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Notes
See Timothy Schroeder and Carl Matheson, “Imagination and Emotion,” in S. Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 19–40.
For example: Alex Neill, “Fiction and the Emotions,” American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993): 1–13; Peter Lamarque, Fictional Points of View (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996); Gregory Currie, “The Moral Psychology of Fiction,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1995): 250–259; Currie, “The Paradox of Caring: Fiction and the Philosophy of Mind,” in M. Hjort and S. Laver (eds.), Emotion and the Arts (Oxford: OUP, 1997), p. 63–77; Berys Gaut, “Reasons, Emotions and Fiction,” in M. Kieran and D. Lopes (eds.), Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 15–34; Stuart Brock, “Fictions, Feelings, and Emotions,” Philosophical Studies 132 (2007): 211–242.
Timothy Schroeder and Carl Matheson, “Imagination and Emotion,” in S. Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 19–40; Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error (London: Vintage Books, 1994); Tamar Gendler and Karson Kovakovich, “Genuine Rational Fictional Emotions”, in M. Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 241–253.
Jinhee Choi, “Fits and Startles: Cognitivism Revisited,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61 (2003): 149–157; Jesse Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Jenefer Robinson, Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and its Role in Literature, Music, and Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).
Tamar Gendler, “Imaginative resistance revisited,” in S. Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 149–174; see also Tamar Gendler and Karson Kovakovich, “Genuine Rational Fictional Emotions,” in M. Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 241–253.
Gendler (2003), op. cit., p. 136
Schroeder and Matheson (2006), op. cit., pp. 34–35.
Suits (2006): op. cit., pp. 380–381.
For further discussion of these issues see See Schroeder and Matheson (2006), op. cit., p. 25; Currie, “Desire in Imagination,” in T. Gender and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 201–221: 209; Gendler and Kovakovich (2005), op. cit.
Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-believe (London: Harvard University Press, 1990); Gendler (2006), op. cit.; Lamarque (2002), op. cit.
Jonathan Cohen, “Belief and Acceptance,” Mind 98 (1989): 367–389; Michael Bratman, “Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context,” Mind 101 (1992): 1–15.
Cohen (1989), op. cit., p. 368.
Bratman (1992), op. cit., p. 9.
Cohen (1989), op. cit., p. 368; Jonathan Cohen, An Essay on Belief and Acceptance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 13–14.
Bratman (1992), op. cit., p. 9. Cf. Cohen (1992), op. cit., pp. 12–13.
See for example Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), op. cit.; Meskin and Weinberg (2003), op. cit.
Currie (1995), op. cit; Kendall Walton “Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime: On Being Moved by Fiction,” in M. Hjort and S. Laver (eds.) Emotion and the Arts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 37–49; Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), op. cit.
David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 250–251.
Walton (1990), op. cit.; Compare Paul Harris, The Work of the Imagination (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); Cohen (1992), op. cit., p. 22
Velleman (2000), op. cit., p. 259.
Walton (1990), op. cit.
Harris (2000), op. cit., p. 82.
Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Matthew Kieran, “Art, Imagination, and the Cultivation of Morals,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54 (1996): 337–351.
See Gendler (2003), op. cit., for further discussion of cases that she labels ‘affective transmission.’
Harris (2000), op. cit., p. 88.
For example David Lewis, “Truth in Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978): 37–46; Walton (1990), op. cit; see also Lamarque (2002), op. cit.
Walton (1990) ibid., p. 41.
Bratman (1992), op. cit., p. 10.
Currie (2002), op. cit.; Kreitman (2006), op. cit.
Bratman (1992), op. cit., pp. 10–11.
Brian O’Shaughnessy, Consciousness and the World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), p. 362; see also Kathleen Stock, “Thoughts on the ‘Paradox’ of Fiction,” Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 3 (2006): 37–58. See also Schroeder and Matheson (2006), op. cit., p. 24.
Cain Todd, “Emotional Objectivity, Attention, and the Phenomenology of Evaluative Content,” in preparation.
Ned Block, “Attention and Mental Paint,” Philosophical Issues 20 (2010): 36.
Ibid., p. 53.
Sebastien Watzl, “Attention as Structuring of the Stream of Consciousness”, in C. Mole, D. Smithies, W. Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 153.
See Michael Brady, “Virtue, Emotion, and Attention,” Metaphilosophy 41 (2010): 115–131.
This paper was written with the generous support of the Swiss National Science Foundation. I would like to thank audiences in Geneva and Fribourg, Kevin Mulligan, and the two anonymous referees of this journal for their helpful comments.
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Todd, C. Attending Emotionally to Fiction. J Value Inquiry 46, 449–465 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-013-9358-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-013-9358-0