Abstract
Notoriously, the dispositional view of natural properties is thought to face a number of regress problems, one of which points to an epistemological worry. In this paper, I argue that the rival categorical view is also susceptible to the same kind of regress problem. This problem can be overcome, most plausibly, with the development of a structuralist epistemology. After identifying problems faced by alternative solutions, I sketch the main features of this structuralist epistemological approach, referring to graph-theoretic modelling in the process. Given that both the categoricalists and dispositionalists are under pressure to adopt this same epistemological approach in light of the regress problem, this suggests that the categoricalist versus dispositionalist debate is best fought on metaphysical rather than epistemological grounds.
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Notes
Lewis expresses this thought in two different ways, by appealing to the permutation scenario and the replacement scenario. For further details see Lewis (2009).
It is worth noting that the term ‘internal relation’ is a slippery one, and is used in different ways in different contexts. See for example Barker (2009), who distinguishes between Armstrongian, Leibnizian and Bradleyan internal relations (Barker 2009, pp. 246–247). The notion of internality described above is the Leibnizian one.
The following regress objection can be framed without addressing the question of what, precisely, the nomic relation amounts to. Armstrong (1983, Ch. 6), takes the nomic relation to be a sui generis relation between properties. Other categoricalists view nomicity in terms of regularity relations: see for e.g. Lewis (1973, p. 73).
This appears to be how Fales, who holds something like a dual aspect view of properties, thinks the epistemology of properties should be tackled (1990, p. 222).
See Lewis for a related worry (2009. p. 217). He considers whether the fundamental quiddities could all be construed as qualia as a way of answering the global quidditistic scepticism discussed earlier, but he rejects this proposal on the grounds that qualia clash with his materialist commitments.
In a recent book chapter, Paul (2013) draws a similar conclusion (though from a somewhat different angle) with regards to Lewisian metaphysical realism. Paul argues that our scientific terms can have determinate reference on Lewis’s system (thereby overcoming Putnam’s model-theoretic problem), but that this is contingent on our world having the right kind of (non-symmetrical) structure.
Localised versions of the symmetry problem have also been raised in the philosophy of mind. Those who accept the possibility of inverted qualia, for example, accept that two distinct qualitative experiences could play identical functional roles. In the case of intersubjective qualia inversion (Shoemaker 1975, p. 197), because the functional roles of people’s differing experiences would be the same, the differences in those experiences would be completely undetectable (all the perceivers would still overtly agree on which objects count as having which colour, for example). This suggests, among other things, that purely functional theories of mind miss something out. See Shoemaker (1975) for a functionalist response. Needless to say, it would be nice for the categoricalists if they could find an argument to rule out functional symmetries in all cases, whether they be phenomenal or non-phenomenal ones.
Hawthorne illustrates by asking us to consider the following scenario: ‘there are four properties, call them A, B, C, D. Here are the laws governing them: ANC, BNC, (A and B)ND’ (2006, p. 224). Here, A and B are distinct, since their coinstantiation has different effects than is produced by single instantiations of them. Such a structure, Hawthorne claims, is intuitively possible yet is clearly symmetrical.
The same point applies to another structuralist view which would allow for symmetrical structures, one which was first suggested by Shoemaker and which Hawthorne calls ‘modest’ structuralism. For details of this view see Hawthorne 2006, appendix, pp. 226–227.
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My thanks go to the anonymous referees for their very helpful comments.
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Tugby, M. Categoricalism, dispositionalism, and the epistemology of properties. Synthese 191, 1147–1162 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0316-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0316-y