No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Assent to Faith, Theology and Scientia in Aquinas
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
This paper revisits Aquinas's understanding of theology as a science based on a participation in the divine scientia. Our modern presuppositions (in terms of “autonomous” reason and philosophy as a discipline utterly separate from theology) often appear to render Aquinas's claims implausible. In this contribution it is argued that (a) all sciences are fiduciary in the broad sense (with the exception of those that rely on principles per se nota) and (b) that first principles can only be accepted or rejected, but not refuted or demonstrated within the relevant discipline. From this, two conclusions can be drawn: first, despite its reliance on revelation theology's case is, therefore, not as peculiar as modern readers might initially assume: every discipline operates with key assumptions it simply accepts. Secondly, given the role of first principles, to characterise Aquinas's account of the assent of faith as fideist or voluntarist is beside the point, for you can only accept or reject first principles. The contribution ends by suggesting that assent to the articles of faith is not an extraneous acquiescence in assertions of divine authority either, as a reading of the first question of the Secunda Secundae makes clear. Indeed, the paper hints that we should not read the first question of the Prima Pars without engaging with the first questions of the Secunda Secundae.
- Type
- Original Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2018 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers
References
1 ST I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2 and a. 2: “doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo.” For the translations of Aquinas's works I am indebted to www.dhspriory.org/thomas (unless indicated otherwise). Aquinas gives a broad meaning to the term “Sacra Doctrina” in the first question of the Summa Theologiae. In the strict sense Sacra Doctrina refers to the (mainly theoretical, but also practical) scientia of theology in which we use demonstrative reasoning on the basis of the articles of faith so as to invite students into the world of Christian teaching. Sacra Doctrina refers, therefore, to the academic discipline, relying on intellectual rigour and arguments, that assists students in acquiring the necessary mindset to become themselves teachers of the Christian faith. When Aquinas, however, argues in article 1 that Sacra Doctrina is necessary for salvation (necessarium ad humanam salutem) he cannot possibly mean that all people need to engage in theology as an academic discipline – a kind of salvation Scripto solo. Thus, Sacra Doctrina does not exclusively refer to the academic discipline we call Christian theology (although it certainly includes it) but it also denotes Christian teaching and learning in the broad sense (the contents of faith of the “simple” believer). In the broad sense Sacra Doctrina refers to the knowledge revealed by God through the Scriptures that is foundational for the faith of the ordinary Christian, as well as for academic theology.
2 Quoted by Freddoso, Alfred J., ‘Ockham on faith and reason’ from Spade, Paul Vincent (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 334Google Scholar.
3 ST I, q. 1, a. 2.
4 ST II-II, q. 2, a. 9.
5 ST I, q. 1, a. 2 ad 1.
6 ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7; ST II-II, q. 2, a. 3 ad 2.
7 Jenkins, John I., Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 15Google Scholar. He quotes Aquinas's Commentary on the Posterior Analytics I, 4.32: “Therefore, it must be that the one having scientia if his apprehension is perfect, apprehends the cause of the thing of which he has scientia.” (p. 19)
8 Wisdom, in turn, combines insight (intellectus) into first principles with scientia.
9 See ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7 and (less explicitly) ST I, q. 1, a. 7: “God is in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles.”
10 I use the edition by Ribaillier, Jean, Altissiodorensis, Magistri Guillelmi, Summa Aurea (Collegium S. Bonaventurae: Grottaferrata, Rome: 1980-’85)Google Scholar; here: Summa Aurea III, tr, xii, c. 1. (p. 199)
11 For the translation of per se nota as “immediately known,” rather than as “self-evident,” see T.C. O'Brien's footnote in the Blackfriars’ edition of St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), vol. 31, p. 24 (with references).
12 See ST II-II, q. 1, a. 4 for a supporting description. Here Aquinas first outlines an assent on the basis of insight into first principles that are immediately known (per se), or through conclusions, in a mediated manner. Here the will has no role to play. He then outlines another way the mind assents, not through a sufficient motivation of its object but through some voluntary choice that influences the mind in favour of one alternative rather than the other. The assent of faith is of the latter kind. The implication is that the articles of faith are not first principles per se nota.
13 I am using the translation of Aquinas’ Commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate [Expos. De Trin.] by Maurer, Armand, Thomas Aquinas. Faith, Reason and Theology (Toronto: PIMS, 1987)Google Scholar.
14 I will explore this in section 3 of this paper.
15 For a more thorough discussion of intuitus simplex, see: Van Nieuwenhove, Rik, “Contemplation, Intellectus, and Simplex Intuitus in Aquinas: Recovering a Neoplatonic Theme” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2017): 199-225CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
16 Expos. De Trin. q. 2, a. 2 ad 4; see also ST II-II, q. 1, a. 7.
17 Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, IV, 4 (no. 607).
18 ST II-II, q. 2, a. 3 ad 2.
19 Stump, Eleonore, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2005), 366ffGoogle Scholar.
20 Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, ch. 11, lect. 1, no. 554.
21 ST II-II, q. 2, a. 3 ad 2.
22 ST I, q. 5, a. 4 ad 1.
23 In both instances (art and matters of faith) a cognitive claim is made. I assume a cognitive (as distinct from an emotional or experiential) theory of art. Art is not simply about emotions but rather discloses something about our world and the human condition, although our language will always fail to express fully the truth claims of art.
24 See Tenbergen, Maarten, Klassieken van de Russische Literatuur (Utrecht, Aula: 1991), 342Google Scholar.
25 In the latter case, the piece of art does not “address us” as one would say in German (“Es spricht mir nicht an” means “It does not appeal to me,” or “It does not resonate with me.” Literally it means: “It does not speak to me.”)
26 ST I, q. 1, a. 8: “As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith…”
27 The phrase is taken from Whittaker, John, “Kierkegaard and Existence Communication” from Faith and Philosophy 5/2 (1988): 168-84, 175CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The reference to Kierkegaard in this context is important: if my interpretation is correct, what Kierkegaard says on faith as “existence-communication” as distinct from doctrine would be recognised by Aquinas. Aquinas is as little a rationalist than Kierkegaard a fideist.
28 ST I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2 and ST II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2. Insofar as theological science is concerned, this claim excludes the preambles of faith, including the five ways.
29 Therefore, with the exception of what he says about the preambles of faith (and perhaps the commentaries on Aristotle and some minor works such as De Ente et Essentia), everything Aquinas wrote – including the first three books of the Summa contra Gentiles – is theological (on his terms) although it is possible to extrapolate a philosophy (in our understanding of the term) from his writings.
30 ST II-II, q. 1, a. 1 (in this instance I borrow from the Blackfriars’ edition).
31 See III Sent. d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2 and ST II-II, q. 2, a. 2. I am inclined to translate credere in Deum as “to have faith in God.” This refers to the act of faith, as distinct from the object of faith. In III Sent. d. 23 Aquinas explains credere Deo in terms of giving credence to God because God has spoken “the way a man believes the testimony of a good person who sees what he himself does not see” (sicut homo in his quae non videt, credit testimonio alicujus boni viri qui videt ea quae ipse non videt).
32 Commentary on the Second Epistle to Corinthians, 2 Cor. 3:12-18 (no. 114).
33 This is how adaequatio intellectus et rei should be translated rather than in terms of “correspondence.”
34 The beatific vision involves a profound deiform transformation of the person, whereby the intellect is strengthened by the light of glory (ST I, q. 12, a. 2) which renders us deiform (ST I, q. 12, a. 5). Faith prepares us for, and inchoatively realises, this deiform assimilation that will come to fruition in heaven. As the light of glory transforms our intellect in the afterlife, the light of faith on earth inaugurates this transformation of the intellect here and now.
35 ST II-II, q. 2. a. 3 ad 2.
36 De Ver. q. 11, a. 1.
37 In this instance I am using Thomas Gilby's translation from the Blackfriars Edition.
38 An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the School of Divinity, St Andrews. I am most grateful to Professor Judith Wolfe and her colleagues for giving me the opportunity to share my ideas. I would also like to thank Professor Christopher Insole and Mr William Crozier, both in the Department of Theology and Religion, Durham University, for detailed and constructive criticism of a previous draft.