapers, which made it possible for the first time for a readership to imagine a vast community of anonymous fellow readers reading the same newspaper at the same time (22–36).

In the chapter 'Imagined Communities' of *The Politics of Aesthetics*, Mark Redfield discusses further Anderson's analysis of European nationalisms. He criticises Anderson on the basis of his disregard for the emphasis Benjamin placed on the link between trauma or shock and the spread of print culture: 'The material production of class consciousness and national consciousness here [in Anderson's work] remains inseparable from capitalism as a mode of production inseparable from the *shock* of print technology' (51, italics added) Anderson, according to Redfield, defamiliarises Benjamin's use of 'shock': 'Benjamin consistently emphasises that the disruption of *Erfahrung* goes hand in hand with the "homogenising" force of capitalist and mechanical reproduction: the shock experience of the crowd, the photograph, the film, and so on corresponds to what the worker "experiences" at his machine – the numbing drill of a reiterated present tense, "sealed off from experience"' (Benjamin, 'OSMB', 176, in Redfield, *The Politics of Aesthetics*, 51). Relying on the relationship Benjamin established between trauma and modernity, he claims that the 'imagination of the nation responds to and to some extent cushions or wards off the shock of modernity', while the signs of the imagined nation (such as the flag or the emblems) are mechanically produced '*substitutes* for what Benjamin called *Erfahrung*' (59) Hence, nationalism, what Benjamin calls in fact 'historicism', *benefits* from the change that the technological shock of the mechanical reproducibility of writing brought about in the 'structure of experience [*Erfahrung*]' by constructing the 'homogeneous empty time' of historical progress. However, despite this difference, both Anderson and Redfield suggest that the imagining of time according to the model offered by novels necessarily turns novel readers into effective participants of the nationalist discourse.

Yet, what modernity also generates, according to Redfield, is 'Emma Bovary's shattering boredom – her inability to live in time' (53). Redfield alludes to Elissa Marder's article on *Madame Bovary* in

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the *Addictions* issue of *diacrtics*. Marder calls Emma Bovary's compulsive devouring of romances her 'addiction to novels', which she sees as a mark of her inability to live in time: she is urged by a compulsively repetitive need to forget and escape the life that is so different from the life depicted in romances, which, in her case, constitute an emphatically fictitious time, homogeneous and empty.[12] Clearly enough, Madame Bovary's addiction to novels has little to do with what Anderson's and Redfield's Benjaminian argument implies. Instead, it seems to be the exorcised spectre of the accounts of nationalism.

Redfield suggests that 'the image of the social body provides the organic analogue for the abstract, technically propagated unity of the nation-state as imagined community' (75). Then, one may ask, how does the 'figure of the addict' affect the image of this body?[13] And how can the discourse of nationalism use or abuse the haunting presence of this figure? In order to investigate further how the compulsive, repetitive mechanisms involved in addiction threatens what Anderson has aptly called 'imagi-nation', I shall return to Walter Benjamin's writings, and examine the relationship he established between the trauma of modernity and the subject's addiction to modernity, or, properly speaking, the subject's addiction to the trauma of modernity.

In 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', following the often quoted passage on memory, Benjamin, in a brief digression on Poe's *Man of the Crowd*, points to the emergence of the 'traumatophile type' (159). This type, as opposed to the participants of nationalist discourse, can hardly contribute to the imagination of the nation. He is 'in urgent need for stimuli', either provided by the crowd of the big city, or by novels, news, novelties, and information. Unlike the posited 'agency' of the nationalist discourse, this subject passively craves for succumbing to its effects.

In the same essay, Benjamin makes a distinction between Baudelaire and Poe's 'man of the crowd'. Baudelaire is the kind of 'traumatophile type', who 'made his business to parry the shocks' while seeking them (159–160). As a 'special achievement of the shock defence', he is able to assign the incident a precise point in time in consciousness 'at the cost of the integrity of its content'. Benjamin calls this a peak achievement of the intellect: Baudelaire turns the incident into a short lived event (*Erlebnis*), and then *portrays*, that is, turns

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into language (and consciousness), into *Erfahrung,* the condition of the modern man (160). As Andrew Benjamin equally comments: 'Baudelaire turned *Erlebnis* into *Erfahrung*' (133).

However, what is important for us here is Benjamin's portrayal of the addict. As opposed to both Baudelaire and the *flâneur*, the 'man of the crowd' attests to the failure of the shock defence. Although he is also 'traumatophile type', and is 'in urgent need for stimuli', he succumbs to the effects of the crowd: 'The man of the crowd is no *flâneur*. In him, composure has given way to manic behaviour' ('On Some Motifs', 168). In other words, he equally seeks for the repetition of the potentially traumatising shock events – either provided by the crowd of the big city, or by novels, news, novelties, and information. However, unlike Baudelaire, he is unable to portray the events. Meanwhile, paradoxically, what Benjamin finds a 'magnificent touch' in Poe's story, is that it 'includes the earliest description of the *flâneur*"' ('Paris of the Second Empire', 31). Thus, what characterises 'l'homme des foules' (French for 'man of the crowd') can be applied with restrictions to the simple, anonymous man of the crowd, who typifies the modern man of the age of mechanical reproducibility: he is 'unable to assimilate the data of the world around him by way of experience'.

In 'The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire' ('PSEB'), Benjamin also explains why this type seeks out the crowd. On the one hand, the crowd paradoxically provides him with the enjoyment of the 'multiplication of number'. This is a Kantian displeasure: the shock cannot be overcome and transformed into the meaningful totality of the mathematical sublime. Further, given that this 'type' 'does not feel comfortable in his own company' ('PSEB', 27), the crowd permits him to 'fill the hollow space created in him by [...] isolation with the borrowed – and fictitious isolation of strangers' (33). In other words, the isolated and hollowed up subject seeks a way out from his isolation by relentlessly repeating the very events [*Erlebnis*] that isolate him in the hope of filling up his own emptiness. However, the attempt to obtain relief by entering other people's fictitious soul is ever bound to fail. Substitutes only entice further desire. It is in this sense that Benjamin claims that '[e]mpathy is the nature of the intoxication to which [Poe's flâneur] abandons himself in the crowd' (31).

At the same time, with the use of the term 'intoxication', Benjamin's own purpose is to echo Marx's metaphor of religion as

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the opium of the people. As he says, the crowd is 'the latest narcotic for people who have been abandoned'. Further, 'the intoxication to which [he] surrenders is the intoxication of the commodity in a surging stream of customers' ('PSEB', 31). Later, eventually literalizing the metaphor, he concludes that the charm, for the poet, of these 'commodity-souls' (32) equals that of 'the *addicts* under the influence of drugs' (32, italics added). But on what specific basis does Benjamin establish a relationship between addicts and commodities? On what specific basis does he say that '[w]hen Baudelaire speaks of "the big cities" state of religious intoxication, the commodity is probably the unnamed subject of his state'? (32)

In 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', he links the shock experience of the crowd both to the isolated experiences of the worker at the machine and to the isolated games the 'addict' plays in gambling (173). Both the worker and the 'compulsive gambler' live 'like automatons' and therefore become the extensions or precise replica of either the mechanically reproduced objects or of the modes of communication to which they are addicted. In an unconscious enjoyment of his identification with commodities the addict metamorphoses into techné and turns into a figure for 'mechanical reproduction' itself.

As for the temporal structure of addiction, Benjamin opposes it to the progressive unfolding of temporality that constitutes experience. Whereas experience 'accompanies one to the far reaches of time, that fills and divides time', the (non-)experience of both the worker at the machine and the addict is devoid of temporal dimension. He says, '[t]he jolt in the movement of the machine is like the so called *coup* in a game of chance. The manipulation of the worker at the machine has no connection with the preceding operation for the very reason that it is its *exact repetition*' ('On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', 173). In other words, both the compulsive repetition of the gambler and the trained repetition of the worker is the ceaseless and meaningless repetition of the same. Hence, the addict not only becomes the replica of mechanical reproducibility itself, but addiction, as an automated iteration, or the ceaseless repetition of the same, effectively blurs the boundaries between humans and machines.

At the same time, the repetitions proper to addiction, while becoming inevitably bound up with the repetition or iterability necessary for any meaning, experience, or tradition to be constituted, equally

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undermine the repetition involved in recollection and necessary for the unfolding of the tradition. Living their lives as automatons and being unaware of their commodity nature, the worker and the gambler thus only 'pass the time', or 'while away the time', and come to 'resemble Bergson's fictitious characters who have completely liquidated their memories' (173–174). In fact, by establishing a relationship between addiction and the destruction of memory, Benjamin anticipates Derrida's theorisation of the drug as *pharmakon*.

In 'The Rhetoric of Drugs', Derrida links the problematics of drugs to that of writing, the *pharmakon*, and claims that the drug, like the '*pharmakon* "writing" does not serve the "good", "authentic" memory. 'It is rather the mnemotechnical auxiliary of bad memory. It has more to do with forgetting, the simulacrum, and *bad* repetition than it does with anamnesis and truth [...] The bad *pharmakon* can always parasitize the good pharmakon, bad repetition can always parasitize good repetition' (24). What a Benjaminian approach would bring to the fore in this characteristically Derridean argument is that the mechanical repetition proper to addiction also poses a threat to the *institution* of memory and, therefore, to the invention of *tradition*.

In the next chapter, through the close analysis of Coleridge's attack on 'the devotees of circulating libraries' in *Biographia*, it will be shown that Coleridge attacks novels precisely because they impair the memory, fragment the temporality of experience, and therefore, because novel reading poses an obstacle to both personal *Bildung* and the construction of tradition. This fragmentation of experience is also mirrored, as if repeated by the fragmented temporal structure of the novel itself. As he already argues in *The Friend*, 'wanting [...] all the connections, and (if you will forgive so trivial a metaphor) all the *hooks-and-eyes* of the memory, they are as easily forgotten: or rather, it is scarcely possible that they should be remembered'. Of course, the over-exciting, habit-forming novels Coleridge has in mind has nothing to do with the German *Bildungsroman* Benjamin alludes to.[14] This latter not only offers a model for personal *Bildung*, but, as we have seen, also constitutes an effective contribution to the building up of national tradition. As Thomas Pfau equally explains:

> The formal shift from epic to novel, so lucidly analyzed [...] in Walter Benjamin's 1936 'The Storyteller,' arises from modernity's fundamental estrangement from all cosmological premises and

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> its consequent loss of any ethical framework such as Western thought from Aristotle to Aquinas had variously derived it [...] Whereas epic telling draws on knowledge that is forever bound up with the experience and acknowledgment of things past [...], modern narrative no longer derives its legitimacy from an appeal to antecedent realities and memories but from its own discontinuous and performative imaginings of an as yet unrealized future. ('The Philosophy of Shipwreck', 971)

Unlike Benjamin (and Pfau), Coleridge does not turn towards the relatively new genre of the novel to find a model for subject formation or nation building. Instead, he seems to turn 'backward', and appears to resist what Benjamin calls the decline of tradition or 'prophetic time'. Yet, the thoughtful, active reading of the Bible that he recommends against the passive indulgence in the sensational products of the mechanical age[15] does *not* derive its 'legitimacy from an appeal to antecedent realities and memories' but, precisely as Pfau puts it with regard to Benjamin's theorisation of the *Bildungsroman*, 'from its own discontinuous and performative imaginings of an as yet unrealized future'. In other words, when Coleridge proposes the imaginative (symbolic) reading of the Bible to (re-)create national history, his purpose is something eminently modern. It originates from his awareness, similar to Benjamin's, of the loss of a 'tradition', which has to be consciously or wilfully 'recreated', or substituted for. As was already quoted from 'The Statesman's Manual', 'if there exists means for deriving resignation from the general discontent [...] that antidote and these means must be sought for in the *collation* of the present with the past, in the habit of thoughtfully *assimilating* the events of our own age to those of the time before us' (*LS,* 9, italics added). To put it differently, what he proposes is, exactly, the performative *construction* of the continuous, teleological narrative of the nation.

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6
Craving for Novelties – Craving for Novels
The Politics of Intoxicated Reading

> Gin consumed by paupers to the value of about eighteen millions yearly. Government by journeymen clubs; by saint and sinner societies, committees, institutions; by reviews, magazines, and above all by newspapers. Lastly, crimes quadrupled for the whole country, and in some counties decupled' (*Ch & St*, 68).

It is *Biographia Literaria* that comes closest to the genre of the *Bildugsroman* in offering a (scattered) narrative of individual development with an explicitly educative purpose. In the motto, Coleridge quotes Goethe[1] saying that he 'wishes to spare the young those circuitous paths, on which he himself has lost his way' (*BL* I., 3). Indeed, the autobiographical activity of *Biographia Literaria*, crowned by the institution of the imagination, is often linked to Coleridge's ambitious project of English subject-making: as Pyle puts it, the book aims to 'effectively govern both nation and individual' (15). At the same time, overloaded with implicit quotations, allusions, and plagiarisms, the book, this (non-)narrative of literary influences, is born precisely out of the technological shock of printing. Though the attempt to overcome the multiplication of books often fails, and the integration of Coleridge's wide-ranging reading experiences into the linear narrative proper to any (literary) autobiography remains a mere promise, his efforts to 'collate' and 'assimilate' (*LS*, 9), or, as he says, to use narration 'in order to give a continuity to the work' (*BL*, 5) must be taken seriously: he '*struggles* to idealise and to unify' (italics added).

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Of course, Coleridge distances himself from the novel form. On the first page, he is quick to underline that he uses 'narration' only to introduce the 'statement' of his 'Principles in Politics, Religion, and Philosophy, and the application of the rules, deduced from philosophical principles, to poetry and criticism' (*BL*, 5, italics added). In a long footnote attached to the beginning of Chapter 3, Coleridge bursts out in disparagement against the readership of circulating libraries – offering a prosthesis to the (lacking but promised) organic unity of his work:

> For as to the devotees of circulating libraries, I dare not compliment their *pass-time*, or rather *kill-time*, with the name of *reading*. Call it rather a sort of beggarly daydreaming, during which the mind of the dreamer furnishes for itself nothing but laziness and a little mawkish sensibility, while the whole *materiel* and imagery of the doze is supplied *ab extra* by a sort of mental *camera obscura* manufactured at the printing office, which *pro tempore* fixes, reflects and transmits the moving phantasms of one man's delirium, so as to people the barrenness of a hundred other brains afflicted with the same trance or suspension of all common sense and all definite purpose. We should therefore transfer this species of *amusement* (if indeed those can be said to retire *a musis* who were never in their company, or relaxation can be attributable to those, whose bows are never bent) from the genus, *reading*, to that comprehensive class characterised by the power of reconciling the two contrary yet co-existing propensities of human nature, namely, indulgence of sloth and hatred of vacancy. In addition to novels and tales of chivalry in prose or Rime […], this genus comprises as its species, gaming, swinging, or swaying on a chair or gate, spitting over a bridge; smoking; snuff-taking; tete-a-tete quarrels after dinner between husband and wife; conning word by word all the advertisements of the daily advertiser in a public house on a rainy day, &c. &c. &c. (*BL* I., 48, Coleridge's footnote with his own italics)

Coleridge's distaste for novels, and especially for novel reading, is well known. In what follows, I will suggest that the problem is not so much with the addictive qualities of the novels themselves (with what David Stevens calls 'gothic addictiveness', 97), but rather with

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the effects of novel reading, with the character of readers, with the way in which novels are read (or, rather, not read); ultimately with the politics of intoxicated reading. In the passage on 'circulating libraries', Coleridge's key terms comprise 'pass time' or 'kill time', the '*camera obscura*' of both the 'mind' and the 'printing office', 'doze[s]' supplied '*ab extra*', 'barrenness of brain' and 'hatred of vacancy', 'novels' and 'advertisements', as well as mechanical habits such as 'gaming, swinging, or swaying on a chair or gate, spitting over a bridge; smoking; snuff-taking', and 'conning' (as opposed to remembering). All in all, terms that would be associated by Benjamin to the 'traumatophile' figure of the 'addict'. What are the Coleridgean specificities of this passage?

Calling the reading of romances a 'kill-time', Coleridge implies that novels, as opposed to his high-brow readings are not necessary to retain and are not worth being integrated into any narrative of personal development. Novels not only constitute temporary escapes from time, they literally kill 'time' understood in the sense of temporality and experience. Indeed, together with 'the habit of perusing periodical works [that] may be properly added to Averrhoe's catalogue of ANTI-MNEMONICS', they also 'weaken [the] memory' (*BL* I., 49). Hence compromising the faculty of recollection upon which both the construction of the fiction of cultivation projected by the *Biographia*, and the narrative of the collective memory of the nation is predicated, compulsive novel reading undermines the kind of temporality that is necessary for the unfolding of both the individual and the nation. Small wonder that the habit of novel reading gets associated precisely with those iterative, mechanical habits (i.e. spitting, smoking, snuff taking, or the coning of advertisements) that digress the mind from the active repetition involved, according to Coleridge, in the work of the Imagination: rather than taking part in 'the repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I am', (*BL* I., 304), the repetitive character of these compulsive habits is a 'bad repetition': the mechanical, compulsive repetition of the same.[2]

The term 'beggarly daydreaming' connects aesthetic with economic and social concerns: novel readers are like beggars, they defy protestant work ethics and parasitize on the body of the nation.[3] As Derrida puts it with regard to drugs, 'in our common conception, the drug addict as such produces nothing [...]. He is legitimate only

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in certain cases, [...] only inasmuch as he participates, at least indirectly, in the production and consumption of goods' ('Rhetoric', 26). Elsewhere, Coleridge ranks 'the habit of receiving pleasure without any exertion of thought, by the mere excitement of curiosity and sensibility [...] among the worst effects of habitual novel reading' (*F* II., 150). As opposed to 'sloth', and 'sensibility',[4] he recommends agency: will, effort, and the 'exertion of thought'.[5]

Meanwhile, 'curiosity' itself is associated by Coleridge to (physical) 'appetite', which opposes the aesthetic notion of 'taste': 'The love of poetry is a taste; curiosity is a kind of *appetite*, and hurries headlong on, impatient for its complete gratification' ('Review'). In *Opus Maximum* he makes a further distinction between satiable 'appetite' and insatiable 'appetite', which latter he calls 'craving': 'appetite, either as *craving*, or as gratified' (*OM*, 124). Elsewhere, 'curiosity' and 'craving' are associated with 'restless desire', which opposes 'pleasure', and the distinction actually anticipates later psychoanalytic theories of addiction. For example, in opposition to the works of Milton and Shakespeare, which generate 'the pleasurable activity of the mind excited by the attractions of the journey itself', during novel reading, one is 'carried forward [...] by the mechanical impulse of curiosity, or by a restless desire to arrive at the final solution;' (*F* I., 14). Whereas pleasure is a 'journey', which can be enjoyed for itself, craving is uncontrollable, mechanical, and aims, in vain, at immediate fulfilment without, however, finding any pleasure in the 'journey' itself. The reader will only want more and more of the same, and novel reading turns indeed into a compulsively repeated habit, an addiction to virtual food. The political overtones of both 'craving' and 'restlessness' have already been mentioned: whereas the general 'craving for Publicity' is connected by Coleridge to 'over-civilisation', 'restlessness' is just another term for 'stimulatability', which is associated to a susceptibility to fanaticism (cf, *BL* I., 111).

According to Sarah Kofman, the term 'camera obscura'[6] originally designated 'the dark place of the monasteries where sexual prohibitions were transgressed, and where everything that was supposed to be hidden took place' (21). Kofman's phrasing is a perfect summary of the descriptions of hidden places in *The Monk*, which Coleridge placed among 'the most powerful *stimulants*' ('Review').[7] Of course, the 'camera obscura' actually stands as a metaphor for the Lockean, passive mind,[8] and, at the same time, it thematises

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the mise-en-abyme effect of the sentence that (hardly) contains it: what Coleridge says, is that the printing office produces precisely those passive, Lockean and Hartlean minds the existence of which is challenged, meanwhile, throughout *Biographia*. Hence, despite Coleridge's insistence that the mind cannot do without the will, the passage on circulating libraries does present an instance of the mind's turning into a machine, and presents this possibility as an actual historical threat. Here, this threat is associated with the emergence of an age of mechanical reproducibility, upon which both the wide circulation of books, including Coleridge's own, and the rise of literacy are predicated. Indeed, in Chapter X, the description of the effects of the hypothetical, but actually denied, existence of Hartlean minds is very similar to the way in which Coleridge presents the effects of novel reading. He illustrates the state of delirium that would ensue from 'the absence of the interference of will, reason and judgement' with the 'phantasmal chaos of association' rising from the immensity of all the 'impressions from the top of St. Paul's church' and with the 'rapid and continuous … series of such total impressions' (*BL*, 116). This phantasmal chaos of associations, in the absence of the 'mind's exultation in its own [active] rational faculties',[9] would pose an obstacle to the rise of any unified experience, which Kant would call sublime. The delirium arising from novel reading is, in fact, the technically mediated version of this delirium: readers find pleasure precisely in the experience of being overwhelmed. And while Coleridge's description of the subject's failure to experience the sublime from the top of St Paul's Church bears some uncanny resemblance to trauma (in both cases, the subject is 'overwhelmed', and there is a 'check of the vital forces', which is not followed by any positive mental movement), the devotees of circulating libraries actually indulge in the experience of a virtual trauma: like Benjamin's 'traumatophile types', they enjoy the strong stimuli offered by the images rising from among the printed letters of the book.

Michel Foucault, in 'Fantasia of the Library' argues that the 19th century was generally characterised by these 'hallucinatory' reading habits that Coleridge attributes to the public of circulating libraries: 'the visionary experience arises from the black page and white surface of the printed signs […] The imagination now resides between the book and the lamp' (90). Friedrich Kittler, drawing on Foucault's essay, argues that it was precisely this 'transparent' reading, effacing

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the technical materiality of the sign that was disciplined by the institutionalisation of 'rereading' and hermeneutics in the 19th century. Kittler's rhetoric is also telling of the subversive potential transparent reading implies: reading [is seen] as a 'need, such as opium perhaps is for the people of the Orient, who use it to produce a pleasant numbing of the senses' (115). Coleridge is clearly unhappy about this 'pleasant numbing of the senses', and is weary of the suspect pleasures thus offered. As he argues in *The Friend*, 'those who confine their reading to such books dwarf their own faculties, and finally reduce their Understandings deplorable imbecility' (*F* II., 150–151). Apart from emphasising, like Wordsworth does, that these powerful stimulants reduce the mind to a 'state of savage torpor', Coleridge presents novel reading precisely as an 'opiate', or at least, his description of the effects of novel reading is rendered in terms of drug use: the '*materiel* and imagery of the *doze* is supplied *ab extra*', and, like opium, novel reading yields the 'suspension of all common sense'. This 'suspension of all common sense', must be clearly distinguished from the 'willing suspension of disbelief for the moment' that, according to Coleridge, should constitute 'poetic faith' (*BL* II., 6.). Whereas 'reading' or the suspension of disbelief implies the consciously controlled, temporary suspension of the awareness of the medium (an 'illusion', during with the reader 'knows that it is at all times in his power to see the thing at it really is'[10]), the impact of the vision arising from the book can be put down to pure belief, to a 'delusion' during which one forgets about the vision's mediated character.

Of course, Coleridge himself is not exempt from the intoxicating effects of novels. As he argues in his review of *The Monk*:

> we feel no great difficulty in yielding a temporary belief to any, the strangest, situation of *things*. But that situation once conceived, how beings like ourselves would feel and act in it, our own feelings sufficiently instruct us; and we instantly reject the clumsy fiction that does not harmonise with them. ('Review').

Coleridge is aware that there *is* a temporary delusion during which all readers feel some unconscious sympathy with the characters, which is then destroyed by his realisation that the novel does not offer a 'semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of the imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment,

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which constitutes poetic faith' (*BL* II., 6).[11] However, what renders temporary identification possible for anyone – even for Coleridge himself – is a momentary absence of will and judgement (i.e. a 'suspension of disbelief'), or else, a common, natural susceptibility to relinquish agency and let the 'other' pierce through boundaries of the self.

Mark Roberts describes 20th century media addiction:

> media [...] tend to implode reality, drawing us into their rarefied domain. With this implosion, the distance between subject and object is eliminated. We become the event and the event becomes us, leaving us 'frozen' [...] We no longer participate in the event, but, rather, the event participates through us. (350)

The 'media addicts' Coleridge has in mind do not need the images supplied by movies or television to arrive at a state of ecstasy: the images rising from among the printed letters are sufficient to induce a trance, and the suspension of all common sense. At the same time, the disappearance of the boundary between the subject and the object during novel reading effectively appears as a mediatised version of the 'contagion' effect of sympathy.

The most famous instance of experiencing of sympathy as contagion occurs in 'Christabel'; the poem as a whole stages a process during which, as Robert would have it, we 'no longer participate in the event, but, rather, the event participates through us'. In its most famous scene, Christabel drinks in Geraldine's eyes unawares, and the intoxication this poisonous draught brings about is described by the narrator as 'forced unconscious sympathy':

> The maid, alas! Her thoughts are gone,
> She nothing sees – no sight but one!
> The maid, devoid of guile and sin,
> I know not how, in fearful wise
> So deeply had *she drunken in*
> That look, those shrunken serpent eyes,
> That all her features were resigned
> To this sole image in her mind:
> And *passively* did imitate
> That look of dull and treacherous hate!

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And thus she stood in dizzy *trance*,
Still picturing that look askance
With forced *unconscious sympathy*
Full before her father's view– (ll. 597–612, italics added)

If we take at face value Lucy Newlyn's claim that Christabel is '*overwhelmed* by the material she *reads*' (79) (i.e. that she, in fact, does *not* '*read*'), then Christabel emerges as a figure surprisingly similar to novel readers: she is intoxicated by the material she reads (i.e. by Geraldine, who herself has often been associated with the Gothic as a genre), by her gaze presented as some inebriating draught, or else, a 'doze supplied ab extra'. At the same time, reminding us of the similar structure of trauma and addition, Christabel's intoxication is, in fact, the repetition of previous similar events. When, previously, she invites Geraldine to 'sleep with' her (l. 117), she offers Geraldine a sip of 'cordial wine', and takes a huge amount of it herself:

Again the wild-flowered *wine she drank*:
Her fair large eyes 'gan glitter bright,
And from the floor whereon she sank,
The lofty lady stood upright:
She was most beautiful to see,
Like a lady of a far countrée. (ll. 214–219)

Further, the wine only heightens the feeling of intoxication, the loss of agency she had already started to experience when she had listened to Geraldine's gothic story of rape in the first place. With this story, she had all too strongly sympathised, to the point of becoming effectively 'contaminated' by it. Thus, the facts that Christabel experiences Geraldine's advance as a rape, that Geraldine eventually becomes the 'Lord' of Christabel's 'utterance' (ll. 255–256), and her arms turn into Christabel's 'prison' (l. 291) only make explicit what we have seen all along: the consequences of passive, effeminate sympathy and 'mawkish sensibility', which, according to Coleridge, go together with the effects of a dangerous susceptibility to states of intoxication.

Considering that Christabel is one of Coleridge's possible poetic personae (cf, Leadbetter), many of Coleridge's prose works, as will be discussed in the following chapters, can be considered as conscious

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attempts to monitor, control, or at least keep at bay the various intoxicated voices of his poetry. At the same time, Coleridge's warnings against the ex-stasis of over-identification, or the enjoyment of the kind of virtual trauma that characterises Christabel, novel readers, and sometimes even Coleridge himself, already point towards the implicit criticism involved in one of the first modern thematisations of the subversive potentials of literature used as drug: Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* (see, Marder, Ronell) – the author of which famously claimed: 'Madame Bovary, c'est moi'.

Coleridge is well aware not only of the intoxicating, but also of the politically subversive effect of the printed word:[12] the printing office '*pro tempore* fixes, reflects and transmits the moving phantasms of one man's delirium, so as to people the barrenness of a hundred other brains afflicted with the same trance or suspension of all common sense and all definite purpose'. This phrasing immediately brings to mind the threat posed by the mesmeric power of revolutionary orators,[13] which equally generated, according to the conservative discourse, trance and the loss of all common sense. Small wonder that Coleridge condemns political fanatics and the devotees of circulating libraries in very similar terms: while compulsive novel readers are characterised by a 'barrenness of brain', and are prone to being stimulated '*ab extra*', fanatics betray 'the absence of all foundations within their own minds', and a resulting 'reliance on the immediate impressions of the senses' (*BL* I., 30–31).[14] And since fanatics' need for strong external stimuli can also explain, why they seek 'in the *crowd* … for a warmth in common' (*BL* I., 30),[15] the 'theatre' (being 'the general term for all places of *amusement* thro' the ear or eye in which men assemble in order to be amused by some entertainment presented to all at the same time', *Shakespeare Criticism* I., 177, italics added), becomes, for Coleridge, the space *par excellence* for any potentially dangerous excitation. His anti-theatricality, more particularly, his attack on the 'perfect delusion' proposed by the 'French school', which contrasts his positive evaluation of Shakespearean 'stage-illusion' (during which the spectator 'knows that it is at all times in his power to see the thing at it really is', *Sh. Cr.* I., 178),[16] lies thus in perfect accordance with his outrage against the pleasures offered by intoxicated reading. Whereas both stage illusion and 'proper' reading implies the *willing suspension* of disbelief, both stage delusion and intoxicated reading are predicated on the *suspension of*

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will and judgement: the audience forgets about the mediated character of the spectacle, and takes the embodied text as reality.

Hence, the problem is not so much with the novel as a genre, or with the spread of the printing press and the concomitant rise in literacy. In *The Friend*, Coleridge even argues that 'the slave of impure desires will turn the pages of Cato, not to say, Scripture itself, into occasions and excitements of wanton imaginations. There is no wind but feeds the volcano, no work but feeds and fans the combustible mind' (*F* I., 52). If even the Scripture can be turned, let us say, into a sensationalist novel, or into a stimulus further exciting the mind, and there is a danger of the possible perversion of *any* book, then no manner of writing can prevent printing, or the *techné* of writing, from turning into drug, used by the healthy but abused by the sick, who indulge in the perversion of books as the objects of their impure desires. At the same time, Coleridge is also very much aware of the power of the distance that increases the always unpredictable effect of words: as he asserts in *On the Constitution of the Church and State*: 'I expressed my belief, that in no instance had the false use of a word become current without some practical ill consequence, of far greater moment than would *primo aspectu* have been thought possible' (*Ch & St*, 24). No matter whether the use of a world is false or proper, the effect of words is unpredictable, and can be far greater than intended. Coleridge's 'revulsion at the threat which reading posed for writing' (Newlyn 55) thus indicates that he deems proper ways of *reading* much more important than proper ways of writing. 'Proper' reading, as I will show in the next chapter, has to be characterised, first and foremost, by 'THOUGHT sometimes and ATTENTION generally' (*F* II., 17) to the letter of the text, by a constant awareness of the *mediated* character of the images rising from among the printed letters of the book.

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7
He 'did not *write*, he *acted* poems'
Kubla Khan, Luther, and Rousseau

> This transcendental imaginary discourse [...] this is what is condemned by a society based on work and on the subject answerable as subject. A poem ought to be the product of *real* work [...] it is always non-work that is stigmatised. The authentic work [...] ought to be the result of an effort (with merit and rewards) and of a responsible effort. [....] And even if the work comes from an effortless effort, a work without work, subordinate to the dictations of the other, still we require that this alterity be authentic and not factitious, neither simulated nor stimulated by artificial projections (Derrida, 'Rhetoric', 30).

'Kubla Khan' (c. 1797) and the introductory note Coleridge attached to it at the poem's first publication (1816) constitute an instance of the intersection of the discourse on opium, the discourse of intoxication, and the discourse of addiction. First, the poem inscribes itself in the 19th century discourse on opium through its famous reference to the 'anodyne' Coleridge ostensibly took while conceiving the poem. At the same time, Coleridge's self-image as an addict who needs medical help emerged between the composition and the actual publication of the poem.

In a letter dated March 1798, that is, around the date of composition of 'Kubla Khan', Coleridge complains to his brother George about his pains that could only be relieved by laudanum, the only available painkiller at the time. 'My indisposition originated in the

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stump of a tooth over which some matter had formed: this affected my eyes, my eyes my stomach, my stomach my head [...] Laudanum gave me repose' (*SL*, 67). In April 1814, two years before the publication of the poem with the preface, he was already complaining that he was unable to overcome his opium habit without external medical help:

> Had I but a few hundred pounds but 200, half to send to Mrs Coleridge, & half to place myself in a private madhouse, where I could procure nothing but what a Physician Thought proper, & where a medical attendant could be constantly with me for two or three months... then there might be Hope. Now there is none. (*SL*, 173)

The way in which Coleridge describes the tortures resulting from his opium habit, and the remedy he seeks, namely to be placed under the surveillance of a doctor and enclosed in an asylum, supports Sedgwick's Foucauldian argument that in the 19th century, opium habit started to emerge as a 'problem', and a specifically medical problem at that. Meanwhile, the date of this letter also indicates that the 'addict', as a 'species', or, in Coleridge's case, the emergence of an *identity* defined by his opium habit, could have come into being some decades before what Sedgwick calls, as we have seen, the Nietzschean hypostatisation of the will. Indeed, as we saw in the Introduction, in a letter from 1814, Coleridge writes that his opium habit poses an impediment precisely to the workings of his 'volition', the instrument of the Will.

As opposed to addiction, intoxication designates a state in which self-consciousness is suspended. It bears close resemblance to the state of poetic inspiration, during which, according to Plato, the poet is 'out of his senses'. While in *Ion*, Plato's judgement of inspiration, or else, of the poet's Dionysian intoxication by the 'honeyed fountains' of the gardens of the Muses, seems to be neutral,[1] in *The Republic*, however, he warns against the political dangers of the intoxicating effect of poetry: 'we shall be right in refusing to admit him [the poet] into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason' (Book X). In what follows, I shall argue that 'Kubla Khan' and its preface, while offering running commentaries on Plato's different treatments

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of poetry also establish an explicit connection between intoxication, intoxicated reading, and politics, more particularly, politically dangerous performatives. These connections come to the fore if we place the poem and the preface in the context of Coleridge's essay on Luther and Rousseau in *The Friend*.

In the eighth issue of *The Friend* (October 5, 1809), Coleridge describes Luther's vain effort to translate a passage from the Bible, the 'Trance of Slumber' resulting from his frustration, and his subsequent hallucination of the 'Devil':

> [Luther] ceasing to *think*, yet continuing his brain on the stretch in solicitation of a thought; [...] sinks, without perceiving it, into a Trance of Slumber: during which, his brain retains its waking energies, excepting that what would have been mere *Thoughts* before, now (the action and counterweight of his outward senses and their impressions being withdrawn) shape and condense themselves into *Things*, into realities!' (*F* II., 120)

John Beer draws a sweeping parallel between Luther's vision after a period of 'intense thinking' and the state of the 'Author' in the preface to 'Kubla Khan' to argue that the poem's images were 'the subject of intense thought on Coleridge's part'.[2] In fact, both 'Kubla Khan' (c.1797) and the introductory note Coleridge attached to it in 1816 can be productively reread in the context of Coleridge's essay on Luther and Rousseau in *The Friend*. The 'Author', like Luther, has a 'vision in a dream': falling asleep over Purchas's *Pilgrimage*, he has a vision of Kubla's dome, while Luther, falling asleep over the Bible, has an hallucination of the devil. I will suggest that apart from the fact that Coleridge speaks about Luther very much as he does of himself in the preface, both the poem supplemented by the preface and the essay on Luther and Rousseau offer commentaries on the political implications of the relationship between intoxicated reading, poetic vision, and the potentially dangerous, daemonic power of words.[3] For Luther's intoxicated reading is also linked, in Coleridge's mind, to his being a 'great poet'. However, being 'possessed' by his visions, and '*acting*', rather than '*writing*' poems, he also resembles, according to Coleridge, the 'crazy Rousseau', whose words had 'direful' consequences (*F* II., 110–121). Associating possession and intoxicated reading with the

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dangerous power of words, the essay on Luther and Rousseau can bring into focus the political potentials of the 'Author's' original vision, the performative character of Kubla's political speech act ('in Xanadu did Kubla Khan / a *state*ly pleasure dome *decree*', italics added), as well as the historical implications of the ecstatic 'I' of the last stanza. It may eventually suggest that the introductory note to 'Kubla Khan' can be read as a second 'decree', a written declaration that can distance the conservative Coleridge from his own poem. It may indicate that the Coleridge of 1816 (as opposed to Luther, Rousseau, Kubla Khan, and the 'Author' of 1797 described in the preface) is (re-)framing his own poem in an attempt to avert its potential consequences.

Critics, such as Irene H. Chayes, Kathleen M. Wheeler, and Jean-Pierre Mileur have observed that the introductory note can be read as Coleridge's own interpretation of the poem. Yet, few have taken the preface's claims literally to suggest that Coleridge, in 1816, wanted to disavow his poem. Among such readers is Marilyn Butler, who contends that by introducing the preface, Coleridge wished to reduce and domesticate the poem's radical, political implications (133–157), or David Perkins, who claims that the person from Porlock is introduced by Coleridge in order to re-establish his own place among 'ordinary human beings' and 'stop the transgression'. Recently, Anne Frey has drawn on John Beer's, Marjorie Levinson's, and Simon Brainbridge's suggestions that the khan is a *porte parole* of 'radical solipsism' (Levinson), the embodiment of the 'commanding genius' of *Biographia* (Beer and Perry), and a parallel to Napoleon (Bainbridge), in order to argue that opium provides a necessary 'frame for the poet's vision' (Frey, 43–44). Claire Miller Colombo concentrates on the performative character of the khan's initial speech act, without, however, taking the introductory note into consideration. She places the poem in the context of *The Statesman's Manual* and *Lay Sermons* on the basis of the coincidence of their dates of publication (1816–1817), and concludes that the poetic persona of the poem is a false-prophet who 'in the blindness of self-complacency confounds Symbols with Allegories' (*LS* 30; Colombo, 46). Colombo's contention thus supports Angela Esterhammer's claim that the conservative Coleridge was against the 'destructive speech act of statesmen and institutions' but believed in the 'redemptive utterance of [...] some spirit that connects God and nature with the poet's soul'

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(Esterhammer, 146). Esterhammer's argument, however, leaves one in trouble as far as the political import of the poetic utterance of Kubla is concerned.

The first version of Coleridge's essay on Luther and Rousseau appeared in 1809. It proposes to establish a parallel between 'the heroic Luther' and 'the crazy Rousseau' on the basis of 'the similarity of their *radical nature*' (*F* II., 113, italics added). With this comparison, Coleridge aims to give a model for the right reading of 'the pages of history' (*F* II., 111): an insight into the 'real resemblances' between certain historical figures can render 'the whole more intelligible' (*F* II., 111).[4] Focusing on the right way of reading history, he anticipates the educative project of *The Statesman's Manual* (1816), which advances the reading of the Bible as a 'Guide for Political Skill and Foresight'. For, according to Coleridge, the proper interpretation of the Scriptures can help the statesman shape the nation's future in accordance with its past.[5] Coleridge's emphasis on 'correct' models of interpretation indicates that by the time he composed the preface to 'Kubla Khan', he had already predicated nation formation upon an attentive hermeneutic activity (*F* I., 16)

In the essay in *The Friend*, rather than focusing on the identity of opinions of the different historical characters, or establishing parallels between their 'outward actions', Coleridge wished to foreground the similarity between their 'effects', their 'instruments', and their 'circumstances' (*F* II., 111). In the case of Luther and Rousseau, this parallel 'effect' stems from the same 'instrument': the power of their words. As he puts it: 'the effects produced on their several ages by Luther and Rousseau, were commensurate with each other, and were produced in both cases by [...] serious and vehement *eloquence*' (*F* II., 113, italics added). It is (partly) this eloquence, as he argues elsewhere, that rendered Rousseau's system so dangerous: his intoxicating arguments were 'calculated' to exert, 'on noble and imaginative Spirits', 'a peculiar fascination' (*F* II., 123).

Edward Duffy associates Coleridge's fear of Rousseau's daemonic power with the 'concluding exhortation' of 'Kubla Khan': 'Beware! Beware! / His flashing eyes, his floating hair / Weave a circle round him thrice / And close your eyes with holy dread' (63–64). This parallel also supports Lucy Newlyn's claim that the last lines of 'Kubla Khan' indicate that 'there is some danger, Coleridge suggests, that his enchantment may be contagious'. And this, according to Newlyn,

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equally testifies to 'Coleridge's interest in the power of the word to 'make things happen' (76–77).

In his 1818 edition of *The Friend*, Coleridge places the essay on Luther and Rousseau among the Landing Places, which are offered to readers (these 'fellow-labourers'), who are tired of the tense intellectual effort that Coleridge has required from them. (i.e. 'THOUGHT sometimes, and ATTENTION generally', which both 'are Efforts', *F* I., 16–17.) Yet, this 'Landing Place' partly serves to prevent what it stages. For Luther, who, by 1818, becomes the title figure, is far from representing the ideal reader of *The Friend*. Firstly, he suffers the 'great irritability of the nervous system', which, added to 'the impressions made upon him in early life, and fostered by the theological Systems of his Manhood', can, according to Coleridge, explain 'all his apparitions' (*F* II., 116). Hence, what he lacks is precisely what Coleridge asks from his own readership: attentive and thoughtful reading. Secondly, it was 'The Darkness and Superstition' that 'moulded his mind': he 'deemed himself gifted with supernatural influxes', because his ideas were 'more in sympathy with the spirits who he was to influence' (*F* II., 119). Thus, the fact that his firm principles, his 'standard[s derived] from a common measure already received by the Good and the Wise' (*F* II., 113) were coupled with an 'irritability' and the influence of the (Catholic) superstitions of his age resulted in his becoming a 'great Reformer' (*F* II., 121) who, at the same time, 'hurled his inkstand at the Devil' (*F* II., 115), that is, fought against 'Apparitions'.[6]

Meanwhile, the description of Luther is equally evocative of Coleridge himself. Coleridge admits that he himself is not excepted from seeing 'ghosts and apparitions' (he meticulously describes the state when '*our* thoughts, in states of morbid *Slumber*, become at times perfectly *dramatic*' and 'the Vision appears to talk to *us* its own thoughts in a voice as audible as the shape is visible', *F* II., 118, italics added), while the allusion to Luther's 'deranged Digestion' and his taking of 'de-obstruent medicines' (*F* II., 115–116) may also bring to mind Coleridge's own problems with his digestive system, triggered by his opium habit (Holmes). As H. J. Jackson also remarks, 'In the *Friend* [Coleridge] wrote about Luther's encounter with the devil in a way that suggests sympathetic identification' (277). However, these are the scenes of reading and writing depicting Luther at work that offer the most provoking parallels – as well as the most conspicuous differences – between the two men.

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One scene of reading depicts Luther in the midst of 'intense thinking', trying to exorcise the 'cloud of Darkness conjured up between the Truth of the sacred Letters and the eyes of his Understanding' (*F* II., 120). Yet, he cannot understand, let alone translate, what he perceives: the efforts of his understanding being 'baffled', he can see '*nothing-but-Words*' (*F* II., 120, italics in the original). The book appears to be a sheer multiplication of letters, an overwhelming array of materiality, which his mind is incapable of bringing into a meaningful spiritual totality.

It is at this moment of utter frustration that, giving up 'thought' and 'attention generally', he 'ceas[es] to think'.[7] Turning away from the Bible, he 'sinks, without perceiving it, into a Trance of Slumber'. In this second phase, 'what would have been mere Thoughts before [...] shape themselves into *Things,* into Realities' (*F* II., 120), and Luther has a 'brain-image of the Devil, vivid enough to have acquired apparent *Outness*' (*F* II., 120). Luther's way of reading clearly parallels that of the 'Author' of 'Kubla Khan'. Although the 'Author' was under the effect of an 'anodyne' while falling asleep above the pages of Purchas's *Pilgrimage*, during his sleep he similarly had a vision in which 'all the images rose up before him as *things*'. And even if the term 'anodyne' seems to be a mere euphemism for opium or laudanum, and the tranquillity it is supposed to entail seems to stand in a sharp contrast with Luther's 'irritation', early 19th century debates around opium use, as well as Luther's actual 'Trance of *Slumber*' (italics added) point to the political implications of both Coleridge's and Luther's half-sleep. Virginia Berridge and Griffith Edwards suggest that in the early 19th century, opium use was generally associated with the 'irritable' lower classes. These, as Coleridge puts it, easily 'becomes *restless* and *irritable* through the increased temperature of collected multitudes', and are, therefore susceptible to fanaticism (*BL* I., 42, italics added). What was supposed to distinguish the opium-eating habit of the working classes from that of the literary circles and the middle classes was precisely the assumption that the former took opium as a stimulant, whereas the later ones professedly took it as an anodyne. Although Berridge does not allude to Coleridge, Coleridge also remarks in a letter that he had not 'at any times taken the flattening poison as a stimulus, or for any craving after pleasurable sensations' (*SL*, 223). The choice of 'anodyne', therefore, not only marks the medicinal use of opium in

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Coleridge's early years, but also the important boundary he sought to maintain between himself and the 'mob'.[8] Thus, when he was struggling, by the time of composing the preface, with 'Restlessness & incipient Bewilderment' (as an effect of temporary opium withdrawal, *SL*, 173.), he always took 'tranquilisers' rather than 'stimulants' (which are, of course, the different denominations of the very same substance), potentially inducing a 'Trance of Slumber'.

Secondly, even though Coleridge is reading Purchas whereas Luther is reading the Bible, both readings are characterised not so much by a 'willing', but rather by an un-'willing suspension of disbelief': the obliteration of the mediated character of the images (the printed letters), and a consequent failure to achieve any interpretive activity. At the same time, both Luther's way of intoxicated reading, and that of the 'Author' of the preface – triggered by a 'doze of laudanum' – mirror the kind of intoxicated (non-)reading that is proper, according to Coleridge, to the audience of gothic romances. For these latter, as we have seen in the previous chapter, reading turns into an opiate: the 'materiel and imagery of the doze [being] supplied ab extra', it induces a 'trance', and the 'suspension of all common sense' (*BL* I., 48, n.2, italics added). In fact, both the readers of the gothic *and* the 'Author' of the preface to 'Kubla Khan' are characterised by the skipping of the medium of the book, that is, by the forgetting of its textual or linguistic manifestation. Further, this is a *constant* characteristic of Luther's reading habits as well: Luther fought against 'an Army of Evil Beings headed by the Prince of the Air [which] were no metaphorical beings in his Apprehension' (*F* I., 119). Interpreting the 'metaphor', or, as he will later call it, 'the symbol in a literal i.e. phaenomenal sense', he exhibits the 'folly and danger of interpreting *sensually* what was delivered of objects *super*-sensual'. And this, according to the later Coleridge, is the very ground on which 'the whole branchery of papal superstition and imposture' was based (*Ch & St*, 120).[9] Coleridge presents this same charge against Luther's way of reading in the next sentence of the essay in *The Friend*: 'The Bible was a spiritual indeed but *not a figurative* armoury in his [Luther's] belief' (italics added). Hence, Luther, as at least this specific essay suggests, does not consider the Bible the symbol of the Logos, but its sheer medium: instead of the 'translucence' that characterises the symbol (*LS*, 30) he opts for an (impossible) transparency.[10] However, the meaning of the Bible does not manifest itself without

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due attention to its letter; this can also explain why Luther, possessed by his own visions, hurled his inkstand at the Devil (*F* II., 115). Coleridge himself, as opposed to both Luther and the 'Author' of the preface, takes great care to reclaim his agency while reading. When he accounts the episode with the ink-stand, and reflects upon the black spot it 'actually' left on the wall of Luther's room, he stresses that the spot immediately offers itself to two possible readings: 'being capable of a double interpretation, it is equally flattening to the Protestant and the Papist' (*F* II., 115). In a similar way he points to the necessity to reflect upon the reading process, or, generally speaking, to the necessity of constant self-reflection in his marginalia to Luther's *Table Talk*: 'Force yourself to reflect on what you read paragraph by paragraph, and in a short time you will derive your pleasure, an ample portion at least, from the activity of your mind' (*Selected Marginalia* I., 280, also in Jackson, 283)

Yet, when he is reading Purchas, he is intoxicated, and loses all capacity for self-reflection. More particularly, he (like Luther) forgets about the letter of the text, and, finding himself in an artificial paradise, has a vision of Kubla's dome. At the same time, the 'Author' of the preface not only speaks about a vision rising out from the pages, but also about the 'parallel production of the correspondent expressions, without any sensation or consciousness of effort'. First, given Coleridge's emphasis on the 'conscious will', and the concomitant '*struggle* to idealise and to unify' in his definition of the secondary, or poetic imagination, one may already ask, as Coleridge does, 'if that indeed be called composition'. Secondly, Luther, just like the 'Author', was also a species of poet: as Coleridge writes, 'Luther was indeed a Poet [...], as great a poet as ever lived in any age or country' (*F* II., 119). In the same sentence, however, he also alludes to Luther's obsession, which, retrospectively, renders him a lesser poet: '*but* his poetic images were so vivid that they mastered the Poet's own mind! He was possessed with them' (*F* II., 119, first italics added). One may remember that in *Biographia*, Coleridge speaks about the 'true' poet, Shakespeare, as follows: 'Shakespeare, no mere child of nature; no automaton of genius; no passive vehicle of inspiration, possessed by the spirit, not possessing it' (*BL*, ch. 15). 'True' poets are no 'automatons' and are never 'possessed' by the spirit: rather than being transported in states of inspiration (and inspiration, in this sentence, is synonymous with intoxication, with the state of being intoxicated

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by a 'spirit'), they remain in control, and sustain their agency. At the same time, the danger of Luther's possession lies, mainly, in its consequences: it immediately turns his *poetic* words into '*armouries*', which clearly signals the politically threatening potentials of the 'Trance of Slumber', and the subsequent state of being intoxicated by the visions rising out from the printed book. The whole passage on Luther as a poet reads as follows: 'The Bible was a spiritual indeed but not a *figurative* armoury in [Luther's] belief: it was the magazine of his war-like stores, and thence he was to arm himself, and supply both shield and sword, and javelin to the elect [...] LUTHER did not *write*, he *acted* poems' (*F* II., 119, original italics). Literally enacting the way he reads, Luther 'acts' his poems, instead of 'writing' them. In this sense, as will be argued below, his words parallel the speech act, the performative 'decree' of the Khan.

Luther's words, as 'instruments', have great power (and therefore, 'effect'), and make it possible for Luther to camouflage himself as pure medium in the mystic sense of the term. The power of his language is such that it makes the reader forget its actual medium, the letter, that is, the fact, that it has to be deciphered, interpreted, or simply, read. In other words, his eloquence has the capacity to metamorphose the written text into a kind of pure *speech* act. His words can transmit the trance they are generated by, and have a hallucinatory 'effect': like the words of Rousseau and of the poetic 'I' of 'Kubla Khan', they have the power to intoxicate.

According to Coleridge, a more specific 'effect' of the erasure of the readability proper to writing is the illusion that a speech act is always applicable, regardless of the historical or political context. At least, this is the problem that he outlines at the end of the essay, when he imagines Luther living in Geneva in Rousseau's time:

> Conceive [Luther] as a citizen of Geneva, and a contemporary of Voltaire … conceive this change of circumstances, and Luther will no longer dream of Fiends or of Antichrist – but will he have no other dreams in their place? [...] His impetuous temperament, his deep working mind, his busy and vivid imaginations — would they not have been a trouble to him in a world, where nothing was to be altered, where nothing was to obey his power, to cease to be that which it had been, in order to realize his preconceptions of what it ought to be? [...] And might not a perfect constitution,

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> a government of pure reason [...] have easily supplied the place of the reign of Christ in the new Jerusalem? [...] Henceforward then, we will conceive his reason employed in building up anew the edifice of *earthly* society, and his imagination as pledging itself for the possible realisation of the structure. We will lose the great reformer, who was born in an age which needed him, in the Philosopher of Geneva, who was doomed to misapply his energies to materials the properties of which he misunderstood, and happy only that he did not live to witness the direful effects of his system. (*F* II., 120–121)

First of all, Geneva may make one think of Calvin, the other father of Reformation, and Coleridge indeed remarks in a footnote attached to the essay that in 'Calvin's own city, some half a dozen only of the most ignorant believed in Christianity in any form' (*F* II., 113n) at the end of the 18th century. Small wonder that Luther, had he lived two centuries later, might have been influenced by the 'Darkness' of another, more 'enlightened' age. Secondly, the contention that Rousseau 'was doomed to misapply his energies to materials the properties of which he misunderstood' not only brings to mind Coleridge's opinion on the *Social Contract*, which, as has been argued, he considers as single, violent performance yielding terror, or else, as an imposition of abstract rules upon individuals, but also his definition of the mechanic (as opposed to the organic) form: 'The form is mechanic when to on any given material we impress a predetermined form, not necessarily arising out of the properties of the material' (*LL* I., 495). This, as we saw in the first part of this book, runs counter to his organic idea of the aesthetic state, this 'ever-originating social contract' (*Ch & St*, 15), ideally governed by continually renegotiated laws 'elicited' from an ever-changing 'material'.

Most importantly, the above passage on a Luther metamorphosed into a Rousseau suggests that words ('instruments'), for Coleridge, do not have value in themselves: his emphasis falls on the 'effect' produced by the uncontainable, performative power of these 'instruments'. When he evokes Rousseau's spectre, he argues that the violence unleashed by Rousseau's system went far beyond Rousseau's intentions, suggesting that since time and space always weaken the words' reference back to a locatable source, they will always have the potential to misfire, in other words, their power is uncontainable.

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Because both Luther's and Rousseau's words possess power (they, as Newlyn put it with regard to 'Kubla Khan', 'make things happen'), and they perform precisely in an erasure of their written (and, therefore, readable *and* historical) character, they become weapons that potentially unleash violence. At least, they fascinate those who succumb to their visionary power without actually reading them. Hence the fact that the violence unleashed by Rousseau's system went far beyond Rousseau's intentions suggests indeed that the same 'instruments' (i.e. words) can have a different 'effect', depending on the way they are read (or not read), and on the constellation of the 'circumstances' on which they are imposed (see above: *F* II., 112). At the same time, 'eloquence' will always fascinate those who are susceptible to the visionary or spectral power of words, and do not read them in an awareness of their written and historically bound character.

In the terms of the distinction made in *Biographia Literaria* between the 'absolute' and the 'commanding genius', both Luther and Rousseau are commanding genii, impressing their 'preconceptions on the world without' (*BL* I., 32). Had Luther lived in Rousseau's time, his words, like Rousseau's, would have acted as the 'shaping spirit of ruin, to destroy the wisdom of ages in order to substitute the fancies of the day, and to change kings and kingdoms, as the wind shifts and shapes the clouds' (32, italics added). For the adept at Burkean expediency, as Coleridge was in 1809, the destruction of the wisdom of ages would, of course, be unacceptable. The parallel between 'Kubla Khan' and the 'commanding genius' has been well established since John Beer's reading of the poem, to which Leadbetter added an important modification: Coleridge's own participation in the daemonic forces represented by the Khan. Conspicuously, Coleridge also sees something of himself in both Luther and Rousseau. Rousseau, like Coleridge, represents a daemonic force that is both attractive and repulsive to Coleridge. As Duffy also argues:

> Behind Coleridge's constant tirades against the licentious minds and manners of the French, there thus emerge hints of a more ambivalent attitude toward 'crazy Rousseau' – a not unadmiring demonization, a sensitivity to the seemingly raw and unleashed energy of Rousseau's personality. But if the Rousseau of the older and more conservative Coleridge is a daemonic force, he is one less to be revered than to be contained and feared. (Duffy, 63)

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However, 'Kubla Khan', representing Coleridge's 'daemonic' part, is to be 'contained and feared' not only because of the daemonic force he embodies, but also because his geometrical plan is slightly reminiscent of Rousseau's. In *The Friend*, Coleridge argues that Rousseau's 'universal Principles [...] necessarily suppose uniform and perfect Subjects, which are to be found in the *Ideas* of pure Geometry and (I trust) in the *Realities* of Heaven, but never, never in Creatures of Flesh and Blood' (*F* II., 133). Kubla's geometrical garden, his 'twice five miles of fertile ground / With walls and towers [..] girdled round', is the 'effect' of his powerful, performative 'decree'. This 'decree' is of 'radical nature' (*F* II., 113), exactly like the speech acts of a Luther turned into a Rousseau: it 'build[s] up anew the edifice of *earthly* society', and, just like 'Declaration of the Rights of Man' (influenced by Rousseau's *Contract*), it silences those 'ancestral voices' upon which, according to the conservative Coleridge of 1816, the organic unfolding of history should be predicated.

In other words, Kubla's 'decree' performs a State, a 'stately pleasure-dome' into existence, through a singular act of speech. His words are, precisely, 'armouries', and their linguistic power, or 'effect', is eminently historical: they superimpose themselves upon the non- or prelinguistic forces of 'nature'. When he hears the meaningless 'tumult' as being the 'voice' of some ancestors ('And 'mid this tumult Kubla heard from far / Ancestral voices prophesying war!'), he endows this nature with an arbitrary meaning, and thereby also posits, and again through language, the identity of his State as against the fantasy of a potentially threatening past. In this sense, the last lines of the first part of the poem exhibit the invention (rather than the intervention) of history and the accomplishment of the institution of Kubla's State.[11] Thus, by the time he published the poem, Kubla's civilisation may represent the worst of Coleridge's nightmares, similar to his dream of Luther's turning into a Rousseau and building a new Jerusalem on earth.

Consequently, the would-be ecstatic poetic persona of the epilogue (possessed with the song of the Abyssinian maid) would also obtain the restrictive 'but' that Coleridge applies to Luther conceived as a poet. His words have a potential, similar to Luther's and Rousseau's, of turning into weapons if transmitted to an audience susceptible to rapture. Like Luther, this 'I' is 'a Poet indeed [...] but his poetic images [are] so vivid that they master [...] the Poet's own mind!

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He [is] *possessed* with them' (*F* II., 119). Could he indeed 'revive' the song of the Abyssinian Maid, and build, or 'decree' that 'dome again', then, from the point of view of the conservative Coleridge of 1816, he would be duly exorcised from the (political) community – exactly like and for the same reasons as Plato's poet, banned from the Republic.[12] Thus, for a Coleridge rereading his poem in 1816, it is the same '*folly*', and perhaps also '*danger* of interpreting *sensually* what was delivered of objects *super*-sensual', which characterises Luther, that is exhibited in the last stanza of 'Kubla Khan': 'Beware! Beware! / His flashing eyes, his floating hair!'

However, since Coleridge is aware that words can always have 'some practical ill consequence, of far greater moment than would *primo aspectu* have been thought possible' (*Ch & St*, 24), the poem has the potential to yield readings that establish an author figure 'behind' the Khan's utterance who is disturbingly similar to the Khan himself. And because this figure is also similar to the one from whom the conservative Coleridge of 1816 wanted to distance himself – the radical poet and political journalist that he used to be, or else, the 'commanding genius' who easily metamorphoses from poet into politician – Coleridge does everything to relieve the poem's political implications in the preface.

As has been mentioned, the kind of intoxicated reading that characterises both Luther and the 'Author' is linked, in Coleridge's thinking, to the appearance of visions, and the potential of the 'corresponding expressions' to become 'armouries', dangerous weapons that unleash violence. However, even though Coleridge, by evoking this connection in the preface, does admit the 'real resemblance' (*F* II., 111) between Luther and himself, he tries to contain what seems to be hardly containable. For Coleridge, as opposed to both Luther and Rousseau, is well aware of the possible 'effects' his enchanting vision may have under certain 'circumstances'. He is poet critic, who 'reflects on his own reflections' (*BL* I., 132), and is rereading his own vision in order to try (but fail) to control the spectres inevitably rising.

First of all, the term 'anodyne', together with the emphasis on the lack of 'effort' serve as a warning sign that the 'Author' produced something that he did not want to produce. As we saw in the Introduction, he lamented in 1814 that laudanum constituted a 'poison' to his 'volition', which, 'dissevered from the Will' contradicts the Will's dictum (*SL*, 175). The 'honey-dew' of the poem,

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which *is* evocative of opium,[13] is therefore reduced, in the preface, to the status of a mere anodyne, which, while having a tranquilising effect, still inhibits the working of his 'volition', which would allow for the proper performance of the 'responsible Will'. Further, the 'Author' is, in fact, *saved* from becoming a possessed visionary in the preface, that is, from being identifiable with the ecstatic 'I' of the last stanza: the (posited or fictional) arrival of the person on business from Porlock, just like the fictitious friend in Chapter 13 of *Biographia*, or the posited listeners of the conversation poems, disrupts Coleridge's potentially dangerous flights of fancy.[14] Thirdly, Coleridge's emphasis on the 'broken charm' in the preface, that is, the foregrounding of the repetition involved in the actual composition of the poem places an accent on the written character of a text to be deciphered, rather than to be indulged in by succumbing to both its visionary and incantatory charm. Hence, when he recommends that we should regard the poem as a 'psychological curiosity', this curiosity might be the obsession of the ecstatic poet, a possible mirror image of Luther, whose words, unless they are read, have the potential of turning into weapons that can be used for good *or* ill. Consequently, the preface appears as a second 'decree', a declaration from Coleridge's part, which overwrites the one starting the poem. It brings into existence an 'author' different from both the 'Author' and the poetic persona of the epilogue.

In fact, the same attempt at containment and reframing occurs in the 1818 edition of *The Friend*. Whereas both the 1809 and the 1812 editions of the essay on Luther and Rousseau include a long disquisition on Coleridge's own experience with ghosts ('A Lady once asked me if I believed in ghosts and apparitions, I answered with truth and simplicity: *No, Madam! I have seen far too many myself*', etc. *F* II., 118), this passage disappears in the 1818 version only to reappear on the next pages as a separate essay under the heading 'Ghosts and Apparitions'. Of course, the 1809 essay did need editorial shaping, for the long digression disrupted the argument. However, the moving of the passage to the next pages, that is, the spatial separation of the speaking subject ('Coleridge') from 'Luther and Rousseau', relieves Coleridge's own hallucinatory experiences of the political implications he attached to the seeing of ghosts in the previous essay, which compared two historical figures on the basis of their 'radical nature'. And even if in the 1818 essay on 'Ghosts and Apparitions' Coleridge

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also alludes to Luther when describing himself ('Now substitute the Phantom from Luther's brain for the images of *reflected* light (the fire for instance', *F* I., 145), he does manage to disentangle the problem of apparitions (and especially his own) from the Rousseau question. Put differently, he does everything to domesticate his ghosts, and to exorcise the spectre of politics. In the same vein, although he admits that he is – as the preface to 'Kubla Khan' also indicates – similar to Luther in some respects, he refuses the presumption that this similarity might lie in their common 'instruments', 'effects', or 'circumstances'. Coleridge tries again to monitor the way his text is read, and the author figure it potentially engenders.

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Part III
Habits

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8
The ‘habits of active industry’ (*AR*, 49)

> a modernity at once unable and unwilling to overcome its own indulgences, a rationalised world increasingly dependent on its own habits, both good and bad. (Falflak, 63)

So far, I have deployed certain binaries that organise Coleridge’s pre-Arnoldian discourse on ‘culture’, such as the opposition between freedom and compulsion, will and stimulatability, agency and passivity. Via Eve Sedgwick, and Walter Benjamin, I have theorised the ‘other’ of cultivation as ‘addiction’; considering addiction as, primarily, an ‘epidemics of the will’ (Sedgwick). In the first Chapter, I argued that Coleridge’s idea of cultivation is inherently related to the ideas of freedom and autonomy. However, education, in Coleridge’s view, has to elicit the kind of autonomy that is in harmony with the will of God and that of the State.[1] As I will show, Coleridge, as both the inheritor of the British empirical tradition, and an advocate of Kant’s idea of moral autonomy, introduces the idea of love and the practice of habits as a partial solution to this aporia. The importance Coleridge attaches to habits (both ‘habits of reflection’ and ‘virtuous habits’) renders his pedagogical ideals more complex, since the mechanical character of habit, this ‘*automatic* reflex’ (Barney, 41, italics added) goes against the pedagogical ideal of eliciting free will in the individual.

Conspicuously, the mechanisms of habits, these mental automatisms acquired in childhood are hardly distinguishable from the mechanisms of addiction, which, as we have seen, render the

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individual an 'automaton' (*BL* II., 26), an '*homme machine*', or else, the replica of mechanical reproducibility itself. According to the *OED*, habit is a 'settled disposition or tendency to act in a certain way, esp. one acquired by *frequent repetition of the same act* until it becomes almost or quite *involuntary*; a settled practice, custom, usage; a customary way or manner of acting' (italics added). The first definition *OED* gives of 'addiction', is hardly distinguishable from that of habit: 'The state of being (self)addicted [devoted, given up *habitually* to a practice], or given *to* a *habit* or pursuit; devotion' (italics added). In the chapters that follow, I investigate the difference between addiction, which has a negative connotation, and habit, which has both a negative and a positive valence in Coleridge's thinking.

Unlike many of his English contemporaries (on the latter, see Richardson; Bygrave), Coleridge hardly speaks about 'practical education': rather than laying down rules as to how to raise the child, he focuses on the basic principles of education, and on the mental processes involved in it. In other words, his thinking about education remains almost purely 'formal', precisely in the Kantian sense.

In fact, Kant equally held lectures on pedagogy, which were edited and published by Friedrich Thedor Rink in 1803. In these lectures, Kant basically repeats the crux of his practical philosophy: since '[t] he child should learn to act according to maxims whose justice he himself perceives' (*Educational*, 186), the formation of 'discipline' and the use of punishment have to be relegated to the background. Similarly in line with his ethical rigour, he argues that '[c]hildren must be kept from […] sympathy': sympathy is an inclination that has no place in 'morality', which, according to Kant, refers to 'character' (199). 'Character', in its turn, consists, according to Kant's lectures on pedagogy, 'in the firm resolution of the *will* to do something, and then in the actual execution of it' (202, italics added). There is no trace that Coleridge actually read Kant's pedagogical lectures, despite the fact that, as I will show in what follows, Kant's ideas on pedagogy could have found hospitable reception in Coleridge's thinking about education. Meanwhile, as has been mentioned several times, Coleridge was far from being an established Kantian: for example, he placed more emphasis on feelings and emotions, as well as on the institution of religion, than did Kant. And while Coleridge (like Kant) rejected the feeling of sympathy as

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something passive and effeminate, he did endorse love as an *active* feeling, and even principle, which connects the individual to God, as well as, to the State.

According to the records of Henry Crabb Robinson, Coleridge started his 1808 lecture on education by claiming that there are three 'means of forming the character'. These 'cardinal rules' of early education are '1. to work by love and so generate love: 2. to habituate the mind to intellectual accuracy or truth: 3. to excite power' (*LL* I., 105*)*. Later in the record, Robinson calls the second point the child's acquisition of 'habits of truth' (*LL* I., 106). These points largely correspond to Coleridge's later outlines of early education, in *Logic* and in *Opus Maximum* respectively. While in a passage of *Opus Maximum*, he surveys the ways in which the early bond with the mother, who serves as a mediator towards God, generates love and religious feelings in the child, which itself forms the basis of good 'character' (*LL* I., 107), the first chapter of *Logic* describes the ways in which the mind can be habituated to reflection. Differently put, whereas *Opus Maximum* is an 'Assertion of Religion' (*LL* I., ccxxvi) with an important passage on the ways in which religious feelings are elicited in infancy through the early bond with the mother, paving the way for the later awakening of 'virtuous habits' (*F* I., 103.), *Logic* (modelled on Kant's *Logic*) deals with the development of the faculty of Understanding, and describes how the mind of the child should be 'made early accurate' (*LL* I., 107), inducing proper 'habits of reflection' (*AR*, 6). In the first part of this Chapter, I shall focus on the ways in which Coleridge imagines the development of proper habits.

Like Coleridge's emphasis on feelings, the importance attributed to habits is equally rooted in British moral philosophy, and (therefore) also goes against the grain of Kant's morality. Raymond Williams, as was mentioned in the first chapter, noted that Coleridge's use of cultivation 'denote[s] a general condition, a "state or *habit*" of the mind' (italics added). Indeed, while Coleridge famously calls his own opium use the 'ACCURSED habit' of taking laudanum, education, which forms the basis of cultivation, equally consists, according to Coleridge, of '*educing* the faculties and *forming* the habits' (*LS*, 40, italics in the original). This latter phrasing wonderfully captures one of the cruxes of Coleridgean pedagogy, namely, the concomitant necessity to both elicit 'free will' and inculcate 'habits' during the process of education.

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Remembering his formative years at Christ's Hospital in *Biographia*, Coleridge praises Reverend James Bowyer for forming his taste and judgement through habituation (he 'habituated me to compare Lucretius [...] not only with the Roman poets of the, so called, silver and brazen ages; but with even those of the Augustan era'; *BL* I., 8–9), and later in the book, he also speaks about 'the general habits of genius' with regard to Shakespeare:

> Shakespeare, no mere child of nature; no automaton of genius; no passive vehicle of inspiration, possessed by the spirit, not possessing it; first studied patiently, meditated deeply, understood minutely, till knowledge, become habitual and intuitive, wedded itself to his habitual feelings, and at length gave birth to that stupendous power, by which he stands alone. (*BL* II., 26–27)

Shakespeare is not the child of nature, and is no automaton, but his active knowledge and feelings have grown into a habit, and can work by themselves. The unstable difference between being a *passive* 'automaton' and being driven by 'habitually' *active* feelings and knowledge must be left in suspense for the moment, suffice it to say for now that apart from drawing attention to proper habits of feeling and habits of reflection in the genius, Coleridge equally presents the proper working of the active faculty of the esemplastic imagination as, in 'The Statesman's Manual', specifically, a habit. To offer an antidote for the 'restless craving for the wonders of the day', he recommends 'the habit of thoughtfully associating the events' of the past with those of the present (*LS*, 9). In this specific passage, Coleridge points to a clash between two kinds of habit: the bad habit of restless craving, turning the individual into a desiring machine, and the good habit of tranquil thoughtfulness, which is an essential feature of the cultivated individual. Meanwhile, Coleridge, as we will see, equally presents virtue itself as a specific kind of habit. In his ideal State, for example, the gentle communication of knowledge by the educator yields the formation of 'virtuous habits'. As he puts forward in his appraisal of Sir Alexander Ball: 'Were but a hundred men to combine a deep conviction that virtuous habits may be formed by the very means by which knowledge is communicated, then men may be made better, not only in consequence, but *by* the mode and *in* the process, of instruction' (*F* I., 103). It seems that

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the Coleridgean idea of cultivation is thoroughly intertwined with a discourse of habits; indeed, as I will show in what follows, education aims at turning knowledge, reflection, feelings, and the proper working of the will into a habit.

Of course, the concept of habit has a long tradition in the history of philosophy. As an immediate precedent, it is famously central to Burke's philosophy, stressing the role of habitual behaviour in the maintenance of culture and cultivated life. Burke's advocacy of the importance of prejudice and custom, which must supersede one's 'private stock of reason', was mentioned in the first chapter as something that Coleridge *opposed*; however, it is worth quoting the Burkean passage in its entirety to contextualise the forthcoming argument, namely, that Coleridge still attributes an important place to the formation of habits, though his own understanding of habit is, in fact, different from that of Burke:

> We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages. […] because prejudice, with its reason, has a motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which will give it permanence. Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, and does not leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision, sceptical, puzzled, and unresolved. Prejudice renders a man's virtue his habit; and not a series of unconnected acts. Through just prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his nature. (129–130)

Burke does not think that man is to be always perfected by the education or the elicitation of his latent rational faculties, since singular rational choices only result in a 'series of unconnected acts'; rather, virtue must have a temporality similar to tradition and history, which gave birth to those prejudices that have to govern our actions. Therefore, it is, precisely, prejudice, or else, custom, that renders one's virtue a habit, since only virtue *as* habit can guarantee the permanence and the continuity so central to Burke's concept of history. Of course, Burke's phrasing equally evokes the Aristotelian link between virtue and habit;[2] however, while Aristotelian habit

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opposes the more social 'custom', and concerns individual virtue or individual acts of judgements (about, for instance, the golden means), Burkean habit is inseparable from socially and historically established customs and norms. Burke's idea of a social 'second nature' considered as 'habit' is most famously exemplified by his 1794 speech at the trial of Hastings:

> man, in his moral nature, becomes, in his progress through life, a creature of prejudice, a creature of opinions, a creature of habits, and of sentiments growing out of them. These form our second nature, as inhabitants of the country and members of the society in which Providence has placed us.[3]

As is well established, it is Hume's well known argument on 'custom' being 'the great guide of human life' (*An Enquiry*, V. 1) that exerted the most considerable influence on Burke. Hume did not differentiate between custom and habit, but emphasised, instead, the *repetitive* character of mental habits and the lack of any reflective act during their operation:

> This principle is Custom or Habit. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of *Custom*. (*An Enquiry*, V. 1)

Hume and Burke found, as many have argued, a favourable echo with Wordsworth, whose understanding of habit bears the traces of both the Humean concept of custom or habit and Burke's ideas of 'second nature', tradition and prejudice.[4] However, Coleridge, while considering Burke the most important man of principles, sharing most of his conservative ideals, and being far from rejecting Burke's idea of *social* custom, opposes both Hume's and Burke's understanding of habit. In *Biographia Literaria*, he criticises Hume on a Kantian basis for 'degrade[ing] the notion of cause and effect into a blind product of delusion and habit, into the mere sensation of proceeding life (nisus vitalis) associated with the images of the memory' (*BL* I,. 121), while in *Aids to Reflection*, he advances the good habit of active reflection precisely against (Burkean) prejudices, against the

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bad habit of passively accepting received opinion. More precisely, the book intends to 'awaken the *faculty*, and form the *habit*, of reflection' as a remedy against, for example, 'the habit of taking for granted the words of catechism' (*AR*, 16), and is addressed to those who wish for 'aid in disciplining their minds to habits of reflection' (*AR*, 6). Hence, Coleridge is not against the formation of habits *per se*; on the contrary; he attributes an important place to the formation of proper habits in his thinking about education. However, he does not follow the footsteps of Hume or Burke in his understanding of habit. Quite counter-intuitively, despite his open rejection of Locke's empiricism, and his dismissal of Aristotle in favour of Plato, he seems to echo, as we will see, Locke and Aristotle in the particular matter of habits.

Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693/1779) was the most important treatise on education in 18th century Europe, exerting a great influence not only in Britain but also on the continent, finding various echoes in Rousseau's Émile.[5] It instructs its readers about the ways in which good habits can be formed in childhood: '[t]he great Thing to be minded in Education is, what Habits you settle' (13). For, as he maintains, 'the main (I had almost said only) thing to be considered in every action of a child is […] what habit it tends to and is likely to settle in him; how it will become him when he is bigger; and if it be encouraged, whither it will lead him when he is grown up' (86).

According to Locke, rather than being mere 'counterfeit' standards of behaviour induced by discipline, or a fear of punishment, habits have to turn into the child's 'nature' through the process of education:

> And therefore what he is to receive from Education, what is to sway and influence his Life, must be something put into him betimes; Habits woven into the very Principles of his Nature, and not a counterfeit Carriage, and dissembled Outside, put on by Fear, only avoid the present Anger of a Father who perhaps may disinherit. (28)

Locke's description of the nature of proper habits is reminiscent of the way in which Wordsworth differentiates between words that are 'an incarnation of the thought' and those that are 'only a clothing for it' in an entirely different context, and these phrasings can,

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of course, give rise to conclusions about the unnatural, necessarily counterfeit character of both Locke's habits and Wordsworth's incarnate words. However, what is more important for us now is that Locke's idea that habits must be turned into the child's nature through education will actually find an echo in Coleridge's thinking about education.[6] Meanwhile, Coleridge's 'virtuous habits', as we will see, also bear the traces of Aristotelian habits, equalling virtue itself. Coleridge famously declares himself a Platonist, rather than an Aristotelian, when he claims 'Every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist. I don't think it possible that anyone born an Aristotelian *can* become a Platonist; and I am sure no born Platonist *can* ever change into an Aristotelian. They are the two classes of men, beside which it is next to impossible to conceive a third' (*Table Talk* for July 2, 1830). However, Laurence Lockridge, who gives a thorough account of Coleridge's understanding of virtue, and discusses 18th century British moralists as possible influences, claims that 'Aristotle anticipates everybody [i.e. every 18th century British moralist], *of course*, in *Nicomachean Ethics*' (229, first italics added). Yet, while admitting that Coleridge read Aristotle's ethics (149–150, 229, 232), perhaps on the basis of Coleridge's own preference for Plato over Aristotle, he does not take the possible traces of Aristotle's understanding of habit in Coleridge's thinking in any serious consideration – except in a brief passage of essential importance for my present argument: Coleridge

> would emphasise with Aristotle the importance of developing proper habits, of gradually '*training up*.' A liberal education is 'that which *draws* forth, and trains up the germ of free-agency in the Individual – Educatio, quae *liberum* facit: and the man, who has mastered all the conditions of *freedom,* is *Homo Liberalis*–' *Freedom, so considered, is paradoxically a matter of habit.* (173, second italics added. Lockridge quotes *CL* VI., 629)

In what follows, I will deploy Lockeridge's passing remark that for Coleridge the freedom to be elicited by education is a matter of habit. But rather than searching for further antecedents, I will focus on what Coleridge actually means by 'habits of reflection' (*AR*, 6) and 'virtuous habits' (*F* I., 103) to ask the question how his conception of habit complicates his idea of cultivation. For while Coleridge

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posits 'agency' as a '*fact* of immediate consciousness' (*F* I., 509) and one of the most important attributes of our 'humanity', he is no less adamant in emphasising the necessity of possessing and/or eliciting good habits of reflection and a good character. His frequent appraisal of 'temperate life and habits of active industry' (*AR*, 49), for example, indicates that activity itself has to turn into a habit.

Of course, the foregrounding of the importance of habits in Coleridge's thinking gives rise to further questions. For example, what, exactly, is the place of free will and acts of judgement in habit, which, according to the *OED*, is the frequent and *involuntary* repetition of the same act?, or, how to theorise habits in the context of cultivation if it is the Will that makes us human? Should it then simply be the case that habit *is*, like the Schellingian work of art, the actualisation of 'the identity [...] of freedom and necessity'? (see, Bode, 616). Or, as Coleridge puts it in his marginalia to Fichte: '*zwang* or compulsion is not the same as Necessity, nor Choice (*wilkuhr*) the same as Freedom – On the contrary, Necessity and Absolute Freedom are one' (quoted in Frey, 25).

In order to be able to search for an answer to these questions, one has to investigate, first and foremost, the specificity of the Coleridgean habit. What is habit for *Coleridge*? What kind of habits does education have to inculcate? Is good habit merely the working of a character always already disciplined, or of a mind that can properly work by itself? And are bad habits merely the habits of the uneducated? In the first chapter of *Logic*, before the actual description of the child's early development, and the eliciting of the faculty of understanding, Coleridge outlines the ultimate purpose of education: it has to draw out the habit of using words properly.

> If the insight into the distinct import of terms […] for the expression of different objects be of high importance in science, the extension of the process to words in general as the exponents of all our thoughts and notices is no less fruitful […] We may even assert that it is this power and habit which above all others marks and constitutes the intellectual superiority of one man over the other'. (*L*, 7)

Coleridge advocates the necessity of having clear and distinct ideas, to which he adds, as if, à la Locke, the concomitant necessity of

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possessing clear and distinct terms to express these ideas.[7] It is the turning of these linguistic abilities into knowledge and the turning of this knowledge into *habit* that ensures one's superiority over one's fellow beings. Apart from the fact that Coleridge was famous for his endeavours to densynonymise certain terms (to properly express ideas), *Aids to Reflection* actually endeavours 'to direct the Reader's attention to the [...] incalculable advantages attached to the *habit* of using [Words] accurately' (7, italics added). At the same time, the acquisition of proper habits of language use not only has an abstract, metaphysical import: in *Biographia*, he underlines 'the close connection between veracity and habits of mental accuracy', which results in 'the beneficial after-effects of verbal precision in the preclusion of fanaticism' (*BL* II., 143.) In other words, the habit of using words accurately can also prevent political fanaticism -- even if, as we have seen, time and place always weaken the words' reference back to a locatable source.[8] Proper habits of reflection, coupled with the habit of proper language use, must be considered, therefore, the prerequisites of any aspiration to political influence. Accordingly, when in a letter to Humphrey Davy (1808), Coleridge defines the prospective readership of *The Friend*, he makes it clear that 'I do not write this Work for the *Multitude*; but for those, who by Rank, or Fortune, or Official Situation, or Talents and *Habits of Reflection*, are to influence the Multitude' (*F*I., xxxvi, second italics added). Coleridge's well-defined, middle- or upper-class readership must always already be endowed with proper 'Habits of Reflection', which necessarily go together with verbal precision, that is, the habit of using words properly. For words always have the potential to have a performative, and, therefore, political effect.

How is it possible to educe these mental capacities and to turn them into a habit? This is the question he proposes to answer in the first chapter of *Logic*. 'In the unpublished Logic', argues Richardson, 'Coleridge departs decisively from the rigid order and constant drill of the Madras system, stating that education begins in the "happy delirium" which is "Nature's kind and providential gift to childhood"' (Richardson, *Literature, Education, and Romanticism*, 104). However, Coleridge's discussion of the way in which the child unconsciously gets hold of notions rather indicates that the child's development in early infancy actually precedes the child's later education under Bell's rules. The infancy of humanity, as Coleridge says in *Logic*, is indeed characterised by 'light-headedness', and the first knowledges are acquired 'promiscuously': 'happy delirium' is 'Nature's providential

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gift to childhood' (8) At the same time, 'Light-headedness' and 'delirium' are exactly the terms Coleridge uses in chapter 6 of *Biographia* when he wants to ridicule Hartley's empirical theory of association. Here, he gives the example of the 'light-headed' Göttingen girl, who unconsciously retains everything she had ever heard from her master, without actually understanding anything of it. When she is lying in fever, 'possessed', she can continuously talk in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. According to the *Biographia*, the absence of the interference of will and judgement characterises only those who are in a 'light-headed' or delirious state, which terms bear all the dangerous political implications that were discussed in the previous chapters.

Meanwhile, the story of the Göttingen girl equally offers a happy proof that 'reliques of sensations may exist for an indefinite time in a latent state, in the very same order in which they were originally impressed' (*BL* I., 111). In fact, by the end of the *Biographia* paragraph, the original illustration, the mad girl's mechanical and meaningless retention, which yields a kind of total memory, is entirely forgotten by Coleridge. Rather than criticising further Hartley's theory, he leaps into a religious register to imagine an ideal '*body celestial* [...] to bring before every human soul the collective experience of its whole past existence' (*BL* I., 112). The fact that this so-called 'collective experience' to be brought before the human soul is the same total memory, although differently organised (112), as the mad Göttingen girl's, would suggest that the Hartlean mechanical brain forms the palimpsestic model of 'the dread book of judgement, in whose mysterious hieroglyphics every idle word is recorded' (*BL* I., 112–114), and the basis of the analogy is total memory. However, Coleridge is adamant that in order for *human* memory to be instituted, the imperishable reliques or records of sensations must be forgotten: 'free-will, our only absolute *self*' has to shape and construct 'knowledge' and 'experience' (114). In *Logic*, Coleridge gives a similar account of the mind's development, including the formation of knowledge, and the concomitant forgetting of the first reliques of sensations through the work of the 'will *within* the will' (8, Coleridge's emphasis):

> It is the method of Nature, which thus stores the mind with all the materials for after use, promiscuously indeed, as it might seem without purpose, while she supplies a gay and motley chaos of facts, and forms and thousandfold experiences, the origin of which lies beyond memory, traceless as life itself. (*L*, 8)

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Coleridge emphasises, just like in *Biographia*, that the original impressions made on the nervous system remain in the mind, though they do not, and should not form part of human memory.[9] The unconscious choice the child makes among these sensations is called a 'will *within* the will', which indicates that this 'will' is not the same as the one he calls 'free-will'. Rather, this 'will' automatically organises experience; it translates a spontaneous *action* that structures the otherwise passive reception of notices, while equally saving us from light-headedness, or else, from the threat of total recall.

In the next phase of the child's development, 'the charms of novelty and continual change' solicit the mind by a 'gentle *compulsion*' to perceive the similarity between certain objects. Despite the fact that promiscuity and compulsion, like light-headedness, are generally negative terms in Coleridge's vocabulary (he derogatorily calls the modern readership 'promiscuous' in *The Friend*[10] and equates 'compulsion' with 'Slavery' in his marginalia to Spinoza[11]), here, both 'promiscuity' and 'compulsion' are devoid of negative connotations. First, nature, as 'the Divine Providence in the creation', only *seems* to store the mind promiscuously: Coleridge places the emphasis on 'as if': 'Promiscuously we have said, and *seemingly* without design' (8, italics added). Secondly, 'gentle compulsion' translates the design of the Divine providence (unknown to humans), or else, the working of the 'universal will', which is present even in spontaneity (*OM*, 140).

In the next part of the chapter, Coleridge turns to his prime object: education. Even though he draws a parallel between natural growth and human education (i.e. 'What Nature has *educed*, man *educates* or trains up', *L*, 9), he also underlines that education is both natural *and* artificial: 'education consists of *two* parts, the process of *educing*, and that of *training*: and in *human* education as in the education of plants, the educing must come first' (*L*, 10). Natural education is supposed to be 'determined by the forms and faculties developing or seeking to develop themselves from within' (*L*, 10), but 'artificial education' is different:

> What it *should* be, and what in the main it *is,* and ever has been, among the cultivated portions of mankind, may be easily known from its aim and object: which can be no other than to render the mind of the scholar a fit organ for the continued reception and

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> reproduction, for the elaboration, and finally for the application of those *notices* supplied by sensation and perception, gradually superinducing those which the mind obtains, or may be taught to obtain, by reflection on its own acts, and which, when formed and matured into distinct thoughts, constitute […] the mind's notions. […] If then we have rightly stated the *aim* of human education, in its main divisions; and if the latter and that which is more especially the *end* or *final* aim, be the formation of right *notions*, or the mind's knowledge of its constitution and constituent faculties as far as it is obtained by *reflection*; it is obvious that in order to its realisation the several faculties of the mind should be specially disciplined, and as [...] the muscles of the leg and thigh are brought and made prominent in the exercise of the riding school, that *so* should the intellectual powers be called forth from *their* dormant state' … . (*L*, 12–13)

Thomas Pfau, in *Wordsworth's Profession*, comments upon the beginning of this almost Lockean passage in order to show that Romantic education seeks to hide the artificial means by which it triggers the individual's intellectual development:

> Even as it is instanced by the self's 'reflecting on its own act' and thereby converting the extrinsic 'notices' of sensation and perceptions into the mental property of 'notions', the epistemological mobility of the subject is circumscribed by an 'artificial' social process masquerading as the individual's spontaneous intelligence. (159–160)

Indeed, education is an artificial process, and it aims, as we saw in the first chapter, to hide its own artificial means by refiguring itself as natural. However, this specific passage also suggests that artificial education, besides giving the illusion of triggering the *natural* and organic growth of intelligence, also aims at forming those *mechanical* habits of reflection that can work by themselves. In fact, what the passage from *Logic* suggests is that the aim of education is the formation of 'habits of reflection' that can work *without* the interference of will and judgement. That is, it aims at the automated transformation of natural sensations and notices into notions through no less automated acts of self-reflection.

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Let us then consider again Coleridge's description of his opium habit: 'By the long long Habit of the accursed Poison, my Volition (by which I mean the faculty *instrumental* to the Will, and by which alone the Will can realise itself – it's Hands, Legs, & Feet, as it were) was completely deranged, at times frenzied, dissevered itself from the Will, & became an independent faculty' (*SL*, 175). As the passage in *Logic* on artificial education indicates, the aim of education is equally to dissever 'volition' from the conscious 'Will', so that it can function without its constant interference: 'the several faculties of the mind should be specially disciplined, and as (if I may be allowed the illustration), as the muscles of the leg and thigh should be brought out and made prominent in the exercise of the riding school, that *so* should the intellectual powers be called forth from *their* dormant state ...' (*L*, 12–13). Although the horse rider's members do not become frenzied, and do not look as if they were dissevered from the rider's will, horse riding is, undoubtedly, an automated movement, and the more the rider's muscles are prominent, the more perfectly graceful or mechanical it becomes. (For how can we know the rider from the ride? To paraphrase this Yeatsean paraphrase: how can we know whether there is will behind volition -- behind its hands, legs and feet, as it were?) This mental habit, however, is not the same as the previous 'will *within* the will', since it is acquired though discipline and what Coleridge calls 'artificial education'. In *Opus Maximum*, Coleridge writes in a similar way about the perfect movements of the experienced musician:

> The very fingers and muscles of an experienced musician perform the most difficult labyrinth spontaneously, even while the player perhaps is directing his attention to some foreign object [...] But who would assert the existence of these *habits* except as the result of, and I may so say, the *incorporation* of antecedent distinct acts of will. (*OM*, 140–141, italics added)

The proper functioning of the mind (whose acts of 'reflection on its own acts' becomes a habit) is similar to that of the violinist: both are predicated upon the workings of habit, that is, repetitive mechanisms, which can work *without* the interference of conscious will, or choice. That is, there had been antecedent, distinct acts of will in the past, but these acts of will have been incorporated into habit. The term

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'incorporation', at the same time, signals the somatic character of habits: habits turn the will into automated bodily or nervous mechanisms, the same way as 'the muscles of the leg and thigh are brought and made prominent in the exercise of the riding school' (*L*, 13).

However, as a result of the educative process described in *Logic* the child would only 'have the habit of truth without having any notion or thought of *moral truth*' (*LL* I., 106). According to Lockridge,

> '[d]espite some hostile marginalia to *The Nature of Human Freedom*, Coleridge speaks in a similar way [as Schelling does] when he writes that exercise of will is 'the condition of all moral good while it is latent, and hidden, as it were, in the center; [...] The will for Coleridge is causa sui, the source of our individual being, ideally anchored in the Universal Will of God'. (Lockridge, *Coleridge the Moralist*, 96)

In *Opus Maximum*, while claiming, as we have seen, that the will 'has to struggle upward into FREE-WILL', Coleridge indeed adds that Freedom 'is impossible except as it becomes one with the Will of God' (*OM*, 144). Conspicuously, however, Coleridge defines the will itself as habit: 'the Will [...] as an abiding faculty, *a habit or fixed [...] and systematic predispositions*' (*OM*, 33, italics added), which phrasing immediately draws attention to the function habit plays even in Coleridge's spiritual idea of the Will. He explains the equation of the will with habit as follows: when the wise man wanting to determine another's Will,[12] he asks, 'What does he *habitually wish*? – thence deducing the state of the Will and the impulses in which that state reveals itself, and which are commonly the true efficient causes of human actions' (*OM*, 33, italics added). And to clarify what he means by 'habitual wish', he adds, 'it is not the motives that govern man, but it is the man that makes the motives' (*OM*, 33). When speaking about the man making the motives Coleridge does *not* imply that a man decides on the course of his actions by some act of the will. Rather, to illustrate his argument, he gives the example of a 'haunch of venison' as the motive, placed next to a healthy man of 'keen appetite,' and another who is 'sick, dyspeptic, and stomach-worn' (33). Motives cannot explain their respective reaction to the venison, only the 'state of their will' can (which, as we have seen, is, in fact, 'a habit or fixed [...] and systematic predispositions'). In other words,

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the state of one's will depends on the answer to the question what they *habitually* wish for.[13]

Small wonder that in his 'Supernumerary Lecture on Education', Coleridge lays such a great emphasis on 'strengthening the *character*' (*LL*, 107, italics added). It is character as a habit that seems to determine the will. Coleridge's claim, in the lecture, that 'let the child be good and know it not' (*LL* I., 107) suggests that virtue has to be unconscious and turned into habit, through education. How to educate the character, then? This is the question he seeks an answer for in *Opus Maximum* and his 'Supernumarary Lecture on Education'.

In his lecture on education, Coleridge equally ponders the importance of motives in judging a person, but this time, he lays more emphasis on the relative importance of feelings: 'I hold motives to be of little influence compared to feelings' (*LL*, 106). As he argues further, 'our feelings are the hidden springs which impel the machine, with this difference that notions and feelings react on each other reciprocally. The veneration for the Supreme Being, sense of mysterious existence, not to be profaned by clear notions' (106).[14] Quite uncharacteristically, Coleridge uses the metaphor of the 'machine' for humans to claim that it is the eliciting of (religious) feelings, and particularly, the stimulation (!) 'of the heart to love' (*LL*, 106) that impels this machine. Feelings, therefore, play a prime role in the development of the virtuous character, or else, in the education of 'virtuous habits'. As was quoted and discussed in the first part of this book, 'Stimulate the heart to love, and the mind early accurate, and all other virtues will rise of their own accord and all vices will be thrown out' (*LL*, 106)

In fact, throughout his lecture on education, Coleridge focuses on the educative theories[15] he wishes to overwrite by his own: this is one of the reasons why he attaches such a great importance to the eliciting of feelings and to the stimulation of the heart to love in the development of virtue. Opposing the system of 'cramming' children (*LL*, 107), he expresses his opinion that any *imposition*, be it moral, political, or physical, is a form of terror. As we have seen, he criticises Joseph Lancaster's educational scheme, which imposes the most humiliating punishments on children, for the same reasons as he does Rousseau's 'abstract' system of the 'general will', which is not only the antechamber of terror, but *is* a form of terror. At the same time, he finds that Maria and Robert Edgeworth's moralising tales of

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charity constitute another, though slightly different, imposition to humiliating punishments or abstract political systems (*LL* I., 103).[16] He mockingly calls these tales too 'goody':

> I infinitely prefer the little books of 'The Seven Champions of Christendom', 'Jack the Giant Killer', etc., etc., for at least they make the child forget himself – to your moral tales where a good little boy comes in and says "Mama, I met a poor beggar man and gave him the sixpence you gave me yesterday. Did I do it right?' – 'O, yes, my dear; to be sure you did.' This is not virtue but vanity; such books and such lessons do not teach goodness, but – if I might venture such a word – goodyness. […] The lesson to be inculcated should be, let the Child [be good] and know it not. (*LL* I., 108).[17]

Apart from the fact that, as Richardson also argues, the tales that make 'the child forget himself' are politically safer than the 'suspect rational approach of the Edgeworths' (*LL*, 121), that these didactic stories only teach 'goody-ness' implies that the acts of charity presented in them are not grounded in virtue, they do not stem from the character. Rather, their root is a utilitarian kind of 'vanity', the wish of the child to please his mother, who will then congratulate him for his actions. However, if, according to Coleridge, vanity must be distinguished from virtue in the judgment of an act, then these are not the acts themselves, nor the motives, as we have seen, that determine whether a child is virtuous or not: s/he always already has to possess a virtuous *character*. Hence, in the old debate around the question 'What is virtue?', Coleridge seems to reject any account of morality that would be based on intentions or particular acts.[18] Hence, if it is character, rather than actions or motives that defines the good man, and character is the habit of doing good, then goodness also has to turn into a habit. This habit is a kind of behaviour that is not so much consciously willed, but is ingrained through education, and works by itself. The child has to be good without knowing it: 'Let the child be good and know it not', as Coleridge writes (*LL* I., 107).

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9
The Habit of 'abstruse research'
'Dejection: An Ode'

In *Opus Maximum* Coleridge elaborates his ideas on how the heart's stimulation to love actually happens in infancy, when the child still lacks both the power of abstraction and that of speech. He describes the child's earliest bond with the mother, up to the point when he 'leaves the gentle teachings of his first home' and engages in the 'austere discipline of the understanding' (*OM*, 136). On the one hand, Coleridge gives an account of the way in which the child gets the sense of its own existence from the mother's gaze, voice, and touch: in the dark night, when the three-year-old child has fears, he entreats his mother 'I am not there, touch me, Mother, that I may be here.' The witness of its own being had been suspended in the loss of the mother's presence by sight or sound or feeling' (132). On the other hand, the mother's pious face is also indicative of God's presence, and the mother comes to serve as a medium between God and the child:

> The infant follows his mother's face as, glowing with love and beaming protection, it is raised heavenward, and with the word 'GOD' it combines in feeling whatever there is of reality in the warm touch, in the supporting grasp, in the glorious countenance. [...] for the infant the mother contains his own self, and the whole problem of existence as a whole; and the word 'GOD' is the first and one solution to the problem. (131)

Via the mother, the child experiences God ('That which the mother is to her child, a someone unseen and yet ever present is to all', *OM*, 126) and finds an answer to the enigma of his existence.

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The feeling of God's presence, in its turn, allows for the still unconscious conception of life as unity: as long as the child is under the care of the mother, he experiences a sense of wholeness ('the mother exists as a One and indivisible something before the outlines of her different limbs and features have been distinguished', *OM*, 131), which is always anterior to the perception of the parts. For, as Coleridge puts it, the human mind *commences* in the implicit conception of life as unity, as plastic and invisible (134). To put this into more abstract terms, there is always a governing idea or category, which precedes the perception of the particular object: 'the tree precedes the perception of the particular tree' and the invisible principle of shape precedes the perception of distinct objects (136, 134). The tree, which precedes the perception of the particular tree, partakes of the idea of life as unity, and the subsequent induction of the concept or the notion of the tree from the similarity of particular trees is already the work of the understanding. Hence, the acquisition of notions, or words, as the result of the power of abstraction is predicated upon a previous experience of life as unity. Hence, when Coleridge claims that 'It is the method of Nature, which thus stores the mind with all the materials for after use, promiscuously indeed, as it might seem without purpose' (*L*, 8), but adds that 'Promiscuously we have said, and *seemingly* without design' (8, italics added), he equally alludes to the unity of life, granted by a Providence in creation. The individual experience of this Providence is mediated by the mother's love, which, therefore, turns out to be the ultimate ground of the development of proper 'habits of reflection' as well.

Meanwhile, the mother's love is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of the development of habits of virtue. The acquisition of 'moral truths', and virtue as habit, is subsequent to both the development of the understanding (i.e. the development of good habits of reflection), and the child's initial feeling of God's presence, mediated by the mother. In *Opus Maximum*, Coleridge still speaks about the stage when the 'babe acknowledges a self in the mother's form [...] years before it can recognise a self in its own' (*OM*, 121). At this early stage of development, the child still lacks any individuality on its own, as well as the capacity for reflection and self-reflection. It is characterised by an 'implicit faith' (by a faith the child is not aware of), which is 'the offspring of unreflecting love' (*OM*, 121), similar to God's love for the individual. The child's awakening to moral truths

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comes about with the rise of self-consciousness, accompanied by '*dawning* presence of the mother' (*OM*, 134, italics added). In this second stage, signalled by the use of the first person pronoun (the child speaks of himself as 'I', rather than imitating others who speak about him in the third person), the infant acquires a sense of 'alterity in itself', and becomes a person. Self-consciousness then generates a conception of life 'elevated into that of personeity'. Hence, while the ground remains the love of the mother conveying the love of God, it is the child's sense of individuality, and his capacity for self-reflection that establish his moral personhood, and his *awareness* of the divine Personëity. This is also the developmental stage, when (at the dawning presence of the mother) the father enters the picture: he will serve as a model for the Coleridge ideal of the educator, who, as we have seen, actually elicits Personhood and the awareness of the moral law.

Rosemary Ashton writes that most of Coleridge's 'comments on his mother – they are remarkably few – as well as the evidence of his adult personality, suggest that his early relationship with [his mother] lacked warmth' (12). Coleridge did not love his mother; he did not even attend her funeral (12). This biographical fact, placed next to Coleridge's insistence on the importance of the mother's love as the mediator of God's, may shed some new light on the sense of absence that lingers in many of Coleridge poems. In what follows, I shall examine 'Dejection: An Ode', the only poem where Coleridge actually uses the term 'habit'. Here, as is well established, the term, associated with 'abstruse research', appears in the most negative light possible, and has also been associated with Coleridge's opium habit (Schmid, 175–179).

In an 1803 notebook entry analysed by both Paul Youngquist and Tilar Mazzeo as an instance of Coleridge's pondering the nature of his opium habit, Coleridge argues as follows:

> Is not *Habit* the Desire of a Desire? – As Desire to Fruition, may not the faint, to the consciousness *erased*, Pencil-mark *memorials* of or relicts of Desire be to Desire itself in its full prominence? [...] May not the Desirelet [sic] a so correspond to the Desire A, that the latter being excited may revert wholly or in great part to its existing cause a, instead of sallying out of itself toward and external Object, B? (*N* I., 1421)

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Both Youngquist and Mazzeo reduce the importance of this passage to their respective theorisations of Coleridge's opium habit. Whereas for Mazzeo the unconscious character of (opium) habit is linked to the unconscious character of Coleridge's plagiarisms, for Youngquist, it bears witness to Coleridge's 'heartrending desire for a world without habit, without loss, without opium' (94). Indeed, the end of the notebook entry seems to express Coleridge's wish for an escape from the vicious circle of his 'infirm Habits':

> But if I could secure you full Independence, if I could give too all my original Self healed & renovated from all infirm Habits; & if by all the forms in my power I could bind myself more effectively even in relation to Law [...] then, *then*, would you be the remover of my Loneliness, my perpetual Companion. (*N* I., 1421)

Apparently addressing Sara Hutchinson (who is also the original addressee of 'Dejection: An Ode'), Coleridge establishes an opposition between his opium habit and his capacity to respect the Law.[1] Yet, the phrasing immediately subverts the opposition: getting himself rid of the bondage of opium would allow him to take on another kind of bondage: it would permit to '*bind*' himself more effectively to the Law. This, in its turn, will ostensibly earn him Sara's love. The binary between cultivation, which aims, as we have seen, at the eliciting of freedom and autonomy, the awareness of the Law in oneself on the one hand, and addiction, which has most often been defined by the absence of free will on the other, seems, again, to shatter.

At the beginning of the notebook entry, where Coleridge discusses the intricate relationship between desire and habit, every single term is defined by absence. If there is habit, then there is no desire: habit is only the desire of the desire. But what kind of desire is the one that desires desire? That is, what kind of desire is habit? It is a desirelet, a trace, a relic of desire, which is erased or absent from consciousness? It is, in fact, something that, as Youngquist also argues, conspicuously resembles Derrida's trace or Freud's memory trace. Meanwhile, Fruition is also absent from the Coleridgean chain of analogies: habit implies that when desire is awakened or excited, rather than heading for Fruition, it immediately disappears and turns as if backwards, into habit. In other words, it falls back into the desire of desire, which only testifies to desire's loss. Habit is therefore a trace that,

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although erased or absent from consciousness, is still somehow present: it renders the loss of desire unforgettable.

It is 'Dejection: An Ode' that speaks in the most tragic tone of the loss of desire, of the impossibility of 'Fruition' and the prison house of habits, while staging these as a necessary, and perhaps necessarily, modern predicaments.[2]

> There was a time when, though my path was rough,
> This joy within me dallied with distress,
> And all misfortunes were but as the stuff
> Whence Fancy made me dreams of happiness:
> For hope grew round me, like the twining vine,
> And fruits, and foliage, not my own, seemed mine.
> But now afflictions bow me down to earth:
> Nor care I that they rob me of my mirth;
> But oh! Each visitation
> Suspends what Nature gave me at my birth,
> My shaping spirit of Imagination.
> For not to think of what I needs must feel,
> But to be still and patient, all I can;
> And haply by abstruse research to steal
> From my own nature all the natural man -
> This was my sole resource, my only plan:
> Till that which suits a part infects the whole,
> And now is almost grown the habit of my soul. (76–93)

When the speaker was young, he was entertaining the (illusionary) hope, or else, 'desire' for a possible Fruition: the mind's unity with nature ('fruits, and foliage, not my own, seemed mine'). The dream of Fruition retrospectively appears as fancy, mere illusion. As Coleridge puts it in another notebook entry: 'Sometimes when I earnestly look at a beautiful Object or Landscape, it seems as if I were on the *brink* of a Fruition still denied – as if Vision were an *appetite*: even as a man would feel, who having put forth all his muscular strength in an act of prosilience, [is] at that very moment *held back* – he leaps & yet moves not from his place' (*N* III., 3767). What has thus remained is the reality of habit, the 'habit of abstruse research'.[3] This habit, like the one in the first notebook entry defining habits, appears precisely as the desire of desire: rather than 'sallying out of

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itself toward and external Object, B', towards 'Fruition' (i.e. a unity with outward nature), it turns back upon itself, into the habit of an 'abstruse research' for the 'natural man' within. Of course, this kind of habit is far from being a beneficial one. On the one hand, it 'see[s], not feel[s]' (38), that is, it works only with 'clear notions', or abstractions, while being devoid of 'feelings'.[4] On the other hand, it translates the speaker's ceaseless and torturing *awareness* of the habit-hood of his habits, of the fact that Fruition is impossible, that he can only desire desire, and this sheer desire of desire 'infects the soul'.

The title of the poem 'Dejection: An Ode' points precisely to this infection of the soul. The term 'dejection', as Anya Taylor has shown us, derives from Milton, who uses 'the word "dejection" to describe the emotional paralysis that breaks down the spirit of an unhappily married man' (28). At the same time, the patience that the speaker ascribes to himself in line 88 ('to be still and patient, all I can') actually brings to mind Milton's sonnet XIX, 'When I consider how my Light is Spent', which was written on a similar occasion. Milton, like Coleridge, struggles with a sense of the loss of poetic gifts (called 'talents' in Milton and the 'shaping spirit of Imagination' in Coleridge), and, ultimately, with a feeling of being lost in a universe that is without God's guidance.

When I consider how my light is spent
Ere half my days in this dark world and wide,
And that one talent which is death to hide
Lodg'd with me useless, though my soul more bent
To serve therewith my Maker, and present
My true account, lest he returning chide,
'Doth God exact day-labour, light denied?'
I fondly ask. But Patience, to prevent
That murmur, soon replies: 'God doth not need
Either man's work or his own gifts: who best
Bear his mild yoke, they serve him best. His state
Is kingly; thousands at his bidding speed
And post o'er land and ocean without rest:
They also serve who only stand and wait.

While Milton is blind (both literally and metaphorically), Coleridge can *see* but is unable to *feel*, and feeling, as we have seen both in his

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description of the religious import of the early bond with the mother and his lecture on education, is not feeling *per se*, but rather is, or derives from, a feeling of God's love and presence in the Universe. The 'Divine Providence in Creation' had once endowed the speaker with the shaping spirit of a (human) Imagination, endowing nature with a meaning ('Ours her wedding garment, ours her shroud!' 47–49), and infused him with the illusionary hope to achieve Fruition, or else, the mind's unity with nature through an act of will. However, although most commentators of the poem would agree with Burwick that 'one can trace the increasing importance of the [human] will from the first to the last of the Conversation Poems [i.e. 'Dejection: An Ode']' ('Coleridge's Conversation Poems', 170–171), the various contexts of the poem suggest that in 'Dejection', nature's 'wedding-garment' is not truly 'ours'; as Coleridge asserts in *Aids to Reflection*: 'There is but one Wedding-garment, in which we can sit down at the marriage-feast of Heaven: and this is the Bridegroom's own Gift, when he gave himself for us that we might live in him and he in us' (*AR*, 314–316). The shaping power of 'our' human imagination actually derives from the feeling of the presence of God's love in 'us', and, therefore, what the failure of the shaping spirit of the imagination tragically testifies to is the loss of the feeling of God's loving presence in the universe.

This sense of the presence of the Divine Providence, and, therefore, of life as unity, is supposed to be mediated, as we have seen, by the mother in early infancy. As an intermediary between God and the child, she is the one who can stimulate the heart to love, in other words, to feelings. In 'Dejection: An Ode', it seems as if it was this founding figure of the mother, as the repository of love, that had been retrospectively withdrawn, or else, that had never existed in the first place. The speaker ascribes this absent love to the 'Lady', who is not so much asked to love him *back* (i.e. he himself is not able to feel, let alone love[5]), but rather to 'stimulate his heart to love' (*LL* I., 107), through the love, the 'Joy' she possesses within. Indeed, the feeling of Joy is presented in 'Dejection' both as a kind of categorical imperative ('not to think of what I *needs must* feel', italics added), and as something the speaker is constantly craving (see the intensifying repetition of the word in stanza 5). In a different context, Faflak calls Romantics' craving for Joy a 'compulsion, turning the enlightened self-examination of feeling into the nearly evangelical imperative to

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feel *well* and to feel *good*, to not worry and to *be* or *get* happy' (62). In this poem, however, it is the Lady who is endowed with the capacity to partake of Joy (*she* will feel what the speaker 'needs must feel'), and to serve as a mediator between God, nature, and the speaker. Placed in the context of the *Opus Maximum* passage on the importance of motherly love representing God's love and the unity of life, Sarah may thus embody the fantasy of a (surrogate) mother.

However, since the Lady's love, is, in fact, absent, there remains no bridge, no mediator between God, nature, and the speaker, and, therefore, he has to remain without feelings, desires, Fruition, or Joy – and it is precisely upon these latter that, as we have seen, the working of the imagination is predicated. What remains is habit: 'the Desire of a Desire'. Indeed, as has been suggested by the first notebook entry on habit, the habit of 'abstruse research' testifies to desire's loss, in both a psychological, and a metaphysical sense. Unable to 'sally […] out of itself toward and external Object, B', this habit 'revert[s] wholly or in great part to its existing cause a' (*N* I., 1421) in order to draw out from the speaker's own nature the 'natural man', who would be able to feel, desire, and love. However, this 'natural man' had, in fact, long been lost, and, therefore, the habit of 'abstruse research' should 'steal' something from the speaker's nature that the speaker does not actually possess. This habit of the Understanding unfounded in Love thus dooms the realisation of Fruition or Joy to failure from the start, while it also renders the loss of the possibility of Fruition, and the desire of desire unforgettable. For, as has already been suggested, habit is a trace that, although erased or absent from consciousness, is still somehow present: it renders the loss of desire unforgettable.

Education, rather than eliciting *this* habit, must generate a different kind of habit, namely, one that is able to forget about its own 'habithood', of its own being a habit. This forgetting should be generated by Love, and should result in the individual's ability to '*bind* [himself] more effectively even in relation to Law' (*N* I., 1421). This bond, however, is a beneficial bond, since it gives the illusion of freedom and autonomy. Indeed, the habithood of good habits (so that they can work as good habits) has to remain a trace 'to the consciousness' indeed 'erased' just like the innumerable reliques of sensations we acquire in childhood.

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Conclusion

Cultivation through Love: 'Effusion XXXV' and 'The Eolian Harp'

In this last chapter, I examine Coleridge's poem, 'The Eolian Harp', and its early version 'Effusion XXXV' to show how they thematise both addiction and the habit of self-discipline, eventually staging successful processes of inward development or *Bildung*. In other words, the process of cultivation staged by 'The Eolian Harp' will present, in miniature, the stakes of the binary initially established between addiction and intoxication on the one hand, and cultivation on the other. Although 'Effusion XXXV' was considered to be a 'mere philological curiosity' by most critics (Stillinger, 27), Coleridge kept returning to it and revising it throughout his life. The fate of the poem is therefore the opposite to that of 'Kubla Khan': critics did not take seriously what Coleridge did. It was 'my favourite of *my* poems' (*CL*, 294–295), he wrote.

EFFUSION XXXV

Composed August 20th, 1795, at Clevedon, Sommersetshire

My pensive Sara! Thy soft cheek reclined
Thus on my arm, most soothing sweet it is
To sit beside our cot, our cot o'ergrown
With white-flower'd Jasmin, and the broad-leav'd Myrtle,

(Meet emblems they of Innocence and Love!)
And Watch the clouds, that late were rich with light,
Slow saddening round, and mark the star of eve
Serenely brilliant (such should Wisdom be)

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Shine opposite!! How exquisite the scents
Snatched from yon bean-field! And the world *so* hushed!
The stilly murmur of the distant sea
Tells us of silence. And that simplest lute,
Placed length-ways in the clasping casement, hark!
How by the desultory breeze caressed,
Like some coy maid half yielding to her lover,
It pours such sweet upbraidings, as must needs
Tempt to repeat the wrong! And now, its strings
Boldlier swept, the long sequacious notes
Over delicious surges sink and rise,
Such a soft floating withchery of sound
As twilight Elfins make, when they at eve
Voyage on gentle gales from Fairy-Land,
Where Melodies round honey-dropping flowers,
Footless and wild, like birds of Paradise,
Nor pause, nor perch, hovering on untamed wing!

And thus, my love! As on the midway slope
Of yonder hill I stretch my limbs at noon,
Whilst through my half-closed eye-lids I behold
The sunbeams dance, like diamonds, on the main,
And tranquil muse upon tranquillity;
Full many a thought uncalled and undetained,
And many idle flitting phantasies,
Traverse my indolent and passive brain,
As wild and various as the random gales
That swell and flutter on this subject lute!
Or what if all animated nature
Be but organic harps diversely framed,
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze,
At once the soul of each, and God of All?
But thy more serious eye a mild reproof
Darts, O beloved woman! Nor such thoughts
Dim and unhallowed dost thou not reject,
And biddest me walk humbly with my God.

Meek daughter in the family of Christ!
Well hast thou said and holily dispraised

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These shapings of the unregenerate mind;
Bubbles that glitter as they rise and break
On vain Philosophy's aye-babbling spring
For never guiltless may I speak of him,
Th' Incomprehensible! Save when with awe
I praise him, and with faith that inly feels;*
Who with his saving mercies healed me,
A sinful and most miserable man,
Wildered and dark, and gave me to possess;
Peace, and this cot, and thee, heart-honoured Maid!

*L'athée n'est point à mes yeux un faux esprit ; je puis vivre avec lui aussi bien et mieux qu'avec le dévot, car il raisonne davantage, mais il lui manque un sens, et mon âme ne se fond point entièrement avec la sienne : il est froid au spectacle le plus ravissant, et il cherche un syllogisme lorsque je rends une action de grâce. « Appel à l'impartiale postérité, par la Citoyenne Roland, » troisième partie, (113).

THE EOLIAN HARP

My pensive Sara! thy soft cheek reclined
Thus on mine arm, most soothing sweet it is
To sit beside our Cot, our Cot o'ergrown
With white-flowered Jasmin, and the broad-leaved Myrtle,
(Meet emblems they of Innocence and Love!)
And watch the clouds, that late were rich with light,
Slow saddening round, and mark the star of eve
Serenely brilliant (such would Wisdom be)
Shine opposite! How exquisite the scents
Snatched from yon bean-field! and the world *so* hushed!
The stilly murmur of the distant Sea
Tells us of silence.

And that simplest Lute,
Placed length-ways in the clasping casement, hark!
How by the desultory breeze caressed,
Like some coy maid half yielding to her lover,
It pours such sweet upbraiding, as must needs
Tempt to repeat the wrong! And now, its strings

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Boldlier swept, the long sequacious notes
Over delicious surges sink and rise,
Such a soft floating witchery of sound
As twilight Elfins make, when they at eve
Voyage on gentle gales from Fairy-Land,
Where Melodies round honey-dropping flowers,
Footless and wild, like birds of Paradise,
Nor pause, nor perch, hovering on untamed wing!
O! the one Life within us and abroad,
Which meets all motion and becomes its soul,
A light in sound, a sound-like power in light,
Rhythm in all thought, and joyance everywhere –
Methinks, it should have been impossible
Not to love all things in a world so filled;
Where the breeze warbles, and the mute still air
Is Music slumbering on her instrument.

And thus, my Love! as on the midway slope
Of yonder hill I stretch my limbs at noon,
Whilst through my half-closed eyelids I behold
The sunbeams dance, like diamonds, on the main,
And tranquil muse upon tranquility:
Full many a thought uncalled and undetained,
And many idle flitting phantasies,
Traverse my indolent and passive brain,
As wild and various as the random gales
That swell and flutter on this subject Lute!

And what if all of animated nature
Be but organic Harps diversely framed,
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze,
At once the Soul of each, and God of all?

But thy more serious eye a mild reproof
Darts, O beloved Woman! nor such thoughts
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Meek Daughter in the family of Christ!
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> These shapings of the unregenerate mind;
> Bubbles that glitter as they rise and break
> On vain Philosophy's aye-babbling spring.
> For never guiltless may I speak of him,
> The Incomprehensible! save when with awe
> I praise him, and with Faith that inly *feels*;
> Who with his saving mercies healèd me,
> A sinful and most miserable man,
> Wildered and dark, and gave me to possess
> Peace, and this Cot, and thee, heart-honored Maid!

Seamus Perry regards 'The Eolian Harp' 'as a delicate example of Coleridgean mixed feelings,' as an oscillation between the heterodox theology of the 'One Life' and the 'transcendent deity' of orthodoxy (68, 69). James Mays links this ambiguity to Coleridge's hesitation whether to publish the poem or not: 'A number of philosophic analogues for the harp metaphor – in Böehme, Cudworth, Priestly – suggest reasons to his uncertainty over whether or not to publish what he had written. The analogues point up implications which connect the metaphor with his lifelong attraction to and denial of 'pantheistic' idealism' (*PW* I., 231). Similarly, Lucy Newlyn interprets 'The Eolian Harp' as a dialogue between 'the poet's radical Unitarianism [what she earlier calls 'heretical pantheism'] and the conservative Anglicanism which was to mark his later writing' (73). Yet, as opposed to most critics who tend to disbelieve that the poem opts for a moralising solution, she suggests that 'Sara' exemplifies the ideal, sympathetic listeners generally posited in the conversation poems, who serve to control and guide the reading process. Paul Cheshire, examining the changes effectuated on the poem in their historicity, sees three contending aspects of Coleridge reflected in the subsequent versions: 'We see the growth of the poem from the prothalamial celebration of the seventeen line *Draft 1* to a dramatization of the three contending aspects of Coleridge – the lover who is anticipating domestic contentment; the philosopher who is approaching a vision of the One; and the Christian who holds such philosophising 'vain' and 'never guiltless' unless it is subordinated to reverence and obedience to God' (1–2). The critical assessments of the last address to Sara largely correspond to the three aspects evoked by Cheshire: it has been read as an expression of Coleridge's true obedience to

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Sara (Newlyn), as ironic commentary upon domestic unhappiness (Wheeler, 90–91), or as something acquiring different meanings following the alterations of Coleridge's religious convictions and his relationship with his wife (Cheshire).

My own point of departure will be Lucy Newlyn's comment that the posited presence of Sara, as a model reader of the poem 'embod[ies] and enact[s] the domestic communitarianism to which [Coleridge] held allegiance at the time of writing, and which would eventually mature into the hopes he invested in a "clerisy". In this sense, [it] indicate[s], proleptically, the direction of Coleridge's later political thinking' (Newlyn, 73). In other words, I shall investigate the ways in which the subsequent versions of the poem anticipate Coleridge's later views on education, and consider the poem as a problematic display of individual *Bildung*, the telos of which is to become part of the larger community of the church and the state. Accordingly, the problematic figure of Sara will prove to serve as an early model for the educator. In the second part of the chapter, I shall concentrate on the original context of the French footnote, which Coleridge had attached to 'Effusion XXXVI', but withdrew from 'The Eolian Harp', and place this self-editorial process in the general context of Coleridge's thinking about cultivation.

The inward mental process 'The Eolian Harp' (from 1817) describes appears to follow the tripartite pattern of spiritual autobiographies: fall, conversion, redemption. The (ecstatic) 'fall' is related to a state of intoxication, possession, passivity, and loss of control, while the (remorseful) 'conversion' consists of a sudden moment of self-reflection, and of the regaining of agency, elicited by the presence of a loving educator. 'Redemption', in its turn, is signalled by the speaker's (supposedly happy) endorsement of the communities of the church and the state.

The harp image of the 'fall' is generally placed by critics under the umbrella term 'pantheism' (not leaving much place for the free or responsible will[1]), but it also evokes sensuality, excess, and a state of possession beyond conscious control:

> How, by the desultory breeze caressed,
> Like some coy maid half yielding to her lover,
> It pours such sweet upbraidings, as must needs
> Tempt to repeat the wrong!

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The remorseful conclusion accentuates that the temptation to 'repeat' the escape from the domestic idyll into the realm of fancy is indeed related to the 'wrong': the adjective 'wildered' in the concluding part of the poem ('sinful and most miserable man, / Wildered and dark') literally refers back to these 'wild and various' phantasies, which, defying containment through sound and rhythm, are explicitly sexual (see also, Leadbetter). At the same time, the 'twilight Elfins' of the speaker's fancy (who 'Voyage on gentle gales from Fairy-Land, / Where melodies round honey-dropping flowers, / Footless and wild, like birds of Paradise, / Nor pause, nor perch, hovering on untamed wing!'), are, in fact, versions of Plato's poet: the poet is presented in *Ion* as a 'light and winged thing', whose 'melodies [...] are gathered from rills that run with honey, out of glens and gardens of the Muses [that] they bring as the bees do honey, flying like the bees,' (*Ion*, 220). The speaker's temptation, and fall, may thus equally evoke the unstable binary between intoxication and inspiration: both constitute an escape from the real world, and testify to the relinquishing of self-control and consciousness, to a state of possession and ecstasy, during which the individual is driven by powers beyond its own control. However, like the preface to 'Kubla Khan', but even more explicitly so, the conclusion to 'The Eolian Harp' suggests, as we will see, that there is a need for self-discipline, and to control the possession, the ecstasy, and the passivity characterising the state in which the poet, according to Plato, 'has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him' (*Ion*).

As a preliminary to any further analysis of the conclusion, it is necessary to engage with the passage that has constituted the most considerable impediment to the reading of the poem as a process of cultivation, peaking in its final 'message'; namely, the 'one Life theme', which Coleridge added to the poem in 1817. At this time, he was estranged from his wife, and also rejected pantheistic faith.

> O! the one Life within us and abroad,
> Which meets all Motion and becomes its soul,
> A Light in Sound, a sound-like power in Light
> Rhythm in all Thought, and Joyance every where –
> Methinks, it should have been impossible
> Not to love all things in a world so filled;
> Where the breeze warbles, and the mute still air
> Is Music slumbering on her instrument.

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Critics are still uncertain whether these lines reflect Coleridge's true belief in the natural symbol, or rather stage a possible belief in the natural symbol. M. H. Abrams offers an influential analysis of the 'one Life' theme as an expression of Coleridge's post-Newtonian rejection of the separation of matter and spirit, exerting a great impact on subsequent interpretations of the poem (see, Mays (*PW*); Halmi, *The Genealogy of the Romantic Symbol*; Cheshire). The poem as a whole, according to Abrams, bears the influence of German *Naturphilosophie* and Jacob Boehme's reading of the *Genesis* in *Aurora*. Compared to this, states Abrams, 'the coda is rendered inconsequent and anticlimactic' ('The Correspondent', 113–130). The changes affecting Coleridge's religious thinking (including his turn towards Anglicanism) may, however, make us challenge the equation of the 'one Life' with the Coleridge of 1817. In fact, the later Coleridge, as we have seen, was wary of sudden insights, that is, of what traditional criticism would call 'inspiration'. Such ejaculations as 'O the one life within us and abroad'; 'And what if all animated nature / Be but organic Harps diversely framed' have an uncertain status in Coleridge's thinking.

Although Boehme is often associated with the 'one Life' theme in Coleridge scholarship, in *Biographia Literaria*, which appeared the same year as the 1817 version of the poem (entitled, for the first time, 'The Eolian Harp'), Coleridge offers the following critique of this 'ignorant mystic' (*BL* I., 151), of this '*uneducated* man of genius' (150, italics added), that is, Jacob Boehme:

> O! it requires deeper feeling, and stronger imagination, than belong to most of those, to whom reasoning and fluent expression have been as trade learnt in boyhood, to conceive what *might*, with what inward *strivings* and *commotion*, the perception of a new and vital TRUTH takes possession of an uneducated man of genius. His meditations are almost inevitably employed on the eternal, or the everlasting […] Need we then be surprised, that under an excitement at once so strong and so unusual […] that he should at times be so far deluded, as to mistake the tumultuous sensations of his nerves, and the co-existing propensities of his fancy, as parts or symbols of the truths opening to him? (*BL* I., 150–151).[2]

This passage on Boehme is reminiscent of the way in which Coleridge criticises Luther in *The Friend*. Luther, like Boehme, suffered

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the 'great irritability of the nervous system' and 'deemed himself gifted with supernatural influxes' (*F* II., 116, 119), which, added to 'the impressions made upon him in early life, and fostered by the theological Systems of his Manhood', could, according to Coleridge, explain 'all his apparitions' (*F* II., 116). In *Biographia*, the attack is not explicitly launched against 'irritability', or the bad influences acting upon Boehme's formative years, but against his *lack of education*, which makes the ignorant 'mistake the tumultuous sensations of his nerves, and the co-existing propensities of his fancy, as parts or symbols of the truths opening to him' (*BL* I., 150). For even if sometimes, it is indeed some new and vital truth that takes possession of the uneducated men of genius, these men are both unable to make a distinction between truth and fancy, and lack proper habits of reflection: they let themselves be *possessed* by what they take, due to their 'anomalous sensations', for symbols of eternal truths. In other words, like Luther, who believes in the reality of his hallucinations, Boehme believes that his fancies are the symbols of truth. The ignorant's delusions, during which the images rising up from his own nerves become confounded with eternal truths, are presented by Coleridge as not only utterly mistaken, but also as deficiencies caused by the lack of education.

As opposed to both Boehme and Luther, Coleridge considers himself as someone belonging to those lucky, well-educated ones 'to whom reasoning and fluent expression have been as a trade learnt in boyhood'. Yet, however well-educated Coleridge may be, the 'one Life' theme of 'The Eolian Harp' (just like the various other texts examined in this book) testifies that he is far from being exempt from such (perhaps delusionary) insights, which he later calls 'the shapings of the unregenerate mind'. In this poem, it is the specular figure of Sara that prevents the speaker from mistaking, like Boehme did, the fancies of his own mind for 'symbols of the truth opening to him'. Sara's gaze elicits a feeling of guilt (Coleridge appears as 'sinful and most miserable man'), which, however, is immediately redeemed by her presence, by the 'Peace, and this Cot, and Thee, heart-honoured Maid'.

In fact, there is a distinction to be made between the absent listeners of the other conversation poems and the listener addressed both in 'Effusion' and 'The Eolian Harp', who is physically present. Sara's cheek reclines on the speaker's arm, which brings to mind Coleridge's insistence on the importance of the mother's physical presence in the early stages of infancy. She equally shares with the mother the

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function of mediating the love of God, and drawing forth a reverence for the 'Almighty'. As Coleridge puts it in *Opus Maximum*: 'The child [...] gazing upward to [the mother's] countenance marks her eyes averted heavenward, while yet it feels the tender pressure of her embrace, and learns to pray in the mother's prayers' (*OM*, 126). The mild reproof in her eyes at the end of the poem then paves the way for the awakening of the speaker's conscience: it elicits his awareness of the moral law, and the religious faith that 'inly feels'. Indeed, in the last stanza, the figure of Sara becomes more 'masculine' (or else, Medusa-like), and comes to evoke the educator (the later Parson), this father figure, who elicits the moral law.

In the *Church and State*, apart from emphasising the necessity of the presence of the educator, Coleridge places the clerisy on the threshold between the private and the public:

> [t]he clergyman is […] a neighbour and a family-man whose education and rank admit him to the mansion of the rich landholder, while his duties make him a frequent visitor of the farmhouse and the cottage. He is, or he may become, connected with the families of his parish or its vicinity by marriage. (*Ch & St*, 75–76).

Sara's disciplinary gaze, in the poem, equally plays a mediating role between public duties and private, domestic love – as well as mediating between the feminine and masculine phases of the educative process. Meanwhile, the community that the disciplined speaker eventually becomes part of also changes in character in the course of the poem's progression from 'Effusion' to 'The Eolian Harp': with the alteration of Coleridge's attitude to his wife and matters of religion, the domestic community of the first drafts turns into the political community of the church and the state.

In what follows, I suggest that the 1795 addition and the 1817 withdrawal of the footnote referring to the *Appel à l'impartiale postérité par la Citoyenne Roland* adds a third viewpoint to the two contending perspectives of the poem, and thereby complicates the unstable hierarchy established between them. In the 1796, 1797, and 1803 editions, before the full acknowledgement of the purpose and the reason of the 'mild reproof' darting Sara's eyes, the speaker 'repeat[s] the wrong' to which he has been 'tempt[ed]' in the middle of passing a sentence upon it. As if against his own determination to do the contrary, he disrupts the passage suggesting the full

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acceptance of Sara's devotion and the faith that 'inly feels' with an index that alludes to the ambiguous writing of a French woman. This note attached as a supplement to 'Effusions XXXV' is a quotation from Madame Roland's *Appel à l'impartiale postérité, par la Citoyenne Roland*. Madame Roland was not only a domineering wife, as Mays suggests via 'The Fall of Robespierre' (*CP*, I.1. 235), but also, and much more importantly, an active supporter of *La Gironde*, and was imprisoned and executed by Robespierre during the Terror.[3] Her figure thus embodies the ideals of the Revolution without their 'practical ill consequences' (*Ch & St*, 24.), that is, she represents in the English imagination, including Coleridge's, all those victims of the Revolution who had to suffer the 'direful' consequences of the Revolution's metamorphosis into Terror. Her memoirs can be best read as an apology, as a direct appeal to the universal law embodied by some implied, impartial posterity; as she writes: 'there is no law to condemn me; or any fact, which admits of the application of a law' (Roland, 'Mad. Roland's Appeal', 376). In other words, it is a true 'Appeal to Law', verbally anticipating Coleridge's essay of the same title.

Coleridge's footnote to 'Effusion XXXV', a quotation from this 'Appeal', remained in the 1797 and 1803 editions, but disappeared from the 1817 version onwards. It reads:

> L'athée n'est point à mes yeux un faux esprit ; je puis vivre avec lui aussi bien et mieux qu'avec le dévot, car il raisonne davantage, mais il lui manque un sens, et mon âme ne se fond point entièrement avec la sienne : il est froid au spectacle le plus ravissant, et il cherche un syllogisme lorsque je rends une action de grâce. « Appel à l'impartial postérité par la Citoyenne Roland », troisième partie (67).

> Madame Roland's memoirs were published as an English translation by Joseph Johnson in 1795, the same year as the original appeared in France:

> The atheist is not, in my eyes, a man of ill faith: I can live with him as well, nay better than with the devotee, for he reasons more; but he is deficient in a certain sense, and his soul does not keep pace with mine; he is unmoved at a spectacle the most ravishing, and he hunts for a syllogism, where I am impressed with awe and admiration. (Coleridge, *PW* I., 234–235, n.60)

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J. C. C. Mays claims that 'Coleridge transcribed the note from Marie Jean (Philippon) Roland de la Platière *Appel a l'impartiale postérité* (3 vols Paris 1795), dropping accents and changing the punctuation slightly'. Indeed, in the original, there is a semicolon between 'davantage' and 'mais', (*Appel*, 67) also present in the English translation. This semicolon renders the phrasing less ambiguous than it appears from Coleridge's footnote, leaving no doubt that the dependent clause ('he is deficient in a certain sense') refers to the atheist rather than to the devotee.[4] Mays also remarks that Coleridge 'read French only slowly at the time' (*II* 1., 337), implying that Coleridge first read the book in English, and then looked into the French original for the paragraph he needed.

However, nowhere else does Coleridge mention Madame Roland's 'Appeal',[5] and it is likely he came across the paragraph while reading an extract published in the October 1795 issue of *The Analytical Review*. The date of the review can also explain why the footnote first appears as a 'last minute note' (Mays) to the 1796 version, and not in that of August 1795. Most importantly, the original context of the footnote in *The Analytical Review* (i.e. the paragraphs preceding and following the one Coleridge actually quotes) can contribute to our understanding of 'Effusion XXXV', the origin of 'The Eolian Harp'. The passage quoted by Johnson in *The Analytical Review* reads:

> In the silence of the closet, and the dryness of discussion, I can agree with the atheist or the materialist, as to the perfect insolubility of certain questions; but in the bosom of the country, and in the contemplation of nature, my soul soars to the vivifying principle that animates all objects, to the almighty intellect that arranges them, to the goodness that instils into them such exquisite charms. Now, that immense walls separate me from those I love, that the accumulated evils of society descend upon us at once as a punishment for seeking its greatest happiness, I look beyond the bounds of life for the reward of our sacrifices, and the felicity of re-union.
>
> How? In what manner? I am ignorant; I only feel that it must be so.
>
> The atheist is not, in my eyes, a man of ill faith; I can live with him as well, nay better than with the devotee; for he reasons more; but he is deficient in a certain sense, and his soul does not

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> keep pace with mine; he is unmoved at a spectacle the most ravishing, and he hunts for a syllogism, where I am impressed with awe and admiration.
>
> It was not suddenly and at once that I fixed myself in this firm and peaceful seat, in which, enjoying the truths which are demonstrated to me, and resigning myself with confidence to the feelings that constitute my happiness, I am content to be ignorant of what cannot be known, without being disturbed by the opinions of others. I compress in a few words the essence of many years' meditation and study, in the course of which I have sometimes shared the zeal of the theist, the austerity of the atheist, and the indifference of the sceptic. These fluctuations were always accompanied with sincerity, as I had no inducement to change my opinions for the purpose of countenancing a relaxation of manner: my system of conduct was fixed beyond the power of prejudice to shake: [...] When I received the divine aliment, I reflected on the words of Cicero, that, to complete the follies of men, with respect to the Deity, it only remained for them to transform him into food, and then to devour him. My mother increasing daily in piety, I was less able to deviate from the ordinary practices, as there was nothing I so much dreaded as to afflict her.

The 4th part of the translation still remains to be published (383–384).

Paul Cheshire, summarising recent scholarship on 'Effusion XXXV', claims that the footnote supports the conclusion of the poem, Sara's devoted Anglicanism. Coleridge 'has not just italicised "*feels*" (line 52) but has added to it the footnote from *Appel a l'impartiale postérité*, which glosses the expression: the atheist may reason better, but he lacks the responsive heart that feels awe' (13). However, the original context of the footnote suggests that it is impossible to establish a parallel between either Madame Roland's 'athée' and the harp image of the middle of the poem, or her 'dévot' and Sara's orthodox Anglicanism in the poem's conclusion. First, Madame Roland's preference for the 'dévot' cannot be mistaken for religious orthodoxy: she speaks in derogatory terms about her mother's 'increasing daily in piety', and satirises the (Catholic) communion. Consequently, even though the 'dévot' is better than the atheist, he only stands as a second best compared to those, such as

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Madame Roland, who admire the 'vivifying principle that animates all objects' while contemplating nature, and whose 'soul soars to the almighty intellect that arranges them, to the goodness that instils into them such exquisite charms'. Thus, despite the fact that Madame Roland's phrasing 'How? In what manner? I am ignorant; I only feel that it must be so' has reminded critics of Coleridge's pious lines ('The Incomprehensible! Save when with awe / I praise him, and with faith that inly feels'), the preceding paragraph explaining her awe and admiration is closer in spirit to the religious beliefs that Coleridge himself entertained around 1796. These, according to John Beer, constituted a middle ground between Anglican orthodoxy and the 'essentially rationalistic and mechanical' order of Unitarianism (Beer). This third alternative recognises the presence of divine providence in the universe, but refrains from explaining or trying to understand its mystery. It rejects the orthodoxy of the Church, but opts for a faith that 'feels' instead of a reason that understands. Secondly, Madame Roland's 'sincere' fluctuations between different convictions may also strike familiar chords with Coleridge: although his convictions are not exactly overlapping Roland's, 'Effusion XXXV' itself is an oscillation, as many critics have noted, between the heterodox theology of the harp image and the 'transcendent deity of orthodoxy' (e.g. Perry, 68, 69). At the same time, it also points towards a third pole, which, in October 1795, might have found a distant echo in Madame Roland's memoirs.

Small wonder that the footnote disappeared from 1817 onwards. First, it advances a religious perspective that Coleridge later rejects. Second, this quotation from, and remembrance of, a French woman undermines the address to the wife, Sara, and the conclusion's appraisal of domesticity, by its sheer, disruptive presence. Third, since Madame Roland may bring to contemporary readers' mind Coleridge's early radicalism, the editorial process the poem undergoes is very similar to the one we witnessed in the preface to 'Kubla Khan': Coleridge does everything to control the reading process, poses obstacles to the potential construction of an author figure resembling his younger self, and fashions the poem as a process of inward cultivation or *Bildung*. The withdrawal of the footnote thus again testifies that even though Coleridge's writings often exhibit a *poetics* of intoxication, he most often opts for a *politics* of cultivation.

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Notes

Introduction

1 Just like Wordsworth's, cf, Simpson.
2 On Coleridge's changing relationship to Kant until the composition of *Biographia*, see, Class.
3 As Pamela Edwards writes, the will is 'an expression of practical reason', and 'the template for not only spiritual renewal, but moral and political reform' ('Coleridge on Politics', 247; see also, Edwards, 'Morality and Will', 111–132).
4 These terms were associated by conservatives with political radicalism, and have been recently discussed with reference to 18th century concepts of sympathy (cf, Csengei, 82). Coleridge, like his contemporaries, mentions Haller's name as an important point of reference for his views upon the workings of the nerves and the muscles in higher animals (*OM*, 142).
5 Noel Jackson, investigating the political implications of the term 'stimulation' equally notices, 'Coleridge strikes an unmistakably Burkean note when he describes the period of most intense conflict as marked by an "excess of stimulation," and compares the unfolding of Revolutionary events to the action of electricity' (Jackson, 50–51).
6 Practically speaking, we can ask with Derrida: 'What do we hold against the drug addict?' ('The Rhetoric of Drugs', 25). (This 'we' is, of course, the 'we' of the prohibitive or normative discourse, also endorsed by Coleridge.) First, the addict 'cuts himself off from the world, in exile from reality […] and the real life of […] the community' (25). Second, 'his or hers is a pleasure taken in an experience without truth' (25). For even though the enjoyment of artificial paradises has later been regarded as *the* high way to truth (considered as *aletheia*: unconcealment or unforgettingness), the truth of intoxication, according to the normative discourse, cannot be integrated into the temporality of the kind of experience that is considered to be real by the correspondence theories of truth. Third, 'the drug addict as such produces nothing, nothing true or real. He is legitimate […] only inasmuch as he participates, at least indirectly, in the production and consumption of goods' (25–26).
7 On this latter, see Bygrave, and on the problematic status of freedom in theories of addiction see Reith, 'Consumption'.
8 Alan Richardson links the lack of the Will related to Coleridge's opium habits to his fears concerning mind's turning into an automaton. 'This view of opiates would have been familiar to fellow readers of *Zoonomia*. Darwin had theorized that opium worked by increasing "irritative motions from internal stimulus [*sic*]" and augmenting the amount of

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"sensorial power" accorded to sensation from within the body at the expense both of "voluntary power" and "irritation from the stimulus of external objects"' (Richardson, *British Romanticism and the Sciences of the Mind*, 50).

9 Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, 89.

10 Matthew Arnold's father, Thomas Arnold, was profoundly influenced by Coleridge's idea of Christianity. Cf, de Graef, 644. Matthew Arnold, in Chapter II of *Culture and Anarchy* argues: 'by our best self we are united, impersonal, at harmony [...] this is the very self which culture, or the study of perfection, seeks to develop in us; at the expense of our old untransformed self [...] culture suggests the idea of the State. We find no basis for a firm State-power in our ordinary selves; culture suggests one to us in our best self' (89).

11 See also: David Haney's (193) contention that it would be unlikely that Coleridge was not familiar with *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*.

12 An early example of the politics of intoxication can be found, for instance, in Plato's *Laws*: '[Ath.] I should say that if a city seriously means to adopt the practice of drinking under due regulation and with a view to the enforcement of temperance, and in like manner, and on the same principle, will allow of other pleasures, designing to gain the victory over them in this way all of them may be used. But if the State makes drinking an amusement only, and whoever likes may drink whenever he likes, and with whom he likes, and add to this any other indulgences, I shall never agree or allow that this city or this man should practise drinking' (accessed 12 February 2015 at: http://www.pluto.no/litteratur/free_txt/pdf/Plato/laws.pdf). Plato's famous banning of the poets from the Republic will be discussed in the analysis of 'Kubla Khan'.

1 Cultivating Reason and the Will

1 On this passage see Wellek (105): 'Reason takes here both the function of Kant's intuition and of Kant's practical Reason which are brought together by their common independence from discursive reasoning'.

2 Coleridge is in perfect agreement with the middle-class, imperialist attitudes of his time, when, apparently dissolving social particularities, he equates the 'animal' with the 'savage' and the 'barbarian'. On Coleridge's changing attitude to slave trade and abolitionism, see, Sonoi; Keane.

3 As Redfield argues discussing the ideal of disinterestedness that 'marks judgements of taste': 'the empirical subject transcends its class interests in a moment of contact with a formal identity – the transcendental body, as it were -- of humanity. This formal identity, furthermore, has an empirical representative in mainstream aesthetic discourse: the state'. (*Politics of Aesthetics*, 12.) Coleridge's 'humanistic' approach to cultivation and the equation he establishes between the cultivated individual and the citizen (as a responsible member of the state) also carries the ideological burden of the Arnoldian bond between 'culture' and the 'state'. As Redfield remarks,

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'[b]oth cultivation and the state function, at least in principle, as sites of imaginary reconciliation [...] for an increasingly complex and fragmented social order' (12).

4 Paul Hamilton, in an attempt to clarify Coleridge's engagement with the aporia resulting from his Christianised version of Kantianism, argues that Coleridge's version of Christianity turns the Schellingian Will into Kantian Practical Reason, or Free-Will, which, in its turn, must always be identical with God's. 'If we think of the Absolute as itself practical, as a will, then, contra Schelling's will that wills nothing, we can identify with its purposes. We can, that is, enter into a relationship with God. And God's purposes are set out, as far as Coleridge is concerned, in the precepts of Christianity, God's definitive revelation to humankind. Ergo we can identify our practical reason with God's Practical Reason once we have stepped inside the ideological circle of Christianity' (Hamilton, 422).

5 Divine Personëity differs 'from personality only as rejecting all commixture of imperfection associated with the latter' while being 'an essential constituent in the idea of God' (*OM*, 177). On the concept of Person see also: McFarland's 'Prologmena' to *OM* (cxiv–cxix); On Personëity see Evans (208).

6 Claire Colebrook's claim that post-Enlightenment ideas of individual freewill and autonomy are, in fact, problems of representation specifically related to modernity helps us to contextualise Coleridge's stance better, since his 'organicist' politics, as we will see in the second part of this chapter, is also as a problem of representation. Colebrook writes: 'By arguing that enlightened knowledge is possible only when subjects are aware of themselves as autonomous, Kant articulates one of the key eighteenth-century motifs of representative democracy. The link between representation and modernity neither emerges with Kant, nor can be contained within the Kantian problematic. Consider one of the central images of the 'age of reason': the French revolution with all its promise of liberty, equality and fraternity followed soon after by the Terror. How do we explain this self-enslavement of what is, ideally, a self-legislating reason? The problem had been encountered a century earlier in the English revolution and its subsequent reversion to monarchy' (17).

7 On Rousseau, see also: Duffy; de Man, *Allegories of Reading*, 135–303.

8 Cf, Kant, 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment': 'Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another', accessed 24 February 2015 at: https://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/documents/What_is_Enlightenment.pdf

9 The eminent Victorian, Matthew Arnold struggles with the belief that 'man' is, as yet, in a state of self-imposed immaturity; as he comments: 'we are not ready for right – *right*, so far as we are concerned, is *not ready* – until we have attained this sense of seeing and willing it' "The Function of Criticism" (25).

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10 The increasing readership of the radical press makes him conclude that 'the writings of these incendiaries' constitute 'plausible arguments against the education of the lower classes' (*LS*, 150) See also Paul Keen's comment about the 'republic of letters' in Romanticism: with the fast diffusion knowledge and information, 'a shadow government of enlightened public opinion' was formed, which 'no responsible government would wish to, or *could even hope to* oppose' (28, italics added.)

2 The Shaping Spirit of Education

1 As a preliminary to any discussion of the Coleridgean idea of *national* education, it must be underlined that even though the equivalence between the Nation (as an '*imagined* community', Benedict Anderson) and the State (as the formal universality of *institutions*, Lloyd and Thomas, 5) appears to be counterintuitive, in Coleridge's conception, the state 'in that highest sense of the word, [is] equivalent to the nation, considered as one body politic' (*Ch & St*, 73).
2 Coleridge attended Blumenbach's lectures in Germany, cf, *The Friend* I., 494, n. John Kooy argues that the term '*Bildungstrieb* is 'possibly' a 'reference to Schiller's *Aesthetic Letters*' (95)
3 Drawing on these organicist metaphors, Thomas Pfau concludes that education is conceived by Coleridge as a 'force that is isomorphous with the process of organic life itself', as something 'wholly coincident with the (teleological) functionalism of all the constitutive parts that make up a complex organism' ('Of Ends and Endings', 233, 234).
4 See also Redfield on Schillerian *Bildung* 'Bildung is not achieved in the manner of a technical construction, but grows out of the inner process of formation and cultivation, and therefore remains in a constant state of further continued Bildung' (*Phantom Formations*, 47).
5 In *Lay Sermons*, which explicitly treats the history of the nation, Coleridge argues that if the educts (i.e. histories) are properly read, they become not only 'prophetic', but also generally applicable to the political situation of England. For instance, quoting Jeremiah 8. 15 (var. 141 n.1), '[w]e looked for peace, but no good came; for a time of health and behold trouble', he argues that these phrases not 'only contain [the present] state of the case, but suggest the most *natural* scheme and order of treating it' (141, italics added). Yet, if one starts to wonder in what way this phrase 'naturally' symbolises contemporary history, one arrives at an impasse: rather disappointingly, Coleridge goes into a lengthy exposition of his own views concerning the present state of affairs, regardless of the actual Biblical context. As Balfour equally points out (concerning another, allegedly 'symbolic', passage), 'Coleridge's reading appears forced, at best' (263). For a more sympathetic reading of the Coleridgean 'symbol', see Halmi, *The Genealogy of the Romantic Symbol* (Passim).

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6 'It is among the miseries of the present age that it recognises no medium between the *Literal* and the *Metaphorical*. Faith is either to be buried in the dead letter, or its name and honours usurped by a counterfeit product of the mechanical understanding, which in the blindness of self-complacency confounds SYMBOLS with ALLEGORIES. Now an allegory is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language which is itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses; the principal being more worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike unsubstantial, and the former shapeless to boot. On the other hand a Symbol […] is characterised by a translucence of the Special in the Individual or of the General in the Especial or of the Universal in the General. Above all by the translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal' (*LS*, 30).
7 To the word 'educt', the editors of *Lay Sermons* helpfully attach a footnote saying that the term is used in the *chemical sense*, in contra-distinction to 'product'. 'Educt', according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, is 'that which is educed', and was used in 18th century chemistry to denote 'A body separated by the decomposition of another in which it previously existed as such, in contradistinction to product, which denotes a compound not previously existing, but formed during the decomposition'. Educts are natural parts of the chemical bodies from which they are educed, whereas products are alien parts formed during its decomposition, or dispersion.
8 According to Coleridge the imagination 'is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead'. (*BL* I., 304)
9 Coleridge is actually aware that these histories are artificial, or performative constructs of an imagination, which actively 'binds' and 'connects' the present with the future. As he claims in 'The Statesman's Manual': 'if there exists means for deriving resignation from the general discontent […] that antidote and these means must be sought for in the *collation* of the present with the past, in the habit of thoughtfully *assimilating* the events of our own age to those of the time before us'. (*LS*, 9, italics added).
10 The next chapter will analyse the consequences, and problematize the idea of such a construction by examining the poetic display of a successful and a failed narrative cultivation.
11 Redfield, 'Aesthetics, Sovereignty, Biopower: From Schiller's *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen* to Goethe's*Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten*', accessed 16 February 2015 at: http://www.rc.umd.edu/praxis/biopolitics/HTML/praxis.2012.redfield.html

3 Staging Education

1 The titles of the different versions of Coleridge's ballad will be respected throughout the book, since it went through important changes in the period under discussion. The 1798 version in *Lyrical Ballads* was entitled

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'The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere', the title of the 1800 version was 'The Ancient Mariner. A Poet's Reverie', to be changed by 1802 into 'The Ancient Mariner'. The glossary only appears in 1817 (that is, well after the intellectual exchanges between Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Alexander Ball discussed in this chapter), when the poem was published in *Sibylline Leaves* under the title 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner'.

2 Of course, the idea of the empirical realisation of the Kantian model is, in fact, counter-Kantian. As Pfau also notes: Kant 'disaggregates the notion of moral agency from any normative good and from any empirically observable practice' (Pfau, 'Beyond Liberal Utopia', 10).

3 Fulford, 'Catholicism and Polytheism: Britain's Colonies and Coleridge's Politics'.; Hewitt, 89–102.

4 Though I am not pursuing a specifically Foucauldian analysis, I find Anne Frey's summary of Foucault's writings on governmentality especially relevant for the following argument: 'In several late essays, including "Governmentality," "*Omnes et Singulatim*," and "The Subject and Power," and in the lectures published in English as *Security, Territory, Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault suggests that the late eighteenth century saw a change in the nature of state power.[10[in original]] The state no longer defined itself through a king's sovereignty over a territory but by the state's ability to govern a population. It governed this population, however, not only as a group but also as a collection of individuals who must each be actively formed. The state studied individuals to analyze the population's sanitary conditions, crime, debt, nutrition, or health, for example, and then formulated policies to address each issue through a combination of local and central interventions. Foucault traces the state's individuating power to the tradition of pastoral care developed in the Christian Church. In the Christian tradition, the pastor supervises and morally forms each individual and his parish as a whole, encouraging his parishioners to renounce this world in hopes of salvation in the next. Indeed, the pastor must answer personally for the state of each parishioner's soul. For this reason, Foucault writes, pastoral power 'cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people's minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it' ([Foucault] "Subject and Power," 333). [11[in original]] According to Foucault, from the beginning of the eighteenth century the state adopted but secularized this pastoral model. The state understood the ultimate goal of pastoral care differently from the Church: "it was a question no longer of leading people to their salvation in the next world but, rather, ensuring it in this world" by developing "health, well-being (that is sufficient wealth, standard of living), security, protection against accidents" ("Subject and Power," 334). The state linked the health of each individual to the nation as a whole, aiming to "develop those elements constitutive of individuals" lives in such a way that their development also fosters the strength of the state' ([Foucault] "*Omnes et Singulatim*," 322). Nevertheless, for Foucault, these pastoral processes were

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not confined to the state. In fact, he suggests, beginning in the eighteenth century, governing functions proliferated and spread across the population.

Foucault suggests that this pastoral state emerges alongside, and at the same time countering and enabling, a liberal government rationality. On the one hand, liberalism's limitations on government contradict the tactics of a pastoral state: liberal economics suggests that the sovereign cannot in fact see citizens' individual interests or understand the mechanisms by which in pursuing their interests they create a prosperous society. Government therefore must leave society alone to develop without interference. On the other hand, Foucault suggests, liberalism's insistence on individual freedom in fact proves to be a governmental tactic: freedom develops "not only as the right of individuals legitimately opposed to the power, usurpations, and abuses of the sovereign or the government, but as an element that has become indispensable to governmentality itself." [12[in original]] Liberalism defines individuals' ability to pursue their own interests as both necessary to good government and as the object of good government, and so government must create the conditions under which they have the capacity to be "free." For this reason, he suggests, "freedom is nothing else but the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of security," with security defined both as what we would now call "national" security (the conditions necessary for society to conduct economic transactions) and as "social" security, the conditions necessary for individuals to maintain themselves (48). In describing the disciplinary reach of government authority, Foucault draws on the model of bio-power he developed in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*. But whereas his earlier work imagined that individuals had little free will in the face of the disciplinary tactics that constructed them, Foucault's late work focuses on the way in which individuals claim subjectivity. [13[in original]] He suggests that disciplinary structures rely on individual agency; power does not monolithically control another person but rather is a means of "acting on another's actions" ("Subject and Power," 340). Foucault excludes physical coercion or slavery, for example, from his definition of power. Instead, "power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free," by which he means that they "are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of reacting and modes of behavior are available" ("Subject and Power," 342). Power relationships affect the choices individuals make but do not remove their ability to choose. Far from setting freedom and power at odds, then, Foucault finds a "complicated interplay" between the two and suggests that "freedom may well appear the condition for the exercise of power" ("Subject and Power," 342). This model of power is evident in Foucault's analysis of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberalism's insistence that the state governs best when it relies on individuals' capacity for free choice'. (58–60)

5 In 'The Statesman's Manual', Coleridge opposes Bell's plan for 'universal learning', rather than his emphasis on the necessity to *elicit* knowledge.

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6 Kant argues as follows: '[T]he moral law is […] an object of *respect*. […] Therefore respect for the moral law is a feeling which is brought about by an intellectual basis [i.e. freedom], and this feeling is the only one that we cognise completely a priori, and the necessity of which we have insight into (Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, 74). Therefore the moral law inevitably humbles every human being inasmuch as he compares with it the sensible propensities of his nature. If the presentation of something *as a determining basis of our will* humbles us in our self-consciousness, then insofar as this something is positive and a determining basis it arouses *respect* for itself (74). A feeling of respect for the moral law […] can be called a *moral feeling* (75). […] *Respect* always applies only to persons, never to things […] His [i.e. the other person's] example holds before me a law that, when I compare it with my conduct, strikes down my self-conceit (77). John Llewelyn summarises Kant's position as follows: 'It is ultimately the moral law for which moral respect is held … the respect we have for the person is "properly speaking for the law that his example exhibits. So I cannot respect myself as a person unless I respect the moral law"' (Llewelyn, 155).

7 Which is most probably flogging (see: Fulford, 'Sighing for a Soldier', 165–168.

8 This is a clear instance of the Freudian uncanny: 'The idea of the "double" does not necessarily disappear with the passing of primary narcissism, for it can receive fresh meaning from the later stages of the development of the ego. A special faculty is slowly formed there, able to oppose the rest of the ego, with the function of observing and criticising the self and exercising a censorship within the mind, and this we become aware of as our "conscience". In the pathological case of delusions of being watched this mental institution becomes isolated, dissociated from the ego, and discernible to the physician's eye. The fact that a faculty of this kind exists, which is able to treat the rest of the ego like an object – the fact, that is, that man is capable of self-observation – renders it possible to invest the old idea of the "double" with a new meaning and to ascribe many things to it, above all, those things which seem to the new faculty of self-criticism to belong to the old surmounted narcissism of the earliest period of all' ('The Uncanny', 426).

9 David Baulch, inspired by Slavoj Žižek's discussions of 'ideology', draws a parallel between 'the supernatural forces of the Gothic and the supersensible thing-in-itself of Kantian metaphysics' in an analysis of *Biographia* (Baulch, 73). According to his interpretation, both the Gothic and the supernatural posit 'an unreachable yet a priori realm of the imagination that functions as the fantasy frame of ideological, that is to say experiential, reality' (77). Without contradicting Baulch's or Žižek's claim, 'The Appeal to Law' brings, however, into sharp focus the stakes involved in the translation of the Kantian 'respect' for the Law in oneself into a fear from the gothic spectre or spirit of this Law.

10 In *Biographia Literaria*, Coleridge famously praises the Reverend James Boyer, his headmaster at Christ's Hospital for early 'habituating' his tastes (*BL* I., 9–10; more will be said on this in Part III of this book), but it

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should also be noted that Boyer never restrained himself from infliction the most painful punishments on his pupils, which included flogging.

11 David Perkins, *Romanticism and Animal Rights*, 103.
12 On this particular episode, see Bewell, 103.
13 On the 'echo of the rocks' that Peter finds fearsome and threatening, see Bewell, who considers the personification of nature as the first step in Peter's educative process (103). On Peter's encounter with the 'dead man' (the ass's master), and his turning of the spectres of his conscience into the proper figure of a 'dead man's face', see Turner. On the relevance of the Methodist, see Jacobus.
14 On the difficulties of comparing the two ballads, see Bromwich, who remarks that 'Peter undergoes an agony like the Mariner, and passes through a conversion like the wedding guest' (Bromwich, 123). Jacobus renders the comparison of the two poem almost impossible, observing that 'where Coleridge's Ancient Mariner is alienated from the spiritual world, Peter is alienated from the world of human feeling; shooting the albatross does violence to a cosmic harmony, but beating the ass does violence to humane values' (*Tradition and Experiment*, 265).
15 Stanley Cavell also draws attention to the wedding-guest's wise non-comprehension. Other critics focusing on the ethical implications of the 'Rime' without, however, engaging with its politics are, for instance, Hartman; Haney.
16 That is, 'ethics' as something related to the Levinasian-Derridean concept of 'justice', cf, for instance, Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*. See also, Haney.

4 Sympathy

1 Geoffrey Hartman calls the effect of the tale a 'secondary traumatisation' ('Trauma', 258); as he puts it, '[s]uch story-eruptions [as the Mariner's 'ghastly tale'] hypnotize listeners by their contagious magic, by a secondary traumatism ('Trauma', 269).
2 Leask, *British Romantic Writers and the East,* 187. Pinch, *Strange Fits of Passion*; Burgess; Chandler, *An Archaeology of Sympathy*.
3 In *Poetic Justice*, Martha Nussbaum draws on Smith's account of sympathy to argue that while reading novels we should assume the role of Smith's 'Judicious Spectator' (a term that Smith himself never uses), and that this will, in its turn, help us to develop a sympathetic (i.e. 'morally good') judgement of other people (Nussbaum, 73–74). Robert Eaglestone, in his critique of Nussbaum's book, points out that Nussbaum 'reads artworks as people' in a characteristic effacement of 'the idea of the [singularity of the] text' (46.) In fact, Nussbaum's suggestion that we should read artworks as people could have indeed been inspired by Smith, and her treatment of people as artworks may also make one wonder about the consequences of the potential effacement of people's singularity and difference – notions equally related to Eaglestone's idea of the text. For example, calling for the necessity

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of 'judicious imagination' at the court, Nussbaum singles out the following passage from Smith: 'the spectator [i.e. the judge] must … endeavour, as much as he can, to bring home to himself every little circumstances of distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer' (Nussbaum, 73–74). As we have seen, Smith himself, being aware that imagination is always deceitful (i.e. that a 'passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in [the other's] from the reality', 7) is, in fact, critical about the phrasing 'bring home to himself', and his exploration of the conditions, the consequences, and the actual workings of (his own version of) sympathy renders Nussbaum's argument, that 'the ability to think of other people's life in a novelist's way is an important part of the equipment of a judge' (73), ethically suspect. A properly Smithean reading of Nussbaum would suggest that any resistance to sympathy, that is, to the aesthetic, has to be conceived as a resistance to justice. In other words, it would suggest that individuals, who are not able to arouse our sympathy because their pain presses too close, or because they lack perfect self-command, have to be convicted. Second, it would also suggest that if we cannot imagine ourselves in their situation, and our sympathy, is therefore, not aroused, then they equally have to be convicted. As Smith writes: 'As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. […] By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His agonies, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels'. (*Theory of Moral Sentiments* 7)

4 It is interesting to note that Coleridge mocks Wordsworth precisely for distorting the 'real language' of man (i.e. the extent to which 'Mr. Wordsworth's homeliest composition differs from that of a common peasant'), since in this specific poem, it is, precisely, the 'real' that he finds reprehensible. As we have seen, "The Ancient Mariner" problematizes Smith's 'aesthetic' conception of sympathy: the narration of the Mariner's distress 'is every moment interrupted by [...] natural bursts of passion', and his tale presses too close. Meanwhile, the literal death of the albatross and the intrusion of the Mariner's abject body (half dead and half alive) prevent the unfolding of a coherent, aesthetic narrative. However, the Rime does succeed in producing 'aesthetic pleasure': the setting is 'supernatural', the figure of the Mariner is not devoid of magnanimity; the poem as a whole is highly derealised, and Coleridge refrains from the literal rendering of 'disgusting images' of suffering.

5 As Lockridge also claims, Coleridge's 'implicit metaphor for conscience is frequently Kant's: conscience is the internal tribunal' (123).

6 In Part II of this book, more will be said about the importance of love in Coleridge's thinking about education.

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5 Re-reading Culture and Addiction

1. In 'The Rhetoric of Drugs', Derrida, investigating the cultural and ideological implications of the idea of addiction, establishes a link between addiction, repetition, and writing through the logic of the *pharmakon*, and outlines the drug's controversial relationship to memory, anamnesis, and truth. Yet, he mentions De Quincey's *The Confessions of an English Opium Eater*, as the most important point of origin.
2. As was shown in the Introduction, this distinction appears first in *The Friend:*: 'Never can a society comprehend fully, and in its whole practical extent, the permanent distinction, and the occasional contrast, between cultivation and civilisation; never can it attain to a due insight into the momentous fact, fearfully as it has been, and even now is exemplified in a neighbour country, that a nation can never be a too cultivated but may easily become an over-civilised race' (*F* I., 494)
3. In Coleridge's time, 'alarm' and 'alarmism' were terms related to those who were terrified by the consequences of the French revolution. See: '*Alarm*, – the *tocsin* of delusion; plunging Englishmen into the calamities of war, under the falsest pretence of their liberties being endangered. [...] *Alarmists*, – miserable politicians, who have been dupes of the sound, terrified by the downfall [sic] of aristocracy in France; bewildered by apprehensions and fears for themselves, they have lost all sense of their duty towards the people, and have joined the conspiracy of courts against the interests of humanity'. These entries from Charles Pigott's 1795 *Political Dictionary* are quoted in Mark Jones (70).
4. To Derrida's enumeration of oral pleasures (i.e. 'oral consumption is not limited to any particular classified narcotic, but covers all sorts of nonclassified objects of compulsive eating or drinking, things like peanut butter, chocolate, coffee, liquor, and tobacco' ('The Rhetoric of Drugs', 33) it is possible to add the verbal pleasures of the mouth, such as gossiping.
5. See also: Andrew Benjamin: 'At play here is the fundamental distinction between *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis*. [...] The worker at the machine does not experience *Erfahrung*. Each moment is new. A repetition of the same (novelty). The experience (*Erlebnis*) at the machine is not even noticed as it enters consciousness. It is located within memory without having been the object of conscious recognition. Modernity causes the forgetting of experience. Benjamin's reference to Freud is precisely in these terms. He uses psychoanalysis to argue for the possibility of an event entering into psychic life without the subject being aware of the event' (132), '[M]odernity is articulated within the distinction between *Erlebnis* and *Erfahrung*. It is only in terms of this distinction that it is possible to, say, characterise the worker as "sealed off" from the possibility of a place within the continuity that is tradition, because he is 'sealed off' from *Erfahrung*' (134).
6. In this case, as Walter Benjamin remarks, 'there is no substantial difference between the concepts *Erinnerung* and *Gedächtnis*, as used in Freud's essay' (*Illuminations*, 158).

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7 In Andrew Benjamin's interpretation, Walter Benjamin's memory (*Erinnerung*) contains both remembrance and reminiscence.
8 Walter Benjamin is, of course, very critical of this new idea of progress and the role the *Bildungsroman* plays in justifying it: 'it [the *Bildungsroman*] bestows the most frangible justification on the order determining it' (87).
9 This practically means the nationalist discourse reconstructs history according to its own vested interests.
10 Anderson alludes here to Walter Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', where Benjamin famously claims that 'History is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled with the presence of the now' (233). In this key essay, Benjamin distinguishes between the history of (good) historical materialists, who can catch a grasp of 'time filled with the presence of the now', and the official history of (bad) historicists, who construct the narrative of history as a progress in homogenous empty time.
11 A can go shopping in London while B courts a woman in Spain, but one still imagines them as belonging to the same (textual/imaginary) community.
12 Elissa Marder starts out her analysis of addictions in 'Madame Bovary' by saying that if Flaubert's novel 'remains so timely, it is because its heroine, Emma, suffers from the quintessential malady of modernity, the inability to incorporate time into experience' (49). Mapping out Madame Bovary's different addictions, she draws, among others, on Riffaterre's influential claim that '*Madame Bovary* is a fiction about the dangers of fiction'. Riffaterre himself connects Madame Bovary's promiscuity to her addiction to novels, and his claim that the 'errant wife is stepping out of bounds when she secretly indulges in the reading of novels and in a daydreaming identification with the women who slink about the never-neverland of wish-fulfilment' (Marder, 51).
13 See: Redfield's Introduction to the *Addiction* issue of *diacritics*: 'the figure of the addict channels anxieties about the uncertain differences between machines and bodies; about the "nature" of technology; about the ways in which identities and desires get produced within a consumer economy that represents subjectivity both as inalienably natural and as compulsively iterative and artificial' (4).
14 In England, in the first half of the 19th century, the novel was relegated to the lowest part of the hierarchy of genres by such advocates of high culture as Wordsworth and Coleridge. As E. J. Clery claims, 'by the 1770s the lack of new and original contenders [who could have aspire to a success similar to that of Richardson, Fielding, or Sterne] was sending the novel into what appeared to be a terminal decline' (32). Coleridge's use of the term 'novel' does not, therefore, include those novels that we tend to label as the greatest achievements of the 18th century. Dr Johnson, for instance, still differentiates between two kinds of novels, the ones that 'exhibit life in its true state' and the ones that he calls 'romances': 'The works of fiction, with which the present generation seems more particularly delighted, are such as exhibit life in its true state, diversified only

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by accidents that daily happen in the world, and influenced by passions and qualities which are really to be found in conversing with mankind … Its province is to bring about natural events by easy means, and to keep up curiosity without the help of wonders: it is therefore precluded from the machines and expedients of heroic romance, and can neither employ giants to snatch away a lady from nuptial rites, nor knights to bring her back from captivity; it can neither bewilder its personages in deserts, nor lodge them in imaginary castles' (in Clery, 58). The first part of the argument contains the stems of what will later be called the realist novel, the kind of novel that was almost non-existent in Coleridge's time, whereas the second part refers to the romances Coleridge, at the turning of the century, calls novels. Although Horace Walpole's preferences are the precise opposite of Johnson's, he distinguishes in a similar manner between his own 'Gothic story', allegedly influenced by medieval romances, and the realistic 'romances' (i.e. novels) from which he wanted to distance himself: 'It was an attempt to blend the two kinds of romance, the ancient and the modern. In the former all was imagination and improbability: in the latter, nature is always intended to be, and sometimes has been, copied with success. Invention has not been wanting; but the great recesses of fancy have been damned up, by strict adherence to common life' (Second 'Preface' to *The Castle of Otranto*, 9)

15 Associated with 'the abstract and artificial methods of French sensationalist psychology' (Jackson, 76).

6 Craving for Novelties – Craving for Novels

1 Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* is evoked by Benjamin as the example *par excellence* of the *Bildungsroman*.
2 On the controversial relationship between memory and imagination in the 18th century, see, Komáromy.
3 Tom Furniss discusses the role of the protestant ethics of labour in his analysis of the ideologies emerging from and perpetuated by Burke's writings on the sublime (5).
4 In this sense, Coleridge's attack follows the pedagogical thrust of 'conduct books', which attempted to organise and control leisure time to prevent the 'sloth' that could give rise to all kinds of subversive activities, such as the potentially exciting indulgence in dreams triggered by the reading of romances. (See, among others, Armstrong.)
5 Coleridge's 1797 critique of Lewis's *The Monk* equally indicates the importance he attaches to the 'efforts of the mind', and to 'difficulties surmounted': 'No address is requisite to the performance of any design; and no pleasure therefore can be received from the perception of "difficulty surmounted"' ('Review').
6 For a lengthy discussion of this Coleridgean passage with a special focus on the metaphor of the 'camera obscura', see Christensen. Christensen also offers an account of the trope from Locke's 'An Essay Concerning

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Human Understanding' through Marx's *German Ideology* to W.J.T. Mitchell's discussion of the metaphor in *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology*. Christensen's discussion concerning Coleridge's hint at Locke's false ideology that turns everything upside down could be further complicated by Marx's metaphor of religion, and, consequently, of ideology itself, as the opium of the people.

7 Indeed, the novel was generally accused of unleashing those secret and prohibited passions that turned the readers into consuming and desiring machines; these passions were not only associated to bodily but also to political desires with subversive effects (Stevens, 24). Coleridge's attack on the devotees of circulating libraries thus inscribes itself into the general long 18th century context that attributed politically subversive effects to the Gothic, the prime attraction of these libraries. Hence, my focus is not so much on the content of these romances, which has received ample critical interest, but on their effects, the characteristics of their readers, and the way in which they are read.

8 Locke's description runs as follows: 'External and internal sensations are the only passages that I can find of knowledge to the understanding. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the windows by which light is let into this dark room. For, methinks, the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little opening left … to let in external visible resemblances, or some idea of things without; would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion it would very much resemble the understanding of a man'. Accessed 17 February 2015 at: http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/l81u/B2.11.html.

9 As Neil Hertz explains with regard to the experience of the Kantian mathematical sublime: the mind's 'blockage' at a 'vast scattering' is followed by 'the mind's exultation in its own rational faculties, in its ability to think a totality that cannot be taken in through the senses' (40).

10 *Shakespeare Criticism* I., 177.

11 As Michael Tomko equally argues, for Coleridge, the '"experimentative faith" of the reader, audience member, or inquirer is only "for the moment." [...] throughout this experimental trial, a reader never surrenders his or her power of disbelief or dissent. This power is suspended, but not relinquished. It remains under the control of the will' (245–246).

12 The relationship between the printed word and the dangerous crowd has been well established since the spread of the political pamphlets of the French Revolution.

13 According to Fulford, mesmerism associated with the Revolution and the power of revolutionary orators was a 'menacing political force', a matter of 'excessive and fanatical mass belief' ('Conducting the Vital Fluid', 57–59.)

14 As Vallins argues, 'fanaticism [...] is rather an image of heat or excitement voluntarily created by the interaction of weak or unfruitful minds. Whereas the enthusiast is fulfilled in the contemplation of what arises automatically from or within his mind, *the fanatic is effectively empty*, and

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can only find or have meaning in conjunction with others of his kind' (61, italics added).

15 Benjamin, as we have seen, establishes a more explicit connection between the modern subject's 'emptiness', 'empathy', and the 'crowd': as he writes, 'empathy is the nature of the intoxication to which [the traumatophile type] abandons himself in the crowd' (31), which allows for him to 'fill the hollow space created in him by [...] isolation with the borrowed – and fictitious isolation of strangers' (33).

16 'Not delusion (the surrender of reason to emotional sensations), but illusion ('the willing suspension of disbelief') is the proper engagement of the imagination' (Burwick, *Illusion*, 268).

7 He 'did not *write*, he *acted* poems'

1 'the Muse first of all inspires men herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration. For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not by art, but because they are inspired and possessed. And as the Corybantian revellers when they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric poets are not in their right mind when they are composing their beautiful strains: but when falling under the power of music and metre they are inspired and possessed; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers when they are under the influence of Dionysus but not when they are in their right mind. And the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves say; for they tell us that they bring songs from honeyed fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells of the Muses; they, like the bees, winging their way from flower to flower. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles'. (Plato, *Ion*)

2 Beer, 206.

3 On Coleridge, 'Kubla Khan', and the daemonic, see, Leadbetter (183–200).

4 'The Events and Characters of one Age, like the Strains in Music, recall those of another, and the variety by which each is individualised, not only gives a charm and poignancy to the resemblance, but likewise renders the whole more intelligible. [...] It is not from identity of opinions, or from similarity of events and outward actions, that a real resemblance in the radical character can be deduced.' (*F* II., 111)

5 On the political import of 'symbolic' reading, and interpretation in general, in *Lay Sermons* see also, Balfour.

6 We have to make a distinction between the haunting Spectres of Coleridge's conscience (as discussed in the first part), and the (somewhat more pleasurable, but sometimes no less dangerous) Spectra that are thematised in the present discussion. As Rei Terada puts it: 'Coleridge's generally pleasurable absorption in spectra stands in contrast to his terror

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of obsessive thoughts and ideas, memories, and dreams as opposed to daydreams. Although they may seem similar in that both seem epistemologically nearly useless – and what's worse, one may turn into the other – there is a strong distinction for Coleridge between spectra and these experiences, which he calls "spectr*es*." I believe the terminological distinction between spectra and spectres is intended by Coleridge: although their contrast is nowhere thematized in the *Notebooks*, I cannot find a single instance when he deviates from the pattern (and he was, as we know, fond of disambiguation). A *spectrum* (plural: *spectra*) is a knowing collaboration with the sensorium; a *spectre* (plural: *spectres*) seems to take place inside the self, lacks visual distance and often even visualizable attributes, and is involuntary. Spectres are unwelcome, intractable impositions that might be called internal objects or psychic facts' (*Looking Away*, 37).

7 'Disappointed, despondent, enraged, ceasing to think, yet continuing his brain on the stretch in solicitation of a thought; and gradually giving himself up to angry fancies, to recollections of past persecutions, to uneasy fears and inward defiances and floating images of the evil being, their supposed personal author' (*F* II., 120).

8 As he says in a letter dating from 1808: 'the practice of taking opium is dreadfully spread – throughout Lancashire and Yorkshire, it is the common dram of the lower order of people'. (*CL* 125–126)

9 The whole passage runs as follows: 'the understanding of the same symbol in a literal i.e. phaenomenal sense, notwithstanding the most earnest warnings against it, the most express declarations of the folly and danger of interpreting sensually what was delivered of objects super-sensual – this was the rank of wilding, on which "the prince of this world," the lust of power and worldly aggrandizement was enabled to graft, one by one, the whole branchery of papal superstition and imposture'. (*Ch & St*, 120)

10 Nicholas Halmi, in *Genealogy of the Romantic Symbol*, outlines the difference between the Coleridgean symbol and Luther's theory of consubstantiation as follows: 'When [Coleridge] proposes the concept of the symbol as a corrective to the doctrine of consubstantiation, he is implying that the Eucharist cannot be consubstantial with the body and blood of Christ *because* it is symbolic of them' (130). Meanwhile, Halmi also suggests that Coleridge regarded Lutheran hermeneutics and the Lutheran Eucharistic theology of consubstantiation as separate problems, while his conception of the Eucharist and his conception of the symbol were also different. This, together with Coleridge's claim that Luther was influenced by the Catholic superstitions of his age, would make it understandable why Coleridge attributes Luther's erroneous reading of the Bible to a specifically Catholic hermeneutics.

11 Jerome McGann influentially interprets the 'ancestral voices prophesying war' as an 'intervention' of history into Coleridge's 'escapist' dream (99).

12 'we shall be right in refusing to admit him [the poet] into a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason.[…] hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are

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the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State'. (*Republic*, Book X)

13 The Abyssinian Maid of the last stanza, as Paul Youngquist and Nigel Leask also seem to imply, can equally be read as a figure of the Orient, and, therefore, as a figure for the transport through opium to (artificial) paradises. (Leask, 'Kubla Khan and Orientalism', 1–22; Youngquist, *Monstrosities*).

14 See also, Perkins, *Romanticism and Animal Rights*, 180.

8 The 'habits of active industry' (AR, 49)

1 In this sense, Coleridge seems to repeat, with some considerable difference, what Stephen Bygrave sees as the central problem of Kant's idea of Enlightenment, namely, that '[i]t is possible to achieve as much freedom as the state will allow' (22).

2 In Aristiotelian ethics, as Almási argues, 'the world *ethos* is translated … as "habit" […] It concerns the individual [as opposed to the more social "custom"], it denotes the acquisition of virtue via repetitive practice. It also has strong connections with the result of repetition of the virtuous deed, because *habitus* as "mental constitution, character, disposition' is the Latin translation of the Greek "ἕξις", meaning "state", "disposition", "habit"' (Almási, 34–35). J. A. Smith also outlines in his introduction to Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* that 'Character, good or bad, is produced by what Aristotle calls "habituation," that is, it is the result of the repeated doing of acts which have a similar or common quality. Such repetition acting upon natural aptitudes or propensities gradually fixes them in one or other of two opposite directions, giving them a bias towards good or evil. Hence the several acts which determine goodness or badness of character must be done in a certain way, and thus the formation of good character requires discipline and direction from without. Not that the agent himself contributes nothing to the formation of his character, but that at first he needs guidance. The point is not so much that the process cannot be safely left to Nature, but that it cannot be entrusted to merely intellectual instruction. The process is one of assimilation, largely by imitation and under direction and control. The result is a growing understanding of what is done, a choice of it for its own sake, a fixity and steadiness of purpose. Right acts and feelings become, through habit, easier and more pleasant, and the doing of them a "second nature"' (10–11).

3 Also quoted by Chandler, *Wordsworth's Second Nature*, 338.

4 As Jackson notes: 'Wordsworth's understanding of habit as the ultimate ground of moral feeling has been described as deriving most significantly from Humean, and more specifically Burkean, reflections on how custom

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affects the way we feel, think, and behave as moral agents, that is in Burke's terms as living bearers of the traditionary relations of the past' (73).

5 Richard Barney has persuasively demonstrated how the educational model offered by Locke's treaties is reproduced by the 18th century English novel, anticipating the German *Bildungsroman*. Drawing a parallel between Locke's habit and Pierre Bourdieu's *habitus*, Barney argues that 'Locke's 'Custom' [a term Barney uses interchangeably with 'habit'] is the prime mechanism in forming a pupil's habitus, since it promises ultimately to combine the operations of the body with the rationality of the mind in an ideological disposition that is both partially self-aware and partly unreflective' (42). Barney calls Lockean habit an 'automatic reflex,' which, 'produced by "repeated Practice and the same Action done over and over again" (sec. 66), can support rational activity while a child's reasoning power remains immature' (41).

6 Indeed, Locke, like Coleridge, places education before instruction; in 'On the Conduct of the Understanding', he notes that the business of education [...] is not as I think to make them [the students] perfect in any of the sciences, but so open and dispose their minds as may best make them capable of any when they shall apply themselves to it' (62) .

7 See, Locke, 'On the Signification of Words', in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, III.ii.1.

8 In the same paragraph, Coleridge also underlines 'the advantages which [...] language alone [...] presents to the instructor of impressing modes of intellectual energy so constantly [...] as to secure in due time the formation of a second nature' (*BL* II., 144), that is, language alone, by conveying powerful ways of thinking, can help the educator form good habits (i.e, 'a second nature').

9 As Vallins claims in a different context, Coleridge describes 'thought as arising from physical processes of which we are unconscious' (25).

10 'How to guard against the herd of promiscuous Readers?' (*F* I., 51).

11 *Selected Marginalia*, I., 55.

12 That is, when he asks whether his Will is Good, i.e., originating in the Divine Will, or Evil, as the 'Will of Man', originating in 'the Evil Ground we call Original Sin'. Coleridge calls the original sin a '*Mystery*', a fact we cannot comprehend (*AR*, 288). On evil, see also Jeffrey Barbeau: 'In *Aids to Reflection*, Coleridge unabashedly claims that evil not only exists, but also has a definable origin: 'The Man of sober mind, who seeks for truths that possess a moral and practical interest, is content to be *certain*, first, that Evil must have had a beginning, since otherwise it must either be God, or a co-eternal and co-equal Rival of God; both impious notions, and the latter foolish to boot' (256). Agency is paramount. In Augustinian fashion, he maintains that sin is rooted in the evil Will of the individual: 'A Sin is an Evil which has its ground or origin in the Agent, and not in the compulsion of Circumstances' (266). If the control of circumstances determines evil, then evil cannot be identified as sin, 'such *evil* is not *sin*; and the person who suffers it, or who is the compelled instrument of its infliction on others, may feel *regret*, but cannot feel *remorse*' (267).

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Likewise, an act of sin cannot be reduced to one link in a chain of causes: 'For if it be Sin, it must be *original*: and a State or Act, that has not its origin in the will, may be calamity, deformity, disease, or mischief; but a *Sin* it cannot be' (271). Evil originates in the human will' (19).

13 As an example, he goes on to evoke 'the *character* of Iago, who is represented as now ascribing one and now another and again a third motive for his conduct, each a different motive, and all alike the mere fictions of his own restless nature, distempered by a keen sense of his own intellectual superiority and a vicious habit of assigning the precedence or primacy to the intellectual over the moral' (*OM*, 34). In Iago's case, motives are mere fictions, for his character is determined by his 'restless nature' and the 'vicious habit' of preferring the intellectual over the moral.

14 I ascribe to Vallins' claim that in Coleridge's thinking, there is a 'a sense of the inseparableness of thought and feeling, and of mental and physical, which is closely allied to his later interest in idealist efforts to transcend these oppositions' (25).

15 Cf, Richardson; Bygrave

16 Nancy Armstrong's *Desire and Domestic Fiction* contains a persuasive argument on the ways in which these writings (moralising tales for both girls *and* boys) contributed to the emergence of the image of the 'good' and 'honest' English gentleman/husband (as opposed to the dominating, aristocratic male, associated with the French) (108–134).

17 On Coleridge's advocacy of imaginative tales, see, Richardson.

18 As Lockridge also argues, quoting from Coleridge's *Notebooks*: 'One should ask not what C[oleridge] has *done?* or what S[outhey] *done?* – but -- … what *is* C. or S. on the whole?' (*N*, 1, 1605, in Lockridge, 35).

9 The Habit of 'abstruse research'

1 On Coleridge's crypto-Kantianism at the time of composing the entry, see, Class.

2 Modernity, according to Walter Benjamin is also characterised by the loss of the aura of the *natural* object: The '[e]xperience of the aura […] rests on the transposition of a response common in human relationships to the relationship between the inanimate or natural object and man. The person we look at, or who feels that he is looked at, looks at us in turn. To perceive the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the ability to look at us in return' (*Illuminations*, 184).

3 Hamilton argues that the phrase 'abstruse research' is there to 'diagnose the *distortions of* a *temperament* which uses abstraction in that way, not to attack abstraction as such' (52, italics added).

4 For Coleridge 'feeling was [...] an indispensable part of the reflective process, both animating or connecting our ideas' (Vallins, 67). See also, Berkeley: 'Coleridge repeatedly depicts metaphysics and thought in general as dangerous and unwholesome: the "quick-silver mines of abstruse Metaphysics"' (Berkeley, 11); or Paul Hamilton: 'The place of this opinion

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within the drama of the poem, "Dejection: An Ode", in which it appears, is arguably to diagnose the distortions of a temperament which uses abstraction in that way, not to attack abstraction as such. Neil Vickers has argued in any case that if the "abstruse researches" are biographically understood, they probably refer to Coleridge's altruistic attempt to help his friend Tom Wedgwood alleviate a fatal nervous condition'. (52)

5 See also, Schmid, who argues that Coleridge was unable to feel pleasure at the time of composing 'Dejection: An Ode', because of his opium addiction (175–176).

Conclusion

1 See, McFarland. Concerning Coleridge's complicated relationship to Spinoza, see, Halmi, 'Coleridge's Ecumenical Spinoza', 188–207.

2 David Vallins, quoting this same passage from *Biographia*, explains Coleridge's take on mystique enthusiasm by contemporary theories of melancholy (53), and Coleridge's aversions to 'mental excitement [which] may also produce physical agitation, resulting in a tendency to mistake the sensations of the body and the images of fancy for revelations' (54). He eventually resorts to *Aids to Reflection* (387) to conclude that 'the central facts about mysticism are that it is at once a pretence to knowledge and a consequence of anomalous sensations. Idiosyncrasy, diversion or perversion from the tenets of true religion or philosophy, seems to be the object of Coleridge's criticism' (53). Putting this statement next to the conclusion of 'The Eolian Harp' may also shed light on the reasons why Coleridge rejects the Boehmean insights implied in the 'one Life' theme, which equally seems to be a 'perversion from the tenets of true religion or philosophy' as expressed in the coda.

3 See also, Dart, 82.

4 Coleridge, who was adamant on reading thoughtfully and attentively, did not pay attention while copying this passage, and his inattention has indeed lead to confusion: critics disagree as to how to interpret the passage. Kathleen Wheeler, for instance, interprets the dependent clause as referring to the devotee (87.) Coleridge, generally, has problems with the semi-colon: although he advocates attentive and thoughtful reading, he bases his appraisal of Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* on Defoe's use of a semicolon that is simply not there. See, Rothman.

5 This statement was confirmed by Professor Mays in a personal e-mail correspondence.

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