Abstract
This paper is about two proposals endorsed by Xunzi. The first is that there is such a thing as a moral expert, whose moral advice we should adopt even when we cannot appreciate for ourselves the considerations in favor of it. The second is that certain political authorities should be treated as moral experts. I identify three fundamental questions about moral expertise that contemporary philosophy has yet to address in depth, explicate Xunzi’s answers to them, and then give an account of politically authorized moral expertise as Xunzi understands it. The three questions at the heart of this study are these: how should we distinguish between knowing the correct course of action on another’s authority and knowing it for oneself? What exactly are the underlying considerations that the expert grasps and the novice does not? Who are the experts and in what spheres of life can they legitimately claim expertise?
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Analects 論語. In The Collected Commentaries on the Analects 論語集注. Edited by zhu Xi 朱熹. Sibu beiyao edition.
Anscombe, G.E.M. 1981. “Authority in Morals.” In Ethics, Religion and Politics. Oxford: Blackwell: 43–50.
Aristotle. 1998. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by David Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chan, Joseph 陳祖為. 2002. “Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties, and Confucianism.” Philosophy East and West 52.3: 281–310.
Cholbi, Michael. 2007. “Moral Expertise and the Credentials Problem.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10.4: 323–334.
Driver, Julia. 2006. “Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise.” Philosophical Studies 128.3: 619–644.
Fraser, Chris J. 2011. “Knowledge and Error in Early Chinese Thought.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 10.2: 127–48.
Hills, Alison. 2009. “Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology.” Ethics 120.1: 94–127.
Hopkins, Robert. 2007. “What Is Wrong with Moral Testimony?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74: 611–634.
_____. 2011. “How to Be a Pessimist about Aesthetic Testimony.” Journal of Philosophy 2011.3: 138–57.
Hutton, Eric L. 2000. “Does Xunzi Have a Consistent Theory of Human Nature?” In Kline and Ivanhoe 2000, 220–36.
_____, trans. 2005. “Xunzi.” In Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. Edited by Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, 255–309. Cambridge: Hackett.
_____, trans. forthcoming. Xunzi.
Ivanhoe, Philip J. 2000. “Human Nature and Moral Understanding in the Xunzi.” In Kline and Ivanhoe 2000, 237–251.
Jones, Karen. 1999. “Second-hand Moral Knowledge.” Journal of Philosophy 96.2: 55–78.
Kline III, T.C. 2000. “Moral Agency and Motivation in the Xunzi.” In Kline and Ivanhoe 2000, 155–175.
Kline III, T.C., and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds. 2000. Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Cambridge: Hackett.
Knoblock, John. 1988, 1990, 1994. Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works. 3 vols. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
McGrath, Sarah. 2011. “Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism.” Journal of Philosophy, 108.3: 111–137.
Nivison, David S. 1996. “Critique of David B. Wong ‘Xunzi on Moral Motivation.’” In Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and His Critics. Edited by Philip J. Ivanhoe. Chicago: Open Court, 323–31.
Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wong, David B. 2000. “Xunzi on Moral Motivation.” See Kline and Ivanhoe 2000, 135–54.
Xunzi 荀子. 1935. In The Collected Commentaries on the Xunzi 荀子集解. Edited by Wang Xianqian 王先謙. Taibei 台北: Shijie Shuju 世界書局.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Tiwald, J. Xunzi on Moral Expertise . Dao 11, 275–293 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-012-9282-1
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-012-9282-1