Summary and conclusion
Rorty's critique concentrates on one aspect of foundationalism: the claim that nonpropositional sensory awareness serves as the basis for propositional justification. This claim is an essential component of classical foundationalism, though not necessarily of the more moderate versions of foundationalism that have been proposed. Thus even if it were a successful critique it would tell against only one type of foundationalism. But nothing in Rorty's argument provides any reason to doubt the plausibility of a classical foundationalist explanation of why sensory awareness justifies ordinary nonbasic propositions. Even classical foundationalism, then, remains untouched by Rorty's critique.
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Triplett, T. Rorty's critique of foundationalism. Philosophical Studies 52, 115–129 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354161
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354161