Abstract
In my (2020), I criticize how Meinertsen in Metaphysics of States of Affairs treats the main ‘internal’ problem of his state of affairs ontology: the problem of unity. In this note, I consider instead some questions about Meinertsen’s approach to one of his important ‘external’ problems: the problem of non-substantial change.
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References
Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge University Press.
Bergmann, G. (1967). Realism: A critique of Brentano and Meinong. The University of Wisconsin Press.
Meinertsen, B. R. (2018). Metaphysics of states of affairs. Springer.
Vallicella, W. F. (2020). Review of B. R. Meinertsen. Metaphysics of States of Affairs. Metaphysica, 21, 167–177.
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Vallicella, W.F. Meinertsen on Non-Substantial Change, Trope Bundle Theory, and States of Affairs. Philosophia 51, 425–429 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00495-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00495-y