

ob man intellektuelle Fähigkeiten des menschlichen Bewusstseins nachweisen kann, von denen sich einwandfrei zeigen lässt, dass sie nicht durch eine Turing-Maschine realisierbar sind. (Siehe etwa Wang, *op.cit.*, Abschnitt 6.2) Zu dieser Fragestellung würde man sich gerade von einem phänomenologischen Denkansatz mehr erwarten, als im Buch angeboten wird.

Insgesamt ist also zu kritisieren, dass Tieszen trotz des Buchtitels keine Lösungsansätze für zwei spezifisch Gödelsche Fragen hat. Die Lösungen, die der Autor bietet, beantworten durchaus allgemeine philosophische Fragen nach mathematischem Platonismus und Anti-Reduktionismus in der Philosophie des Geistes, die sich aus Gödels Werk ergeben. Aber die besonderen logisch-mathematischen Aspekte an Platonismus und Anti-Mechanismus, die Gödel intensiv beschäftigten, bleiben in Tieszens phänomenologischem Ansatz bisher unteranalysiert. Man kann das natürlich auch positiv wenden und hier Chancen für weitere Forschung sehen.

Im Lichte dieses zweiten Kritikpunktes möchte ich folgende abschließende Bewertung von Richard Tieszens *After Gödel* anbieten: In dieser Monographie wird erfolgreich aufgezeigt, dass Husserls Phänomenologie einen erfolgversprechenden Ansatz bietet, die philosophischen Herausforderungen Gödels zu meistern. Die tatsächliche Durchführung ist Tieszen in Grundzügen gelungen, aber insgesamt hat er die Philosophie Gödels noch nicht eingeholt.

*Stil und Organisation des Buchs: After Gödel* ist klar und sehr gut lesbar und ohne Verwendung von Formalismen geschrieben. Das Buch kommt aus meiner Sicht auch gut ohne formale Hilfsmittel aus. Ob sie an der einen oder anderen Stelle dennoch hilfreich gewesen wären, scheint mir allein vom individuellen Rezipienten abzuhängen. Aber die äußere Strukturierung des Buchs ist nicht optimal gelungen. Das beginnt schon dabei, dass die zahlreichen Unterparagraphen der acht Kapitel nicht im Inhaltsverzeichnis aufgeführt sind, was Suchen im Text mühsam macht. Tieszen bedient sich zudem zahlreicher Querverweise im Text, die aber in der Regel nur auf "vorherige" oder "folgende" Abschnitte verweisen, also letztlich unklar bleiben, was das Auffinden der gemeinten Stellen leider sehr mühsam und langwierig gestaltet. Gerade deswegen wäre es auch hilfreich gewesen, in dem völlig unstrukturiert fortlaufenden Text in jedem Paragraphen wichtige Thesen und Argumente hervorzuheben, etwa durch Einrückung und Nummerierung oder eine anderweitige Benennung.

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Kripke, Saul. 2013. *Reference and Existence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (184 pp., ISBN 978-0-19-992838-5).\*

Saul Kripke's new book is the written version of his notorious John Locke Lectures from 1973, entitled *Reference and Existence*. The book contains the six lectures, the elaborate discussion and application of Kripke's earlier conception – worked out in *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke 1980 – to such problems as reference, existence, negative existential claims, fictional characters, semantical and speaker's reference 'in order to tie up some loose ends' (3).

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Before we discuss some elements of Kripke's work in details, we have to clarify two panels of his *metaphilosophy* in order to set up the stage: (i) *appealing to intuition* and (ii) *theory-opposition*. Kripke has maintained that our pre-philosophical intuitions and common sense commitments play the fundamental role in the philosophical argumentations as already elaborated in *Naming and Necessity*. As he puts it:

Of course, some philosophers think that something's having intuitive content is very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything; myself I really don't know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking. (Kripke 1980, 42)

The other element of Kripke's metaphilosophy is his theory-opposition ('TO'). In the sense of TO the peculiarity of philosophical theories is that they are destined to fail – they are false. Kripke does not discuss the details of this (seemingly late-Wittgensteinian) commitment but gives the following declaration when he presents the descriptivist theory of names: "It really is a nice theory. The only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. It's wrong" (Kripke 1980, 64). This passage could be read as claiming that the task of philosophy is to appeal to our intuitions and to reveal certain misunderstanding and dissolve the artificial and sterile problems typically generated by philosophers. Our intuitions are, however, significantly diversified, thus they are usually contradictory, and produce certain tensions. Since one of the main important virtues of theories is their inner consistency our intuitions cannot yield any suitable theory; therefore, though Kripke is not talking about pictures explicitly, the task of philosophy is to draw *pictures* about the problematic discourses.

Pictures might have some *prima facie* advantages over theories. While theories are restricted regarding their frameworks and underlying constructive principles – e. g. consistency, coherence, explanatory force, simplicity etc. –, as we could say, pictures do not have to 'represent' their captured *something* so *sharply* and *rigidly*. Pictures can be drawn with rough-and-ready strokes. This point is, of course, true about Kripke's own conception: "You may suspect me of proposing another theory [...]; but I hope not, because I'm sure it's wrong too if it is a theory" (Kripke 1980, 64).

*Reference and Existence* (hereafter RE) shows the signs of Kripke's just discussed metaphilosophy relatively frequently. In the first lecture we find the question "how naming relates to existence, in particular the problem of vacuous name and reference to what does not exist, of fictional entities, of existential statements, and the like" (3). This question is important, since, as the saying goes, any (semantical or reference) theory which can account for the fictional discourses (and the negative existential statements) can gain some advantages over its alternatives. The problem is that we have the intuition that both 'Sherlock Holmes does not exist' and 'Sherlock Holmes is an outstanding detective' are true. This seems to be a problem, since we also have the intuition that what does not exist cannot be an outstanding detective. This is especially important in the case of a Millian view of names (like Kripke's own) which claims that proper names are rigid designators, that is, they refer to the same individual in every possible situation. In this view, proper names do not possess any meaning beyond that they (directly) refer to the named individual and their semantical contribution to the sentence in which they occur is to referring to an individual. If that is the case how could we understand such sentences and even more puzzlingly how could they be true if there is no referent?

Kripke seems to think, however, that “the existence of fiction is a powerful argument for absolutely nothing” (23). Though the case of fictions that contain names seems to provide an inescapable problem for a Millian conception where the only function of names is referring, Kripke provides an answer:

When one writes a work of fiction, it is part of the pretense of that fiction that the criteria for naming, whatever they are, are satisfied. [...] Perhaps what makes it a work of fiction is that these criteria are not in fact satisfied, but pretense is just that: a pretense. So I will call this ‘The Pretense Principle’. (23–24)

So, even if there are no referents in the fiction we *pretend* that there are.

One could raise a question about the status of propositions at this point. If we pretend that names are referring, what could be said about propositions? Kripke claims that the Pretense Principle (‘PP’) entails that “for a follower of Mill, the proposition that occurs in a work of fiction would only be pretended propositions” (23). At this point we are left with our *intuitions*; we do not get any detailed or structured theory about either pretending or propositions but have to rely on our ordinary language practices, on our intuitive understanding. Suppose I am not a millionaire, but I can pretend that I am one. I could still conceive the way how I would spend my (non-existent) money while presumably it would not be a problem for anyone to understand that I would spend my money on cars, on houses and travelling even though actually I could not afford all of that. Likewise, there is no Sherlock Holmes but I can still talk like there was one and still everyone would grasp what I am saying about him who is familiar with the story. Neither do we get any detailed or worked out *theory* of propositions. Kripke’s *picture* is a very common conception of propositions in philosophy, namely that propositions and sentences are not identical and sentences can express propositions, but that’s all we have to know.

In Lecture 2 Kripke draws his picture with the help of PP. The questions of fiction and myth and their modal contexts are in the focus of his interest. He argues that “there are no such genuine propositions as that Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street” (42); since there is no Sherlock Holmes actually, ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is a fictional name. But that also means that there are no modal propositions about Sherlock Holmes (about his possible existence) “for there are no propositions to be true of a certain hypothetical world” (*ibid.*). Kripke formulates similar claims about certain predicates like ‘unicorn’, ‘dragon’. Speaking about certain entities that have the external characteristics of unicorns, special conditions are to be mentioned: “not only should they look like unicorns but they should *be* unicorns, have the same internal structure. Unfortunately, the story just doesn’t tell us what the internal structure of a unicorn is supposed to be, and therefore it hasn’t told us which hypothetical animal to look for in another possible world” (47) which means that one cannot say of any particular possible world that it could contain unicorns. In fact we have to conclude that the predicate ‘unicorn’ is merely pretended and it is precisely analogous to that of the hypothetical proper name ‘Sherlock Holmes’.

Despite these somewhat negative conclusions about fictional characters and, so to say, fictional predicates, Kripke’s next step is to show the two senses in which the statement ‘There really is a Sherlock Holmes’ is true. This is done in Lecture 3 where Kripke’s frame for argumentation is based on intuitions and ordinary practices, like everyday discussions and argumentations again. “What do we mean when we say that Hamlet thought many things? It seems clear that there *is* a sense in which the assertion is true. A pupil would

receive a low mark if, on a true-false test, he marked ‘Hamlet soliloquized’ as ‘false’” (57). Kripke claims that normally we proceed as if statements about fictional characters *were true*. They are simply true *according to the story*, i. e. when we are talking about fictional characters the general and ordinary rule is “that it counts as true if it is a true report of what is in the story” (58).

This is the first sense in which we can state that ‘Sherlock Holmes exists’ is true. Kripke introduces, however, a more radical sense (an ‘out-and-out’ reading) in which that statement is true. He takes our relevant ordinary statements about fictional characters at face value and claims that in them we *quantify* over fictional characters therefore we commit ourselves to the existence of fictional characters (71). To get closer to Kripke’s ideas let’s take the case of predicates. Kripke claims that in the first sense predicates are attached to the implicit qualifier ‘in the story’ or ‘according to the story’. In the second sense, however, the predicate is attached to a real entity, an abstract entity that exists actually, in our world, so to say. “A fictional character [ . . . ] is an abstract entity. It exists in virtue of more concrete activities of telling stories, writing plays, writing novels, and so on [ . . . ]” (73).

The specification of this relation between these activities and the fictional characters is not worked out in details but “should be obvious on its own intuitive character” (ibid.). We get an example anyway: “[abstract fictional characters] exist in virtue of more concrete activities the same way a nation is an abstract entity which exists in virtue of concrete relations between people” (ibid.). This example also highlights another important aspect of fictional characters: as nations depend in a(n intuitive) sense on the citizens’ activities and relations, “no fictional characters would exist if people had never told fiction” (76). Therefore it seems like as fictional characters are part of our ordinary ontology, or what would be a better phrase, worldview and are abstract artifacts, *products of human activity*. At this point one could expect a certain metaphysical or ontological theory about these existents, but as a consequence of TO, Kripke did not work out this conception as a theory; rather we get a picture which can be understood on the basis of his many examples in the lectures.

This two-kinds-of-predication picture is being used in Lecture IV in a much wider – and at first maybe even surprising – context; Kripke confronts his picture with the problems of perceptual verbs and objects of sight. His main target is the debate between Ayer and Austin on sense data. Kripke’s concerns are, however, not epistemological, he is doing ordinary language philosophy at its best – taking certain phenomena as evident and uncovering the conceptual and intuitive nature of the discourse the main element of which is ‘to see’. He tries to settle the question on the base of an analogy with predication regarding fictional characters. Take a star which appears from the Earth as a speck, which is smaller than a sixpence. Normally we would say that the speck *is* the star, but since they got incompatible properties (one is a huge astronomical object, while the other is a little dot) they cannot be identical. Kripke claims that if we follow our ordinary practices and intuitions we can get over of this problem. Just like we can predicate certain properties to Sherlock Holmes truly ‘according to the story’ and in an ‘out-and-out’ sense to the abstract entity, we can distinguish between “the out-and-out interpretation of the predicates (‘I see a very large star’); and the way the object really looks (smaller than a sixpence) [ . . . ]” (98) where the latter contains an implicit qualifier, namely ‘according to the appearances’. This does not mean that we have to account for two ontologically different things (the speck and the star), these are just “two different forms of language” (104).

We saw the different senses in which we can state truly that fictional characters exist. Kripke's last task is to show in which senses can we truly state that they do not exist. Nevertheless Lecture V did not discuss this question but contains a discussion of the distinction between semantical and speaker's reference. Kripke is working on different cases of (not) having a referent in a discourse but since these ideas are to be found in more details also in Kripke 1977 so I won't stress them here. We should rather move to his last lecture.

In the last lecture Kripke takes the problem of negative existentials, which "become more acute rather than less so, on [his] views" (144). Kripke discusses various alternative proposals and criticizes in details the so-called *metalinguistic analysis* which claims that the statement 'Sherlock Holmes does not exist' is equivalent to the statement 'The name "Sherlock Holmes" is empty'. Kripke formulates different criticisms against this view one of which relies only on our ordinary practices and intuitions. He says that let us suppose

one is telling the child, who is now getting grown up [...] 'Look, Santa Claus doesn't really exist.' If one is able to tell the child that, the child must have learned something about Santa Clause. He isn't really just being told that some name, which he may otherwise not understand at all, has no referent. [...] If he comes to believe that Santa Claus does not exist, and express this belief afterwards by saying that 'Santa Claus does not exist', he is using the name and not mentioning it. (153)

Of course Kripke admits that "when someone knows who Santa Claus is, then he will believe that Santa Claus doesn't exist if, and only if, the name 'Santa Claus' has no referent. [...] That is not to say, though, that all he means by 'Santa Claus doesn't exist' is that the name 'Santa Claus' has no referent" (155). So Kripke claims that there *is* a certain difference between the negative existential and the metalinguistic sentence, therefore the metalinguistic procedure fails.

Some critical considerations could be mentioned here. If we are to talk about such logically oriented procedures, one of the most important examples is the work of Rudolf Carnap. In his notorious idea of *explication* Carnap tries to transfer ambiguous and shallow ordinary notions into scientifically respectful and unambiguous ones (see Carnap 1950, §§ 1–5). Regarding this procedure there are certain conditions that need not be mentioned here, the point, however is, that claiming that a sentence in an ideal and sterile language is ideal and sterile is just begging the question. If the only requirement in the metalinguistic analyzes is that we have to preserve the truth-value of the object language statement, then the procedure is successful. Of course something is lost regarding certain elements of meaning or mental images but they are beyond the point. Kripke's claim that a child does not mention but uses the name 'Santa Claus' and does not mean by 'Santa Claus doesn't exist' that 'The name "Santa Claus" is empty' is just right, but at this point he is in agreement with the metalinguistic analyzer. In a Carnapian explication we do not claim that when the child says 'Santa Claus doesn't exist' she means that 'The name "Santa Claus" is empty'; the latter is a *proposal* to grasp the *logical core* of the statement or is an *explicatum* which is independent from our ordinary intuitions.

At this point we have arrived at a seemingly dead end. So to say, Kripke and the metalinguistic analyzer work on different fields and as Kripke himself remarks, at some points he has a certain tendency to throw up his hands (155). We are facing here a *metaphilosophical* dilemma. Kripke noted earlier (76, n. 16) that he does not share a certain philosophical

*attitude*, i. e. that ‘scientific language’ can reject ordinary discourse. Ordinary discourse and pre-philosophical intuitions provide the examples and commitments to Kripke. On the base of these the framing of philosophical theories is highly questionable according to him, but useful pictures can be drawn, which are, however, sometimes quite “complicated and messy” (159).

Despite the fact that the lectures were held forty years ago in 1973, the book is not just a documentation of the philosophical stage of the 70s and a thinker’s intellectual development. Even though one is asked implicitly to embrace a special metaphilosophical attitude, *Reference and Existence* shall be an influential work in various contemporary debates and discussions since it contains countless dilemmas, questions, proposals and innovative ideas regarding the relation between reference and existence, fictional characters and discourse, negative existentials, semantical and speaker’s reference, indirect discourse and modal notions.

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## References

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