Abstract
In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed a novel argument against moral intuitionism. I suggest a defense on behalf of the intuitionist against Sinnott-Armstrong’s objections. Rather than focus on the main premises of his argument, I instead examine the way in which Sinnott-Armstrong construes the intuitionistic position. I claim that Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of intuitionism is mistaken. In particular, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong mischaracterizes non-inferentiality as it figures in intuitionism. To the extent that Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of intuitionism has been adopted by others uncritically, intuitionists have cause for concern. I develop an alternative, and more accurate, reading of what is non-inferential about intuitionistic moral knowledge. In light of this alternative reading, certain elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s case against intuitionism are significantly weakened. But perhaps more importantly, this paper helps clarify what circumspect intuitionists mean when they claim that some moral knowledge is non-inferential.
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Notes
By ‘inferable belief’, I mean a particular belief that is inferable for a particular person. I shall sometimes dispense with reference to the person for ease of exposition.
See Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a, 189).
Sinnott-Armstrong also rejects (MI 1) on the grounds that it cannot stop certain epistemic regresses. See Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a, 190). Again, the general idea is that (MI 1) is too weak for intuitionists’ purposes.
See Sinnott-Armstrong (2002, 306).
Sinnott-Armstrong offers a version this argument for cases of moral disagreement at Sinnott-Armstrong (2006b, 358).
See Sinnott-Armstrong (2002, 313–314; 2006b, 344).
See Sinnott-Armstrong (2006b, 363).
See, for example, Sinnott-Armstrong (2002, 317, 320, 322, 232, and 324).
See Ross (2002, 30).
See Audi (2004, 101–118).
Cf. Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘[A] belief is . . . non-inferable if the believer is not able to infer it from any other belief’ (2006a, 187).
See Pollock and Cruz (1999, 79).
Correctly characterizing the basing relation is still a matter of debate. For some dissenting opinions on the above, see Korcz (1997).
See Audi (1993, ch. 8).
While Sinnott-Armstrong does mention, in passing, the idea of basing one’s belief on an inferential ability (2002, 307; 2006a, 189), basing one’s belief on an inferential ability differs from basing one’s belief on a reason. Cf. Sinnott-Armstrong’s description of an instance in which one bases a belief on an ability to infer it (2006a, 189). Sinnott-Armstrong also suggests that reference to a basing relation, as he conceives of it, might be dropped for the sake of simplicity. He writes, ‘…opponents of moral intuitionism, who claim that an inferential ability is necessary, do not have to claim that any inferential ability is sufficient to make any moral belief justified. Maybe the moral belief must also be based upon the inferential ability’ (2006a, 189 n.16). Sinnott-Armstrong’s idea is that he is only examining the weakest, most minimal conditions for justification. If Sinnott-Armstrong’s minimal discussion of an inferential ability presents a problem for intuitionism, then adding a stronger, further condition might spell even greater trouble for the intuitionist. What is not appreciated here is that positive conditions for inferential justification are not the only concern. We are also interested in what it would mean for a moral belief to be non-inferential and justified, in the intuitionist’s sense. If a non-inferential moral belief for intuitionists is one that is not held on the basis of a reason, I argue below that this represents a significant difference from a belief that is, or might be, non-inferable. Therefore I do not think that dispensing with the basing relation, as I understand it, is innocent.
Compare this idea to Audi’s distinction between structurally inferential and episodically inferential beliefs. See Audi (1993, 238).
See Sinnott-Armstrong (2006b, 363).
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Acknowledgements
For their helpful comments and discussion, I would like to thank Patrick McKee and Deborah Mower.
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Tropman, E. Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge. Acta Anal 26, 355–366 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-011-0126-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-011-0126-0