Abstract
Recently, some philosophers of science (e.g., Gürol Irzik, Michael Friedman) have challenged the ‘received view’ on the relationship between Rudolf Carnap and Thomas Kuhn, suggesting that there is a close affinity (rather than opposition) between their philosophical views. In support of this argument, these authors cite Carnap and Kuhn’s similar views on incommensurability, theory-choice, and scientific revolutions. Against this revisionist view, I argue that the philosophical relationship between Carnap and Kuhn should be regarded as opposed, rather than complementary. In particular, I argue that a consideration of the fundamentally disparate nature of the broader philosophical projects of Carnap (the logic of science) and Kuhn (providing a theory of scientific revolutions) renders the alleged similarities between their views superficial in comparison to their fundamental differences. In defense of the received view, I suggest that Carnap and Kuhn are model representatives of two contrasting styles of doing philosophy of science, viz., logical analysis and historical analysis respectively. This analysis clarifies the role played by Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the demise of logical empiricism in the second half of the twentieth-century.
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- 1.
At the outset, it is important to note that there is variability among how strongly (and how qualified) the revisionist thesis is advanced by various authors. Moreover, different revisionist analyses have been forwarded for various purposes, e.g., Friedman’s (2001, 2003) analysis is motivated to demonstrate a shared neo-Kantian heritage inherited by Carnap and Kuhn (see DiSalle 2002; Richardson 2002; Tsou 2003; Lange 2004). The main target of the argument in this paper is Gürol Irzik and Teo Grünberg’s (1995) influential article, “Carnap and Kuhn: Arch Enemies or Close Allies?”, which offers one of the strongest expressions of the revisionist view. While my argument focuses on Irzik and Grunberg’s (1995) article, it is more broadly applicable to other revisionist analyses that, either explicitly or implicitly, follow a similar line of reasoning.
- 2.
Gürol Irzik (2003) has argued—correctly, in my judgment—against this specific claim. In particular, Irzik opposes “relativist” interpretations of Carnap and Kuhn (e.g., see Friedman 1998, 2001), suggesting that both Carnap and Kuhn hold nuanced views on scientific rationality that are not accurately described as “relativist” (cf. Axtell 1993; Irzik 2003, pp. 331–335).
- 3.
- 4.
In Chap. 5 of Structure (“The Priority of Paradigms”), Kuhn argues that it is paradigms (rather than explicit rules) that determine the nature of normal science. Kuhn suggests that paradigms are prior to rules in a temporal sense (i.e., paradigms will suggest certain rules, but not in a determinate way), but also in terms of importance (i.e., paradigms are more important than the rules that are abstracted from the paradigm for binding a community of scientists during normal science). On the basis of these considerations, Kuhn suggests that philosophers of science ought to focus their attention on paradigms (i.e., exemplars), as a unit of analysis, rather than explicit rules. It is important to notice that Kuhn’s methodological prescription is opposed to Carnap’s attempt to reduce scientific theories to a set of explicit rules (e.g., syntax). Moreover, the tacit rules discussed by Kuhn are not the same kinds of rules at the core of Carnap’s linguistic frameworks (Pincock 2012, pp. 127–128).
- 5.
From a somewhat different perspective, Peter Galison (1995) suggests that Kuhnian paradigms and Carnapian linguistic frameworks are similar insofar as they represent science in terms of “island empires,” i.e., isolated and relatively stable assemblages of experimental and theoretical procedures and results. Galison opposes this island empire picture of science because it conceals the fragmented and heterogeneous nature of science.
- 6.
As a qualification, Kuhn’s naturalistic approach was most marked in Structure, and in his post-Structure writings. Kuhn took a ‘linguistic turn’ wherein his work became more traditionally philosophical and relied less heavily on the history of science (see Irzik and Grünberg 1998; Bird 2000, 2002, 2004; Kindi 2005; Mladenović 2007; Gattei 2008). In offering a qualified defense of the received view on the Carnap-Kuhn relationship, my claim is that Kuhn’s early philosophical views—as exemplified in Structure—are significantly different than the style of philosophy of science championed by Carnap. While Irzik and Grünberg (1995) focus on Kuhn’s later work in advancing their argument that Carnap and Kuhn are ‘close allies,’ I focus on Kuhn’s early views because: (1) Kuhn’s Structure was much more influential and widely read by philosophers of science than his later works, and (2) Kuhn’s Structure is the most relevant work for the received view on the Carnap-Kuhn relationship that maintains that Kuhn contributed to the demise of logical empiricism by offering a revolutionary approach to philosophy of science (discussed in Sect. 5.5 of this chapter).
- 7.
- 8.
Kuhn ([1962] 1996, Ch. 13, pp. 205–207) adopts an instrumentalist stance on theory-choice insofar as he suggests that, historically, paradigms that emerged as victors did so because they had greater puzzle-solving power, i.e., they could solve a significant number of puzzles of the previous paradigm and could also solve new puzzles (see Tsou 2006, pp. 216–217).
- 9.
Kuhn’s bottom-up methodology can be understood as a particularist (as opposed to generalist) approach to philosophy of science. From this perspective, Structure can be located in a broader tradition of particularist approaches in philosophy (e.g., see Kant [1781] 1998; Wittgenstein [1953] 1958; Sellars [1956] 1997; McDowell 1979; Brandom 1994). For connections between Kuhn’s and Wittgenstein’s views, see Kindi (1995; 2012) and Sharrock and Reid (2002). As an alternative to this reading of Structure as a particularist approach, see Richardson, Chap. 4, this volume.
- 10.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Kuhn’s Structure emerged as the most iconic and influential example of the new historical philosophy of science associated with writers such as Norwood Russell Hanson (1958), Stephen Toulmin (1961), Paul Feyerabend (1975), and Larry Laudan (1977). Retrospectively, these works have jointly been responsible for the ‘historical turn’ in philosophy of science (Bird 2008). In addition to its influence in philosophy of science, Structure had an arguably larger influence in the social sciences, especially among sociologists of science (see Bird 2000, Chap. 7); Kuhn famously repudiated relativist interpretations of his work by proponents of the Strong Programme of the sociology of scientific knowledge (Kuhn 2000, Chap. 5). For further discussion of Kuhn’s relation to the sociology of science and the Strong Programme, see K. Brad Wray (Chap. 12) in this volume.
- 11.
With characteristic honesty, Kuhn admitted that he had not read any of the mature works of Carnap when he was writing Structure (see Borradori [1991] 1994, p. 153; Kuhn 2000, pp. 227, 305–306; Irzik 2012, appendix). Wray (2013) points out that Kuhn likely did not feel the need to read later positivist works since he was well-acquainted with Quine’s ([1951] 1980) critiques of Carnap, while Kuhn and Quine were colleagues at the Harvard Society of Fellows (see Kuhn 2000, p. 279).
- 12.
Besides Structure, Quine’s influential criticisms of Carnap (Quine [1951] 1980, 1969) undoubtedly served to stabilize the image of logical empiricism as an impoverished project in empiricist foundationalism (see Reisch 2005, pp. 3–5). For criticisms of Quine’s presentation of Carnap in the context of the Carnap-Quine analyticity debates, see Creath (1991), Stein (1992), and Friedman (1999, 2001).
- 13.
This aspect of the revisionist argument is part of the larger movement of historical scholarship on logical empiricism (e.g., see Coffa 1991; Cartwright et al. 1996; Giere and Richardson 1996; Nemeth and Stadler 1996; Richardson 1998; Friedman 1999; Hardcastle and Richardson 2003; Stadler 2003; Awodey and Klein 2004; Okruhlik 2004; Reisch 2005; Carus 2007; Friedman and Creath 2007; Richardson and Uebel 2007; Uebel 2007; Creath 2012), which has revealed both the great complexity of thought as well as heterogeneity within logical empiricism.
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Alan Richardson, Vasso Kindi, Christian Damböck, Trevor Pearce, Scott Edgar, Ian Hacking, Bill Wimsatt, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Chris Pincock, Morgan Harrop, Philip Hanson, Gürol Irzik, George Reisch, Greg Frost-Arnold, David Marshall Miller, David Alexander, Uljana Feest, Thomas Uebel, and Matteo Collodel for helpful comments and suggestions. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the ninth biennial meeting of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science (HOPOS) at University of King’s College, Halifax, NS, June 2012; the twenty-third biennial meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) in San Diego, CA, November 2012; and the third annual Philosophy Alumni Conference at Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, March 2013. I am grateful for feedback that I received on these occasions. Special thanks to Harrop (my commentator at the SFU alumni conference) for his detailed and extensive written comments.
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Tsou, J. (2015). Reconsidering the Carnap-Kuhn Connection. In: Devlin, W., Bokulich, A. (eds) Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 311. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13383-6_5
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