Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-nr4z6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-07T15:57:00.177Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Thinking What One is Doing: Knowledge-how, Methods, and Reliability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 June 2021

John Turman Open the ORCID record for John Turman [Opens in a new window]
John Turman*
Affiliation:
Stanford University, CA, USA
*
Email: john.michael.turman@gmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

There has been renewed interest over the last twenty years in Ryle's claims and arguments about knowledge-how. Elzinga (2018) and Löwenstein (2017) have both recently defended independent Ryle-inspired accounts of knowledge-how. In what follows, I will propose and defend an amendment to accounts of knowledge-how like those of Elzinga and Löwenstein. I argue that this amendment provides an additional needed distinction between the performance robustness provided by certain performance methods (or styles), and the robustness of an agent's ability to perform according to such methods (or styles). Additionally, the proposed amendment, if adopted, will make the amended views even more Rylean. I argue for this, in part, through original exegetical work on an under-discussed theme in Ryle's philosophy of mind: the relation between semi-hypothetical statements, methodological act-description, and knowledge-how.

Keywords

Knowledge-howRyleReliabilitySemi-hypotheticalIntelligenceMethods
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 2023 , pp. 195 - 211
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bäckström, S. and Gustafsson, M. (2017). ‘Skill, Drill, and Intelligent Performance: Ryle and Intellectualism.’ Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5(5), 40–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elzinga, B. (2018). ‘Self-regulation and Knowledge How.’ Episteme 15(1), 119–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gram, M.S. (1974). ‘Mongrel Categoricals and Category Mistakes.’ Southern Journal of Philosophy 12(1), 35–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hawley, K. (2003). ‘Success and Knowledge-how.’ American Philosophical Quarterly 40(1), 19–31.Google Scholar
Hofstadter, A. (1951). ‘Professor Ryle's Category-mistake.’ Journal of Philosophy 48(9), 257–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hornsby, J. (2011). ‘Ryle's Knowing How and Knowing How to Act.’ In Bengson, J. and Moffett, M.A. (eds), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, pp. 80–100. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
King, H.R. (1951). ‘Professor Ryle and the Concept of Mind.’ Journal of Philosophy 48(9), 280–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kremer, M. (2017 a). ‘A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge.’ European Journal of Philosophy 25(1), 25–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kremer, M. (2017 b). ‘Ryle's “Intellectualist Legend” in Historical Context.’ Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5(5), 16–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Löwenstein, D. (2017). Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. https://philarchive.org/archive/LWEKACv2.Google Scholar
Lyons, W. (1979). ‘Ryle's Three Accounts of Thinking.’ International Philosophical Quarterly 19(4), 443–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parry, R.D. (1980). ‘Ryle's Theory of Action in the Concept of Mind.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40(3), 379–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryle, G. (1945). ‘Knowing How and Knowing That: The Presidential Address.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46, 1–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryle, G. (2009 [1949]). The Concept of Mind. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sax, G. (2010). ‘Having Know-how: Intellect, Action, and Recent Work on Ryle's Distinction Between Knowledge-how and Knowledge-that.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91(4), 507–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Small, W (2017). ‘Ryle on the Explanatory Role of Knowledge How.’ Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5(5), 56–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stout, R. (2003). ‘Ryle's Behaviourism.’ Revue internationale de philosophie 1, 37–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tanney, J. (2017). ‘Volume Introduction: Gilbert Ryle on Propositions, Propositional Attitudes, and Theoretical Knowledge.’ Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5(5), 1–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Waights Hickman, N. (2019). ‘Knowing in the “Executive Way”: Knowing How, Rules, Methods, Principles and Criteria.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99(2), 311–335.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weldon, T. (1950). ‘The Concept of Mind.’ Philosophy 25(94), 266–270.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
White, A. (1964). Attention. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
White, A. (1967). The Philosophy of Mind. New York, NY: Random House.Google Scholar