Abstract
According to a recent view, known as the 'pragmatic encroachment' thesis, an agent’s non-truth-related factors are relevant to the epistemic status of her beliefs. In particular, in addition to truth-related factors, practical factors are said to be relevant to the question whether or not true belief amounts to knowledge. Despite the intuitive appeal of the thesis, however, it is puzzling how practical factors can impact the truth-related factors that ground the epistemic status of one's beliefs. In this paper, I will distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of the way in which practical factors are said to be thus relevant. Their differences are explicated in terms of the nature and the extent to which practical factors are said to impact the epistemic status of one's beliefs. I begin by considering a strong version of the thesis that suggests principles according to which the practical rationality of one's actions is a necessary condition on knowledge and justification. Having noted an inadequacy in the formulation of such principles, the arguments in their support are subsequently stated and criticized. Finally, I identify two modest versions of the thesis of pragmatic encroachment and argue that they, too, fail to explain how practical factors can bear on the epistemic status of one's beliefs.
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Notes
The term is due to Grimm (2011).
These cases are adopted from Fantl and McGrath (2002).
These cases are adopted from DeRose (1992).
Stanley seems to advocate a similar view: "[T]he factors that make true belief into knowledge include elements from practical rationality…What makes true belief into knowledge is not entirely an epistemic matter (2005, 2).
This is by no means the only way of explaining such intuitions. Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), for example, have argued that the order of explanation should be reversed. While Fantl and McGrath take the possession of knowledge to be a sufficient condition for rational action, Hawthorne and Stanley take knowledge to be necessary for rational action. Williamson (2000) also emphasizes the action guiding role of knowledge without requiring that practical stakes be included in the nature of knowledge. For discussion see Kvanvig (2011).
Fantl and McGrath initially construe the premise (2) in terms of what is the best thing for S to do. Later, however, they state that it is not necessary to restrict the argument to judgments of what is best. (2) is thus formulated in terms of preferring one state of affairs to another.
Neta (2007) has objected to this step of the argument on the basis of a counterexample which, he claims, shows that what is rational for an agent, who is justified in believing a proposition p ('He will not need any medical services for the next two years'), to prefer in fact (getting health insurance) does not coincide with what is rational for him to prefer, given p (not getting health insurance). I think Neta ignores Fantl and McGrath's reductio argument for the transition from (JA*) ((KA*)) to (JA) ((KA)). In fact, Fantl and McGrath could argue that, Neta's case is actually a high stakes case where the slightest negligence on our part might cost our lives and so, contrary to what he claims, the agent is not justified in believing the proposition in question.
Engel (2009) also believes that (T) is more credible than (T').
Having argued against (KA), something must also be said about our intuitions regarding high/low stakes cases. For an alternative explanation of such cases see Kvanvig (2011) which maintains that these cases constitute an argument for the falsity of a widely held assumption about the value of knowledge.
I would to thank Muhammad Legenhausen and my audience at IPM for constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Vahid, H. Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment. Acta Anal 29, 25–41 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0192-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0192-6