Abstract
Some authors have recently arguedthat an object’s velocity is logicallyindependent of its locations throughout time.Their aim is to deny the Russellianview that motion is merely a change oflocation, and to promote a rival account onwhich the connection between velocities andtrajectories is provided by the laws ofnature. I defend the Russellian view of motionagainst these attacks.
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Meyer, U. The Metaphysics of Velocity. Philosophical Studies 112, 93–102 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022579621057
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022579621057