

Foucault, Governmentality, and Critical Disability Theory Today: An Introduction Revisited Shelley Tremain

A risk worth taking

Ten years after the publication of the first edition of *Foucault and the Government of Disability* in early 2005, the far-reaching and transformative effects of the book for critical understandings of disability continue to unfold and multiply. Indeed, the first edition of the book has become a classic text in the library of critical disability theory and research, helping to shape a number of recent and ongoing discussions and debates within the interdisciplinary field of inquiry called “disability studies.” This introduction to the celebratory tenth-anniversary second edition of the book returns to the introduction of its forerunner in order to draw out the impact that the first edition has had on critical thought about disability, as well as to provide the overview of certain pertinent concepts, themes, and arguments in both Michel Foucault’s work and critical disability theory that the introduction to the former edition provided. For like the first edition of *Foucault and the Government of Disability*, this second edition of the book is intended for readers unacquainted with Foucault’s approach and with disability theory, as well as for avid readers of either or both.

Beginning in the Great Depression, and over the last forty years especially, people variously classified as “handicapped,” “disabled,” or as “people with disabilities,” have engaged in local and global organizing and campaigning, developing politicized conceptions of disability that counter medicalized approaches to it. These political conceptions of disability and the increasing consolidation and cultural presence of the social movements that spawned them have precipitated significant social change, including the deinstitutionalization of thousands of people incarcerated in nursing homes and hospitals worldwide, retrofitting of government offices and public facilities to make them more physically accessible, redesign of urban infrastructures and landscapes, closed captioning on late-model televisions, and the growing recognition that disabled people constitute a marginalized and disenfranchised constituency. Disabled people’s movements have also had an impact on academia, where the interdisciplinary (and counter-disciplinary) field of disability studies has emerged strongly. Courses in disability studies are now offered at universities and colleges throughout North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Europe, as well as in some regions of South America, Central America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Academics who conduct their work under the rubric of disability studies or closely related fields such as philosophy of disability problematize the foundational assumptions of many traditional disciplines and fields of inquiry, as well as the methodologies that they employ, the criteria of evaluation to which they appeal, and the epistemological and social positioning of the researchers and theorists invested in them. From within both autonomous programs and home disciplines, philosophers of disability, disability theorists, and disability researchers engage in a diversity of investigative and critical pursuits. They have, for example, identified the ways in which the institutional, structural, discursive, and material practices of the discipline of philosophy (and its sub-field feminist philosophy) have conspired to exclude disabled philosophers; have pointed out the cultural and historical specificity of dominant Euro-American notions of corporeal attractiveness; analyzed how disability colluded with race in the formation of the modern nation-state; plotted histories of disabled people’s resistance; traced genealogies of eugenic policies that culminate in contemporary reproductive technologies; critiqued representations of disabled people in the media and literature; and considered the intersections between race, disability, gender, class, and queer sexualities.

The desire to edit and publish a collection of critical disability theory that revolved around the

ideas of Foucault and, in particular, his ideas about governmentality, was borne out of my own intellectual concentration on and use of his work. The production and publication of a book of disability theory that would focus primarily on the work of a single author, especially an author whose writing seemed in many ways remote and abstracted from concrete analyses of disability, was, however, novel and, therefore, a risk for the University of Michigan Press to take on. Although before the publication of the first edition some disability theorists had used Foucault's ideas in interesting and creative ways, attempts to articulate a Foucauldian stance on disability had, overall, been largely rudimentary. Nevertheless, the University of Michigan Press took up the risk involved in the publication of the book because Foucault's corpus had shown itself to be so generative of bodies of knowledge in other disciplines across the academy, including the disciplines of history, philosophy, the social sciences, medicine, architecture, and psychology. Within these and other academic and intellectual domains, Foucault's insights had by that time demonstrated their capacity to provoke scholars to question what was previously considered self-evident, timeless, unchanging, and necessary. Furthermore, his writings, lectures, and public statements had motivated scholars to critically reflect on the current situation, on the historical conditions that led to these formations, and how they might be differently perceived and transformed. To enable critical thinkers to develop new ways in which to conceive of their relationships to themselves and with each other, as well as their imbrication in relations of power, he provided the analytical tools of archaeology and genealogy, elaborating groundbreaking analyses of punishment, psychiatry, and sexuality to show how these tools could be employed. Given the rich theoretical offerings that scholars in a host of critical contexts had generated out of Foucault's work, LeAnn Fields, the editor of the *Corporealities: Discourses on Disability* series for the U of M Press, thus believed that insofar as *Foucault and the Government of Disability* would expand and complicate how the phenomena surrounding disability were at that time understood, the prospective book had the potential to enhance and enrich the field of disability studies and that the gamble involved in the book's publication was, therefore, worth taking. This risky decision was prescient. Indeed, the first edition of *Foucault and the Government of Disability* has both enlarged and deepened Foucault's relevance and applicability to work on disability by responding to his call to interrogate what has been regarded as natural, inevitable, ethical, and liberating through analyses of a range of widely endorsed practices and ideas surrounding disability, including rehabilitation, community care, impairment, normality and abnormality, inclusion, prevention, genetic counseling, accommodation, and special education.

Critical disability theory with Foucault

From 1971 until his death in 1984, Foucault held the Chair in the History of Systems of Thought at the Collège de France, where, during lectures and seminars held weekly between January and June, he reported on original research that he was pursuing (Ewald and Fontana 2003). In the introduction to the first volume of his three-volume edition of Foucault's writing, Paul Rabinow remarks that Foucault began his 1975–76 course “with a despondent, almost despairing apology for what he characterized as his thinking's directionless drift” (Rabinow 1997, xv). As Rabinow explains it, Foucault had intended in these lectures to bring the work of recent years to completion that year, but was at a loss on how to do so. In that first lecture Foucault lamented, “[T]hough these researches were very closely related to each other, they have failed to develop into any continuous or coherent whole. They are fragmentary researches, none of which in the last analysis can be said to have proved definitive, nor even to have led anywhere” (1980, 78; cf. Foucault 2003a). Rabinow suggests that this confession seems harsh, given that Foucault published *Discipline and Punish* in 1975 and *The History of Sexuality, Volume I*, in 1976. In fact, by the end of the course, Foucault had introduced a conception of power that he claimed had been overlooked in political philosophy. This form of power, crystallized in the final chapter of the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, he called “bio-power” or “bio-politics.” Before going further, I must pinpoint this form of power, this bio-power, for it is vital to any Foucauldian analysis of disability.

From Aristotle to Locke and Rousseau, and on to Rawls, political philosophy has concerned itself with questions about legitimation and sovereignty: What are the foundations of legitimate rule? What is the nature of sovereignty? What is the most just form of government? On what grounds can rights be based? Although Foucault did not reject outright the significance of these questions for political thinking, he did refuse the idea of

primal, or natural, rights that is presupposed by the juridical conceptions of political power from which these questions arise. In the terms of juridical conceptions, the individual possesses power (as one would possess a commodity) in the form of inherent, inalienable rights, the transfer or surrender of which (through a juridical act or a contract) constitutes a sovereign. In his lecture of January 7, 1976, Foucault argued to the contrary that power is not something that is exchanged, given, or taken back, but rather is *exercised* and exists only in action. In addition, Foucault disputed the assumption of many juridical conceptions that posits that power is fundamentally repressive. Though consensus and violence are the instruments or results of power, he remarked, they do not amount to its essential nature (2003a, 13). As he put it, “The exercise of power can produce as much acceptance as may be wished for: it can pile up the dead and shelter itself behind whatever threats it can imagine. In itself the exercise of power is not violence; nor is it a consent, which, implicitly, is renewable” (Foucault 1982, 220). For Foucault, the question that political philosophy should ask about power is this: *How*, that is, *by what means*, is it exercised? (217). Indeed, one of the most original features of Foucault’s analysis is the idea that power functions best when it is exercised through productive constraints, that is, when it *enables* subjects to act *in order* to constrain them (Tremain 2001; 2002). He argued, furthermore, that the continued preoccupation with juridical conceptions of power in modern political philosophy has obscured the productive capacity and subtle machinations of a form of power that began to coalesce at the end of the eighteenth century: namely, bio-power.

This new technology of power—this bio-power—that emerges in the second half of the eighteenth century takes as its object life itself, the life of the human qua living being, that is, the life of the human insofar as it is a living being. In his lecture of March 17, 1976, Foucault remarked that this new technology of power, this bio-power, this bio-politics that begins to establish itself in the late eighteenth century, involves a set of measurements such as the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, and the fertility of a population. These processes, together with a whole set of related economic and political problems, become bio-power’s first objects of knowledge and the targets that it seeks to control. It is in this historical moment, Foucault noted, that the first demographers begin to measure these phenomena in statistical terms. As these phenomena began to be taken into account, a new type of medicine developed, whose main function was public hygiene, and whose institutions centralized the power of the new medicine, normalized its knowledge, and coordinated the care that is distributed under its auspices. There were campaigns to educate the public and medicalize the population. In order to deal with accidents, illnesses, and various anomalies, bio-power established charitable institutions and economically rational mechanisms such as insurance, individual and collective savings, and safety measures. Since the phenomena with which this bio-politics (this bio-power) was concerned became pertinent only on a mass level, constants that pertained to the collective had to be established. In this regard, bio-politics involves the introduction of mechanisms whose functions include forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures, and whose purpose is to intervene at the level of generality of these phenomena. Regulatory mechanisms are put into place that prescribe norms, adjust to an equilibrium, maintain an average, and compensate for variations within the “general population,” a group of living human beings whose constitution *as a* “population” is in large part due to this form of power, and especially to the surveillance of “sex” that it requires. In addition, security mechanisms partition the random element of populations from the collective at large in order to maximize the conditions conducive to life (Foucault 2003b, 238–63). In *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, Foucault (1978) explained the rationale behind bio-power’s normalizing strategies:

[A] power whose task is to take charge of life needs continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms. . . . Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor; it does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies of the sovereign from his obedient subjects; . . . it effects distributions around the norm. . . . [T]he law operates more and more as a norm, and . . . the juridical institution is increasingly incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory. A normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life. (144)

As the first edition of *Foucault and the Government of Disability* demonstrated, the importance of critical work on bio-power (bio-politics) to analyses of disability should not be underestimated. For during the past two centuries, in particular, a vast apparatus, erected to secure the well-being of the general population, has caused the contemporary disabled subject to emerge into discourse and social existence. Among the items that have comprised this expansive apparatus are asylums, income support programs, quality of life assessments, workers’

compensation benefits, special education programs, regimes of rehabilitation, parallel transit systems, prostheses, home care services, telethons, sheltered workshops, foster child campaigns, and prenatal diagnosis. These (and a host of other) practices, procedures, and policies have created, classified, codified, managed, and controlled social anomalies through which some people have been divided from others and *objectivized* as (for instance) physically impaired, insane, handicapped, mentally ill, retarded, and deaf. Foucault argued that, in recent times, practices of division, classification, and ordering around a norm have become the primary means by which to individualize people, who come to be understood scientifically, and who even come to understand themselves in this mode.

An understanding of bio-power's capacity to objectivize people in this way illuminates Foucault's remarks about the dual meanings of the term *subject* as they pertain to the circumstances surrounding disabled subjects. For Foucault, to be a subject is, in one sense, to be subject to someone else by control and dependence and, in another sense, to be tied to one's own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both senses of the term imply a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to (Foucault 1982). Because he refused to conceive relations of power in strictly juridical terms, Foucault maintained that analyses of power should not aim to identify some overarching or distant font of subjecting power, but rather "should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects." Hence, work on bio-power and the dual nature of the subject can help us to "discover how it is" that disabled subjects "are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, desires, thoughts, [and so on]" (Foucault 1980a, 97). In 1982, Foucault remarked that the goal of his work over the previous twenty years had not been to analyze power, but rather to write a history of the different modes through which human beings are transformed into subjects (Foucault 1982). In another, earlier context, Foucault had remarked that in his work he had been trying to render evident the "constant articulation of power on knowledge and of knowledge on power," especially with respect to the subject. Power—that is, its exercise—he argued, perpetually creates knowledge and knowledge constantly induces effects of power (Foucault 1975).

Foucault was in particular interested in the knowledges with respect to the subject that comprise the disciplines that have come to be called "the human sciences:" disciplines such as criminology, sociology, psychiatry, and psychology. He was concerned to show how closely the emergence of these knowledges over the last two centuries has been enmeshed in the problems and practices of (bio-)power and the social management of individuals (Gordon 2000). In addition, he suggested that analyses of power should take as their starting point a new kind of counter-politics (what he called "strategic reversibility") that these knowledges have inadvertently spawned. For individuals and *juridically constituted* groups of individuals have responded to subjecting practices directed in increasingly intimate and immediate ways to "life" by formulating needs and imperatives of that same "life" as the basis for political counter-demands, that is, by turning them back as focuses of resistance (Gordon 1991). That Foucault's political activities and scholarship were in large part directed at issues raised by prisoners' rights groups, ex-inmates of psychiatric institutions, refugees, and gay men's alliances is well known.

In addition to the notion of bio-power, other elements of Foucault's ideas are indispensable for a Foucauldian analysis of disability, and none more so than the notion of the subject. These elements, bio-power and the subject, are inextricable from Foucault's notions of government and liberalism.

In Foucault's lectures of 1978–79, he linked his claims about bio-power with his approach to the theme of government. Power, he argued, is more a question of *government*, that is, the direction of conduct, than it is a question of confrontation between adversaries. The term *government*, he remarked in 1982, should be understood in its sixteenth-century sense to refer to any form of activity that aims to shape, guide, or affect the conduct of some person or persons; furthermore, he proposed that the term be defined, in general, to mean "the conduct of conduct." As an *activity*, government can concern one's relation to oneself, interpersonal relations that involve some form of control or guidance, and relations within social institutions and communities, as well as relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty (Gordon 1991). Indeed, Foucault adopted this earlier, broad meaning of *government* because it encompasses not only legitimately constituted forms of political and economic subjection, but any mode of action, more or less considered and calculated, that is bound to structure the field of possible action of oneself or others (Foucault 1982). In other words, when relations of power are construed as government, that is, the direction of conduct, governmental practices should be understood to include state-generated prohibitions and punishments, and global networks of social, economic, and political stratification (the deleterious effects of which congeal disproportionately along disabling, racialized, and gendered lines), as well as normalizing technologies that facilitate the systematic objectivization

of subjects as deaf, criminal, mad, and so on, and techniques of self-improvement and self-transformation such as weight-loss programs and fitness regimes, assertiveness training, botox injections, breast implants, psychotherapy, and rehabilitation. Despite the fact that power appears to be merely repressive, the most effective exercise of power, according to Foucault, consists in guiding the possibilities of conduct and putting in order the possible outcomes. In his most succinct articulation of power as government, Foucault wrote:

[W]hat defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future. . . . The exercise of power . . . is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. (1982, 220)

The conception of power as government (“the conduct of conduct”) that the first edition of *Foucault and the Government of Disability* brought to the center of discussion in critical disability theory is in stark contrast to the “juridico-discursive” (to use Foucault’s term) conception of power that much disability theory had to that point taken for granted. In so doing, the first edition showed that a different conception of force relations was available to critical disability theorists. This conception of power as productive, as circulating, and as coming from below motivated many disability scholars to reconsider and indeed more critically examine aspects of social, economic, cultural, subjective, and intersubjective existence that they had previously regarded as falling outside of the reach of disabling power. Recall that in the terms of juridical conceptions power is construed as a fundamentally repressive thing that is possessed by a centralized external authority such as a particular social group, a class, an institution, or the state, and reigns over, and down upon, others. The “social model of disability,” which, until the publication of the first edition, had been predominant in the disabled people’s movement in the United Kingdom since the late 1970s, and which had at the time received increasing attention internationally, is a paradigmatic example of the juridical conception of power that once prevailed in disability studies. With the publication of the first incarnation of *Foucault and the Government of Disability* and the wide circulation of the idea of power as government, however, critical disability theorists were given tools to think beyond and outside of the social model. When governmentality entered the lexicon of disability studies, that is, when the ideas of force relations as productive and the direction of conduct were introduced into the conceptual apparatus of disability scholarship, critical disability theorists began to recognize that a significant alternative to the construal of power assumed on the terms of the social model was possible and, in particular, an alternative to the social model’s construal of the relationship between impairment and disability was conceivable (see Tremain 2005; see also Tremain 2001, 2002, 2006, 2010). The growing number of articles subsequently published in *Disability Studies Quarterly*, *Disability & Society*, and other academic journals which the conception of power as government inspired is testament to the formative impact that this analytical shift continues to have on critical thinking about disability.

Foucault was concerned with philosophical questions that surround rationalities of government, that is, systems of thinking about the nature of the practice of government. A rationality of government, as Foucault explained it, is a system of thinking about the practice of government that has the capacity to *rationalize* some form of that activity to those who practice it and to those upon whom it is practiced, where this capacity entails to render thinkable *and* to render applicable or acceptable. Foucault coined the term *governmentalities* to refer to these governmental rationalities, and he used this term almost interchangeably with the phrase *arts of government*. In his important 1979 lecture entitled “The Birth of Biopolitics,” Foucault (1997) remarked that the phenomena that from the eighteenth century onward begin to appear as problems that require management cannot be dissociated from the framework of liberal governmentality within which they emerged *as* problems and developed their urgency.

Foucault believed that this emergence of liberal governmentality evinced a transformation from the political and economic thinking that had conditioned earlier Cameralist and mercantilist rationalities and a new configuration of the relationship between knowledge and government. Although these earlier rationalities of government had sought to rationalize a growing governmentality and its regulation through the existence and strength of the state itself, liberalism, Foucault asserted, ushered in the principle “One always governs too much,” or one must always suspect that one governs too much (Foucault 1997; Gordon 1991). To be sure, any

rationalization of state government aims to maximize its effects and diminish (to the greatest extent possible) its political and economic cost. Foucault (1997) argued that liberal rationalization is innovative, however, insofar as it starts from the assumption that government cannot be its own end. Foucault's perspective with respect to liberalism in this regard is distinctive, for he was concerned to understand liberalism not simply as a doctrine, or set of doctrines of political and economic theory, but rather as a style of thinking that is quintessentially concerned with the art of governing (Gordon 1991).

Foucault was not a libertarian; nevertheless, he was intrigued by liberalism, especially because of what he regarded as its "polymorphism," that is, its capacity to continually refashion itself in a practice of auto-critique. In fact, Foucault viewed liberalism as a form of critical reflection on governmental practice itself. Liberalism, he asserted, can be found simultaneously, but in different forms, as both the regulative scheme of governmental practice and the theme of a (sometimes) "radical" opposition. As he explained it, liberalism constitutes a tool for the criticism of reality, that is, for the criticism of (1) a previous governmentality that one tries to shed; (2) a current governmentality that one attempts to reform and rationalize; and (3) a governmentality that one opposes and whose abuses one tries to limit (1997, 75). In addition, he suggested that insofar as the counter-discourses that bio-power inadvertently generates initially emerged within liberal governmentality, the counter-demands that are advanced under the auspices of these discourses are also historical effects of liberalism's polymorphic character. Indeed, insofar as the arguments and claims to entitlement that disability theorists and the disabled people's movement advance are responses to the subjecting governmental practices of bio-power, a Foucauldian stance on the current state of disability politics assumes that these political calls themselves are salient effects of liberalism.

The shape of things to come

The second edition of *Foucault and the Government of Disability* includes all of the chapters in the first edition of the collection and retains the same four parts as the first edition, with each part reflecting a broad area of thought on which Foucault's work concentrated. As a celebratory tenth-anniversary publication, nevertheless, this second edition of the collection also includes four additional chapters in a new part of the book entitled "Foucault and Disability in the Present." Furthermore, an updated and expanded index is appended to these five parts of the book. In the introduction to the first edition of the collection, I had indicated that although the sixteen (original) chapters included in the collection are relatively autonomous, they were written, edited, and arranged in a fashion that limits the repetition within the collection of certain concepts, claims, and arguments that should be instructive for an analysis of disability that follows from Foucault's approach. The same organizational strategy applies to the twenty chapters contained within this new second edition of the book; that is, some of the later chapters in the book presuppose an understanding of certain arguments and concepts that are explained or considered in earlier chapters. Indeed, the four new chapters in the fifth part of this second edition build upon and elaborate many of the ideas, arguments, and themes that the first edition introduced or suggested. Thus, readers of this book unfamiliar with Foucault's work, or with disability theory, or with both, might find that they will derive the most benefit from the book if they read its chapters according to the sequence in which they have been arranged.

As the introduction to the forerunner of this second edition noted, the chapters in "Epistemologies and Ontologies," the first part of the book, variously take up Foucault's concerns with the mutually constitutive and reinforcing relation between power and knowledge; the ontological status of the objects studied in the human sciences; the emergence of certain human phenomena as problems for power/knowledge; and the constitution of subjects by and through medical, juridical, and administrative practices. Foucault argued that a "history of the present" would enable an understanding of the human subject's current circumstance, that is, would facilitate a historical awareness of its current situation. The chapters in the second part of the book, "Histories," utilize this insight by drawing attention to the importance of historical analyses for critical disability theory. The contributors to "Governmentalities," the third part of the book, use Foucault's analytical tools in order to interrogate various concrete manifestations of disabling government. Recall that, for Foucault, government can concern any activity that affects one's own conduct or the conduct of others. A rationality of government—a "governmentality"—renders some form of that practice of government ("conduct of conduct") conceivable and applicable to subjects who govern and to the subjects who are governed, as well as to how subjects govern

themselves, that is, their own conduct. In fact, Foucault maintained that the notion that the subject's practical political choices can be determined within the space of a theoretical text trivializes the act of moral decision-making to the level of mere aesthetic preference (Gordon 1991, 6). Entitled "Ethics and Politics," the contributions to the fourth part of the collection thus variously put into relief the inextricable relation between ethics and politics.

As I have indicated, the four chapters in the new fifth part of the book demonstrate the impact that the first edition of *Foucault and the Government of Disability* has had on the terrain of critical thought about disability. In particular, the four new chapters offer sophisticated understandings of disability and its implication in, and mutual constitution with, axes of power such as race, gender, nationality, and sexuality, as well as provide fresh interpretations of Foucault that the first edition of the collection directly or indirectly inspired and motivated. Danielle Peers's textually-rich contribution to the new fifth part of the book documents the genealogy of Peers's subjectivation as a Paralympic athlete and how this subjection as a competitive wheelchair athlete disciplined Peers's body, mind, and breath, rendering Peers simultaneously docile and empowered. In Anne McGuire's highly original new chapter in the collection, McGuire draws upon Foucault's claims about governmentality and bio-power in order to argue (among other things) that current authoritative discourses with respect to "the war on terror" are imbricated in and condition contemporary advocacy discourses on "the war against autism." Ashley Taylor considers the critiques of philosopher John Rawls's theory of justice that a number of philosophers of disability have recently articulated. In a measured and sympathetic treatment of these critiques, Taylor draws upon both Foucault's claims about the productive character of power and Judith Butler's work on "normative violence" in order to show why these critiques are, nevertheless, unsatisfactory. The second edition of *Foucault and the Government of Disability* closes with Katerina Kolarova's provocative new chapter about assisted suicide. Kolarova shows how Foucault's insights about liberal governmentality can enable us to understand how current discourses on "good death" and "choice" with respect to assisted suicide for aging and disabled people are tied to notions of empire and capitalism in the West.

With four new and path-breaking chapters, the tenth-anniversary second edition of *Foucault and the Government of Disability* poses the same series of challenges that its predecessor did and introduces new points of contention and controversy. In particular, the collection challenges readers of Foucault to reconsider ways in which they understand his insights and claims; dares specialists on Foucault to expand the uses to which they have put his work, particularly with respect to considerations of disability; encourages theorists and researchers of disability to continue to think beyond accepted dogmas and outside of dominant frameworks of analysis; and urges disability activists to reaffirm that insurrection takes place, and must take place, through a diversity of modes, in varying intensities, and across a spectrum of social, political, cultural, economic, educational, and personal contexts.

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