Abstract
Beliefs can be evaluated from a number of perspectives. Epistemic evaluation involves epistemic standards and appropriate epistemic goals. On a truth-conducive account of epistemic justification, a justified belief is one that serves the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. Beliefs are also prompted by non-epistemic reasons. This raises the question of whether, say, the pragmatic benefits of a belief are able to rationalize it. In this paper, after criticizing certain responses to this question, I shall argue that, as far as beliefs are concerned, justification has an essentially epistemic character. This conclusion is then qualified by considering the conditions under which pragmatic consequences of a belief can be epistemically relevant.
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Vahid, H. Rationalizing beliefs: evidential vs. pragmatic reasons. Synthese 176, 447–462 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9575-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9575-z