

**BHARTRHARI ON THE INDIVISIBILITY
OF
SINGLE-WORD EXPRESSIONS AND SUBORDINATE SENTENCES**

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The aim of Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of language is to explain the cognition accomplished by expressions in usual communication. By the term 'expression' Bhartṛhari means the unit of language which illuminates itself (its real nature) and the meaning as well on the basis of which communications are accomplished. It as such is a unit of communication comprising utterances, signs, symbols, gestures etc. as instrumental in the manifestation of real language (sphoṭa) and the sphoṭa as well which when manifested by them reveals itself and the meaning as well. Expression is not confined to tokens we utter, write or read because communication is accomplished by it. It is the differences of tokens used that the vitality or otherwise of an expression is decided; though Vaiyākaraṇas give importance to the tokens popularly used in ordinary usages. An expression is expressed in the mind of a speaker before communicating through utterances and reveals meaning when it is revealed in the mind of the audience through hearing and manifesting sphoṭa. The utterances/tokens by proxy are called expressions. According to his philosophy there is no cognition without śabda (language) and all cognition is cognition shot through and through by śabda.¹ Śabda, for him, is indivisible-meaning-revealing unit i.e., sphoṭa which is manifested by verbal noises. The audible verbal noises are only instruments or tools in manifesting the sphoṭa which when manifested, reveals itself and its meaning is revealed non-differently by it. It is through verbal noises that the speaker communicates the language and the meaning (revealed in his mind by it). The audible noises when heard manifest the meaning-revealing śabda in the mind of the hearer.

· Sphoṭa, manifested by tokens, reveals itself as vācaka (expressor) and the

vācya (meaning) it revealed non-differently by it. The cognition revealed by the expression and the expression revealing cognition both in his philosophy are non-different and indivisible complete unit. An expression is indivisible because it is used as a whole without the consideration of whole and part and indivisibly reveals the meaning in the mind of the audience. Meaning is also indivisible because meaning is awareness by expression and as such there is no question of division of whole and part in awareness. By indivisible cognition we mean the cognition of meaning retiring future expectancy involved in the completion of a unit meaning. For Bhartṛhari the complete and meaning-revealing unit is inner and ubiquitously given real-language (vākya sphoṭa). Discrete words independent of sentence cannot be termed as expression because they do not cause clearly specified cognition of meaning. I may utter the discrete word 'dog' but what does it mean? Does it convey any specified meaning e.g., 'it is dog' or 'A dog is running' etc.? Certainly not, but if it does, then the expectancy regarding the query 'what of dog?' is not accomplished and as the expectancy of complete meaning is not exhausted by the use of word 'dog' independently of sentence, it cannot be termed a sentence. Sentence as such is indivisible, inner meaning-revealing unit but for the sake of analysis and grammar it is explained as an indivisible unit comprising indivisible parts explained syntactically as letters, words, sentences which we utter, read or write for communicating or which stand by proxy for the inner indivisible sentence given in the mind. Sentence for Bhartṛhari is sphoṭa as it reveals itself and the meaning as well. The long or short of size of the sentence-token is not a proper criterion required for the definition of a sentence. He defines sentence from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition of complete indivisible-meaning. By the term 'sentence' we mean as indivisible, inner and meaning revealing unit i.e. sphoṭa. It is not confined to token we read, write or speak. A sentence-token is only instrumental in the manifestation of inner sentence which when manifested by tokens or gestures etc; reveals its own nature and the meaning as well. This unit (sphoṭa) may be manifested by any sort of tokens i.e., letter, word or sentence-token and may not be manifested by a large quantity of tokens. Cognition can not be accomplished if the inner sentence is not manifested and revealed in the mind. It is ubiquitously given and is known as expression when it is manifested. It reveals both - its own self and the specific meaning of it as well. Extinction of the expectancy of complete meaning is the criterion on the basis of which he defines sentence as complete, indivisible and specific meaning

- revealing - unit. If the expectancy of the complete meaning is retired even by a single letter or word, they in that case function as an expression. If the expectancy is not removed even by a sentence, that sentence as Bhartṛhari conceives is not different from independent words. In his philosophy discrete words independently of sentence do not denote expression. How can a unit not revealing clear specified meaning be termed expression? If it conveys a specified meaning, then in that case it can not be construed as an independent word but always as a single word expression. We are using the term 'sentence' and 'expression' in the same sense of *sphoṭa*. Expressions are not confined to utterances, gestures or signs we speak, read or write. It as such is inner indivisible unit of a language which reveals itself and reveals meaning nondifferently in the mind. It is the expressor of a complete meaning i.e. a unitary idea exhausting further expectancy involved in the completion of meaning. Usually *Vaiyākarna*s take indivisible complete sentence as the expression. It is the expression as it expresses not only its own self but the meaning as well. If it will not reveal itself first its meaning can not be revealed. They do not accept a meaning without a word. How can a *Vācya* (expressed) be possible without a *Vācaka* (expressor)? The expressor of a complete sense is termed as sentence. Now the question is what does Bhartṛhari mean by single word 'expression'? By single word expression Bhartṛhari does not take words acquired by grammatical analysis of an indivisible sentence as expressor. Expression is always the unit expressing complete unitary-meaning and in case complete meaning is revealed even by the use of single words they are also expressions.² Expression is not a series of the marks on the paper or utterances heard but a complete meaning - revealing unit. How can a single word be taken as an expression accomplishing the complete meaning to be expressed by a sentence, is a question the interpretation of which involves serious controversies among *Padavādins* (those who accept word independently of a sentence as the real unit of communication) and *Vākyavādins* (those who accept indivisible sentence as the real language). Though both of them accept single word expressions yet their interpretation on the cognition by single word expression differs. The present discussion on the problem is confined to the interpretation of *anvitābhidhānavādi Mīmāṃsakas* and *akhandavākyavādin Vaiyākaraṇas* in general and that of Bhartṛhari in particular.

We have to point out that *anvitābhidhānavādi Mīmāṃsakas* and

Vaiyākaraṇas have interpreted Ākhyāta (verb) as sentence while Naiyāyikas have explained nāma (nominal word) as sentence. The present discussion is not an addition to the discussion on pada as a sentence or on sentence as pada. It aims at explaining the concept of single word expression used for communication. An account of controversy of Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas on the problem of single word expression as Bhartṛhari has presented in his Vākyapadīyam is given as follows:

For Vaiyākaraṇas, a word is an expression if the cognition of complete meaning retiring expectancy is accomplished by it. For example, if some one asks 'Rāmaḥ kim karoti?' (What does Rāma do?) and the other replies 'pacati' (cooks), similarly, if some other asks 'kah pacati?' (who is cooking) and the hearer replies 'Rāmaḥ', the complete meaning is revealed only by the words 'pacati' and 'Rāmaḥ' respectively. The hearer's expectancy for the meaning is extinct only by the single word expression 'pacati' and 'Rāmaḥ' and that is why they are distinguished not as discrete words but as single-word expression. Does it mean to say that the word 'pacati' (cooks) is expressive of 'Rāmaḥ pacati' (Rāma is cooking) and so does the word Rāmaḥ expressive of 'Rāmaḥ pacati' (Rāma is cooking)? From the point of view of akhaṇḍavākyavādins it appears contradictory to accept that a word expresses a sentential meaning because they admit cognitive difference between a sentence meaning and a word meaning. From the point of view of padavādins also it apparently appears confusing to accept a word expressive of sentential meaning because they accept sentential meaning as association of word meanings. In order to avoid the confusion Anvitābhīdhānavādi assumes that words express mutually related meaning though they are expressive of their own independent meaning also. Vākyavādin contends that a word independently of sentence is not an expression and that independently of a sentence, it denotes universal by which no communication can be accomplished. For example, if some one without a context utters, 'dog', the expectancy of the hearer regarding 'what of dog' is not exhausted by the word uttered and thus no communication is accomplished. But if some one asks 'who is there' and the other replies 'dog', the word 'dog' is used there as an expression as complete meaning 'there is a dog' is accomplished by it. Now the problem is : if all meaning is the meaning of a word (śabda) how can the meaning 'there is dog' will be explained to be expressed by the word 'dog' which is discretely expressive of only 'dog' universal and is not of 'there is

dog'? How can the cognition 'there is dog' will be explained as that revealed by the word 'dog'? In order to explain these problems we have to observe the specific matter of facts mentioned by Bhartrhari in his *Vākyapadīyam*.

A single word ākhyāta (verb), for Vaiyākaraṇas, is a sentence if it has a fixed agent and accessory. The accomplishment of complete sense by a single word expression like 'verb' is explained by Bhartrhari on the basis of cognition of complete meaning³. For example, 'Devo Jalam varṣati' (the deity rains water) is cognized by the use of the word 'varṣati' because the word 'varṣati' having a fixed agent (the deity) and the object (water) functions as an expression. Being fixed, the object and agent of the action (varṣati) are also cognized by the word 'varṣati' itself. As the action 'varṣati' can not be possible without an agent and object, the agent 'deity' and the object 'water' are also cognized by the verb 'varṣati', and thus, the word 'varṣati' is an expression. In other words, the whole specified meaning 'Devo Jalam Varṣati' is the meaning expressed by the single word uttered (Varṣati). Therefore, it is a sentence. Mīmāṃsakas put a host of arguments against Vaiyākaraṇas theory of single word expression. A brief survey of Bhartrhari's discussion may be given as follows:

If the agent and the object are meanings without words uttered and if 'there is no meaning without a word is acceptable to Vaiyākaraṇas', how these meanings for which the words are not uttered can be said to be the meaning at all? Does a meaning without a word is acceptable? If yes, how can it be expressed and known without word (expressor)? If no, then the word must be accepted as the expressor of sentential meaning and that will go against the fundamental position of Vaiyākaraṇas. In this situation Mīmāṃsakas contend that Vaiyākaraṇas have either to give up their theory that all meaning is meaning of a word or to abandon the concept of single word expression. Can the word uttered be accepted as a cause of cognition of the meaning of word unuttered? If it is said that the complete meaning by a single word expression is cognized by implication or by imposition of the meaning of the words unuttered then indirectly cognized meanings may not be taken as the meaning revealed by words uttered but as the meaning cognized by inference. Vaiyākaraṇas answer the above objection of Mīmāṃsakas by saying that if a 'verb' having an object and agent implied in it is used and if they are also cognized by implication on the basis of the meaning revealed by the verb, the 'verb' then is called a sentence expressing complete meaning. It is considered that as 'verb' implied with the

meanings of an object and agent in the mind is spoken, complete meaning is cognized as expressed by the 'verb' only. Mīmāṃsakas object to this position of Vaiyākaraṇas by considering it as futile to take a single word 'verb' as expressor (grahita) of the meaning of other words unuttered. Mīmāṃsakas contend that if a complete meaning is accepted as the meaning of a single word, the question of relation between different sorts of word nominative, accusative, qualitative etc., will not be explained and therefore Mīmāṃsakas say that in such cases the complete meaning is cognized by śrūtārthāpatti. For Mīmāṃsakas a complete sentential meaning, in such cases, is cognized, on the basis of addition of meanings of the words unuttered by inferences made on the basis of the meaning known by the word uttered so as to accomplish the complete meaning. According to them, the word 'dvāram (door) when spoken is heard and for what purpose the word 'door' is spoken - for closing or for opening - is approached or inferred through the context of the meaning for which the word 'door' is spoken. It is, they say, inferred by the meaning of the word 'door' that if it is a cold time, the word 'door' is spoken for shutting (Pidhehi) but if it is a summer day the word is spoken for its opening (udghāṭaya) Refuting Mīmāṃsaka's interpretation, Bhartṛhari says that meaning is not as inferred entity but a being or idea non-differently revealed by 'śabda'. Meaning for Vaiyākaraṇas is the meaning of 'śabda'. On this ground Bhartṛhari explains the problem of single word expression in two ways :-

1. The form of word-meaning is dependent on the sentential- meaning and that convention is observed only with sentential meaning. Thus, the single word spoken for communicating meaning manifests the complete sphoṭa in the mind of the hearer and the complete meaning is revealed by the sphoṭa manifested by the single word uttered and in such a circumstance the single word serves as an expression expressing a complete sense.

2. The meaning of the word spoken is implied or imposed on the meaning of the word unspoken. Mīmāṃsakas, objecting to this argument of Vaiyākaraṇa, say that if the meaning of the unspoken word is accepted to be accomplished by the meaning of the word spoken then the question of cognition of a meaning without a word arises which goes not only against the Vaiyākaraṇas theory of 'a fixed word denotes a fixed meaning' but also against their fundamental assumption that all meaning is the meaning of 'śabda'. Vaiyākaraṇas say that a single word if implied by the verb is to be considered as a sentence or an

expression (Vākyam tadapi manyante Yatpadam - Carita Kriyam). Mīmāṃsakas find it inconsistent to accept the cognition of complete meaning of a sentence only by a word uttered without bringing the words not uttered. Vaiyākaraṇas, criticising the position of Mīmāṃsakas assert that if complete meaning is cognized by bringing the words unuttered, there is no need of teaching the sūtra 'Kriyārthopapadasya ca karmaṇi Sthāninaḥ'⁴. (If there is a Kriyārthaka kriyā or if the verb is used for an action (expressed) intending an other action, the suffix 'tumun' is applied with the secondary word (accusative) associated with that verb and when it is dropped due to certain reason, dative case is taught with the word expressive of the object. For example, the word 'phalāni' in the expression 'phalāni āhartum jāti' is the object and according to the fixed rule accusative case is applied with an object but as the verb 'āhartum' is used for the action 'jāti' (goes) the suffix 'tumun' is applied with the word 'āhartum' and is dropped due to certain reason. In case of dropping of the verb 'āhartum' dative case is taught with the object by the 'sūtra-kriyārthopadsya ca karmaṇi sṭhānāni', and , thus, the expression 'phalebhyojāti' is formed. In such cases, the use of the dative case expresses the meaning of the word 'āhartum' also which is not uttered. Objecting to this interpretation of Vaiyākaraṇas, Mīmāṃsakas say that if the spoken word conveys the meaning of the word not spoken, there should not be any need of teaching the sūtra 'Kriyārtho '.....''. For example, if the meaning of the word 'niḥ' is conveyed by the word krānta, what is the need of using the word 'niḥ' in the expression 'Niṣkrānta'? Answering the above objection of Mīmāṃsakas, Bharṭṛhari says that 'Phalebhyojāti' is an expression separate from the expression 'phalāni āhartum jāti' and they express their own meanings. Similarly, the word 'niḥ' of the 'niṣkrānta' and the suffix word 'niḥ' are different. As they are similar and alike they are mistaken to be the same. In these cases, Bharṭṛhari suggests⁵ that their meanings for the sake of brevity or easiness is decided by the factors like context etc. Easiness (laghutā) is observed only in studies and not in communications, and hence, it is taken that the meaning of the word 'niḥ' is also conveyed by the word 'krānta'. From the point of view of the theory of śrutārthāptti, Mīmāṃsakas consider it unjustified to accept the cognition of what is not uttered by what is uttered because the nāma-word, if uttered, is expressive of an accomplished character while the verb-word is expressive of non-accomplished character. How can a non-accomplished action be the cause of what is accomplished in character and vice-versa? They add, the meaning of the

non-uttered is accomplished by śrutārthāpatti. By śrutārthāpatti Mīmāṃsakas hold the accomplishment of the meaning of the word unuttered by the inference made on the basis of the meaning of what is uttered in order to retire the expectancy of a complete meaning. Vaiyākaraṇas, disagreeing with the views of Mīmāṃsakas, assume that the meaning is always a meaning revealed by the word (sphoṭa). As fatness (Pinatva) is not seen without taking meal, the meaning 'meal taken' is cognized by implication to fatness, similarly the meaning of the word not spoken is also cognized as the complete sphoṭa in those cases is revealed by the single word uttered and the complete sentential meaning is revealed by the complete sphoṭa.⁶ They accept that the inner, indivisible sphoṭa is revealed even without any utterances and in each case meaning is taken by them as the meaning revealed by language (sphoṭa).

According to Bhartṛhari⁷, if śrutārthāpatti theory of Mīmāṃsakas is taken in view, there may be four possibilities of bringing together of the meaning of the words not spoken.

- 1) First the word unspoken is brought in the the proximity of the word heard and then the meaning of the implied word (upacaritaśabda) is associated with the meaning of the word uttered.
- 2) The word not spoken is brought in by the meaning of the word heard.
- 3) The meaning of the word not spoken is brought in by the word heard.
- 4) The meaning of the word not spoken is brought in by the meaning of the word spoken.

Criticising these four possibilities of cognition of a complete meaning by a single word, Bhartṛhari says that the first of the above four possibilities is not proper because the word brought in by the proximity of the word heard can not be explained. The word spoken is heard and the word not spoken is unheard and as such there is no question of proximity between a heard and & non- heard. The second alternative is also not justified because there is no proximity between the word heard and the meaning brought in by disposition. Similar is the case with the third alternative. There will be no proximity with the word brought in and the word heard and similar is the case with their meaning because the word unuttered will be brought in after the cognition of the meaning of the word heard and then the meaning of the word brought in will be associated with the meaning

of the word heard and cognized first. In such a case the meaning acquired in the last will not be more than imagination.

The fourth of the alternatives is also not acceptable to Vaiyākaraṇas because they believe no meaning without a word. An expressed itself is not an expressor at the same time. How can an expressed (Vācya) be the expressor (vācaka) of an other expressed (vācāya)?

Mīmāṃsaka refuting Vaiyākaraṇas position may say if the verb 'pithehi' not spoken (or destroyed) is taken to be brought in by the word 'dvāram' (the word in accusative case expressive of an object) which is only spoken then there will be a case of simultaneous presence of 'verb' and 'object'. It is contradictory to accept that meanings of accomplished and of a non-accomplished character are simultaneously expressed by the same word and in that case the problem as to whom should one take the primary meaning of the word (to the verb brought in or to the object spoken) arises. It is not justified to accept the 'verb' brought in as primary because as a rule the meaning of word heard is considered primary and to accept the object as primary is not justified because a 'verb' for Vaiyākaraṇas is the primary word in a sentence. Both of the meanings of the word 'Dvāram' may not be cognized simultaneously as primary because one (the action pithehi or udaghātaya) is imposed while the other object (door=dvāram) is expressed. Answering the above objection of Mīmāṃsakas, Bhartrhari, from the side of Vaiyākaraṇas, says that in cases the nāma (nominal-word in the example the object=dvāram) is brought in by the verb, the verb' functions for the nāma also and so is the case when nāma word is brought in, it has the form of verb also and then on the basis of association and disassociation (anvaya-vyatireka), their primary and secondary meanings are known distinctly. Vaiyākaraṇas accept⁸ that there are some words which are of the form of nāma and verb also. For example, word 'ajāpayah' in the expression 'Ajāpayah pitvā śatrūn' occupies both the forms of 'verb' and of the 'nāma' also. The word 'ajāpayah' is derived by \sqrt{ji} , and the form 'jayati' is taught by the \sqrt{ji} and, then, in the sense of incentive (preraṇā) the suffix 'nyant' is added to form the word ajāpayah' which means 'made victorious'. If it is taken to be derived as 'ajāyāḥ payah' it conveys a different meaning "the milk of the goat". Now, which one of the two meanings of the word 'ajāpayah' should be taken in use? is decided by means of association and disassociation made on the basis of contextual factors.

Mīmāṃsakas may put a host of arguments against the Vaiyākaraṇas position mentioned above. Are all words conveying finished character are derived from roots or are they indeclinables (not derived by roots)? Are the words 'nāma' and 'ākhyāta' not separate or are the words conveying accomplished character made out of roots? Have they (nominal words) no meaning separate from the meaning of roots? If they are not different, then on what ground it is said that 'being' is primary meaning of the nāma words and 'becoming' is the primary meaning of ākhyāta words? If the verb is taken separate from nāma, only then it can be said that 'becoming' is the primary meaning of verb and likewise 'being' is the primary meaning of nāma. If the word is accepted as that having all forms - nāma and verb simultaneously, how can their primary and secondary significations be decided? Answering these objections, Bhartṛhari says that the sentence is inner, indivisible (Buddhiṣṭha) and real unit of language, and that, all individual words are indivisible parts of sentence and thus, the parts uttered in some uses manifest, the indivisible sphoṭa form which complete meaning is revealed. The primary and secondary meanings of a word are determined analytically on the basis of the word uttered because the word is uttered with the consideration of primary or central meaning of the expression. The primary logic of an expression lies there with the manifestation of the sphoṭa from which meaning is revealed. If the sphoṭa is revealed even by a letter uttered, the complete meaning of the sphoṭa is cognized which extincts the expectancy for a complete meaning.

Mīmāṃsakas may argue if the sentence is inner indivisible unit and only for the specific purpose of making the inner indivisible understandable to ignorants, it is artificially divided into different kinds of words or alternatively, if the indivisible is linked with word-meaning only for ordinary practice, then the question arises; what is the need of studies like grammar? It is sufficient to accept it just as a matter of ordinary practice, and, hence, all studies in this regard are useless. Answering this objection, Bhartṛhari says that śabda is ubiquitously given as inner-indivisible sentence and a pada (word) is acquired by grammatical analysis of it. Stepping from words to sentences is an easy means for understanding an indivisible and for the easiness (Lāghava) the studies like grammar etc. are needed. Mīmāṃsakas may further argue as to how the ordinary persons know that, that is the meaning of that śabda? Answering the problem Vaiyākaraṇas say that śabda is eternally related with its meaning which is known

by the observation of the use of it by the elders. It is not true to say that ordinary persons take śabda as divided into words and words into roots and suffixes and then synthesizing the meanings of roots and suffixes they use the words for communicating. Taking this matter of fact into consideration Vaiyākaraṇas do not feel a need for assuming anything 'alaukika' (transcendental) other or more than the sentence as real unit of communication. Sentence as sphoṭa is not an ontological being but a cognitive being. It is cognized as revealed by itself when it is manifested by utterances/tokens, gestures etc. The ontological being is accepted by inference as ontological substratum of the cognition of it but so far as cognition is concerned sentence is known as being of awareness which reveals itself and the meaning as well.

On the basis of the observations made above, it may be concluded that the cognition of meaning in usual communication is accomplished not by words but by sentences and if it is accomplished even by single word uttered, in that case the meaning cognized is taken as complete meaning of indivisible sphoṭa which, in those cases is manifested by that token. In one line, it can be said that a single word, for Bharṭṛhari, is a sentence if a verb is implied with or if the complete sphoṭa is manifested by it. The uttered word serves only as instrumental in the manifestation of sphoṭa and the meaning is inevitably revealed by the sphoṭa which when manifested by utterances reveals itself and as the meaning as well.

On Subordinate Sentences

While discussing the issues of sentence Bharṭṛhari has considered the meaning of subordinate sentences which are dependent on other sentence for conveying complete unitary meaning. By subordinate sentence Bharṭṛhari means a sentence the meaning of which does not satisfy the expectancy for a complete meaning and which for conveying a complete meaning is dependent on a complete expression. As subordinate sentences themselves are not complete meaning revealing units, they are comparable to the single-word expressions. As clear and distinct specified meaning is not revealed discretely by them, for complete meaning they are dependent on a complete sentence. Bharṭṛhari says: whenever there is a confusion regarding the clear meaning by a subordinate sentence, the meaning of it is decided on the basis of evidential sentence (linga)

to be found elsewhere in the śāstras like Veda etc.⁹ For example, by the expression 'āktāḥ Sarkarā Upadadhāti (wet pebbles should be placed on the altar) one may have the expectancy as to what liquid should the pebbles be wetted with and the statement 'tejo vaighṛtam (Ghee (refined butter) is the brilliance) is taken as evidential statement on the basis of which it is decided that 'the pebbles should be wetted with refined butter'. A complete sentence according to Bharṭhari is an independent unit which reveals an independent complete meaning. As subordinate sentences, though they appear to be sentences, are not discretely capable of revealing complete meaning exhausting expectancy for a unit meaning their treatment is not different from that of single word expression. As regards single word expression, it has already been discussed in previous pages.

Two or more than two Related Sentences Partake The Unit Sentences¹⁰

This issue is actually related to Bharṭhari's discussion on how two sentences - the rule sentence and the exception sentence form one complete sense. There are chiefly two sorts of sūtras (sentences) used in Pāṇinian Grammar. They are rule sentences or general rules and exception sentences or particular rules. A rule according to the interpretation 'Prakalpyacāpavāda-
viṣayam at śargōbhi niviśate' is that in which its exception is dropped to form a general rule. For example the suffix 'an' is taught with the root if the object (Karma - accusative case) is a secondary word (Upāpada) as we find in the sentence 'Kumbham Karoti Kumbhakāraḥ' (Kumbhakāra is he who makes pots). The word Kumbham (pot) is an object, a secondary word and hence suffix 'an' with 'Kṛ' is applied to form the word Khumbhakāraḥ. Similarly the words svarṇakāraḥ etc., are accomplished by general rule. Taking the general rule into consideration it may be asked that there should be the application of suffix 'an' with the word 'go' (cow) as it is an upapada (accusation) in the expression 'go dadāti'. To this Bharṭhari says that on account of exception sentence (apavāda sūtra) āto nupasarge kaḥ¹¹ if object is a different upapada (different from accusation suffix 'ka' with akārānanta) roots is applied and then the 'ka' is changed for 'e'. Thus, by rule suffix 'n' is applied with the word in accusative case and by exception suffix 'an' is replaced by suffix 'ka' which is changed for 'e' as we find in the formation of words like godaḥ, dhandah etc.

According to the rule 'para nityāntarangayavadanāmottarottarāvaliyah' the exception sentences are stronger than rule sentence and the stronger delimits the weaker. As per the sūtra, the factors mentioned in succeeding sequence are considered gradually stronger than the factors precedent in the sequence and the exception sentence being higher in the succession are taken as the limiter of the rule or precept. The general rule that suffix 'añ' is applied if the object is a secondary word, is limited by the exception and thus the suffix 'ka' is applied on the place of 'añ'. The rule and exception thus form one complete sentence expressive of a complete unit meaning. In order to explain the theory that rule and exception sentence form one complete sentence Bharṭṛhari gives the example from usual usage. The sentence Brāhmaṇānām dadhi dīyatām Māṭharam Vinā.¹² (all Brāhmins except Māṭhara be given sour milk) is a complete one sentence comprising a rule sentence - All Brāhmins be given sour - milk and an exception sentence - except Māṭhara(who is concerned with curd).

The fact of cognition of complete sentential meaning by more than one dependent sentence may be interpreted with the help of the example given above in following three ways.¹³

1. There are two sentences - rule and exception. Out of them exception sentence being mighty delimits the former to form a single complete sentence conveying complete meaning. In the above example, "All Brāhmins be served sour milk" is a rule sentence which is equally applicable to Māṭhara also but the exception sentence 'except Māṭhara' delimits the force of the rule sentence, and, thus, the unitary meaning 'All Brāhmins except Māṭhara (who is concerned with curd be served sour - milk is cognized).

2. Rule and exception sentences jointly convey the single complete meaning. In the above example the meaning 'All Brāhmin except Māṭhara be served sour - milk' is cognized jointly by the two sentences - all Brāhmins should be served sour milk - rule and 'except Māṭhara' - exception.

3. According to some the two-rule and exception - sentences even if they have different verbs (tin) and so appear to be different sentences, yet being related are combined together to form one sentence having a single principal verb. In the above example, there is only one principal verb 'be served' (dīyatām) and, thus, the sentences 'all Brāhmis except Māṭhara be served' are synthesized together to form a single complete sentence conveying complete unitary meaning.

In all the three sorts of interpretations mentioned above, the complete meaning is cognized by the accomplishment of unitary form (ekavākyatā) of the two sentences and this accomplishment of unitariness (ekavākyatā) of sentences is known because of their mutual expectancy in expressing a complete meaning.

Explaining the unitariness (ekavākyatā) of two related sentences - rule and exceptions - Bhartṛhari says that the rule (niyam) and exception (pratiṣedha) are injunctions applicable to all instances in general. If there is a certain given rule only then exception is taught to delimit the given injunction (given to all in general). For example, in the expression 'All except Saurabha go out', all the students of a class including Saurabha are commanded to go out first - is a given position and then the given position is barred at least for Saurabha by the exception sentence 'Saurabha is not allowed to go out'.

Explaining the issue in detail the commentator Puṅjarāja says that 'Arthavadadhāturapratyayaḥ Prāti-padikam'¹⁴ (The meaningful unit which is neither root nor suffix is termed prātipadika) is a given general rule for defining the prātipadikas and then to identify compounds as prātipadika the special rule - 'Kṛttaddhita Samāsāṣca'¹⁵ is taught. It may be argued from the side of Mīmāṃsakas that if prātipadika sanjñā is already taught by the Sūtra 'arthavadha-turpratayayah' which is prohibited by the sūtra 'Kṛttadhita samāsāṣca', then the rule and exception will be contradictory to each other. They may say that both of the sentences are independently expressive or their own meanings, and, thus, in the absence of one being related with the other, how can they together form one sentence? For Bhartṛhari exception and rule sentences are not different but related as they unitedly convey unitary meaning. The exception sentence is taken as a part of general rule and both of them partake a complete sentence.

It is obvious from the discussions made that Bhartṛhari pays much importance to the cognition of meaning in defining sentence and does not consider the syntactical form of sentence as an inevitable factor in deciding the character of sentence. If the cognition of complete meaning is accomplished even by a single word like nāma or Ākahyāta, they are sentence and if one or more than one relative sentence is not discretely capable of revealing unitary cognition, it, from the sense of meaning, is not different from discrete words; rather it is comparable to the words. A sentence is that which independently

expresses a unitary (complete) meaning. Two or more than two related sentences, if they together reveal a unitary complete meaning are one independent sentence. Thus, it is clear that Vaiyākaraṇas in general and Bharṭṛhari in particular have adopted a cognitive outlook in characterizing sentence as a complete meaning - revealing unit. In cases where many verbs are used in a sentence, the sentence is one if other verbs are subordinated to or if they qualify the principal verb.

However, the meaning of discrete word acquired by grammatical analysis of sentence and considered independently is taken as universal and also individual by its implication. In all the cases of the interpretation of word, compound word and sentence Bharṭṛhari is seen always conscious about the concept of indivisibility of sentence as original unit of communication and he explains that the different theories of interpreting sentence as a synthesis of many words are based on artificial analysis. It is the analysis that is the cause of diversity but from the point of view of cognition as revealed in communication and also from the fact of convention, the indivisible meaning is expressed by indivisible sentence without the consciousness or awareness of parts in it, and it is only for ignorants that the indivisible unit is made understandable through divisions or analysis. Taking the discussion in view. Bharṭṛhari philosophizes that the parts of the indivisible are also indivisible; they are also used for meanings without the consideration of their constituent letters and, hence, a word can also not be taken to be a synthesis of letters, It is the moment of articulated discrete sounds on account of which the word is taught as association of phonemes. This interpretation of the unit of language is quite in tune with Bharṭṛhari's sententialism or sententialistic holism.

However, cognition of complete meaning, for Bharṭṛhari is the criterion of sentence and that is the reason he accepts that in some cases a letter and in some other cases, a single word are also sentences if the sentence by the word uttered is revealed by them. Not only that, but a large expanded set of words (which may ordinarily be called sentence), if not capable of revealing complete sentence, is not accepted to be a sentence, and, thus, largeness and shortness of sentence token is not important. A sentence is an inner - indivisible unit which reveals the meaning satisfying the further expectancy for the completion of meaning. For example, the expression 'aśvaḥ dhāvati' (horse runs) is a sentence revealing complete meaning, though, the expression does not convey anything about whose horse and what colour etc. of the horse is. There may be

expectations of these meanings to a hearer also but only for that expectancy, the expression cannot be called incomplete sentence because that expectancy is not caused out of incompleteness of the expression but out of detailed description and the expectancy for detailed description does not make a sentence incomplete.

It is also obvious from the discussion made that Bhartṛhari has strongly defended not only his theory of indivisibility of sentence against padavādins arguments but has given a criterion of sentence as a unit of communication revealing a complete unit meaning exhausting expectancy for the completion of meaning on the basis of which his concept of the non-difference of *sphoṭa* (indivisible complete meaning revealing - unit) and of the sentential meaning (indivisible *pratibhā* revealed by the *sphoṭa*) may consistently be explained.

Padavādins bother more about explaining sentence from syntactical point of view while *Vaiyākaraṇas* aim at explaining communication. Communication is accomplished by indivisible sentence and, as such, it is not accomplished by discrete words independently expression universal. As communication is accomplished by specific and distinct cognition exhausting expectancy, the words conveying universal cannot be taken to be a unit of communication. The indivisible cognition is revealed by the indivisible unit and that unit is taken as sentence by *Vaiyākaraṇas*.

To sum up, we can say that the controversy of padavādins and Akhandavākyavādins is based on their differences of outlook towards explaining sentential meaning. Padvādins try to explain the sentential meaning on the basis of *pada* (word) as the real unit of language while *Vākyavādins* consider themselves justified in accepting it as the meaning of indivisible sentence. From the point of view of *pada* as the expressor of sentential meaning, the *Vākyavādins* position is criticised as defective while from the point of view of Akhandavākyavādins the theory of padavādins is explained as inconsistent. Bhartṛhari has given due importance to both of the aspects while defining sentence. As a meaning for him is clear, distinct, indivisible, inner-being revealed by sentence, he considers sentence as an indivisible *sphoṭa* on the basis of which the cognition is accomplished in usual communication. This indivisible meaning - revealing sentence is explained to ignorants as a piecemeal construction. It is quite agreeable to say that language theory is therefore about formations and not about origin in the radical sense.¹⁶ As an explanation of indivisible sentence,

the theory of padavādinś is very significant but from the point of view of cognition revealed in the mind, Bharatṛhari considers padavādinś theory only as helpful in understanding the indivisible sentence up to a point. It is obvious from the discussions made earlier that he does not give importance to the syntactical definitions of sentence only but successfully philosophizes the cognitive nature of sentence (śabda) also. "The śabda reveals itself and the meaning as well". No study of language is philosophical or conceptual if it does not investigate the concepts as they figure in the mind by expressions. If we study the concept, and, hence, the concept of sentence as it is understood in communications or as it figures in the mind, it becomes lively, interesting and philosophical. Mere syntactical diagnosis is unphilosophical and is not different from descriptive linguistics. From the cognitive point of view, Bhartrhari seems justified in accepting sentence (inner-sphoṭa) as complete meaning - revealing - unit of communication exhausting further expectancy of independently complete indivisible unit. In this definition, the long or short size or shape of a sentence is not accountable because, it is contradictory to take about the length or brevity of an indivisible unit. What is important for this definition of sentence is the cognition of complete indivisible meaning revealed non-differently in the mind by inner-indivisible-unit (sphoṭa). The long or short in shape and size are the qualities of utterances wrongly understood by ignorants as the nature of sentence (sphoṭa).

In brief the single word independently of a sentence denotes universal which on one hand cannot be taken as expression of a complete specific meaning accomplishing communication. On the other hand if the complete meaning is revealed by single word uttered then that single word in that case at worst be construed as a word but as a sentence or expression expressing complete unitary meaning. It is clear now that the sphoṭa is foundational and the tokens are only instrumental in the manifestation of it. The manifestation of it may be accomplished by any amount of complete or incomplete utterances but if once it is manifested it reveals itself and its meaning as well and communications are accomplished. It may not be manifested even by a complete sentence-token and in some cases it may be manifested even by a letter or by a word. Thus from the point of view of accomplishment of cognition the length or brevity of tokens is not given importance in the philosophy of grammarians though they for grammar and analysis accept them as of high importance because

no explanation, clarification and definition is possible without these tokens and that is the reason they explain the indivisible cognition and the indivisible expression infusing cognition on the basis of the process of piece-meal analysis. Taking this process in view they define a pada also as an indivisible unit which isolately of a complete sentence (sphoṭa) expresses universal on the basis of which communication may not be accomplished. Communications are accomplished as the awareness of complete specified meaning and that meaning is revealed not by words (popularly expressive of universal) but by indivisible sentence. Thus, in one line, accomplishment of communication is the criterion of expression and communications are accomplished by sphoṭa. We don't take sphoṭa as an ontological being but as cognitive being of a character of awareness which is known as revealed as Vācaka and the Vācya as revealed non-differently by it in the mind. Expression comprises both of the character of a Vācaka and Vācya. This does not mean that we are denying the syntactical difference of a pada and of a sentence token in our sphoṭa theory of language. For us, a pada and a sentence - token respectively stand by proxy for the pada-sphoṭa and vākya-sphoṭa which are manifested respectively by their respective token. A pada-sphoṭa independently of a Vākya-sphoṭa is not an expression accomplishing communication but a unit revealing universal while a Vākya - sphoṭa (explained as formed by different padas) is taken as a unity revealing complete distinct sphoṭa from which meaning in its completeness and exactness is revealed. We only want to emphasize that a Vākya sphoṭa is manifested by a sentence token and that it may in communication be manifested even by single letters or words (token) also and in the case these utterances also serve as single word expression and not as isolated letters or words or sentence token constituted by them. Vaiyākaraṇas concept of eternal relation as natural fitness of language¹⁷ can not be explained properly if language as sphoṭa is not taken into account, and, if language as sphoṭa is taken into account the meaning is taken as revealed non-differently by it in the mind and then it is proper to accept the tokens as only tools for manifesting sphoṭa which reveals itself and the meaning as well.¹⁸

The nature of a word independently of a sentence, as Bharatṛhari says, is not definite; they are used differently in different expressions, for example, the verb 'pac' (cooking) is used as 'Pāka' (cooked material) denoting a finished character, as 'pacti' (cooks etc.) denoting non-finished character as 'pacaṇaḥ' (fire) and is used also in different persons and numbers. How can the limit of

a pada will be determined if it is taken independently of a sentence? How can their meanings be differentiated? According to Bhartrhari it is only due to their use in the expressions that their forms are decided by the analysis of the sentence. Not only that but the meaning cognized on the basis of analysis of the sentence may be different from the meaning of the indivisible sentence and hence the discrete and complete meaning revealed even by single word utterances cannot be explained without taking it as the meaning revealed by a complete *sphoṭa* manifested by them.

If pada itself independently of a sentence is taken as the expression and if the form of a pada is changed or juxtaposed when analysed which of the form - the former or the latter be attended for association of it with the next word will be difficult to decide; for example, 'Dadhyaṅya' is analysed in the 'Dadhi' and 'ānya' (the 'i' of the word 'dadhi' is reposed for 'ya') and hence it becomes difficult to decide from which point (avadhī) the next word 'ānya' be attended i.e. form 'i' of 'dadhi' or from 'ya' of 'dadhya'? In such a situation it is improper to accept that the word 'dadhi' in the same form is independently expressor of the meaning. The self restrained and veridical character of cognition revealed by language in the mind cannot be explained if sentence as indivisible unit is not taken into account.¹⁹

NOTES

1. *Vākyapadiyam*, 1/123. edited, Sampurnanand Sanskrit Visvavidyalya, Varanasi.
2. *ibid*, 2/326.
3. *Puṇyārāja's Commentary on VP* 3/327.
4. *Pāṇini Sūtra*, 213/4.
5. *VP*, 2/329.
6. *Puṇyārāja on VP*. 2/336
7. *VP*. 2/329

8. *Puṅyārāja on VP, 2/338*
9. *ibid, VP 2/346.*
10. *ibid, VP 2/347-53*
11. *Pāṇini Sūtra, 312/3.*
12. *VP, 2/347.*
13. *Puṅyarāja on VP, 2/348-350.*
14. *Pāṇini Sūtra, 1/2/45.*
15. *ibid, 1/2/46*
16. COMPARE : Speech consists of total utterances of sentence from which words emerge in our artificial analysis, each sentence is a synthesis and it cannot be conceived in terms the mechanical addition of words to words until it is completed : On language, introduction, XXIV. It seems from the above lines that Humboldt from the point of view of communication also conceives the indivisibility theory of language. He, like Bharatṛhari, accepts the artificial synthesis and analysis only as a remedy for making an indivisible understandable to child and ignorant.
17. Bharatṛhari's philosophy of relation between words and meaning. D. N. Tiwari. *JICPR* Vol. XI, No. 2, 1994.
18. See - Cognition, being and the possibility of expressions : A Bhartrharian approach; D. N. Tiwari, accepted for publication in *JICPR*. 1996.
19. *ibid* pp. 38-55.