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An Argument Against the Social Fact Thesis (and Some Additional Preliminary Steps Towards a New Conception of Legal Positivism)

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Indiana University, 026 Sycamore Hall, 1033 E. Third Street, Bloomington, IN, 47405-7005, USA

    Kevin Toh

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  1. Kevin Toh
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Correspondence to Kevin Toh.

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The first, and very different, incarnation of this material was presented at the 22nd World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy which took place in Granada, Spain in May 2005. I learned from the discussion following my presentation, and from subsequent correspondence with Matt Kramer, Andrei Marmor, and Jerry Postema. More recently, I have benefited from conversations with or comments from Steve Darwall, Adam Leite, Brian Leiter, David McCarty, Scott Shapiro, David Velleman, and an anonymous referee for this journal. I am most indebted to Gary Ebbs who, during three separate conversations, was willing to be a sounding board and also tried to improve my thinking on many issues discussed herein.

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Toh, K. An Argument Against the Social Fact Thesis (and Some Additional Preliminary Steps Towards a New Conception of Legal Positivism). Law and Philos 27, 445–504 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-008-9024-z

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