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HEIDEGGER ON ZHUANGZI AND USELESSNESS:

ILLUSTRATING PRECONDITIONS OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

In this paper I look at those passages in the *Zhuangzi* usually associated with “uselessness.” I discuss in what way these passages may have been suggestive to Martin Heidegger to explain his ideas of the necessity of the other thinking and of the “waiting people” being entirely unusable to others. Then I make some brief comments concerning basic conditions of interpretation, using examples taken from the *Zhuangzi* passages discussed. These conditions include family resemblance across the board, a principle of agreement, and the issue of “planetarization” (Heidegger’s term).

I. INTRODUCTION

It has been documented that Martin Heidegger has displayed interest in the *Laozi* or the *Zhuangzi* (in German translations) on at least thirteen occasions.¹ On two occasions he cites an exchange between Hui Shi 惠施 and Zhuangzi 莊子 in full. In 1945 Heidegger cites the passage concerning the necessity of the useless in chapter 26 of the *Zhuangzi*.² In 1962 he cites the passage concerning the tree-of-heaven at the end of chapter 1.³ In section II, I show that in both cases the focus of Heidegger’s interest in the *Zhuangzi* text is that it fits his idea of the necessity of “useless” thinking. In addition I show that, in particular in the 1945 text, Heidegger leans heavily on terminology from Richard Wilhelm’s translation of the *Zhuangzi*.⁴ Most commentators and interpreters who address Zhuangzi’s theme of uselessness focus on

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“the useless tree.” But this doesn’t seem to be the focus of Heidegger’s interest. I discuss the useless tree stories in section III. In section IV, I look at passages in the *Zhuangzi* that are related to the two passages Heidegger cites and which may have suited Heidegger’s thinking.

In sections V and VI, I make some brief comments concerning the basic conditions of interpretation, using examples taken from sections II-IV. These conditions include the necessity to assume family resemblance across the board, the underdetermination of interpretation by many hermeneutic circles, the principle of agreement, and the issue of “planetarization” (Heidegger’s term).

The two passages from Wilhelm’s translation of the *Zhuangzi*, which Heidegger cites in 1945 and 1962, are from chapter 1 and 26. Angus Graham has argued that the passage from chapter 26 might actually have fitted into chapter 1.⁵ In sections III and IV, I will also cite from chapter 4 of the *Zhuangzi*. Other, possibly relevant passages in the outer or miscellaneous chapters, I will only mention briefly and in passing. The passages I refer to a number of times are:⁶

- the exchanges between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi concerning a large calabash and concerning a tree-of-heaven, both at the end of chapter 1;
- the exchange between Zhuangzi and Hui Shi concerning the unnecessary or useless, from chapter 26 (perhaps originally belonging to chapter 1);
- the story of carpenter Shi and the village tree and the story of a great tree and the *shenren* 神人, both in chapter 4, as well as the last few lines of chapter 4.

II. HEIDEGGER AND ZHUANGZI’S USELESSNESS

If we can trust Heidegger’s memory, he tells us:

In my student days I copied [“a short conversation between two thinkers”] from a historiological account of Chinese philosophy because it struck me, though I did not quite understand it earlier.⁷

This citation is from the last “Conversation” of the trilogy of *Country Path Conversations*, composed in 1944-45, namely, “Evening Conversation: In a prisoner of war camp in Russia, between a younger and an older man.” In this text Heidegger discusses a theme that is addressed in many of his writings, the devastation that “consists in the abandonment of being.”⁸ What can we do? “We can do nothing more humble than this humble deed of calmly letting ourselves engage in waiting” and reflect on the “urgent need [*Not*] and the necessity of the unnecessary.”⁹ The “calmly letting ourselves engage in waiting” connects to Heidegger’s well-known notion of *Gelassenheit* (letting-be), which has been associated with Daoist *wuwei* 無為: “what I really will in our meditation on thinking [is] I will non-willing.”¹⁰

At the very end of the “Evening Conversation,” Heidegger cites the following passage from the *Zhuangzi* in full:¹¹

The one said, “You are talking about the unnecessary [*Unnötigen, wuyong* 无用].”
 The other said, “A person must first have recognised the unnecessary [*wuyong*] before one can talk with him about the necessary [*vom Nötigen, yong* 用]. The earth is wide and large, and yet, in order to stand, the human needs only enough space to be able to put his feet down. But if directly next to his feet a crevice were to open up that dropped down into the Underworld, then would the space where he stands still be of use to him? [*zu etwas nütze, youyong* 有用]
 The one said, “It would be of no more use to him [*Er wäre ihm nichts mehr nütze, wuyong*].”
 The other said, “From this the pressing need of the unneeded is clearly apparent.”¹²

In reciting this parable, Heidegger follows the translation of Wilhelm line by line, except for substituting “the one” and “the other” for Hui Dsi (Hui Shi) and Dschuang

Dsi (Zhuangzi).¹³ Heidegger doesn't comment on the text after having cited it. However, comparing Heidegger's citation with the text of the "Evening Conversation" shows convincingly that the text from the *Zhuangzi* played a large role in giving form to his argument and wording in the "Evening Conversation."

A peculiarity of Wilhelm's translation of the last line, *wuyong zhi weiyong* 无为之為用, is to render it as *die Notwendigkeit des Unnötigen*, which he also used as the title of this exchange. In the English translation of Heidegger's text this is translated as: "the necessity of the unnecessary." Another possibility might be "the pressing need of the unneeded." A common rendering in English translations of this line is "the useless has its use." In English *wuyong* is almost always translated as "useless," but in German, Wilhelm has a number of options.¹⁴ It is also important to note that German *Notwendigkeit* has a much wider range of meanings than English *necessity*. In this context (and for Heidegger), *Notwendigkeit* certainly doesn't mean logical or metaphysical necessity, but any and all of the following: pressing need, be required, indispensable, inevitable, unavoidable.

Heidegger repeats the phrase *die Notwendigkeit des Unnötigen* (necessity of the unnecessary), six times before it occurs in the citation from Zhuangzi at the end of his text; sometimes slightly paraphrasing or elaborating it, for example: "the necessity of the unnecessary would remain to be thought."¹⁵

The crevice dropping into the Underworld is mirrored in Heidegger's text, when he speaks of "the emptiness that seems to gape around us when we wait on the pure coming."¹⁶ A couple of times Heidegger draws on the first line of Zhuangzi's answer to Hui Shi, for example, in saying:

Only one who has learned to know the necessity of the unnecessary can appreciate anything at all of the pain that arises

when the human is barred from thinking.¹⁷

Heidegger makes a connection of the unnecessary with thinking.¹⁸ “Thinking is ... the unnecessary. [It] remains at all times the most needed of all.”¹⁹ Heidegger’s “other thinking” no longer remains within the constraint of metaphysical thinking. It is non-imposing or non-coercive; it is essentially preparatory. Hopefully, the other thinking could save the technological world.²⁰

In the preamble of “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” a lecture given in 1962 for science teachers, Heidegger cites (again from Wilhelm’s translation) the following story in full, which comes from the end of chapter 1 of the *Zhuangzi*:

Huizi said to Zhuangzi: “I have a huge tree. People call it the tree-of-heaven [*Götterbaum*]. It has such a gnarled and deformed trunk ... Its branches are so crooked and twisted ... There it stands right in the road, but no carpenter looks at it. So are your words, pompous [*groß*] and useless [*unbrauchbar, wuyong*], and everyone unanimously turns away from them.

Zhuangzi spoke: “Have you never seen a marten whose body lurks and waits if something passes by? ... Now you have such a big tree and yet are sorry that it is not useful for anything [*daß er zu nichts nütze ist, wuyong*]. Why don’t you plant it in a deserted moor or in a wide empty field. There you could idly [*untätig, wuwei*] roam close by it and sleep underneath its branches during your moments of leisure. Neither hatchet nor ax has a premature end ready for it, and none can harm it.

That something has no use [*keinen Nutzen, wusuo keyong 无所可用*], what does one need to worry about!”²¹

According to Heidegger this passage provides the following insight:

One need not worry about the useless [*das Nutzlose*]. By virtue of its uselessness the inviolable and everlasting suit it. Thus, it is wrong to apply the standard of usefulness [*Nützlichkeit*] to the useless.²²

This “summary” may be partly based on other passages from the *Zhuangzi* (see section IV). Here I emphasize that Heidegger takes both exchanges as supporting his

notion of the other thinking, which is referred to as *Besinnung* (reflection) in the 1962 text.

To be useless [*Nutzlos*] in such a way that they let nothing make them immediately practical [*Nutzen*] is the sense of things. Hence, that reflection [*Besinnung*] in which it is pondered after [*nachsinnt*] yields definitely no practical use, yet the sense of things is that which is most necessary [*Nötigste*].²³

The last clause of this citation may be compared with “what is not needed remains at all times the most needed of all,” cited above from the “Evening Conversation.”²⁴ Heidegger may have liked that in both exchanges cited, Hui Shi associates Zhuangzi’s words with the unnecessary (*Unnötigen*) or being useless (*unbrauchbar*).

III. THE USELESS TIMBER

It is the great useless tree that seems to be the central focus of the many discussions of Zhuangzi’s idiosyncratic remarks on uselessness, both early and late, although this doesn’t seem to be Heidegger’s focus. The well-known tree story, occurring with slight variations in four places in the *Zhuangzi*, goes as follows. A great tree is introduced:

a great tree of the kind people call tree-of-heaven (*chu* 樗);
a chestnut-leaved-oak standing by the altar of the god of the soil;
a great tree which stood out from the rest;
a great tree in the mountains.²⁵

A carpenter or woodcutter passes by and shows no interest, because it is useless timber, listing many reasons for its parts being unusable for wood working, for example:

Its trunk is too knobbly and bumpy to measure with the inked line, its branches are too curly and crooked to fit compasses or L-

square.

Make a boat from it and it will sink, make a coffin and it will rot at once, make a bowl and it will break at once, make a gate or door and it will ooze sap, make a pillar and it will be worm-holed.²⁶

In all four cases it is concluded that it is useless timber. Translations vary at this point of the story: wretched timber, worthless tree, good-for-nothing wood, there's nothing you can use it for. Because it is useless timber, the tree can live out the years heaven gave it. As the sacred oak puts it:

As for me, I've been trying a long time to be of no use, and though I almost died, I've finally got it. This is of great use to me. If I had been of some use, would I ever have grown this large?²⁷

Feng Youlan comments: "To be useless is the way to preserve one's life."²⁸ The latter is confirmed by the fate of useful trees:

These are trees [i.e. fruit trees] that by their own abilities make life miserable for themselves; and so they die in mid-path without lasting out the years assigned to them by Heaven.

Cinnamon has a taste, So they hack it down.
Lacquer has a use, So they strip it off.

They [catalpas, cypresses and mulberries] do not last the years Heaven assigned to them.

The straight-trunked tree is the first to be felled.²⁹

Although there are few "philosophical" comments on Zhuangzi's pronouncements concerning *wuyong* in chapter 26, the image of the useless tree was well-known, in particularly in Daoist circles,³⁰ as illustrated by the rhymed essay *Rongmufu* 榕木賦 ("Rhapsody on the Banyan Tree") by Li Gang (Li Kang) 李綱 (1083–1140).³¹ As Edward Schafer remarks, the rhapsody is "a kind of rhymed Taoist apologue."³²

The poem has 63 lines (including 7 lines of introduction in prose).³³ The poem mentions the tree-of-heaven (*ailanthus*) and the sacred oak serving as the village tree. Carpenter Shi is mentioned as well. The story runs as follows. The banyan tree is a large tree, it is a tree like other trees. How does it differ? (line 8-16) Then many lines describe the useless timber of the banyan (lines 17-34). For example (compare passage from the *Zhuangzi* cited above):

the great roots contorting and swelling, the small branches
clenching and crooking (line 18)
make boat and paddle out of it—they will quickly sink (line 27)
make coffin and sarcophagus of it—they will quickly rot (line 28)

However, the poem doesn't shed any light on how to understand what the author of the poem was impressed by, viz. "what is called 'the use of uselessness'" (line 6-7). The poem itself only leads to the conclusion of the banyan tree being wretched timber (*sanmu* 散木).

It seems an ostentatious, ineffectual tree [*sanmu*]! (line 35)

The alternative use of shade is highlighted, drawing on many sources apart from the *Zhuangzi*.³⁴ The consequence of having a long life is mentioned as well (lines 51-55) and contrasted with "cultivated trees" (*wenmu* 文木):

It can avoid premature death by hewing and striking of hatchet
and axe. (line 51)

However, the last lines of the poem draw on chapter 20, where *Zhuangzi* is said to be

located midway between the gifted and ungifted [*cai yu bucai* 才
与不才] (line 62).

Like Li Kang, much of the recent literature focuses on trees exclusively, not noticing the importance of the passage in chapter 26.³⁵ Most of the time the "midway" position taken in chapter 20 (tree and geese story) is taken as an inconsistency to be

explained or thought to be Zhuangzi's final conclusion, instead of focusing on the inner chapters. The distinction between useless timber and other uses of trees is rarely made.³⁶ Authors speak of "useless tree" instead of the more correct "useless timber."³⁷ The only recurrent theme among commentators is uselessness as protection for a long-life. Of course, in Zhuangzi's time, this was important advice.³⁸

IV. TWO SIMILAR PASSAGES?

After citing the tree-of-heaven passage, Heidegger observes: "Two similar passages, with some modifications, are found in other parts of the writing *The True Book on the Southern Land of Blossoms*," the title of Wilhelm's translation. There is no simple answer to the question which two passages Heidegger was thinking of. I will consider a number of possibilities. The first possibility is that the passage from chapter 26 is among the "two similar passages." As I pointed out Heidegger sees *both* passages he cites as suggestive of his "other thinking." As to this general theme (from Heidegger's perspective), the end of Chapter 4 would seem to fit best with the passages he cited:

Nobody knows how useful [nützlich] it is to be useless
[nutzlos].³⁹

Therefore, we must learn "to know the necessity of the unnecessary and, as learners, teach it to the peoples [*Völkern*]." ⁴⁰

The above passage cited from the end of chapter 4 may also be taken as an indirect reference to uselessness as a protection of longevity. Also Heidegger may have noted the story in chapter 4 following the one of carpenter Shi and the village tree, which ends with a cryptic remark concerning the *shenren*, to be associated with longevity:

That really is a tree out of which nothing can be made. That way it has reached its size. That is the reason why the man of spirit is useless [*unbrauchbar*] for life.⁴¹

Some of Zhuangzi's descriptions of *shenren* and longevity may have suited

Heidegger. Compare the passage just cited with Heidegger's words:

By virtue of its uselessness [*Nutzlosigkeit*] the inviable and everlasting suit it.⁴²

The waiting people [*Volk*] would have to be entirely unusable to the others. [They] would have to become the oldest people, so that no one concerns himself with it [i.e. the waiting] and no one makes use of its strange doing, which is a letting and so makes use of it and prematurely uses it up.⁴³

Heidegger's references to longevity are rather convincing ("everlasting," "prematurely"). More speculatively, Heidegger's waiting people may be associated with features of the *shenren*.

Heidegger may have noticed not only the similarity between the great tree in chapter 1 and the trees in chapter 4, but also the similarity of great tree and large calabash in chapter 1, which, according to Hui Shi, have no use (*keinen Nutzen*).

Heidegger writes: "The useless has its own greatness and determining power since it does not let anything be made out of it."⁴⁴ Another similarity between the large calabash and the great tree in chapter 1 is the similarity of Zhuangzi's advice to Hui Shi, which Heidegger may have liked:⁴⁵

Why don't you plant it in a deserted moor or in a wide empty field. There you could idly roam close by it and sleep underneath its branches during your moments of leisure.
Why did you not think of making large (floating) buoys [*Schwimmtonnen*] of them, by means of which you could have sailed over rivers and lakes?⁴⁶

Heidegger may have associated these *wuwei* passages with being directed toward *Gelassenheit*, toward ineffableness and vastness, "the open expanse [*Weite*] of

thinking”⁴⁷ in which Being discloses itself.⁴⁸

Apart from being cut down, a tree may have many other uses or “talents.” A large tree may provide shade and shelter. The roots, leaves and bark of the tree-of-heaven allegedly have the ability to cure all kinds of ailments. There is conventional use and more special “use.” In the line of chapter 2 of the *Zhuangzi*, it has been suggested that distinctions between the useful and the useless cannot and should not be made.⁴⁹ Usefulness is relative to perspective. Passages in chapters 17 and 20 may seem to support this. The passages already discussed also suit this idea: “the salve that keep hands from chapping” was “put to different uses” with very different results.⁵⁰ Great trees may provide shade for *wuwei* or may serve as village tree.

Teschner and Tomasi, referring to Hui Shi and the large calabash argue that innovative instrumental thinking redefines what is useful and sees usefulness in what otherwise would be regarded as useless.⁵¹ Hui Shi lacks this kind of thinking. This seems to be misrepresenting both Heidegger and Zhuangzi. Redefining what is useful is part of *das Gestell*. Zhuangzi’s (and Heidegger’s) point is not merely that, as Graham Parkes suggests, “more and broader perspectives [are] better than fewer and narrower.”⁵² The point is not to find some other use, but to focus on big words,⁵³ the other thinking (*Besinnung*) and *wuwei* (*Gelassenheit*).

Even more speculatively, Zhuangzi’s examples of useful trees being hacked down might be related to Heidegger’s critical comments concerning the consumption drive, for example: “the greed of accumulating always cling only to what is purportedly necessary. They make the eyes of our essence blind to the unnecessary.”⁵⁴

In addition to the two passages Heidegger cites in full, he may have been attracted to several passages throughout chapter 4, as well as to the story of Hui Shi and the large calabach in chapter 1.

V. NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY⁵⁵

(1) *Underdetermination and holism*

In interpretative practice meanings, beliefs, intentions and such like are all interpreted *together*. Whenever one comes up with an interpretation of one facet, one would have already assumed an implicit interpretation of all other facets. Any concrete situation of interpreting a text, a philosopher, or a tradition is underdetermined by the evidence (the “data”), and the holistic relations between different facets of interpretation.

The notion of hermeneutic circle is often introduced in this context with reference to the whole and the parts, but this is far too simplistic. There are *numerous* hermeneutic circles. There is holism all over the place; between different parts, between parts and wholes taken at different levels. There is already a hermeneutic circle “inside” a Chinese character. Meanings of many words are interpreted together, not one by one. Interpretation of work and corpus, passage and work are interdependent. In particular interpretative contexts, even logic is part of the holism of interpretation. There are hermeneutic circles between a particular interpreter and other interpreters and commentators. There is holism of different hermeneutic circles.

The possibility of interpretation seems to be undermined from two sides:

- No interpretation is possible (“the threat of incommensurability”). Reply: family resemblance across the board. See subsection (2).
- Too many interpretations are possible (“the freedom of underdetermination”). Reply: principle of agreement. See subsection (3).

(2) *Family resemblance across the board*

In order to dissolve the “threat” of incommensurability, we have to realise that a necessary condition for interpretation to be possible is family resemblance across the board. By family resemblance is meant: Among the referents of a concept, similarities (*Ähnlichkeiten*) and affinities (*Verwandtschaften*) “crop up and disappear.”⁵⁶ By “across the board” is meant: First, that *all* concepts are family-resemblance-concepts, having no essences or cores, no strict borders (except if *stipulated* to be otherwise, *using* family-resemblance-concepts).⁵⁷ Second, across languages and traditions, numerous concepts can be connected by family resemblances to a greater or lesser extent.

Family resemblance between mutually recognisable human practices must be presupposed. In the practice of interpretation or comparison, different choices are made by different interpreters which extensions of family-resemblance-concepts are made. In another terminology we may also say: assuming quasi-universals is a necessary condition of interpretation. Quasi-universals have the following characteristics:⁵⁸

- A quasi-universal “fuses” the extension of words from two different languages or traditions, thus enlarging the family resemblances associated with corresponding words or phrases in two languages.
- Quasi-universals connect notions from a limited number of traditions. They are not necessarily applicable to all human traditions. In this sense they are “local.”
- They are working hypotheses, that is, revisable as a consequence of the continuing process of interpretation.
- They fulfil a necessary role in interpretative practice. Without assuming a large

number of quasi-universals, interpretation across traditions would not be possible.

- Family resemblance across the board allows the interpreter to select quasi-universals. Recognisable human practices invite the projection of hypothetical quasi-universals.
- Data and background underdetermine the choice of quasi-universals in any particular case. For example, translation of classical Chinese into say, English and Japanese respectively, will usually draw on different quasi-universals.

I will draw on the passages from the *Zhuangzi* discussed in the first part to give some examples of shared (in the sense of recognisable) practices or quasi-universals, which have to be taken for granted as background to embark on the more difficult parts of interpretation. Easily recognisable practices include the practice of a carpenter and his tools and artefacts made (a boat, side boards of coffins,⁵⁹ ridgepoles of tall roofs), as described in the useless timber stories (see section III).

Numbers will usually assumed to be universals (e.g. a thousand oxen, *qian niu* 千牛), but because associations may differ, it is better to speak of quasi-universals. It is easy to imagine contexts in which it does matter, for example a number having particular significance (apart from being used in some standardised measurement). This supports favouring rather literal translations. It may be safer to report that the lowest branches of the sacred oak are 10 *ren* 仞 from the ground than translating it as 70 feet (Watson) or 80 feet (Graham).⁶⁰

Trees, plants, or animals allow for different classifications, but these classifications usually overlap to a considerable degree. Most of the time (but not always) minor discrepancies don't affect the overall meaning of a text, for example

Watson translating *shu* 鼠 as “rats” and Graham translating it as “a mouse.” A translation may turn out to be wrong (perhaps *tainiu* 犛牛 is not a yak),⁶¹ but such cases can only be pointed to against the background of many assumed quasi-universals.

In some cases the type of tree or animal mentioned may be quite irrelevant. This may well be the case for Zhuangzi’s trees, which fall apart in two groups: the ones that end their life prematurely and those that associate with longevity and *shenren*. Then a tree-of-heaven is by definition “useless,” whether it provides medicaments or not; whether it is or is not different from the Spring tree (*chun* 椿) in chapter 1.⁶²

But the specifics of “easy” quasi-universals may be, perhaps unexpectedly, relevant to the broader interpretation of a passage and it is important to distinguish “similarities in the large and in the small.”⁶³ An example of (missing) similarities in the large is differences in how humans and other things fit together in the universe.

In more difficult cases of interpretation, the interpreter may have to learn alien concepts without the help of quasi-universals, by learning how the alien concept is embedded among alien concepts for which quasi-universals are easier to construct; *wuyong* might be an example of the latter (see section VI).

(3) *Principle of agreement*

Family resemblance across the board is a necessary condition for interpretation to be possible. However, it increases underdetermination in the sense that alternative choices of quasi-universals are possible. A necessary precondition of interpretation to constrain underdetermination is the principle of agreement. Some sort of principle of

agreement (in a large number of cases) must be presupposed. The interpreter *must* presuppose that “the other” usually is sincere, speaks the truth, speaks consistently, and often aims for what is right, such conceptions as *sincerity*, truth, consistency and what is right being understood according to the interpreter’s criteria and formulated in his or her language.⁶⁴

Every particular interpretation depends on innumerable other interpretations, each of which can be wrong, but many have to be right lest any sense of interpretation is lost. Only relative to the other on the whole being right, can one ascribe to her or him logical, epistemic, or deontic error. One can have disagreements with the other only against a background of agreements; one can misunderstand the other only against a background of understanding. A false statement can only be identified because it contains many words that occur in true statements. A text can only be interpreted if many utterances of the author(s) are assumed to be true.

As interpretation moves on, or as a result of discussions among scholars, one may reach a stage when a reformulation of the principle of agreement may be required. It is not assumed that the words used in the formulation of the principle name universals.

The principle of agreement is applied in terms of the criteria of the interpreter, but as interpretation advances, one may also start to interpret by the other’s lights (as understood by the interpreter’s lights). Of course we need to have passed the earlier stages in order to find out *what* the standards of the other are.⁶⁵

The principle of agreement is not enough to constrain underdetermination. In addition the interpreter must presuppose a rather evanescent set of epistemic virtues. Epistemic virtues are criteria to choose between competing interpretations, for example: consistency, simplicity, fitting the data, scope, epistemic virtues for

selecting data, and so on. Interpreters will differ in the epistemic virtues they value and in particular in their judgement of balancing different (possibly conflicting) epistemic virtues.

There are many difficult passages in the *Zhuangzi*, but we can only address the difficult interpretative issues if we may assume the truth of many statements, for example:

A wildcat or a weasel crouching low in wait for strays, makes a pounce east or west as nimble uphill or down, and drops plumb into the snare and dies in the net.⁶⁶

Even if we know nothing about the behaviour of wildcats and weasels we can understand the statement, assume its truth, and use that as a basis to interpret the role of this utterance in Zhuangzi's reply to Hui Shi.

Now consider a more difficult case: *shenren yici bucai* 神人以此不材!

Translations differ:⁶⁷

Oh, that is the reason why the man of spirit is useless for life.
Aha ! - it is this unusableness that the Holy Man makes use of!"
Aha! That's why the most daemonic of men are made of such poor stuff!⁶⁸
Ah, the divine man! He has become what he is by a similar lack of useful properties (talents).
Ah! The spiritual man is also worthless like this.

One thing these alternative translations bring out is the ambiguity of *bucal* (and hence how to take the analogy between a great tree and a *shenren*). Are there two separate meanings (talent, timber), or do we have to learn the meaning of *bucal* without help of easy quasi-universals? Further, if we may assume the string of characters to be true (for Zhuangzi), translations (meanings) have to fit the concept of *shenren*, which may remain highly underdetermined by the data, because Zhuangzi uses the word only a few times. Hermeneutic circles will have to be observed between

Zhuangzi's usages of *shenren*, uses in other works of his time, as well as between *shenren* and related concepts, such as *zhiren* 至人 and *shengren* 聖人.⁶⁹

VII. PLANETARIZATION

There is one last feature of contemporary comparative philosophy that needs to be mentioned. It is not so much a necessary condition of interpretation, but an unavoidable constraint on interpretation in the contemporary world.

Perhaps the cooperation in the seventeenth century of Li Zhizao 李之藻 and Francisco Furtado on the *Minglitan* 名理探 was still an intercultural encounter on a more or less equal footing. However, today no philosopher in China (or Europe or America for that matter) is free to conduct philosophical reflection completely independent of European conceptual schemes. In the contemporary world almost all philosophizing is dominated (or “infected”) by European history of ideas. As Heidegger remarked after raising the question of the accessibility of “the ancient world of the Indies, China and Japan” to Western thought,

This question becomes all the more burning, as European thinking threatens to become planetary, in that contemporary Indians, Chinese and Japanese in many cases bring to us what is experienced by them only through our European way of thinking.⁷⁰

For Heidegger the current globalised world (or in his terminology: planetarized world) is unique and is fundamentally distinguished from earlier epochs of Being.⁷¹ The most essential feature of the globalised world lies in the spread and domination of science and technology. All similarities and differences have to fit into a single dominant discourse, which (as a result of the developments of science and technology) becomes more and more standardised (or regimented) and essentialised.

The processes of planetarization lead to a form of hermeneutic relativity that is becoming more and more difficult to overcome.

Is it still possible to interpret classical Chinese texts without using conceptual schemes that originate in European languages? One might say: “Of course this is possible: just write in Chinese.” But modern Chinese contains more than one thousand neologisms, including many loan words, which are introduced to render European philosophical notions such as being, philosophy, logic, ontology, concept, category, consciousness, criticism, judgement, matter, metaphysics, necessity, proposition, and so on.⁷² Of course all languages are in constant change. There are loan words in Chinese that originally came from Sanskrit, Persian, Mongolian, Manchu, and other languages. But from the end of the nineteenth century onwards, the Chinese language has not only enlarged its vocabulary. The language itself has changed.

In addition to the regimentation of *all* languages to modern terminology, databases such as the *Thesaurus Linguae Sericae* employ scientifically inspired classifications, assuming these to specify linguistic universals; and map onto it (pre-Han) Chinese characters (assumed to label these universals). In this way classical Chinese is reconstructed and regimented to fit modern terminology.

Consider the phrase that played a central role in the first part of this paper: *wuyong*. In the *Thesaurus Linguae Sericae* there is a synonym group USELESS, but not a synonymy group WUYONG. The following character phrases are placed in the USELESS group: *te* 特, *heyong* 何用, *wuyi* 无益, *wuyong* 無用, *wuyi* 無益, *yonghewei* 用何為.⁷³ It is not clear what are the criteria for inclusion. For some reason *wuyong* 无用 is not listed, while *wuyi* 无益 is.⁷⁴

The synonyms of useless given in the *Thesaurus Linguae Sericae* are somewhat different from representative lists in English dictionaries, for example by including “unprofitable.” This suggests the list is influenced by translations that have been given for *wuyi*.⁷⁵

Graham classifies passages in the *Zhuangzi* that bear on “uselessness” as part of his evidence to isolate Zhuangzi’s own words. In the inner chapters *wuyong*, including *wusuo keyong* 无所可用, is used in a context of “preferring the useless.”⁷⁶ When the subject is timber, *bucai* or *sanmu* may be used.⁷⁷ Graham doesn’t mention *sanmu* in his classification, and characterizes *bucai* as “preferring untalented to talented.” In the outer and miscellaneous chapters *wuyong* is used in a context of “rejecting as useless,”⁷⁸ and *bucai* in chapter 20 as “compromising between untalented and talented.”

Graham adds *buyong* 不用 to his table, “preferring not utilising.” According to Graham’s table it is only used in the later chapters.⁷⁹ He doesn’t mention the use of *buyong* in chapter 2: the sage (*shengren*) has no use for categories or things.⁸⁰ Perhaps *buyong* should be added to the synonymy group WUYONG.

And shouldn’t we include *buweiyong* 不為用 in the synonymy group of WUYONG? It does not occur in the *Zhuangzi*, but it does occur elsewhere, for example in the *Guanzi*, whereas *weiyong* does occur in the *Zhuangzi*. The latter has occasionally been translated as necessity, for example by Wilhelm and elsewhere.⁸¹ Hence it should find a place in discussions of Zhuangzi’s uselessness. Instead of forcing words from classical Chinese into the straight jacket of a standardised modern “scientific” (hence “universal”) conceptual scheme, it would be more relevant to locate (*wu*)*yong* relative to its congeners in Chinese such as (*bu*)*weiyong*.⁸²

Modern Chinese translations of Zhuangzi's text also tend to pull its meaning into streamlined global talk.⁸³ For example, *wuyong* 无用 is translated as *meiyou yongchu* 没有用处 and similarly for other expressions containing *wuyong*, making the useful and useless more explicitly understood as *practical* use(lessness). *Sanmu* may completely disappear from modern translations, changed to *meiyou yongchu de shumu* 没有用处的树木, when the sacred oak compares worthless tree (*sanmu*) and worthless man (*sanren*).

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The passages in the Zhuangzi involving *wuyong*, seen from Heidegger's perspective, seem to convey three messages:

- necessity of the uselessness (in particular that of “the other thinking”), on which usefulness (that is, the sense of things) depends (chapter 26);
- uselessness sustains longevity (the most important usefulness), which may be associated with the *shenren*, and more speculatively with Heidegger's waiting people (chapter 4);
- whether useful or useless depends on one's perspective: use of timber, extracting healing agents, providing shade, serving as village tree, and including specifically *wuwei* use (chapter 1).

Graham speaks of “unqualified praise of uselessness in the *Inner chapters*.”⁸⁴ This seems to be “extravagant” criticism, overlooking that in Zhuangzi's time advice regarding how to survive was directly relevant,⁸⁵ overlooking as well the possible significance of the passage in chapter 26 that is Heidegger's focus.

Wilhelm's translation shows that we should be careful in imposing one (modern) translation on *wuyong*. Because Zhuangzi's use is unique, we have to be careful to identify it via a globalized universal such as "useless." Although Heidegger only had access to (a now perhaps outdated) translation of Wilhelm,⁸⁶ his understanding of Zhuangzi's *wuyong* may still be admissible and relevant for scholarly work on Zhuangzi's uselessness.

No matter whether a translation is "obvious" or "speculative," interpretation is only possible assuming many quasi-universals and shared truths. More difficult passages are interpreted against the background of the truth of "easy" passages and assumed quasi-universals. Therefore we need a careful translation for "easy" passages as well.

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ENDNOTES

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¹ For a discussion of Heidegger's engagement with the *Daodejing* see Lin Ma, "Deciphering Heidegger's Connection with the *Daodejing*," *Asian Philosophy* 16 (2006): 149-71. For a discussion of his engagement with the *Zhuangzi* see Lin Ma, and Jaap van Brakel, "Out of the *Ge-Stell*? The Role of the East in Heidegger's *das andere Denken*," *Philosophy East & West* 64 (2014): 527-62.

² Martin Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), 156. *Feldweg-Gespräche, Gesamtausgabe* vol. 77 (Frankfurt a/M: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005), 239. In shortened references to Heidegger I will give the page number of the English translation followed by the page number of the German original, separated by a slash.

³ Martin Heidegger, "Traditional Language and Technological Language," *Journal of Philosophical Research* 23 (1998): 129-45. *Überlieferte Sprache und Technische Sprache* (St. Gallen: Erker, 1989).

⁴ Richard Wilhelm, *Dschuang-Dsi. Das Wahre Buch vom Südlichen Blütenland* (Jena: Diederichs, 1920). In sections II and IV, the English translation of the *Zhuangzi* is based on Wilhelm's German translation. Translations in sections III and V-VI, are based on A. C. Graham, *Chuang-Tzu. The Inner Chapters* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981). Other translations that have been consulted include Burton Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). Kristofer Schipper, *Zhuang Zi: De Volledige Geschriften: Het Grote Klassieke Boek van het Taoïsme* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Augustus, 2007).

⁵ Harold D. Roth, *A Companion to Angus C. Graham's Chuang Tzu—the Inner Chapters* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 73. Heidegger's reading

seems to support taking the chapter 26 episode as presenting the “unusualness” or “originality” of Zhuangzi’s view.

⁶ Reference to the *Zhuangzi* is by using the sequence numbering of the *Thesaurus Linguae Sericae* (33 chapters divided into 1770 records): Christoph Harbsmeier, and Shaoyu Jiang (eds.), "An Historical and Comparative Encyclopaedia of Chinese Conceptual Schemes," http://tls.uni-hd.de/main/basic_ch_main.lasso (accessed May 2013). The Chinese original given there is based on the edition of Qingfan Guo 郭慶藩, *Zhuangzi Jishi* 《莊子集釋》 (Collected Commentaries on the Works of Zhuangzi), 4 vols (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 1961); reprint of 1894 edition.

⁷ Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, 156/239.

⁸ Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, 138/213.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 138/213, 155/237. Possible translations of *Not* include: want, poverty, trouble, distress, difficulty, danger.

¹⁰ Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, 38/60.

¹¹ The English text I present is my best translation of the German translation available to Heidegger, which is Wilhelm’s translation; it is not necessarily the best translation of the original Chinese text. In the original Chinese edition of the *Zhuangzi* cited in note 6, the character *wu* is written as 无, not as 無.

¹² *Zhuangzi*, 26.7.1-3. Wilhelm, *Dschuang-Dsi*, 203-204. Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, 156/239.

¹³ The translator of Heidegger’s *Country Path Conversations* renders *das Nötige/Unnötige* as “the necessary/ unnecessary,” but “being-needed/not-being-needed” might have been better renditions.

¹⁴ Professor Chung-Ying Cheng has suggested “void of usefulness” might be a more vivid translation of *wuyong*. It could evoke the idea of “usefulness of the void” in the *Daodejing*. This would require further investigation of the possible similarity of passages in the *Zhuangzi* discussed in this paper and the *Daodejing* (in particular chapter 11).

¹⁵ Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, 143/220; and also: 153/234, 155/237 (three times), 155/238.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 149/229.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 155/237; cf. 143/220f, 155/238.

¹⁸ Occasionally the uselessness of the other thinking is touched upon in later writings of Heidegger.

¹⁹ Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, 143/220-221.

²⁰ See Lin Ma and Jaap van Brakel, "Out of the *Ge-Stell*? The Role of the East in Heidegger's *das andere Denken*."

²¹ *Zhuangzi*, 1.3.6-8. Wilhelm, *Dschuang-Dsi*, 7. Heidegger, "Traditional Language and Technological Language," 131/7.

²² Heidegger, "Traditional Language and Technological Language," 131/7.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, 143/220. Alternative translation: “the unnecessary remains at all times the most necessary of all.”

²⁵ *Zhuangzi*, 1.3.6, 4.4.1, 4.5.1, 20.1.1.

²⁶ *Zhuangzi*, 1.3.6, 4.4.3.

²⁷ *Zhuangzi*, 4.4.6.

²⁸ Youlan Feng, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1931), 64.

²⁹ *Zhuangzi*, 4.4.5, 4.7.4, 4.5.4, 20.4.5.

³⁰ In complicated ways it influenced the recluse-poets. See John S. Major, "The Efficacy of Uselessness: A Chuang-Tzu Motif," *Philosophy East and West* 25, no. 3 (1975): 265-79. Major mentions Xi Kang (Ji Kang) 嵇康 (223-262) and Tao Yuanming 陶淵明 (365–427) as important recluse poets influenced by *Zhuangzi*'s "uselessness."

³¹ Li Gang 李綱, "Rongmufu 榕木賦," in *Quanji* 《全集》, 19-20 (Changsha: Yuelushushe, 2004).

³² Edward H. Schafer, "Li Kang: A Rhapsody on the Banyan Tree," *Oriens* 6, no. 2 (1953): 344-53, 345.

³³ I follow the line numbering and the translation of Schafer. Although Li Kang is primarily known as a politician, some scholars have emphasized his work as a scholar, in particular his work on the *I Ching*.

³⁴ Lines 3-4, 36, and 41-50. The shade and or shelter function is mentioned in the tree stories as well (*Zhuangzi*, 4.4.1, 4.5.1), but not given much attention by commentators. It is still an important function of the banyan tree. "The shade of Banyan trees is the conventional gathering ground for villagers." Xie Gang, "Utopian Sojourn," *China Today* 61, no. 7 (2012): 60-63.

³⁵ A recent exception is Rune Svarverud. "The Usefulness of Uselessness: The Realm of Useless Trees According to Zhuangzi," in *Studies in Chinese Language and Culture. Festschrift in Honour of Christoph Harbsmeier on the Occasion of His 60th*

Birthday, edited by Halvor Bøyesen Eifring and Christoph Anderl, 157-68 (Oslo: Hermes Academic Publishing, 2006).

³⁶ In chapter 4 the sacred oak and the apprentice use *wuyong*, but not carpenter Shi, who speaks of *sanmu* or *bucai*.

³⁷ See, for example, Major, "The Efficacy of Uselessness," 266; Schafer, "Li Kang: A Rhapsody on the Banyan Tree," 345; Svarverud, "The Usefulness of Uselessness," 157; Thomas Radice, "Clarity and Survival in the *Zhuangzi*," *Asian Philosophy* 11, no. 1 (2001): 33-40 (33); Georg Teschner and Alessandro Tomasi, "Technological Paradigm in Ancient Taoism," *Techné: Research in Philosophy of Technology* 13, no. 3 (2009): electronic journal; Sandra A. Wawrytko, "Deconstructing Deconstruction: Zhuang Zi as Butterfly, Nietzsche as Gadfly," *Philosophy East & West* 58, no. 4 (2008): 524-51 (529).

³⁸ As Major remarks *Zhuangzi*'s "teachings were useless, for they contained no prescription for government; but to the person who learned uselessness from them, they were useful indeed (Major, "The Efficacy of Uselessness: A Chuang-Tzu Motif," 277), This view is echoed by Irving Goh, "Chuang Tzu's Becoming-Animal," *Philosophy East & West* 61, no. 1 (2011): 110-33.

³⁹ *Zhuangzi*, 4.7.4 (*wuyong zhi yong* 无用之用).

⁴⁰ Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, 155/ 237, 143/220f.

⁴¹ *Zhuangzi*, 4.5.3.

⁴² Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, 131/7.

⁴³ Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, 152f/234 "the people of poets and thinkers would be in a unique sense the people that waits" 152/233; cf. 154/236.

⁴⁴ Heidegger, "Traditional Language and Technological Language," 131/8. Heidegger

may have borrowed the last clause (*daß sich aus ihm nichts machen läßt*; cf. 131/7: *nichts machen läßt*) from Wilhelm's translation of *wusuo keyong* 无所可用 in the story of the village tree in chapter 4 (Wilhelm, *Dschuang-Dsi*, 43: "läßt sich nichts machen").

⁴⁵ Wilhelm's "wide empty field" (*wuheyou zhi xiang* 无何有之鄉) corresponds to "realm of Nothingwhatever" (Graham), "Not Even Anything Village" (Watson) and "Country of Nonesuch" (Major, "The Efficacy of Uselessness," 352n3; *Rongmufu*, line 56), where things have no use yet, because they have not yet been differentiated.

⁴⁶ *Zhuangzi*, 1.3.5, 1.3.8.

⁴⁷ Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, 142/219.

⁴⁸ Cf. Lin Ma, *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 33.

⁴⁹ Major, "The Efficacy of Uselessness," 268. Svarverud, "The Usefulness of Uselessness," 157.

⁵⁰ *Zhuangzi*, 1.3.4.

⁵¹ Teschner and Tomasi, "Technological Paradigm in Ancient Taoism."

⁵² Graham Parkes, "Lao-Zhuang and Heidegger on Nature and Technology," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, Supplement to Volume 39 (2012): 112-33 (117).

⁵³ As Frank Stevenson puts it, commenting on the passage from chapter 26: The usefulness of useless *dayan* is that it prevents us from falling to our death. We need "the grounding ground or groundless ground." See Stevenson, "Zhuangzi's Dao as Background Noise," *Philosophy East & West* 56, no. 2 [2006]: 301-31 (318).

⁵⁴ Heidegger, *Country Path Conversations*, 143/220.

⁵⁵ Sections V and VI partly overlap with passages in Lin Ma, and Jaap van Brakel, "On the Conditions of Possibility for Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy," *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* 12, [2013], 297-312.

⁵⁶ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations - Philosophische Untersuchungen*. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), § 66.

⁵⁷ See for detailed arguments that *all* concepts in *all* traditions are Wittgensteinian family resemblance concepts: Lin Ma and Jaap van Brakel, "Revisiting Wittgenstein on Family Resemblance and Colour(s)," *Philosophical Investigations* 39 (2016): forthcoming.

⁵⁸ The following list of characteristics appears in slightly different form in Jaap van Brakel and Lin Ma, "Possibility of Comparative Philosophy II: Extension of Family Resemblance Concepts as a Necessary Condition of Interpretation across Traditions," *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* 14 (2015): forthcoming. There an extensive elaboration is given, in particular concerning the varieties of extension of family resemblance across traditions.

⁵⁹ Actually *guangu* 棺槨 means inner and outer coffin or coffin and shell, as Legge correctly observes. Later translators all seem to simplify *guangu* to "coffin."

⁶⁰ A *ren* is 7 or 8 *chi* 尺. A *chi* would be one third of a meter.

⁶¹ *Tai* 藜 is a very rare character. *Shu* (rats, a mouse) and *tai* occur at *Zhuangzi*, 1.3.8.

⁶² *Zhuangzi*, 1.1.7. The identity of *chun* is not clear. Schafer suggests that it is the *Cedralesinensis*, symbol of longevity. The banyan is the only tree surpassing the *Cedralesinensis* in longevity (cf. line 57 of *Rongmufu*).

⁶³ Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, § 66.

⁶⁴ This principle has some similarity to Davidson's principle of charity, but there are some important differences, which I have no space to address here. The principle of agreement includes "if I were in her or his place" (often presented as an aspect of the principle of humanity).

⁶⁵ This might be seen as moving from the principle of charity to that of humanity in the course of the interpretative process, resolving Hansen's critique of Davidson's principle of charity. Hansen favours a principle of humanity that he formulates as: "most utterances [should] be explainable as warranted for the community" (Chad Hansen, "Prolegomena to Future Solutions To "White-Horse Not Horse", *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 34 (2007): 481. Even if we would accept his advice, we would need the principle of agreement or charity to find out what is "warranted for the community."

⁶⁶ *Zhuangzi*, 1.3.7.

⁶⁷ *Zhuangzi*, 4.5.3. Translations by Wilhelm, *Dschuang-Dsi*. Graham, *Chuang-Tzu. The Inner Chapters*. Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*. Schipper, *Zhuang Zi: De Volledige Geschriften*.

⁶⁸ "Daemon," not "daimon," is meant by Graham in its ancient Greek sense of a divinity or supernatural being of a nature between gods and humans.

⁶⁹ On their difference see *Zhuangzi*, 1.1.13.

⁷⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking*. Translated by Andrew J. Mitchell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012). *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge, Gesamtausgabe* vol. 79, 137/145.

⁷¹ The essence of modern technology is *das Gestell*, which essence was already present in the rise of modern science. See Lin Ma, and Jaap van Brakel, "Heidegger's Thinking on the "Same" of Science and Technology," *Continental Philosophy Review* 46 (2013): 19-43.

⁷² See appendices in Lydia H. Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity—China, 1900-1937* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).

⁷³ *Te* is used by Zhuangzi, but not related to the present discussion; *heyong* and *yonghewei* do not occur in the *Zhuangzi*; *bumian* 不免 is used by Zhuangzi in the sense of inevitability (*Zhuangzi*, 1.3.4).

⁷⁴ Apart from Zhuangzi, other authors (including Daoists such as Wenzi) use *wuyong* only in the ordinary sense of something being "obviously" useless. A typical example is: "A true king does not value useless things." Sometimes *wuyong* is used to condemn useless rhetoric.

⁷⁵ *Wuyi* 無益 occurs quite often in Warring States literature, and has been variously translated as: of no use, useless, in vain, of no help, of no advantage, of no avail, of no benefit, meaningless, pointless. Zhuangzi's use of *wuyi* 无益 is not different (*Zhuangzi*, 2.2.6, 12.11.15, 33.3.5).

⁷⁶ All occurrences (in chapter 1, 4, and 26) have been discussed in previous sections. In the sense of preferring the useless *wusuo keyong* is also used at *Zhuangzi*, 20.1.1. The passage on the creature(s) without knowledge and Shen Dao 慎到 at *Zhuangzi*, 33.4.5-6, might be interpreted in line with the inner chapters.

⁷⁷ *Sanmu* occurs at *Zhuangzi*, 4.4.3, 4.4.6; *bucai* occurs at 4.4.3, 4.5.3, 20.1.1.

⁷⁸ There are five occurrences of *wuyong* in chapters 8, 10, and 33. Instead of “useless” the translation could also be “superfluous.”

⁷⁹ *Zhuangzi*, 13.2.22, 22.10.2, 23.7.7, 29.3.16.

⁸⁰ *Zhuangzi*, 2.4.4, 2.4.11.

⁸¹ In translating chapter 11 of the *Laozi*, it is usually translated as “useful.”

⁸² On at least one occasion *buwu* 不无 in chapter 17 has been translated as useless (Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 180).

⁸³ See, for example, Geng-guang Zhang, *Zhuangzi Quanyi* 《庄子全译》 (Zhuangzi Complete Works) (Guiyang: Guizhou People's Publishing, 1993).

⁸⁴ Roth, *A Companion to Angus C. Graham's Chuang Tzu—the Inner Chapters*, 73 and 117; cf. “extravagant praise of uselessness” (116).

⁸⁵ See note 38.

⁸⁶ Heidegger also consulted Martin Buber’s abridged translation of the English translation of Herbert Giles of 1889. Buber, *Reden und Gleichnisse des Tschuang-Tse* (Leipzig: Im Insel-Verlag, 1922).