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**BUTCHVAROV**  
**ON THE DEHUMANIZATION OF PHILOSOPHY**

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PANAYOT BUTCHVAROV  
*Anthropocentrism in Philosophy:*  
*Realism, Antirealism, Semirealism*  
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In this highly original work, Panayot Butchvarov argues that philosophy in its three main branches, epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics, needs to be freed from its anthropocentrism. Philosophy ought to be “dehumanized”. A startling claim. Isn’t epistemology by nature concerned with *human* knowledge, its scope and limits, to allude to a title from Bertrand Russell? And don’t we have it from Aristotle that ethics treats the *human* good? Butchvarov argues to the contrary: “epistemology is not about human knowledge and ethics is not about the human good [...]”. (2) The arguments for dehumanizing epistemology and ethics are relatively straightforward and will be sketched at the end of this article. Butchvarov’s argument against anthropocentrism in metaphysics is rather more intricate, and I will start with it.

## 1. METAPHYSICS DEHUMANIZED

In metaphysics, anthropocentrism assumes the form of antirealism. Antirealism is the view that the world, insofar as it is knowable, depends on us and our cognitive capacities. (6) Bishop Berkeley aside, metaphysical antirealism has its source and model in Kant's transcendental idealism. Contemporary antirealism is "the heir of Kant's transcendental idealism". (189) On Butchvarov's view there can be no return to a pre-Critical, pre-Kantian metaphysics. (225) But surely the world cannot depend on us if 'us' refers to human animals. Butchvarov's task, then, is to develop a version of metaphysical antirealism that is free of anthropocentrism. A key question is whether the characteristic antirealist thesis that the world depends on us and our cognitive capacities can be upheld without 'us' being understood in an anthropocentric way. To answer this question is to resolve the *Paradox of Antirealism (PA)*, a paradox that I would maintain is endemic to every form of transcendental philosophy from Kant, through Husserl and Heidegger, to Butchvarov:

PA: On the one hand, we cannot know the world as it is in itself, but only the world as it is for us, as it is "shaped by our cognitive faculties, our senses and our concepts". (189) This Kantian insight implies a certain "humanization of metaphysics". (7) On the other hand, knowable physical reality cannot depend for its existence or intelligibility on beings that are miniscule parts of this reality. The whole world of space-time-matter cannot depend on certain of its fauna. (7)

Some will reject the paradox by rejecting its first limb. But that would be to reject antirealism. It would be to dissolve the problem rather than solve it. Let's see if Butchvarov can solve the paradox while upholding antirealism. But which version of antirealism does Butchvarov espouse?

## 2. BUTCHVAROV'S METAPHYSICAL ANTIREALISM

Metaphysical antirealism is so-called to distinguish it from antirealism in ethics and in epistemology. It is the view that "the world insofar as

it is knowable by us depends on our capacities and ways of knowing, our cognitive faculties". (111) I would have liked to have seen a more careful unpacking of this thesis, but I take the point to be, or at least to imply, the substantive (non-tautological) proposition that the world is not intrinsically knowable as an Aristotelian realist would maintain but knowable only in virtue of certain contributions on our part. If this is not the point, then it is difficult to see how contemporary antirealism could be "the heir of Kant's transcendental idealism". (189) In any case, metaphysical antirealism divides into cosmological antirealism and ontological antirealism. A cosmological antirealist denies the reality of the world, but needn't deny the reality of the things in the world. Note that 'world' has multiple meanings and that now we are distinguishing between the world as the totality of what exists and the world as the members of the totality of what exists.

Butchvarov takes his cue from proposition 1.1 of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* wherein Ludwig Wittgenstein stipulates that by 'world' he means the totality of facts (*die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen*), not of things (*nicht der Dinge*). Now if the world is the totality of facts, then one who denies the reality of facts denies the reality of the world, and is thereby a cosmological antirealist. (113) Such an antirealist need not be an ontological antirealist, i.e., one who denies the reality of things. Since Butchvarov does not question the reality of things (169), he is not an ontological metaphysical antirealist. He is a cosmological antirealist who advocates a form of logical antirealism according to which (i) "there are no logical objects even though logic is present in all thought" (114), and (ii) the "cognized world" depends on the logical expressions of our language rather than on our "mental faculties" as in Kant. (189)

At a first approximation, when Butchvarov says that there are no logical objects what he means is that the logical connectives, the quantifiers, the copula 'is,' and whole declarative sentences do not designate or refer to anything. In old-fashioned terminology, they are syncategorematic or synsemantic expressions. Consider the sentence, 'Tom is tall and Mary is short.' As I understand Butchvarov, he is maintaining that the sentence itself, both occurrences of 'is,' and the single occurrence of 'and' are all logical

expressions while the proper names ‘Tom’ and ‘Mary,’ and the predicates ‘tall’ and ‘short’ are non-logical expressions. There are no logical objects corresponding to logical expressions. (This bald assertion needs qualification that cannot be provided here. Butchvarov takes a semirealist line on facts, the logical objects corresponding to some sentences.) That there are no logical objects is perhaps obvious in the case of the propositional connectives. Few will say that ‘and,’ ‘or,’ and ‘not’ designate objects. The meaning of these words has nothing to do with reference. But while there are no logical objects, there can be no “cognized world” without language, or rather human languages. With this we are brought back to the Paradox of Antirealism. Even though the things in the world do not depend on human animals, the world itself does so depend inasmuch as there would be no world at all without language.

Consider the generic sentence, ‘Men are taller than women.’ For Butchvarov, many generic sentences are true, but there is nothing in the world that makes them true: they have no corresponding logical objects. And yet without truths like these, and other sorts of truths as well, there would be no world. In this sense, the world, but not the things in it, depends on language-users. Butchvarov’s position is roughly similar to Kant’s. Kant held that one can be both a transcendental idealist and an empirical realist. Butchvarov is like a transcendental idealist in that he holds that the world depends on language and thus on us; but he is like an empirical realist in that he holds that the things in the world do not depend on us. Like Kant, however, he faces a version of the Paradox of Antirealism: surely it is as absurd to maintain that the world depends on the existence of human animals as to maintain that the things in the world depend on human animals.

### 3. BUTCHVAROV’S SOLUTION TO THE ANTIREALISM PARADOX

The solution involves a re-thinking of the role of the personal pronouns ‘I’ and ‘we’ as they function in philosophical as opposed to ordinary contexts. The idea is that ‘I’ and ‘we’ as they figure in the realism-antirealism debate do not refer to anything in the world, and so they do not refer to human

beings; these grammatically personal pronouns refer impersonally to a view or “cognition” of the world, one that is not owned by any person or group of persons. This view of the world, however, just is the world. Therefore, the world does not depend logically or causally on the view of the world or on us: “the world and our cognition of it [...] are identical”. (191) Because the world does not depend logically or causally on our view of the world, it does not depend on us. This is supposed to solve the Paradox of Antirealism. To grasp the thought here, you must realize that “cognition” is subjectless: it is not anyone’s cognition. Now let’s dig into the details.

Butchvarov maintains that in typical philosophical contexts, ‘I’ is a dangling pronoun, “a pronoun without an antecedent noun”. (40) Consider first an ordinary context. If I say, “I was born in California,” I refer to the man BV, a transient chunk of the physical world, a bit of its fauna. The pronoun in this context is replaceable *salva veritate* by the proper name, ‘BV.’ But when I thoughtfully say or write “I think therefore I am,” or “I doubt therefore I am” in the context of a search for something indubitable, something whose existence cannot be doubted, I cannot be taken to be referring to the man BV. For the existence of this man can be doubted along with the existence of every other physical thing.

Butchvarov is on to something, but he expresses himself in a confusing and confused way. His point is not that the ‘I’ in ‘I think therefore I am’ lacks an antecedent, for this is also true in unproblematic sentences such as ‘I am hungry.’ Pronouns used indexically lack antecedents. The point is rather that the ‘I’ of the ‘I think therefore I am’ is not replaceable *salva veritate* with a proper name or definite description or demonstrative phrase in the way that the ‘I’ in ‘I am hungry’ when assertively uttered by BV can be replaced *salva veritate* by a token of ‘BV.’ The problem that Butchvarov is addressing is that in the *cogito* situation we have an indexical use of the word ‘I’ that does not seem to pick out the speaker or any physical thing. What then does it pick out? What does ‘I’ refer to in the philosophical conclusions ‘I cannot doubt that I exist’ and ‘I cannot be mistaken about my own existence’? I agree with Butchvarov that these uses of ‘I’—call them philosophical uses to distinguish them from ordinary uses—cannot refer to the speaker or to

any physical thing. If they did, the question would be begged against the skeptic and no *fundamentum inconcussum* would have been reached.

Some have maintained that 'I' is not a referring expression at all, but this is not Butchvarov's view. For him, 'I' deployed philosophically has a referent but not a physical referent. This seems to leave us with only two options: 'I' used philosophically refers to a metaphysical self or it refers to something that is not a self at all. I incline toward the first view; Butchvarov affirms the second. Why not say something like what Descartes and such latter-day Cartesians as Edmund Husserl either said or implied, namely, that the primary reference of the indexical 'I' is to a thinking thing, a *res cogitans*, a metaphysical self, a transcendental ego? One might argue for this view as follows. (This is my argument.)

- (a) Every indexical use of 'I' is immune to reference failure in a two-fold sense: it cannot fail to have a referent, and it cannot fail have the right referent.
- (b) Every philosophical use of 'I' is an indexical use.

Therefore

- (c) Every philosophical use of 'I' is immune to reference failure. (a, b)
- (d) Every indexical use of 'I' refers to the user of the 'I'-token.
- (e) No philosophical use of 'I' refers to an item whose existence can be doubted by the user of the 'I'-token.
- (f) Every physical thing is such that its existence can be doubted.

Therefore

- (g) Every philosophical use of 'I' refers to a meta-physical item such as a Cartesian thinking thing. (c–f)

Butchvarov won't accept this argument. One point he will make is that the metaphysical self, if there is one, is an item that could be referred to

only by an indexical. “But would anything be an entity if it could be referred to only with an indexical?” (39) A thinker that is only an I “borders on incoherence”. (39) I take the point to be that nothing could count as an entity unless it is referable-to in third-person ways. So BV and PB are entities because, while each can refer to himself in the first-person way by a thoughtful deployment of an ‘I’-token, each can also be referred to in third-person ways. Thus anyone, not just PB, can refer to PB using his name and such definite descriptions as ‘the author of *Anthropocentrism in Philosophy*.’ Philosophical uses of ‘I’, however, cannot be replaced by names or descriptions or demonstrative phrases having the same reference. The philosophical ‘I’ is a dangling pronoun. There is no name or description that can be substituted for it.

For Butchvarov, there cannot be a pure subject of thought, a pure ego, a transcendental I, etc. Butchvarov would also point out that talk of such things involves the monstrous transformation of pronouns into nouns as we speak of pure egos and ask how many there are. ‘Man’ is a count-noun, but ‘ego’? He would furthermore insist Hume-fashion that no such item as a pure I is ever encountered in experience, outer or inner. If I replied that it is the very nature of the ultimate subject of thought and experience to be unobjectifiable, he would presumably revert to his point about the incoherence of supposing that any entity could be the referent of a pure indexical only. He would just deny that there is any ultimate subject. In its philosophical use, ‘I’ refers neither to a physical self nor a metaphysical self.

I concede that Butchvarov has a reasonable case against (g), though I do not think he has refuted it. But let us irenically suppose that (g) is false. Then which of the premises of my argument must Butchvarov reject? If I understand him, he would reject (d): Every indexical use of ‘I’ refers to the user of the ‘I’-token. His view is that only the ordinary uses do and that the philosophical uses such as we have in the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* and the Augustinian *si fallor sum* examples do not refer to the user of the ‘I’-token. They do not refer to persons or anything at the metaphysical core of a person such as a metaphysical ego. To what then do they refer? Here is where things get really interesting.

Butchvarov's proposal is that the philosophical (as opposed to the ordinary) uses of the *grammatically personal* pronoun 'I' are *logically impersonal*: they refer not to persons but to views ("cognitions" in a broad sense) that needn't be the views of any particular person. To show how a use of 'I' could refer to a view rather to a person, Butchvarov offers us this example:

(1) I can't believe you left your children in the car unattended! (197)

One who says this is typically not referring to himself and stating a fact about what he can or cannot believe. He is reasonably interpreted as using the sentence "to indicate the view that leaving children unattended in a car is grossly imprudent". (197) Thus (1) is better rendered as

(2) Leaving children unattended in a car is grossly imprudent.

Now I grant that 'I' in (1) is impersonal in that it is not plausibly read as referring to the speaker of (1), or to any person. But I fail to see how 'I' in (1) indicates (Butchvarov's word) a view or proposition, the view or proposition expressed by (2). If a term indicates, then it is an indicator, which is to say that it is an indexical. But 'I' in (1) is not an indexical. It seems to be an impersonal *non-indexical* use of 'I'. If 'I' in (1) were an indexical, then different speakers of (1) would be referring to different views or propositions. But if Manny, Moe, and Jack each assertively utter (1), they express the same proposition, (2). So it may be that Butchvarov would not only reject premise (d) in my argument above, but also premise (b).

Butchvarov sees that the philosophical uses of 'I' cannot refer to the speaker or to any innerworldly entity, on pain of begging the question against the skeptic. For the existence of any intramundane entity can be doubted. But he also insists, with some plausibility, that the philosophical uses of 'I' cannot refer to any transcendental or pre-mundane or extra-mundane entity. Now if the referent of the philosophical 'I' is neither in the world nor out of it, what is left to say but that the referent is the world itself? Not the things in the world, but the world as the unifying totality of these things. And that is what Butchvarov says. "In the philosophical contexts that



would render reference to the speaker or any other inhabitant of the world question-begging, ‘I’ indicates a worldview and thus also the world.” (198)

Now a crucial step in his reasoning to this conclusion is the premise that a view or “cognition” “need not be a particular person’s cognition”. (197) Not every view is optical, but consider an optical view from the observation deck of the Empire State Building. Butchvarov claims that it would be “absurd” to ask: Whose view is it? One sees his point: that view is not ‘owned’ by Donald Trump, say, or by any particular person. But it does not follow that there can be an optical view without a viewer. Every view is the view of some viewer or other even if no view is tied necessarily to some particular person such as Donald Trump. So the question, Whose view is it? has a reasonable answer: it is the view of anyone who occupies the point of view. The view into the Grand Canyon from the South Rim at the start of the Bright Angel Trail is the view of anyone who occupies that position, which is not to say that the view presupposes the existence of BV or PB or any particular person. But an actual view does presuppose the existence of some viewer or other. And so if the actual world is a (nonoptical) view, then it too has to be someone’s view. There can be a view from nowhere since not every view is optical, but I balk at a view by no one. If I am right, Butchvarov has failed to solve the paradox of antirealism. As I see it, Butchvarov’s argument trades on the confusion of ‘No view is tied necessarily to some definite person’ (true) and ‘No view requires a viewer, some viewer or other.’ (false)

Butchvarov further maintains that if a proposition is described as true, it would be absurd to ask: Whose truth is it? (197) In one sense this is right. That  $7 + 5 = 12$  is not my truth or your truth. But it doesn’t follow that truths can exist without any minds at all. Classically, truth is adequation of intellect and thing, and cannot exist without intellects, whether finite or divine. Truth is Janus-faced: it faces the world and it faces the mind. Truth is necessarily mind-involving. I suggest that truth conceived out of all relation to any mind is an incoherent notion.

This is even clearer in the case of knowledge. Butchvarov claims that if physics is described as a body of knowledge, it would be absurd to ask: Whose knowledge is it? Well of course it is not Lee Smolin’s knowledge

or the knowledge of any particular person. But if there were no physicists there would be no physics. In general, if there were no knowers, there would be no knowledge. Even if truths can float free of minds, it is self-evident that knowledge cannot. Knowledge exists only in knowers even if truth can exist apart from any knowers. And so a worldview that is not anyone's view is a notion hard to credit. And that a philosophical use of 'I' could indicate a worldview is even harder to understand.

#### 4. SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE

Butchvarov attempts to solve the Paradox of Antirealism by re-thinking the role of 'I' in philosophical contexts. He can be understood as trying to find a way to reconcile the following propositions:

- (3) The philosophical uses of the first-person singular pronoun are referential.
- (4) These uses are indexical.
- (5) These uses do not refer to thinking animals or to any objects in the world.
- (6) These uses do not refer to Augustinian souls or Cartesian thinking things or Kantian noumenal selves or Husserlian transcendental egos.

Butchvarov reconciles this tetrad by adding to their number:

- (7) These uses are impersonal and refer to the world. (192)

If 'I' in its philosophical uses refer to the world, then we can avoid the absurdity that the world depends on transient specimens of its fauna.

Butchvarov's Sartrean position is opposed to the triadic Cartesian schema that Husserl presupposes in his radicalized Cartesianism: *Ego-cogitatum qua cogitatum*. For Butchvarov, there is no ego and there are no *cogitationes*; there are only the *cogitata* and their appearing. He speaks of objects and their "lightening" and "revealing". (205) He mentions Sartre by

name but alludes to Heidegger as well for whom the world is not the totality of things or the totality of facts but the illuminated space wherein things appear. For Butchvarov, then, the structure of consciousness is not triadic but dyadic: there is just consciousness and its objects. But consciousness is impersonal: it is not anyone's consciousness. It is the sheer revelation of things, but not *to* anyone. Consciousness is exhausted in its revelation of objects: it has no inner nature. This is a radically externalist, anti-substantialist view of consciousness. Butchvarov is a Sartrean externalist about consciousness.

If this externalist view is correct then one can understand why Butchvarov thinks he has solved the Paradox of Antirealism. If consciousness is nothing, then it is no thing upon which anything else can depend either logically or causally. The paradox arises if the things in the world are made dependent for their existence, nature, or intelligibility on any transient parts of the world such as human animals. The paradox vanishes if consciousness is no thing or things.

But does this really solve the problem? What has now become of the first limb of the paradox? The first limb reads:

On the one hand, we cannot know the world as it is in itself, but only the world as it is for us, as it is "shaped by our cognitive faculties, our senses and our concepts". (189)

Surely consciousness as no-thing, as a Sartrean wind blowing towards objects, as Mooreanly diaphanous, emanating from nowhere, without a nature of its own, not anchored in a Substantial Mind or in a society of substantial minds, or in animal organisms in nature, ever evacuating itself for the sake of the revelation of objects—surely consciousness as having these properties cannot do any shaping or forming. It cannot engage in any activity. For it is not a substance. It *is* only in its revelation of what is other than it. All distinctions and all content fall on the side of the object: none come from consciousness itself. On a radically externalist, anti-substantialist view of consciousness/mind, it can't do anything such as impose categorial forms on the relatively chaotic sensory manifold.

Kant is the main man here as Butchvarov well appreciates. Kant's thinking operates under the aegis of a form-matter scheme. Space and time are the *a priori* forms of sensibility, and the categories are the *a priori* forms of the understanding. These forms are imposed on the matter of sensation. The vehicle of this imposition is the transcendental unity of apperception. All of this is our doing, our transcendental doing, whatever exactly this means (which is part of the problem). Our making of the world is a transcendental making: it is not an immanent process within the world such as a literal making of something out of pre-given materials—which would presuppose the world as the where-in of all such mundane makings and formings. Nor is this transcendental making a transcendent making by a transcendent deity. Now who is it, exactly, who does the forming of the sensory manifold? Who imposes the categorial forms on the matter of sensation? It cannot be human animals or their brains. It cannot be anything in the world. Nor can it be anything out of the world either. And what, exactly, is this activity of forming? It cannot be an empirical process in the world. Nor can it be a transcendent process such as divine creation. What then?

These problems are part and parcel of the Paradox of Antirealism in Kant and such successors as Husserl. The paradox cannot get off the ground without the notions of forming, shaping, imposing, constituting etc. whereas Butchvarov's solution to the paradox in terms of an impersonal, subjectless, non-substantial consciousness without a nature does away with all forming, shaping and imposing. Mind so conceived cannot impose forms since all forms, all distinctions, all content determinations are on the side of the object. How can Mind be spontaneous (a favorite Kantian word) and active if Mind is not a primary substance, an agent?

My suspicion, then, tentatively proffered, is that Butchvarov does not solve the Paradox of Antirealism; he dissolves it by in effect rejecting the first limb. It is clear to me how he removes anthropocentrism from metaphysics; what is not clear to me is how what is left over can still be called antirealism. There is also the question of whether the philosophical uses of 'I' and 'we' that are essential to the formulation of the realism-antirealism debate are really impersonal uses. But this cannot be discussed further here.

## 5. EPISTEMOLOGY DEHUMANIZED

Having seen how Butchvarov attempts to dehumanize antirealist metaphysics, we must now sketch his dehumanization of epistemology and ethics. Butchvarov distinguishes among naturalistic epistemology, subjective epistemology, and epistemology-as-logic. It is the third of these that he recommends as a non-anthropocentric form of epistemology. The difference between the first two can be put starkly by saying that while the former has a subject-matter, but one that is empirical and not philosophical, the latter is purely philosophical but lacks a subject-matter! Naturalistic epistemology is plainly anthropocentric because its subject-matter is human cognitive processes, not those of cetaceans or angels. But there is nothing specifically philosophical about it because it lacks the generality characteristic of philosophy and because all the real work is done by the empirical sciences of psychology and biology. There is just no room for a *philosophical* discipline called naturalistic epistemology. (30)

On the other hand, subjective epistemology is strictly philosophical, but has no subject-matter at all (39). Its only reason for existing is to meet the challenge of skepticism. To do this it must not beg the question against the skeptic as it would if it were to take the philosophical uses of 'I' that figure in the debate with skeptics as replaceable *salva veritate* with terms designating things in the world. It must make do with a subject matter that can be referred to only with indexicals. But Butchvarov thinks it incoherent to suppose that there could be entities that can be referred to only using indexicals. When Descartes doubts his existence as a certain Frenchman, he does not arrive at an indubitable thinking thing; he arrives at nothing at all. "Subjective epistemology is dependent on the use of 'I' as a dangling pronoun, a pronoun without an antecedent noun." (40) But Butchvarov does not do his thought justice, as we noted earlier. The point is not that 'I' used philosophically lacks an antecedent, but that it cannot be replaced *salve veritate* by a name, definite description, or demonstrative phrase. After all, ordinary indexical uses of 'I' lack antecedents, but can be replaced *salva veritate*

with names, descriptions and demonstratives. 'I am hungry,' said by BV, has the same truth conditions as 'BV is hungry.'

Epistemology-as-logic, like formal logic, is plainly philosophical, unambiguously non-anthropocentric, and possesses a subject matter. But how does this subject matter differ from that of formal logic? Whereas formal logic studies the alethic relations exemplified in formal inferences, epistemology-as-logic studies the alethic relations exemplified in nonformal inferences. (43) Chief among these alethic relations are those of nonformal entailment such as the entailment of being colored by being red. Strawsonian presupposition is another such relation and Butchvarov provides a rich and illuminating discussion of it.

## 6. ETHICS DEHUMANIZED

Butchvarov finds a paradox in the classical project of philosophical ethics. As ethics, it is presumably about human action and human flourishing. But humans are animals and thus subjects of empirical study. What room is then left for a non-empirical philosophical ethics?

If humans are natural objects, a species of animal, we can hardly expect to have special philosophical knowledge of them [...] Accounts of human well-being do not belong in philosophy [...] They belong, as I have argued, in the empirical sciences. (57)

But if the human good is not an appropriate object of philosophical investigation, what is?

Drawing on G. E. Moore, Butchvarov maintains that "the focal good is that of the world, not that of the human or sentient parts of it". (59) He finds further support in the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* who ties the notion of ethics to the notion of the world as a whole (66). Since there is no metaphysical subject or philosophical self (5.633), there is no distinction between me or my life and the world. Ethical statements can therefore only be about the world. There is not the space to explain this in any depth, and in any

case, this reviewer finds the discussion hard to follow. Part of the difficulty is Butchvarov's use of Wittgenstein's obscure Say versus Show distinction.

## 7. CODA

This is a powerfully original work, out of the mainstream of contemporary philosophy, and for this reason unlikely to find much resonance. But it repays careful study for those with an open mind. I have not been able to touch upon all of its riches. Butchvarov's semirealism about facts and other items is a difficult but exciting topic that would require a separate article to treat. And the same goes for the discussion of generic statements in Chapter 8.



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## SUMMARIUM

### **P. Butchvarovii doctrinae de philosophia anthropocentrismi purganda censura**

*In hac tractatione recensoria thesis, quam Panayot Butchvarov in libro suo proposuit, examinatur: philosophiam scil. in tribus sui praecipuis partibus, quae sunt epistemologia, ethica, metaphysica, anthropocentrismi esse purgandam.*

## ABSTRACT

### **Butchvarov on the Dehumanization of Philosophy**

*This review article examines Panayot Butchvarov's claim that philosophy in its three main branches, epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics, needs to be freed from anthropocentrism.*