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Hylemorphism, remnant persons and personhood
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Abstract
Animalism is the doctrine that we human beings are – are identical with – animals. Hylemorphism is a form of animalism. In this paper, I defend hylemorphism by showing that while other forms of animalism fall prey to the problem of ‘Remnant Persons, ’ hylemorphism does not. But hylemorphism’s account of personhood seems to have some very implausible implications. I address one of those implications, and argue that it isn’t nearly as objectionable as it might at first appear.
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