Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Applied Ethics. A Defence

  • Published:
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Given a reasonable coherentist view of justification in ethics, applied ethics, as here conceived of, cannot only guide us, in our practical decisions, but also provide moral understanding through explanation of our moral obligations. Furthermore, applied ethics can contribute to the growth of knowledge in ethics as such. We put moral hypotheses to crucial test in individual cases. This claim is defended against the challenges from moral intuitionism and particularism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. I defend this view in (Tännsjö 2010, pp.).

  2. There is a sense in which Jonathan Dancy accepts that there are moral principles, but this seems to me a misnomer. These ‘principles’ cannot operate as premises in any moral explanation; they are just shortlists (or eventually very long lists) of considerations that have sometimes been decisive to the normative status of some particular action, and which it may be wise to keep in mind.

  3. In this passage I rely on my argument in (Tännsjö 1998, Chapter 2).

  4. My use of the term ‘cognitive psychotherapy’ is inspired by Richard Brandt. I heard him presenting the idea in a talk in Stockholm in the early seventies, and he writes about it in (Brandt 1979).

References

  • Brandt RB (1979) A theory of the good and the right. Clarendon, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Broad CD (1930) Five types of ethical theory. Harcourt, Brace and Co, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Dancy J (1993) Moral reasons. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Feigl H (1952) In: Sellars W, Hospers J (eds) Validation and vindication reprinted in readings in ethical theory. Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • McDowell J (1979/1989) Virtue and reason, initially published in the monist. In: Clarke G, Simpson E (ed) Anti-theory in ethics and moral conservatism, vol. 62, 1979, pp. 331–350. New York: State University of New York Press, 1989

  • Parfit D (1984) Reasons and persons. Clarendon, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross WD (1930/1973) The right and the good. Clarendon, Oxford

  • Tännsjö T (1998) Hedonistic utilitarianism. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

    Google Scholar 

  • Tännsjö T (2010) From reasons to norms. Springer, Dordrecht

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, Universitätsvägen 10A, SE-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden

    Torbjörn Tännsjö

Authors
  1. Torbjörn Tännsjö
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Torbjörn Tännsjö.

Additional information

This paper has grown out of a course in applied ethics I held for the ethics program at The University of Oslo in the winter of 2008. It has been presented at the higher seminar in practical philosophy at Stockholm University in the fall of 2009. It has then been presented in the conference in January 2010 on Moral Theory and Theorizing in Ethical Deliberation in Swansea. I thank my students in Oslo and the participants in the two seminars for valuable comments.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Tännsjö, T. Applied Ethics. A Defence. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 14, 397–406 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9293-8

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9293-8

Keywords

Search

Navigation