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The Individuation of Causal Powers by Events (and Consequences of the Approach)

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Metaphysica

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the notion of a “causal power,” particularly as it is relevant to a theory of properties whereby properties are individuated by the causal powers they bestow on the objects that instantiate them. I take as my target certain eliminativist positions that argue that certain kinds of properties (or relations) do not exist because they fail to bestow unique causal powers on objects. In reply, I argue that the notion of causal powers is inextricably bound up with our notion of what an event is, and not only is there disagreement as to which theory of events is appropriate, but on the three prevailing theories, it can be shown that the eliminativists arguments do not follow.

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Notes

  1. Though note that Heil thinks that properties are particular (i.e., modes) and, thus, that properties are individuated by their particular instantiation as well.

  2. Schaffer (2005) argues that we can have such knowledge, if knowledge is possible at all, since skepticism about which possible world we are in with regards to properties parallels skeptical arguments about the external world (for example), but I take it that Schaffer’s offered solutions will not help us further with the individuation of causal powers; but this is exactly the burden that one must meet if denying that causal powers are individuated by events.

  3. Shoemaker (1984/2003) makes much the same argument for individuating properties by causal powers.

  4. From hereon out, I will eliminate reference to time for ease of exposition; it should be assumed unless stated otherwise.

  5. Of course, being a determinable or determinate property is a matter of degree; but we can safely ignore this fact for the sake of simplicity.

  6. Mellor (1997) seems to endorse this method as well.

  7. Keep in mind that I am dealing here with properties, and not predicates.

  8. For a related worry, see discussion of the “qua” problem in response to Davidson’s theory of events and causation: Dretske (1989), Sosa (1984); Horgan (1989, 1997); Heil and Mele (1993), and papers therein.

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  1. Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA

    Brandon N. Towl

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Towl, B.N. The Individuation of Causal Powers by Events (and Consequences of the Approach). Int Ontology Metaphysics 11, 49–61 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-010-0058-y

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