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Rule Consequentialism and the Problem of Partial Acceptance

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Abstract

Most plausible moral theories must address problems of partial acceptance or partial compliance. The aim of this paper is to examine some proposed ways of dealing with partial acceptance problems as well as to introduce a new Rule Utilitarian suggestion. Here I survey three forms of Rule Utilitarianism, each of which represents a distinct approach to solving partial acceptance issues. I examine Fixed Rate, Variable Rate, and Optimum Rate Rule Utilitarianism, and argue that a new approach, Maximizing Expectation Rate Rule Utilitarianism, better solves partial acceptance problems.

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Notes

  1. Because much of the debate on this topic has been framed in the context of Utilitarianism rather than Consequentialism, I will discuss Rule Utilitarian formulations. Most arguments here can be easily extended to Rule Consequentialist theories.

  2. There is one preliminary distinction to draw about Rule Utilitarianism or Rule Consequentialism’s formulation: the difference between compliance and acceptance forms. The difference between these two is well described by Tim Mulgan (2006, 138):

    Compliance Rule Consequentialism: To find the optimal rule set we ask what would happen if a given set of rules were always complied with by everyone.

    Acceptance Rule Consequentialism: To find the optimal rule set we ask what would happen if a given set of rules were accepted by everyone.

  3. Note also that Hooker discusses a Utilitarian counterpart to his Consequentialist theory (e.g. Hooker and Fletcher 2008).

  4. I am thankful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.

References

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Jeff McMahan, Derek Parfit, Holly Smith, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA

    Kevin Tobia

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  1. Kevin Tobia
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Correspondence to Kevin Tobia.

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Tobia, K. Rule Consequentialism and the Problem of Partial Acceptance. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 16, 643–652 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9382-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9382-3

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