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Anderson and Belnap’s Invitation to Sin

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Abstract

Quine has argued that modal logic began with the sin of confusing use and mention. Anderson and Belnap, on the other hand, have offered us a way out through a strategy of nominalization. This paper reviews the history of Lewis’s early work in modal logic, and then proves some results about the system in which “A is necessary” is intepreted as “A is a classical tautology.”

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Correspondence to Alasdair Urquhart.

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Urquhart, A. Anderson and Belnap’s Invitation to Sin. J Philos Logic 39, 453–472 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-010-9135-5

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