

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE DISJUNCTIVE THEORY OF PERCEPTION

JÁNOS TÓZSÉR

MTA-ELTE Philosophy of Language Research Group

ABSTRACT

According to the phenomenological argument for disjunctivism, the reasons why we should prefer the disjunctive theory over its rivals is that (1) the disjunctive theory conforms the most to our pretheoretical or natural convictions about perception (what Michael Martin calls naïve realism), and (2) we should commit ourselves to naïve realism because it conforms the most to the phenomenology of the perceptual experience of objects. In this paper I try to explain why is the phenomenal argument **exceptionally** strong argument for disjunctivism and at the same time against **sense-datum and intentional** theories. Furthermore I try to show that the disjunctivist's explanation of hallucination (which is allegedly the weak point of the theory) is as plausible as its rivals'.

Key words: perceptual experience, sense-datum theory, intentional/representational theory, disjunctivism, transparency, perceptual presence.

Introduction

The disjunctive theory of perception rejects the Common Kind Thesis, according to which if a subject's hallucinative perceptual experience is subjectively indistinguishable from her genuine perceptual experience, then the subject is in the same type/kind of mental state. According to disjunctivists genuine perception and hallucination, even if subjectively indistinguishable, are different kinds of mental states.

There are two customary arguments for the disjunctive theory of perception. One argument (e.g. McDowell 1982, 1994, Putnam 1994) is that the disjunctive theory is better than its rivals (sense-datum theories and intentional/representational theories), because only the disjunctive theory can account for the fact that there is no gap between our perceptual experiences and the mind-independent world, and therefore, only the disjunctive theory can effectively counter the problem of scepticism about the external world. As Putnam puts it: the main fault of non-

disjunctive theories is that they accept “the idea that there has to be an interface between our cognitive powers and the external world [...], the idea that our cognitive powers cannot reach all the way to the objects themselves” (Putnam, 1994, 453). The other argument is a phenomenological one (Martin, 2002, 2004, 2006). According to this argument: the reason why we should prefer the disjunctive theory over its rivals is that (1) the disjunctive theory conforms the most to our pretheoretical or natural convictions about perception (what Martin calls naïve realism), and (2) we should commit ourselves to naïve realism because it conforms the most to the phenomenology of the perceptual experience of objects. So, whereas the disjunctive theory is a phenomenologically plausible theory of the perceptual experience of objects, rival theories are not (or are not completely).

In this paper I deal with the phenomenological argument. My paper consists of five parts. In the first part I show the reasoning strategy of disjunctivism, which is at the same time the phenomenological argument itself. In the second part I present the strategy of sense-datum theory, and in third part I present the strategy of intentional theory. In the fourth part I try to explain why is the phenomenological argument exceptionally strong argument for disjunctivism and at the same time against sense-datum and intentional theories. In the fifth part I try to show that the disjunctivist’s explanation of hallucination (which is allegedly the weak point of the theory) is as plausible as its rivals’.

1. The disjunctive strategy

We have two fundamental, natural convictions about the perception of objects. The first is that when we perceive an object in our environment, the object perceived (the object we are aware of in the perception) is *independent* of our mind and our actual perceptual experience. Suppose I see a tomato in front of me. It is our natural conviction that in this perceptual experience (1) I am aware of the tomato only, and (2) I am not aware of any entity the existence of which is dependent on my actual perceptual experience – that is, of any entity which is mind-dependent. In other words, when I perceive the tomato (1) I directly perceive the mind-independent tomato, and (2) I do not perceive it in virtue of perceiving some mind-dependent entity.

Our other natural conviction is that when we perceive an object in our environment, the object perceived is a *constitutive element* of our perceptual experience of the object in question. Assume again that I see a tomato in front of me. In this case, it is a natural conviction that the perceptual experience I have when perceiving the tomato cannot be individuated without reference to the object perceived. Thus the tomato is a constitutive element of my perceptual experience.

The first natural conviction concerns the nature of the *object* we are aware of in a case of genuine perception – namely, that it is mind-independent. Our second natural conviction concerns the nature of the *relation* between the object perceived and the perceptual experience thereof – namely, that the former is a constitutive element of the latter. In what follows I shall refer to the first conviction as the Mind-Independence Thesis and to the second as the Constitutive Dependence Thesis.

These natural convictions are both rooted in phenomenology; both can be defended by citing certain phenomenological facts. Let me first consider the phenomenological fact that supports the Mind-Independence Thesis. I ask you to observe an object in your environment (for example the table in front of you, your hand etc.) as naturally as you can. Then reverse the direction of your attention. Do not focus on the object itself but to what it is like for you to perceive the object in question. The phenomenological insight you ought to have arrived at during this exercise is the following: in the second case, while concentrating to what it is like for you to perceive the object, your attention shifted from the object to your inside, it did not appear to you as if the mind-independent object were replaced by an object of another (mind-dependent) sort. As Martin writes “the public, mind-independent objects of perception and their features are not banished from one’s attention just because one shifts one’s interest from how things are in the environment to how things are experientially” (Martin 2002, 384). To put it another way: if we were aware of mind-independent objects in virtue of being aware of mind-dependent entities – that is, if we perceived mind-independent objects in virtue of perceiving mind-dependent entities –, then these mind-dependent entities should be manifest to us when we turn our attention to what it is like for us to perceive them. However – and this is the phenomenological fact which supports the Mind-Independence Thesis – no such mind-dependent entities become manifest when we reverse the direction of our attention: the mind-independent objects we are aware of in perception are **not replaced by mind-dependent entities**. Couched in received terminology, perceptual experience is *transparent* to mind-independent world.

Let me now turn to the phenomenological fact which supports the Constitutive Dependence Thesis. I ask you to entertain the thought that “the New York Statue of Liberty holds a torch in its hand.” Now that “Mussolini always flourished during his speeches.” And now that “Rainbows come into existence over waterfalls.” Stop. Look at your left palm. Now at your right wrist. Now look at your table. The phenomenological insight you ought to have arrived at is the following: there is a fundamental difference between how the objects of your three thoughts and how the objects of your three perceptual experiences were given to you. In your perceptual experiences it seemed to you as though something (some object) were *robustly* given to you in comparison with the object of thought: your palm, wrist and table were *there* to you, they were *presented* for you. In contrast with the objects of your thoughts, the objects of your perceptual experience entered your perceptual experience itself. As Robinson puts it:

It can hardly be disputed that experience reveals the nature of objects [...] in a way that other mental states or attitudes do not. They are characterized by the fact that they do not require the presence of the object in question; whether an object is there when you think of or desire it is immaterial to the phenomenology of thought and desire as such. They are essentially acts tailored to the absence of their objects. This is shown in the fact that the experiential differences between other intentional states – between fearing, loving, desiring, for example – do not consist in any difference in the manner of the presence of the object, but in manner of the subject's response to the object. The object is present purely intellectually, that is, as an object of thought, in all these cases. But in sensory experience the role of the object is quite different. In contrast to its absence in the other cases, experience is something by which the object is [...] made present, and which without the [...] presence of the object could not take place. Furthermore, we take this presentational aspect of perception to be intimately related to the distinctive phenomenology of perception: perception is experientially as it is because of the [...] presence of the empirical features of things in the experience itself. (Robinson 1994, 165-166)

You can also grasp the presentative nature of object-givenness in perceptual experience by contrasting perceptual experiences not with thoughts but with imaginations. I ask you to select an object in front of you. Look at it, close your eyes, and then try to imagine it. Your phenomenological insight will be that the imagination – as Hume put it – “may mimic or copy the perception of the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original sensation” (Hume 1740/1975, 17).

Now, the disjunctivist's strategy is this: let us maintain both of our phenomenologically supported natural convictions and claim that whenever we genuinely perceive a mind-independent object, (1) we are directly aware of the mind-independent object only, and (2) the object perceived is a constitutive element of the perceptual experience. We should not be troubled by the fact that we could as well have hallucinations subjectively indistinguishable from genuine perceptual experiences. Respect and take at face value the phenomenology of genuine perceptual experience, and keep to naïve realism!

Of course, the disjunctivist should offer an account of hallucinations. Here is one: in spite of the fact that from a subjective perspective we cannot tell apart our experience in a case of genuinely perceiving a mind-independent object from the corresponding hallucination, we are in different kind of mental states in the two cases. So what we should do is give up the Common Kind Thesis. We *can* do this, for the “subjectively indistinguishable” is not identical to the “belongs to the same mental state type”, and nor is it entailed by it. What is more, we *should* do this. If in a case of genuine perceptual experience the mind-independent object is a constitutive element of our perceptual experience, then we cannot be in the same kind of mental state in a hallucination

which is subjectively indistinguishable from it. For in a hallucination, the mind-independent object in question is not present, or at least is not in the appropriate way. Two entities (including mental states or events) cannot belong to one and the same kind, if the one has a constitutive element the other does not.

2. The sense-datum strategy

The central thesis of the sense-datum theory (e.g. Jackson 1977, Robinson 1994, Foster 2000) is the Phenomenal Principle:

Phenomenal Principle: If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality. (Robinson 1994, 32)

The Phenomenal Principle is neutral about the metaphysical status of the “something” the subject is aware of when having a perceptual experience. The Phenomenal Principle only says: any perceptual experience involves some mind-dependent element. More precisely, it only says: any sensible quality is instantiated by something, but it remains silent about the nature of the thing which instantiates these sensible qualities. It is important to stress this, because the Phenomenal Principle is endorsed not just by the sense-datum theorists but also by the proponents of various qualia-based theories (e.g. Ducasse 1942, Chisholm 1957, Block 1990/1997, Peacocke 1992/1997), who hold that sensible qualities are instantiated by the mind itself. The sense-datum theorist must therefore add: the “something” which instantiates the sensible qualities is an *object*, and this object by definition is the sense-datum. According to this Restricted Phenomenal Principle: if a subject has a perceptual experience, then there must exist a real object, which the subject is aware of (and which has the properties it appears to the subject to have). The Restricted Phenomenal Principle implies, thus, that perceptual experience is essentially relational.

The fact that the sense-datum theorist takes perceptual experience to be essentially relational as a consequence of the Restricted Phenomenal Principle, she is in harmony with the Constitutive Dependence Thesis. For if perceptual experiences are essentially relational in nature, then the subject’s perceptual experience cannot be individuated without reference to the object it is related to, consequently, the perceived object is a constitutive element of the perceptual experience in question.

Now, the sense-datum theorist’s reasoning strategy is the following. Let us start with hallucinations. If the subject is hallucinating, then (given the Restricted Phenomenal Principle) the subject is aware of/is perceiving a real object. Since the subject is hallucinating, she is (per definitionem) not aware of/not perceiving an object which exists independently of her actual perceptual experience. Consequently, the existence of the

object the subject is aware of/is perceiving during a hallucination depends from the subject's perceptual experience, hence, the object is mind-dependent in nature. Furthermore: if the subject's hallucination is subjectively indistinguishable from the subject's corresponding genuine perception, then (given the Common Kind Thesis) the subject is in the same kind of mental states in both cases. Consequently, the subject is aware of/is perceiving a mind-dependent object in the case of genuine perception too. If the subject perceives a mind-independent object at all, she perceives it indirectly, via perceiving a mind-dependent object.

Hence, with the acceptance of both the Restricted Phenomenal Principle and the Common Kind Thesis sense-datum theory is in conflict with the Mind-Independent Thesis. Consequently, she must say: the phenomenological fact on which the Mind-Independent Thesis rests (namely, the transparency of perceptual experiences) cannot be taken at face value. She has to claim: the phenomenology of the perceptual experience of objects systematically misleads us about the nature of objects which we are aware of in the course of genuine perception. It's *as if* we are aware of mind-independent objects during genuine perception, when *in fact* we are aware of mind-dependent ones.

3. The intentional/representational strategy

The central thesis of the intentional/representational theory is the following (I name it Representational Principle):

Representational Principle: the content of the subject's perceptual experience (that is, the way the mind-independent world perceptually appears to the subject) – similarly to the content of belief and thought – represents the mind-independent world as being in a certain way.

By likening perceptual experiences to beliefs and thoughts, intentionalists (e.g. Tye 1992, 2000, Harman 1990/1997, Dretske 1995, Crane 2001, Byrne 2001) gain two things. With this (supposed) analogy they can dispense with the Phenomenal Principle on the one hand, and they can be in harmony with the Mind-Independent Thesis on the other.

How does the intentionalist argue against the Phenomenal Principle? The basic idea is this: as it does not follow from a subject's thinking that *a is F* that *a exists* which is *F*, *similarly* it does not follow from perceptually appearing to the subject that *a is F* that *a exists* which is *F*. This means the following with respect to sense-datum theory: as a subject can think of something without being related to an existing thing (if she thinks about the Pegasus, for instance), *in exactly the same way* a subject can have a perceptual experience without being related to some existing thing. Whereas with respect to qualia-based theories it means this: as a subject can think of something without her mind instantiating the property she ascribes to an object in her thought, *in exactly the*

same way a subject can have a perceptual experience without her mind instantiating the sensible quality which appears to the subject. According to intentionalists: if the subject is hallucinating, the subject is not related to anything/is not aware of anything, as in the case when she is thinking about the Pegasus. It's that simple. As Harman says:

[C]onsider the corresponding argument to searches: "Ponce de Leon was searching for the Fountain of Youth. But there are is no such thing. So she must have been searching for something mental." This is just a mistake. From the fact that there is no Fountain of Youth, it does not follow that Ponce de Leon was searching for something mental. (Harman 1990/1997, 664.)

Or as Tye says:

Consider the following parallel. Paul wants a blue emerald to give to his wife. There are no blue emeralds. It does not follow that Paul wants the idea of a blue emerald to give to his wife. (Tye 1992, 162)

How can the intentionalist be in harmony with the Mind-Independent Thesis? Very simply: when the subject is thinking of a mind-independent object (say, Kasparov), her thought is directed at the (mind-independent) Kasparov himself, the subject is aware of the (mind-independent) Kasparov himself. *The same way*: when the subject has a genuine perceptual experience of a red tomato, her perceptual experience is directed at the (mind-independent) red tomato itself, the subject is aware of the (mind-independent) red tomato itself.

What is the relationship between a genuine perceptual experience and a hallucination which is subjectively indistinguishable from it, according to the intentionalist? Well, when we have a perceptual experience (be it hallucinatory or genuine), the mind-independent world appears to us as being in a certain way. The way in which the mind-independent world appears to us is the representational content of our perceptual experience. Now, if a genuine and a hallucinatory perceptual experience is subjectively indistinguishable from each other, then the mind-independent world appears the same to us in both cases, consequently, the representational content of the two numerically different perceptual experiences are the same. The only difference between them (and for simplicity's sake let us overlook veridical hallucinations) is that the genuine perceptual experience represents the mind-independent world correctly (that is, that the mind-independent world is in the way as it perceptually appears to the subject), and the hallucinatory perceptual experience represents the mind-independent world falsely (that is, the mind-independent world is not in the way as it perceptually appears to the subject). All of which means: the representational content of a perceptual experience determines the way the world would be like *if* the perceptual experience were genuine (veridical). To summarize it with Searle's words:

The visual experience is as much *directed at* or *of* objects and states of affairs in the world as any of the paradigm Intentional states [...]. Now exactly analogously I want to say that in the case of the visual experience, even if I am having a hallucination, I know what must be the case in order that the experience not be a hallucination, and to say that is simply to say that the Intentional content of the visual experience determines its conditions of satisfaction; it determines what must be the case in order that the experience not be a hallucination in exactly the same sense that the content of the belief determines its conditions of satisfaction. (Searle 1983, 39-40).

Let us see the reasoning strategy of the intentionalist. Start from the hallucinations. When a subject is hallucinating, then (see: the transparency of perceptual experiences) the mind-independent world appears to her as being in a certain way. Since the subject is hallucinating, she is (per definitionem) not aware of/not perceiving an object which exists independently of her actual perceptual experience. Consequently, when the subject is hallucinating, no mind-independent object is a constitutive element of her actual perceptual experience. Furthermore, if the subject's hallucination is subjectively indistinguishable from the subject's corresponding genuine perception, then (given the Common Kind Thesis) the subject is in the same kind of mental states in the two cases. Consequently, when the subject genuinely perceives a mind-independent object, the mind-independent object is not a constitutive element of her actual perceptual experience.

Thus, with the acceptance of both the Representational Principle and the Common Kind Thesis the intentionalist is in conflict with the Constitutive Dependence Thesis. Consequently, she must say: the phenomenological fact on which the Constitutive Dependence Thesis rests (namely, the perceptual presence) cannot be taken at face value. She has to claim: the phenomenology of the perceptual experience of objects systematically misleads us about the nature of the relationship, how the dependence of a perceptual experience on its object appears to us. It's *as if* in the case of a genuine perception its object is made present when *in fact* it is not.

4. The phenomenological argument

The debate between sense-datum theory, intentional theory and disjunctivism revolves around three theses: the Mind-Independent Thesis, Constitutive Dependence Thesis and Common Kind Thesis (see especially Martin 2000, Crane 2005a, 2005b). Since hallucinations are possible, these three theses taken together are inconsistent. The acceptance of two theses implies the falsity of the third one. The question is: which two theses should we accept and which one should we reject? If we want to hold the Mind-Independent Thesis and Constitutive Dependence Thesis, then we have to deny the Common Kind Thesis. (This is the disjunctive strategy.) If we want to hold the Constitutive Dependence

Thesis and Common Kind Thesis, then we have to deny the Mind-Independent Thesis. (This is the sense-datum strategy.) And if we want to hold the Mind-Independent Thesis and Common Kind Thesis, then we have to deny the Constitutive Dependence Thesis. (This is the intentional/representational strategy). Therefore, Martin is right when she says: “in the end, sense-datum theories, intentional theories and disjunctivist accounts all have to endorse some form of error-theory concerning perceptual appearances and the introspection of experience” (Martin 2002, 421).

This taxonomy of the theories is clear and correct, but it conceals something. Namely: there is an important disanalogy between the reasoning strategies of these theories. The basic-argument for sense-datum theory and intentional theory is an argument from hallucination, whereas the basic-argument for disjunctivism is a transcendental argument.

Why is the basic-argument for disjunctivism transcendental? The transcendental question: how can naïve realism be true, and at the same time, how can we take at face value the two phenomenological characteristics of the perceptual experience of objects, if there can be hallucinations which are subjectively indistinguishable from the corresponding genuine perceptual experiences? Answer: only if we say that a genuine perceptual experience is not the same kind of mental state as the corresponding hallucination. How can we maintain naïve realism, if we say, that the hallucination is not the same kind of mental state as the corresponding genuine perceptual experience? Because, if we say this, then (and only then) we will not be forced to deny a phenomenological characteristic of the genuine perceptual experience of objects which it really has according to our natural convictions, and which we would have to deny only because we think that it belongs to the same kind of mental states as the corresponding hallucination.

On the other hand, the basic-argument for the sense-datum theory and intentional theory is an argument from hallucination. By accepting the Common Kind Thesis which implies that the genuine perceptual experiences will inherit the intrinsic nature of the hallucinations, the proponents of the two theories must deny one of our natural convictions about the perceptual experience of objects. Consequently, whether we are sense-datum theorists or intentionalists, at one point we have to go against the phenomenology of the perceptual experience of objects. If we are sense-datum theorists, with transparency, if we are intentionalists, with presence. From the phenomenological point of view, thus, sense-datum theory and intentional theory are *on an equal footing*: both accept one and reject one of the two phenomenological characteristics of the perceptual experience of objects. As opposed to this, the disjunctive theory is able to take at face value both phenomenological characteristics of the perceptual experience of objects, that is, it can take the perceptual experience of objects exactly as it is phenomenologically given. Consequently, the disjunctive theory is more plausible phenomenologically than its rivals. Consequently, it is superior to them. This is the phenomenological argument for disjunctivism.

Why is it crucial that the disjunctive theory is phenomenologically more plausible than its rivals? Why is the phenomenological argument so strong? In order to answer that I have to make clear first the role of phenomenological considerations in sense-datum and intentional theories.

The central thesis of the sense-datum theory is the Restricted Phenomenal Principle. The sense-datum theorist's claim that perceptual experiences are essentially relational is grounded on this principle. But the sense-datum theorist can hold the Restricted Phenomenal Principle *solely* on the basis of the phenomenological fact that in perceptual experiences – in contrast with the object of thoughts – an object is presented. If the presentation of an object in perceptual experiences were not a phenomenological fact, the Restricted Phenomenal Principle would have no plausibility at all, a fortiori nor would sense-datum theory itself have any plausibility. In a word: from the point of the sense-datum theorist it is of fundamental importance to take one phenomenological characteristic at face value, for she has to say: “it *not only appears* that an object is made present in the perceptual experience, but is *really* made present”.

The central thesis of the intentional theory is the Representational Principle, according to which the content of perceptual experience represents the mind-independent world as being in a certain way. But the intentionalist can hold the Representational Principle *solely* on the basis of the phenomenological fact that perceptual experiences are transparent to the mind-independent world, that is, in perceptual experiences the mind-independent objects (and their properties) appear to us as being in a certain way. (A remark: why everyone thinks that thoughts are directly directed at the mind-independent world is because thoughts are transparent according to their phenomenology.) If the transparency of perceptual experience were not a phenomenological fact, that is, if mind-dependent entities were made manifest to us when we focus our attention to what it is like for us to perceive objects, then the Representational Principle would have no plausibility at all, a fortiori nor would intentional theory itself have any plausibility. In a word: from the point of the intentionalist it is of fundamental importance to take one phenomenological characteristic at face value, for she has to say: “it *not only appears* that the perceptual experience is transparent to the mind-independent world, but it *really is*”.

As we can see, a phenomenological fact is crucially important to both the sense-datum theory and the intentional theory. As I have shown it in the second and third part, both theories are so construed that each takes at face value one phenomenological characteristic of the perceptual experience of objects, and also accepts the Common Kind Thesis, and based on these two rejects another phenomenological characteristic of the perceptual experience of objects. Therefore, even the rejection of one of the phenomenological characteristics of the perceptual experience of objects is rooted in another *phenomenological* fact.

However, if it is crucially important for both sense-datum theory and intentional theory to take some phenomenological fact about the perceptual experience of objects at

face value, and their being in conflict with another phenomenological fact is (admittedly) a difficulty for them, then it is quite a strong argument on behalf of disjunctivism, that it can take at face value both phenomenological characteristics of the perceptual experience of objects. This phenomenological argument for disjunctivism would not be strong or essential if rival theories could get by without any phenomenological consideration. Since however – as we have seen – the central thesis of both sense-datum theory and intentional theory (a fortiori the two theories themselves) gain their persuasiveness from a phenomenological fact, that is not the case. Disjunctivism wins on its rivals' own turf. It can unify the phenomenologically plausible aspects of sense-datum theory and intentional theory, and can remain free from their phenomenologically implausible features.

5. The case of hallucinations

If there could not be hallucinations which are subjectively indistinguishable from the corresponding genuine perceptual experiences, then we would have no reason not to take at face value both phenomenological characteristics of the perceptual experience of objects. I think we would simply take at face value presence and transparency. In other words everyone would accept the disjunctivist's account of the nature of perceptual experience of objects. But because hallucinations are possible and according to sense-datum theorists and intentionalist they are the same kind of mental states as genuine perceptual experiences are, we “get a chance” not to take at face value one of the phenomenological characteristics of genuine perceptual experiences.

According to the majority of antidisjunctivists the main problem with disjunctivism is that it cannot adequately account for the nature of hallucination (e.g. Johnston 2006, Farkas 2006, Siegel 2007). The disjunctivist's position (especially Martin 2004) is the following: hallucinations are parasitic mental states; there are *no positive features* of the hallucinations. We can report on hallucinations *only* in epistemic terms. As Martin puts it:

[T]he essence of hallucination – what distinguishes hallucinations as a class from other mental states – lies in their being indistinguishable from veridical perceptions, not in some antecedently identifiable feature of the state. This is why, when it comes to a mental characterization of the hallucinatory experience, nothing more can be said than the relational and epistemological claim that it is indiscriminable from perception. (Martin 2004, 72)

In comparison, the antidisjunctivist claims: we can explain the subjective indistinguishability of a hallucination and a corresponding genuine perceptual experience. Namely, that they instantiate the same mental (phenomenal) property, whereby they are of the same kind. In what follows I shall try to shed some light on what it means

that there are *no positive features* of the hallucinations, and at the same time, I shall argue that the disjunctivist's account of hallucinations has no disadvantages compared to the rival theorists' account of hallucinations.

Lets take the case of a subject hallucinating a red and round tomato. According to the sense-datum theorist in this case the subject stands in the relation of/is aware of a mind-dependent object, a sense-datum, which has "red" and "round" sensible qualities. According to the intentionalist in this case the content of the subject's perceptual experience represents the mind-independent world falsely; representing it as if a red and round tomato were in front of her, when in fact there is not. (Lets overlook again the case of veridical hallucinations.)

According to the sense-datum theorist, the intentionalist's account is implausible. Since according to the sense-datum theorist the intentionalist's account of hallucinations is phenomenologically *too feeble*; it does not capture the phenomenological fact about hallucinations that when a subject is hallucinating a red and round tomato, then *to her* (from the first person perspective) something is undeniably there, *to her* something is made present, that is, her hallucination is not a perceptual experience of nothing, but of something surely. According to the sense-datum theorist this presence can only be captured with complete phenomenological precision, if we claim: during a subject's hallucination there is something (a mind-dependent sense-datum), of which the subject is aware of, or she is related to.

According to the intentionalist, the sense-datum theorist's account is implausible. Since according to the intentionalist the sense-datum theorist does not capture the phenomenological fact about hallucinations that when a subject is hallucinating a red and round tomato, then it appears to the subject that what she is aware of/is related to exists *independently* of her mind (of her actual perceptual experience), namely, the tomato itself. According to the intentionalist this transparency can only be captured with complete phenomenological precision, if we claim: the content of the subject's hallucinatory perceptual experience represents the *mind-independent* world falsely.

To the disjunctivist the phenomenological considerations of the sense-datum theorist and the intentionalist are *on a par*. Neither is better than the other. The sense-datum theorist says that during hallucination the subject is aware of/is related to some mind-dependent sense-datum only because she overlooks the transparency of hallucinations. Namely, the phenomenological fact that (even) during hallucination it appears to the subject that she is aware of some *mind-independent* object.

And similarly, the intentionalist says that during hallucination the content of the subject's perceptual experience *represents* the mind-independent world only because she overlooks the presence. Namely, the phenomenological fact that (even) during hallucination it appears to the subject that something is made present to her, and not just represented to her like the objects of thoughts.

The debate about the nature of hallucinations between sense-datum theory and intentional theory is very instructive. It shows that either we say about the nature of hallucination that in its case the subject is aware of a sense-datum, or we say that its content represents the mind-independent world, we can do this only at the cost of overlooking one of the phenomenological characteristics of hallucinations. We will either ignore the transparency or the presence.

Disjunctivism approaches hallucinations differently than the rivals. The disjunctivist (in contrast to what sense-datum theorists say, and in harmony with what intentionalists say) claims the following: since during hallucination it appears to us that a *mind-independent object* is given, and since during hallucination per definitionem we are not aware of a mind-independent object, we are not aware of anything during hallucinations. We are not related to sense-data. On the other hand, the disjunctivist (in contrast to what intentionalists say, and in harmony with what sense-datum theorists say) claims the following: since during hallucination it appears to us that an object is *made present* (and is not just represented as objects of thoughts are), hallucinatory perceptual experiences are not states which represent the mind-independent world. They have no representational properties. So, for the disjunctivist hallucinations are neither relations to mind-dependent objects, nor representations. This means that hallucinations have no positive features.

Instead of playing off the two phenomenological characteristics against each other and ascribe some positive feature to hallucinations at the cost of overlooking one of their phenomenological characteristics, as sense-datum theorists and intentionalists do, and to become phenomenologically implausible at some point, the disjunctivist simply says that the different phenomenological characteristics of hallucinations mutually *neutralize each other*.

Contrary to sense-datum and intentional theorists, who analyze both hallucinatory and genuine perceptual experiences by holding fast to one of their phenomenological characteristics and throwing away the other one, the disjunctivist plays “all or nothing”. Since she denies the Common Kind Thesis she is in a position to take at face value both phenomenological characteristics of genuine perceptual experiences and none of the phenomenological characteristics of hallucinations. This implies the disjunctivist’s view that the only thing we can say about the “nature” of hallucinations is that they are subjectively indistinguishable from the corresponding genuine perceptual experiences.

So, from the phenomenological point of view the disjunctivist account of hallucinations has no disadvantage compared to the rivals’. Disjunctivism is phenomenologically no less plausible about hallucinations in saying that none of their phenomenological characteristics are to be taken at face value than sense-datum and intentional theories are, which can take at face value one of the phenomenological characteristics of hallucinations, which they need, only at the expense of denying the other. The debate of the theories – as we have seen – about hallucinations has the lesson that their phenomenological characteristics mutually extinguish each other.

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Hungarian Academy of Sciences TKI-ELTE
 Philosophy of Language Research Group
 Budapest 1088, Muzeum krt. 4/I, Hungary
 jantozser@gmail.com